

CHINA INVADES INDIA

*The Story of Invasion against the
Background of Chinese History and
Sino-Indian Relations*

Edited by
V. B. KARNIK



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Editor's Note

THIS is a collection of five essays dealing with the past and present of China, the course of relations between India and China, the border problem and the invasion and its aftermath. It seeks to give a connected story of the invasion, its background, and its causes and consequences, in the light of the ancient history of, and present conditions in, China. There is nothing new in what is stated in the book. The essays are based on information that is available to students and scholars in many a book, monograph, journal and newspaper. The attempt has been to bring it together in one volume for the benefit of the general reader. The essayists express their deep debt of gratitude to the scholars and writers for the facts, figures and other information that they have gathered from them. The interpretation is, of course, always of the particular essayist.

It is hoped that this collection will be of use in India for understanding the significance of the invasion and abroad for understanding the Indian case. The Editor and the essayists are obliged to Allied Publishers for the interest that they took in the collection and for publishing it in an attractive form.

V. B. KARNIK

Editor

Bombay, 20 April 1963.

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China Through the Ages

V. B. KARNIK

CHINA is an ancient land and an equally ancient civilization. Its recorded history goes back to the second millennium before Christ, while tradition carries it backwards another thousand years. When China appeared on the stage of world history Babylon and Egypt had already matured and were in the process of decline. Since then many other civilizations and empires have appeared and disappeared, but China has continued on the scene, sometimes playing a prominent role and dominating the stage, at other times standing in a corner, secluded and neglected, immersed in her own problems. Chinese civilization has a longer history and continuity than any other living civilization except that of India. "Chinese civilization, from its very origins down to our own times, forms a single whole, comprising a vast and continuous entity of human experience. It has been said that it is 'the most massive and the most enduring of all known civilizations'."¹


Human beings appear to have been living in China since thousands of years. The discovery of the skeletal remains of a primitive man in a cave near Peking bears evidence to that fact. That man, who is known to anthropologists as the Peking Man, must have lived in those parts thousands of years ago. The Peking Man was a primitive man but scientific investigations of his remains have proved that he was one of the ancestors of the modern Chinese. More abundant and varied remains have been found of the new Stone Age man. Many of these are in the form of pottery, though some implements have been also found. Some relics have also come to light of a rich Bronze Age culture.

¹ *China Then and Now* by Jean Escarre, Henri Vetch (Peking, 1940), p. 3.

Most of these relics have been found in northern parts. It is therefore the inference of some historians that originally the Chinese inhabited only those parts and that later in the course of subsequent hundreds of years they spread into the southern parts. One cannot, however, be dogmatic on the issue, as later discoveries are bringing to light similar relics in some parts of the south. One cannot be also dogmatic about the origin of the Chinese people. Some ascribe the origin to Western and Central Asia from where they might have moved into northern parts of China. Others are inclined to place it in the southern part of Asia; while there are some who are of the opinion that the Chinese people developed in China itself, absorbing in the course of ages others who came in from various parts of Asia. Whatever the truth of these various theories may be, it is a fact beyond dispute that the Chinese formed themselves as a separate and distinct group at a very early period of history and have since then continued to be so. There is an unbroken continuity in the history of the Chinese people from the Stone Age to the modern times.

What we know as China today consisted of two parts: China proper and the outlying dependencies. China proper is the region in which live the vast majority of the Chinese. It has an area of about 15 lakhs square miles. A major part of it lies between the valleys of the Yellow (Huang) and the Yangtze rivers. Both the rivers rise in the mountains of Central Asia. After traversing through the country they join the sea on the east. Both are subject to heavy floods which have from time to time devastated the country. But both have also formed huge basins which are amongst the most fertile in the world. In the far south is the West (Hsi Kiang) river at whose mouth stands the most important port of Canton. The outlying dependencies, which were originally parts of the huge Chinese Empire, are Manchuria (3 lakhs square miles), Mongolia (13 lakhs square miles), Sinkiang (5 lakhs square miles), and Tibet (4 lakhs square miles). In recent years a determined attempt is being made to integrate these areas in China proper. Manchuria is no longer designated by that name. It is called the North-eastern Province. Others are regarded as autonomous regions like the autonomous region of Tibet. The whole area extends

OUTLINE MAP OF CHINA



from Manchuria in the north-east to Tibet in the south-west and from the island of Taiwan (Formosa) in the China Sea to Sinkiang in Central Asia. The area has a population now, according to the census, of over 70 crores rising at the rate of over 2 per cent per year. China is about 3,100 miles long from east to west and 1,900 miles broad from north to south. The exact origin of the word "China" has not yet been established. In Chinese eyes China is whatever lies "beneath heaven". It is also the centre of the world. They call it "The Middle Kingdom" and also "The Flowery Kingdom".

The Hsia and the Shang

Traditionally, Chinese history begins with the first dynasty of Hsia. It is supposed to have ruled over China in the second millennium before Christ. The period that is traditionally assigned to it is 2,000 B. C. There is no historical proof of the existence of this dynasty. Tradition speaks of the "model emperors" Yao, Shun and Yu. They were paragons of virtue and gave themselves wholly to the welfare of their subjects. Yu is supposed to have drained the land of a great flood and to have tamed rivers. Confucian chroniclers also speak of Fu Hsi, the inventor of writing and the founder of the institution of marriage, of Shen Nung, the father of agriculture and medicine, of Huang Ti, the originator of calendar, whose wife taught women to cultivate the mulberry and to weave silk and of Yao and Shun, the ideal administrators. It appears that the progress made by the society in the course of slow evolution is attributed to a few individuals, real or imaginary, and then they are held up as models to later rulers.

The next dynasty was the dynasty of Shang. Archaeology has provided proofs about the existence of this dynasty. In excavations carried on in the north of Honan bronze weapons, sacrificial vessels and chariots of the period of the dynasty have been found. It appears that a high level of culture had been reached. There were books written on bamboo slips. The script that was used can be regarded as the lineal ancestor of the present-day script. A number of animals had been domesticated such as horses, sheep, goats and pigs. Wheat and millet were grown. Cowry shells were used as a medium of exchange. The

extent of the area over which the Shangs ruled is not known. It is clear that there were other rulers, but there is no information about their relationship with the Shangs. The Shang dynasty ruled over China from 1765 to 1122 B.C.

The Chou Dynasty

The Shang dynasty was followed by the Chou dynasty which ruled from 1122 to 256 B. C. The Chou came from the western frontiers of China. They established their rule after overthrowing the last monarch of the Shang dynasty who had become a tyrant. The Chou dynasty which held sway for about nine hundred years is one of the most important in the history of China. Under its long rule a number of changes took place. There was a vast expansion of the territory of China. In the beginning Chou-rule extended only over some parts of northern China. By the end of the period it had extended as far as the Yangtze. As a result, Chinese civilization came in contact with a number of new peoples. They were absorbed but they also added some traits of their own cultures to the Chinese civilization.

During the long rule of the Chou, China found itself divided into a number of small states. This was inevitable owing to the vast expanse of the country and the difficulties of communication. The states accepted the suzerainty of the Central Government, but its power became in course of time more and more attenuated. Warfare was endemic amongst the states, but it was not for the destruction of one state by another but for securing its allegiance and, may be, some tribute. The state which was most powerful established in course of time its empire. Later, however, warfare became intensive and led to the devastation and destruction of vast areas.

In spite of wars and the weakening of the authority of the central power, there was no decline in culture. Art flourished. Bronze vessels and implements were manufactured. A little later iron took the place of bronze. The ox-drawn plough came in. Metal coinage was introduced. Commerce increased and merchants rose to prominence. Contacts were developed with other countries. This period also witnessed an efflorescence of literature. Many of the books that are regarded as classics

and are accepted as authoritative are the creations of this age. Some of them may be mentioned here. They are *Shu Ching* (*Classic of History*), *Chun Chin* (*Spring and Autumn*), *I Ching* (*Classic of Change*), and *Shih Ching* (*Classic of Poetry*). These and other books of the era are studied even now and exercise a considerable influence over the thoughts and actions of the people.

Schools of Thought

The biggest contribution of the period is, however, in the field of thought. A number of schools of thought emerged which have left a permanent impress upon the culture and life of the people of China. "This intellectual activity was stimulated and furthered by the political divisions and struggles of the time. Earnest souls arose who wished to save China from the strife and the exploitation of the weak by the strong which so characterized the age. For the most part the philosophers were scholars whose primary concern was not pure speculation but society and politics. The majority of them either were actually engaged in government as officials and ministers of the princes of the various states or desired to be so employed. Many of them travelled about seeking appointment. At the courts of the various princes they debated with one other. The division of the land into many states made impossible the enforcement of the tenets of any one school or any one philosopher over China as a whole. The political fissiparousness encouraged freedom of thought and discussion. The intellectual ferment thus stimulated led to the most creative period in the history of the Chinese mind."²

"The common problem to which these various schools addressed themselves was the salvation of society. What is the ideal human society and how can it best be attained? Inevitably as they wrestled with these issues, the philosopher-statesmen were compelled to consider other questions. What is the nature of man? Is man inherently good or evil, or is he at birth neither? If good, then a worthy example and the minimum of force are what are required if that nature is to build an ideal society. If bad, then force and forceful educa-

² *A Short History of the Far East* by K. S. Latourette (1957), p. 86.

tion will be demanded. If neither, then education and probably some force will be needed.

“In any event, the assumption was that mankind is divided into two groups, the rulers and the ruled. This arose from the aristocratic nature of current Chinese society. On the one hand were the upper classes, who included the scholars, and on the other the lower classes who tilled the soil and who provided the economic basis for the entire structure.”³

“Many were not content with the salvation of society as a whole. They wished to know the fate of the individual. They endeavoured to find a way of deliverance from the death which seems to be the lot of all men and a road to blissful personal immortality. These two questions, the salvation of society and a happy immortality for the individual, have continued to engage the Chinese mind from that time to the present.

“One must note another feature of the thought of the Chou which also persisted, the seeking for authority in the past. No matter how radical or new the philosophy might be, its formulators endeavoured to find for it a precedent. Antiquity was held to have contained great men whose acts and words were basic. They were variously interpreted and were adduced to support quite opposing convictions, but a Chou thinker usually felt it necessary to bolster his position by an appeal to the past.”⁴

Confucius and Other Thinkers

The most important amongst these schools of thought was the school of Confucius. Confucius has left the most indelible impress upon the Chinese mind and still continues to rule it. He was “born in the state of Lu, probably in 551 B.C. and lived to pass his threescore years and ten, the date usually given for his death being 479 B.C. The traditional account of his life declares him to have been the son of an aged father of Shang descent and a young mother and reports that, left fatherless in infancy, he was reared in poverty by his mother. He was early fascinated by scholarship, ceremonies, and the records of the past and became so proficient in them that he soon attracted students.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

He is said to have held office in his native state, rising to be, as some say, its chief minister but in middle age, supposedly in protest against the conduct of his prince, he retired into private life. For several years he travelled with his disciples from state to state, hoping that some prince would adopt his theory of government and appoint him to carry it into effect. Such hopes proved illusory, and in his old age he returned to Lu, continued to study and teach, and there died and was buried. What purports to be his grave is still guarded by those to whom is attributed lineal descent from him.”⁵ Confucius died a disappointed man. His last words were, “No wise King appears; no one in the Kingdom wishes to make me his master. It is time for me to die.” But five hundred years later he was raised to the position of a “National Sage”. He continued to occupy that exalted position until the Communists rose to power in the middle of the twentieth century.

“Confucius, like the majority of the other philosophers of the Chou, was chiefly concerned with the achievement of an ideal society. Himself an official during part of his life, he thought of this as obtainable through the state and through the governing classes. Interested as he was in the past, he is reported to have declared himself as being a transmitter and not a creator.”⁶

Confucius practised what he taught. High-minded, conscientious, studious, he endeavoured to be the kind of man that he desired all members of the governing class to be. The precepts and sayings of Confucius were recorded and preserved by his admiring disciples. They are chiefly in the *Lun Yu*, or Analects. Confucian social philosophy was based on an elaborate system of duties and obligations. The consanguine family was the corner-stone of Confucian society. Confucius ordained: “Serve the parents, be loyal to the Government, and establish a good name for yourself.”

Other important thinkers of the period were Mencius, Hosun Tzu, Lao Tzu, founder of Taoism which still continues to exercise some influence and Mo Tzu. One more school which deserves particular mention is the school of Legalists. Its adherents believed that society was not to be saved, as the

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

Confucianists taught, by the moral influence of the rulers. A stern age required more drastic measures. These were to be found in the enforcement of codes of law, impartially and firmly administered. Laws were to be changed from time to time to meet altered circumstances. Codes of law were not unfamiliar to the Chinese. The Legalists, however, stressed them. As a kindred policy, they wished to strengthen the hands of the prince. They would have the state, under the direction of the prince, actively control more phases of collective life. Some Legalists emphasized agriculture and wished to make each state self-sufficient. Others advocated encouragement to commerce to add to the wealth of the state. They stood for the socialization of capital and a governmental monopoly of commerce.

In the field of thought the fifth century B.C. was the most fruitful. It was in this century that the "Hundred Schools of Philosophy" flourished, and made an everlasting contribution to the thinking of the Chinese people. This was also the time of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in Greece. While the world knows a lot about the Greek philosophers, very little is known about the equally eminent thinkers of China of the same period.

The Chin Dynasty

During the last couple of centuries of the rule of the Chou dynasty a number of warring states had emerged in the country. One amongst them, the state of Chin, eliminated all its rivals and dethroned the last of the Chous. The prince of the Chin state became in 221 B.C. the Emperor of China. He took for himself the title of Shih Huang Ti, the First Emperor. He ruled only for fourteen years. Immediately after his death there was a revolt against his son which ended the rule of his dynasty. It was a very short rule, but it has left a permanent mark upon the social and political structure of China. It is this fact which has led many scholars to suggest that China derives her name from the state and dynasty of Chin.

The state of Chin occupied the area which now comprises the province of Shensi. The area was thinly populated. The rulers abolished the ancient tribal ownership of land and appealed to the people of surrounding states, which were in

decay and chaos owing to constant wars, to emigrate to Chin and develop the land which would be assigned to them as owners. A large number of persons took advantage of the offer. Agriculture prospered and along with it also prospered handicrafts and trade. The state of Chin became the most peaceful and prosperous state in the country.

As soon as he became the Emperor, Shih Huang Ti began to introduce in the country as a whole the reforms that had succeeded in the state of Chin. The system of separate states governed by hereditary rulers was abolished. With it vanished that Chinese equivalent of feudalism which characterised the Chou period. In place of the old forms of government an appointive bureaucracy was installed, centering in the Emperor and controlled by him. The realm was divided into thirty-six (later forty) provinces, and each of these in turn into *hsien*, or prefectures, of differing sizes. Over every province and prefecture was placed a member of the bureaucracy. Other reforms were also introduced. Writing was simplified and that simplified form of writing was made compulsory throughout the country. Weights and measures were made uniform. The system of private ownership in land was recognised. These steps were taken in pursuance of the Legalist school of thought which was one of the several schools of thought that had developed under the Chou dynasty. In order that there may be no confusion in the minds of the people steps were taken to suppress all other schools of thought. The most notorious of the steps that were taken was the burning of books. Amongst the books that were burnt were the books of Confucius. Books of history were also burnt in order to wipe out the memory of the past with its warring kingdoms and principalities.

Mr. K. P. S. Menon has in his diary made the following observations about Shih Huang Ti: "I always think that Chinese scholars have done him less than justice. He earned their eternal execration by ordering the great burning of the books, including Confucian classics, lest they should breed dangerous thoughts against his regime. For this reason scholars regard him as a devil incarnate; but even the devil must have his due. Ch'in Shih Huang Ti was the first Emperor to form the conception of a unified China. He would not tolerate anything

that stood in the way. Feudalism seemed to be an obstacle; so, away with feudalism! Scholarship seemed to stand in the way; so, away with scholarship! The different scripts, then prevalent, were a bar to unity; so, away with those! Thus, at the cost of much blood and toil, tears and sweat, he pursued his sublime conception of a unified Chinese State, having a single language, and a single ruler.”⁷

Shih Huang Ti not only unified China but also expanded her territories. Chinese rule was extended to far-off lands like Tonking, Cochin China, Burma and Korea. It was also extended in the west as far as Chinese Turkistan. He encouraged the emigration of Chinese to many of these areas with the intention of securing their integration into the Chinese empire. This widespread empire was welded together under one centralized administrative system. Cultural unity and the acceptance of one common social, political and economic theory were the essential elements of this centralization. The successors of Shih Huang Ti made some modifications in the theory. They introduced revised Confucianism in the place of the Legalist school of thought. But the administrative structure that was introduced by the First Emperor was kept intact. It is that structure which kept China together for over two thousand years in spite of the many invasions, many changes in the ruling dynasties and many disasters which overtook the people.

Shih Huang Ti built many roads and palaces and dug many canals. He was also responsible for building a large part of the famous China Wall as a protection against the depredations of the barbarians coming from the north. These huge public works could be constructed only by levying heavy taxes upon the people and by withdrawing labour from fields which led to the neglect of agriculture and the growth of poverty. As a result, there was grave discontent in the country. It burst into revolts immediately after the death of the First Emperor. The dynasty collapsed, but most of the reforms that the Emperor had introduced remained to become a permanent feature of the social and political structure of China.

⁷ *Delhi-Chungking — A Travel Diary* by K. P. S. Menon, p. 192.

The Han Dynasty

The Chin dynasty was followed by the Han dynasty which ruled from 207 B.C. to A.D. 220 with a short break in the first century after Christ. The dynasty produced some eminent rulers and during the period of their rule China rose to heights of glory and power which have few equals in her long history. It is in memory of those achievements that the Chinese even today proudly call themselves "Sons of Han".

The most prominent amongst the Han emperors was Han Wu Ti who ruled from 140 to 87 B.C. He is known in history as "the Martial Emperor". His biggest achievement was his military conquests. In the northeast he reconquered Korea and Manchuria. In the south he went as far as the present Indonesia. In the west he went as far as Central Asia and beyond the present Sinkiang. Not all the territories that he conquered have remained permanently with China. They were lost and reconquered and lost many a time, along with a few other territories which met with the same fate. The Chinese lay claim to all territories which a powerful Emperor had conquered at one time or the other in the course of their long history. Those which were not reconquered and added to the realm are regarded as "lost territories" which every Chinese, whatever his political colour, regards it as his patriotic duty to regain.

In the later period as well, there were a number of able Han rulers. They repeated the military exploits of their predecessors and spread Chinese influence far and wide. China was then the most extensive and the most powerful of the kingdoms. Those were the days of the glory of the Roman empire. But that glory was to fade soon. India was then split into a number of kingdoms and not one of them lasted longer than a couple of hundred years. The empire that the Han dynasty consolidated during that period was far more enduring. It endured until the twentieth century. The rulers changed many a time, territories were lost and sometimes regained, there were some periods of prosperity and many of decline, there were riots and revolts and times of chaos, but the em-

pire of the "Son of Heaven" remained and kept the people of China together for over two thousand years.

The Han continued many of the reforms that the Chin had introduced. But they effected one significant change. They replaced the Legalist school of thought by Confucianism, and since then Confucianism became practically the official religion of the empire. Later, temples were built in honour of the sage and rites were laid down which had to be performed in order to propitiate him. The Han carried forward the unification of the country begun by the Chin. The authority of the feudal chiefs was reduced and the power of the central government was increased. The system of appointing public officials for carrying on the administration in provinces and other areas was continued. The public officials had to acquire proficiency in the knowledge of Confucianism. The system introduced by the Chin of appointing officials on the basis of tests through examinations remained in force. The system of examinations was perfected in the course of years. A thorough knowledge of Confucian texts and other literature was essential for passing the examinations. The administrators of the country were thus trained in one particular manner and owed allegiance, as of necessity, to only one particular school of thought. This gave the empire a unity and solidarity which was not disturbed or undermined by dynastic changes.

Literature as well as culture flourished during the days of the Han. The most eminent of the historians of ancient China, Ssu-ma Chieu wrote his famous work *Shih Chi* (*Historical Records*) in the reign of Han Wu Ti. He recorded in that book the history of China from early times till his day. The practice was continued in later periods and every dynasty had its own official historian. The records left by these writers are valuable for reconstructing the history of the country. It was during the period of the Han that paper was manufactured for the first time. Taking advantage of this new material that had become available for writing, a number of new books were written and a number of old books were rewritten.

There was progress in many other directions. Sun dials and water clocks were prepared. The weaving of silk became common and it became in course of time the best known and

most prized of Chinese exports. Contacts with the world increased and the caravan routes of Central Asia became the regular highways for commerce between China and other countries of Asia and Europe. The wealth of China attracted merchants and traders of many countries and the merchants and traders of China went to many countries by land routes as well as by sea routes towards the east and the south. There was distinct progress in the field of art. Bronzes as well as pottery of the period are found. They carry designs which are freer and more life-like. Glass and lacquer objects have been also found. They show some signs of foreign influence which proves that China had live contact with the outside world.

Impact of Buddhism

It is during this period that China came in contact with Buddhism. It is very likely that the main contact was established from North India through Sinkiang along the caravan routes. Some contact may have been also established particularly in South China by the sea route. In the Han period, Buddhism was not able to make much headway. Confucianism was then in an entrenched position. Later, however, Buddhism made many converts and was able to exercise considerable influence over the country. Buddhism put China in contact with India. The contact continued for about a thousand years.

The collapse of the Han was followed by a long period of the disintegration of the central authority and the rise of a number of small kingdoms which warred against each other. Three amongst them rose to prominence and they are known in Chinese history as Three Kingdoms, their period ranging from A.D. 221 to 265. The well-known historical novel, *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms* deals with the events of that period. A later period ending with the reunification of the country in A.D. 589 is known as the period of Six Dynasties. During both these periods there were a number of invasions from the north. A number of these foreign invaders established their Kingdoms in North China. Having a more advanced civilization, the Chinese succeeded in assimilating most of them. The foreigners were absorbed into the Chinese society and culture. This has happened many a time in the history

of the country. The invasions helped the southward push of the Chinese. They occupied the whole of the Yangtze valley and spread further south. But in spite of the invasions and the colonization of new areas, the basic features of the state and the society remained the same as they had been in the Chin and the Han eras and the desire for a single, central, strong government to rule over the whole of the country remained as keen as ever.

Buddhism, which had come from India, grew rapidly during this period. A number of Indian Buddhist scholars visited China and spread the religion and literature of Buddhism. A number of Buddhist books were translated into Chinese. Chinese scholars and traders also visited India and there was for a number of centuries a lively interchange between the two countries of ideas as well as commodities. The most famous amongst the Chinese scholars who visited India was Fa Hsien. His visit took place in A.D. 400. He took the northern land route through modern Sinkiang and returned to China by the sea route after visiting Ceylon. Buddhism made many converts amongst rulers and noblemen and that helped its spread amongst the people. Buddhist temples and statues were built in hundreds. Buddhism exerted for a number of centuries a tremendous influence on the life and culture of the Chinese people. It was, until the 19th century, the most potent of the foreign influences that have made any impact upon China. The impact did not, however, last long. Early in the twelfth century Confucianism reasserted itself and Buddhism lost all the ground that it had covered.

The Tang and the Sung.

The first dynasty which unified the country after the disintegration of over three hundred years was the Sui dynasty which ruled from A.D. 589 to 618. Its rule was short-lived. But during that short period it strengthened the administrative machinery by improving the system of civil service examinations. It dug many canals and helped the growth of commerce. The most notable figure of the dynasty was the second Emperor Yang Ti.

The Sui dynasty was followed by the Tang dynasty which

ruled for close on three hundred years from A.D. 618 to 907. The Tang dynasty has a very prominent place in the history of China. The most notable amongst its emperors was Ming Huang who ruled from A.D. 712 to 756. He collected in his court a galaxy of poets and painters who have left a rich heritage of poems and paintings. Under the Tang the Chinese arms were carried into the west where they came in contact with the Arab Empire. The extent of the Chinese Empire was carried ahead of the limit reached under the Han. Commerce was developed with many parts of the world and Jews, Arabs, Persians, Tartars, Syrians and Greeks were to be found amongst many peoples who crowded into the capital of the Tang which was then the most populous and the most prosperous city in the world. Merchants came by the overland route through Central Asia as well as by the sea routes as a result of which a number of ports developed on the southern and eastern coast of China.

Under the Tang a number of new religions came to China. They were Christianity of the Nestorian and the Greek forms of faith, Islam and Zoroastrianism. None of these religions were able to exert much influence. Buddhism which was already on the scene continued to grow during the earlier period of the dynasty but began to decline in the later period. The decline was the result of the revival of Confucianism. One of the Emperors of the dynasty ordered the erection of temples to Confucius in every administrative centre of the realm and directed scholars and public officials to offer sacrifices at the temples. The administrative machinery of the state was tightened and with it went the strengthening of the system of examinations and the emphasis on the study of Confucian texts. In spite of all these achievements which has made it famous in Chinese history, the dynasty declined in power and prestige in the ninth century and was overthrown in the early years of the tenth.

The next important dynasty was the Sung dynasty. It ruled from A.D. 960 to 1279. It had to face a number of foreign invasions. Some of the invaders succeeded in establishing their kingdoms in North China. They came as foreigners but were later absorbed into the Chinese society. The most formidable

of the invaders were the Mongols. They were led by their chief, Temn Chin who later assumed the title of Chinghiz Khan. He has left a name in history as the cruellest amongst conquerors. He attacked China in the latter part of the twelfth century. He subdued the states in North China and then began to push southward. The Sung Emperors had to contend with all these invaders. They were required to leave their capital in the north and establish a new capital in the south at modern Hangchow. In the end, they were overwhelmed in 1279 and Kublai Khan, the grandson of Chinghiz Khan, established himself as the Emperor of China.

With a dismal record in the field of politics, the Sung have a bright record in the fields of literature, thought, culture and art. There was lively activity in the field of literature. A number of books were written on Confucianism. There was also a good number of eminent poets. Books were written in addition on botany, mathematics, astronomy and medicine. In the field of thought there was a revival of Confucianism. The Confucianism that emerged as a result of the debates and discussions during the period was reformed Confucianism. It had many traits of Buddhism as well as Taoism. Culture spread under the Sung into southern parts. A number of foreigners who came in contact with it ended by accepting it as their own culture. Painting, pottery and printing reached new stages of development.

The Sung dynasty is also known for a new social experiment that was tried during the period. It is associated with the name of Wang An-shih (A.D. 1021 to 1086). Wang An-shih was a practical statesman. He desired to remove the social and economic evils which were preying upon the country. The programme that he put forward had a socialist colour. The following were some of its planks: (1) state monopoly of commerce; (2) division of land; (3) loans to agriculturists; and (4) taxation of all property. It could be adopted only piecemeal and that also for short periods. And yet there were vehement protests against it. Powerful elements in the society were opposed to it tooth and nail.

As mentioned earlier, the Sung dynasty was overthrown by Mongols. They ruled for about a hundred years from

A.D. 1279 to 1368. They were foreigners, but were proud to call themselves Chinese Emperors. They did not disturb the Chinese institutions and ruled with the help of Chinese officers. The most prominent amongst them was Kublai Khan. He was the Emperor of a realm that stretched from what is now European Russia, Persia, and Mesopotamia in the west to the China Sea in the east, and from the outer boundaries of Mongolia in the north to Indo-China in the south. From his capital at Cambaluc, whose site is partly identical with the present Peking, he reigned over a larger area than had acknowledged the Cæsars, the Caliphs, Han Wu Ti, or Wing Huang. Kublai Khan dispatched many expeditions. Some of them were successful and some unsuccessful. Twice he tried to conquer Japan but did not succeed. He succeeded in securing sovereignty over Burma. In Annam and Indochina he won military successes, but was not able to conquer the territory. He sent a big armada to Java, but it had to return disappointed. Subsequent rulers were not able to preserve the military might and in course of time the power of the Mongols declined.

Under the Mongols, China's contacts with the world increased. The wealth of her cities and her silk and other commodities attracted merchants from many parts of the world. Many foreigners came to serve as soldiers of fortune. Many scholars and religious preceptors also came and went. Christian missionaries visited China and established their missions. The new religion of Islam also sent its emissaries.

The most prominent of the European merchants who visited the court of Kublai Khan was Marco Polo from Venice. For some years he served under the Khan. After his return to his homeland he wrote an account of what he saw in China. His account acquainted the Europeans for the first time with the great achievements of China. It stimulated their curiosity and many adventurous merchants began to look out for easier ways to establish contacts with that big and prosperous country.

The Ming Period

The rule of the Mongols was overthrown by a person of humble origin. He succeeded however, in establishing one of

the best known and glamorous of the dynasties of China. It is called the Ming dynasty. It ruled from A.D. 1368 to 1644. The third Emperor, Yung Lo is the most prominent of the Ming rulers. He dispatched naval expeditions to Cambodia, Sumatra, Java, India and Ceylon. Some of these countries were made to pay tributes to the Emperor of China. A prince of Ceylon was kept a prisoner in China for some years.

The Ming period is known for its buildings. Large parts of Peking and Nanking were built during the period. The Great Wall in the north was augmented and the Grand Canal connecting the northern parts with the Yangtze valley was improved. Books were produced and printed in large numbers. In the field of art also there was considerable activity. But in literature as well as in art nothing new was developed; old ideas and forms and designs were reinterpreted, refurbished and beautified. In social and political affairs also the Ming continued the traditions and institutions of earlier dynasties. They made the civil service examinations stricter, making it obligatory upon the candidates to be more earnest in their study of the texts and principles of Confucianism. As a result, the influence of Confucianism increased, increasing along with it the influence of scholars—a class of learned men who came to occupy a unique position in Chinese society.

Under the Ming, China experienced her first extensive contact with the Europeans. About this time Europe was waking up from its slumbers of the Dark Age and trying to expand the frontiers of knowledge. The world was being explored and a number of discoveries were being made. Scientific inventions were giving man a new command over nature. Europeans had heard of the fabulous riches of the East and were anxious to get a share out of it. The adventurous amongst them were scouring the seas to find an easy way to reach the East. In course of time some of them succeeded in accomplishing their objective. They discovered India, Java, Sumatra, Philippines and China. The first to reach China were the Portuguese. They were followed by the Spaniards and the Dutch and the English and the French. Most of those who went in those days were sheer adventurers who wanted to get rich as quickly as possible. About the same time the Russians also started moving east-

ward in the direction of China. The Chinese regarded all foreigners as barbarians. The civilization of the Europeans was at that time much lower than that of the Chinese. Culturally they were extremely backward. The Chinese could not but regard them as uncultured savages who had no business to intrude upon the Celestial Empire. The Portuguese were driven out of China and the same fate befell others. The position was, however, to change in the next couple of hundred years.

The scholars and religious preachers who went from Europe were treated in a different manner. A number of Catholic missionaries visited China during this period. A good many of them settled down in the country to carry on their work of proselytization as well as of education and social service. They were not able to make many converts, but they did not meet with any ill-treatment. One amongst them, an Italian, Mathew Ricci rose to an important position in the Court of the Emperor. He learnt Chinese and became a Chinese scholar. He tried to introduce many of the ancient Chinese rites and ceremonies into Christianity and thus make it more acceptable to the Chinese people. His efforts were, however, frustrated by the Pope who did not approve of the idea.

The Manchu Emperors

The next dynasty to rule over China was founded by foreigners who came from Manchuria. They were called the Manchus. In Chinese history their dynasty is known as the Ching dynasty. The Manchus dethroned the last Emperor of the Ming dynasty in A.D. 1642. They took advantage of an internal revolt and with the help of a few generals captured the throne. Even after capturing the throne it took them another fifteen years of bitter fighting before the whole country accepted them as the rulers of China. The Manchus were foreigners but they ruled as Chinese Emperors. They kept up all Chinese institutions, followed all Chinese traditions and ruled through Chinese officers.

Two Manchu Emperors have left a permanent mark on the history of China. They were Kaug Hsi and his grandson, Chien Lung. Kaug Hsi ruled from A.D. 1661 to 1722 and

Chien Lung from A.D. 1736 to 1796. During their regimes China again became the most extensive and the most powerful of the countries of the world. Sinkiang was conquered during the period and became a regular province of the Empire. Tibet was reconquered and Nepal was subdued. Burma and Annam were made to pay tributes. Formosa was added to the Empire. Korea and Ryukyu Island were compelled to accept suzerainty. Many of these territories did not stay long in the Empire; some broke even the bonds of suzerainty. But every Chinese, be he a Nationalist or a Communist, looks back wistfully to those exploits of the Manchu Emperors and desires to get back into the realm the territories that were lost when the country had become weak.

Contacts with the West increased during this period. Merchants and adventurers from many European countries visited China with the intention of developing trade. There were many things which they could and were anxious to buy from China, but there was nothing which they could offer in return. China was self-sufficient in every thing and all that she produced was of a better quality than the products of Europe. There was a ready market in Europe for the goods of China. Many of them were highly esteemed. By this time there was a good deal of knowledge amongst educated people in Europe about the culture and civilization of China. They were held in high regard. Confucianism in particular was highly appreciated both as a religion and also as a philosophy. Thus, during those days, Europe was learning from China rather than China from Europe. But the position was to reverse very soon.

As traders and merchants the Europeans had to face many difficulties. Their trade was restricted only to a few ports where special areas were allotted to them. They could not go into the interior. They had to trade through Chinese merchants, who came to be known as the *Cohong*. They had the monopoly of foreign trade. The European countries tried to establish relations with the Emperor and to secure permission to open their Embassies in Peking. The attempts were repulsed. The Chinese were not prepared to accept them as equals. Their Emperor was the Emperor of the entire civilized

humanity. Others were barbarians and the Kings of barbarians could only pay tributes to the Emperor of China and present petitions to him. They could not be granted the status of equality.

China did not need anything from European merchants. But as European merchants needed many things that were available in China they were as a matter of favour allowed the right to carry on trade in some ports. The situation as it existed then is very well expressed in a letter addressed to King George III of England by Emperor Chien Lung. The letter was handed over to Lord Macartney, the head of the British Mission which was accorded an interview with the Emperor in Peking in 1793. The Mission had been to China with the object of "improving commercial relations between the two countries." The letter stated *inter alia*: "As your Ambassador can see for himself, we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange and ingenious, and have no use for your country's manufacture. But as tea, silk and porcelain, which the Celestial Empire produces, are absolute necessities to European nations, have permitted as signal of favour that foreign Hongs should be established at Canton, so that your want might be supplied and your country thus participate in our beneficence."⁸

European Pressures

The Europeans were keen on increasing their trade with China and they continued pressing forward. China was unable to resist that pressure, and in less than fifty years after Emperor Chien Lung wrote that proud and patronising letter to the King of England, she was compelled to adopt a different attitude. The Europeans, more particularly the British, had discovered a new commodity for their trade with China. It was opium. Opium found a ready and expanding market. From the very beginning the trade was illegal. But the British were carrying it on as it was very lucrative. In 1839, the Chinese Government prohibited it as it was resulting in a drain of silver and the degeneration of the people. England did not accept

⁸ *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China* by M. N. Roy (Calcutta, 1946), p. 113.

the prohibition and began a war against China for compelling her to allow the import of the drug. The war continued for three years from 1839 to 1842. It is known in history as the Opium War. It is one of the most infamous of wars. It ended in complete victory for England. As a result of the victory she secured a number of concessions for her trade in China.

Other European countries followed in the footsteps of England. Russia pressed in the north and in the west and eventually was able to advance as far as the Maritime Provinces of Manchuria and to secure the use of large territories and ports and the permission to build a railway. France and the United States pushed forward in the south and the east. Wars and other forms of pressure were exerted from time to time. China was unable to resist them and had to agree to a number of treaties assuring equal treatment to all European countries and opening up her territories to their trade. By 1860 the whole of China had been opened up and the Celestial Empire was at the mercy of the European powers with their gun boats and other weapons to enforce their will. Along with trade the country was also laid open to the activities of Christian missionaries. After each war large indemnities were imposed which placed a crushing burden on the revenues of the Chinese Government.

By this time the Chinese Empire had reached its stage of rapid decline. Europe had left it far behind with its scientific and technical discoveries and inventions and with its system of factory production. China had refused to advance with the times. She remained immersed in her hoary, traditional modes of living and thinking. She was blind to the revolutionary changes that had taken place in Europe and the United States of America. She was in that respect in the same company as India and other countries of Asia except Japan. Japan was the only country in Asia which was quick to learn from the West and to master its technology. China was also suffering from a number of internal ills. Agriculture had stagnated, poverty of the people had grown and floods and droughts and diseases were constantly plaguing the country. A number of military chiefs had emerged and were constantly at war with each other. There were besides the revolts and rebellions of the

people. The people resorted to them when their patience reached a breaking point. During the thirty years following the Opium War, "there were at least six major rebellions, the average duration of which was nearly fourteen years! They were scattered widely through the country, including the south and central part, the north central, north-west, south-west and central Asia."⁹ Weakened and undermined as the Empire was by all these factors, it was not in a position to resist the demands of the European powers backed as they were by their gun boats and armed soldiers.

The European powers operated in China on the basis of concessions and rights secured through agreements with the Government of the Emperor. They were therefore interested in maintaining and keeping intact his authority. They helped the Emperor in suppressing the rebellions which broke out from time to time. One of the most notable of such rebellions was the Tai Ping rebellion which continued from 1848 to 1865. It was the most extensive of the rebellions and a real people's revolt against the whole machinery and institutions of the Government. It was only with the help of the European powers that the Emperor succeeded in suppressing it. The rebellion is estimated to have taken a toll of twenty million lives. The same story was repeated in many other minor revolts. The European powers had to prop up the authority of the Emperor as on its continuance depended the validity of the agreements and concessions that they had secured from him. This did not, however, stop them from depriving the Emperor of many of his overseas territories.

In the last decade of the nineteenth century China had to face a new enemy, Japan. The quarrel took place over Korea. China was claiming rights of suzerainty over Korea. Japan disputed them. She signed in 1876 a treaty with Korea regarding it as a sovereign, independent state. Out of the treaty arose many disputes which resulted in 1894 in a war between Japan and China. It ended in a quick victory for Japan and exposed to all the hollowness of the Chinese Empire. The European powers then continued with greater

⁹ *Modern China, A Brief Survey* by David Nelson Rowe (New York, 1959), p. 21.

vigour and ruthlessness their efforts for securing more and more of concessions and rights from the Chinese Government. Sometimes they worked in concert; at other times there was keen rivalry amongst them. "Spheres of Influence" of various powers began to develop and it appeared as if China might disappear as a nation. Some powers like Great Britain and the United States of America intervened in their own interest to stop this disintegration. They advocated the "open door" policy and succeeded in the end in persuading all European powers and Japan to accept it. By 1899 the policy was accepted, but by that time the Empire had lost some of its territories as well as its right to determine its trade and other policies.

The Reform Movement

Two developments of the period deserve some notice: one was the Reform Movement, and the other the Boxer Uprising. The Reform Movement was an attempt by an educated and enlightened section of the upper classes to reform the system of administration and to modernise the country. Chang Chih-lung, the Viceroy of Waochan, initiated the Movement. Apart from being a successful administrator he was the owner of some industrial concerns. His advice was that China should learn the modern method of government, should acquire useful knowledge, "but not hanker for western things." The Movement initiated by him was carried further by Kang Yu-wei who became later its leader. He succeeded in carrying the Movement to the ruling authorities in Peking. There was a progressive wing amongst them. It was able to win over the Emperor to its side. Under its advice Emperor Kuang Hsue invited Kang Yu-wei to the court. In an appeal to the Emperor issued earlier, Kang Yu-wei had suggested the convocation of a council of the best men of the Empire and the adoption of some reforms which would "again make China strong and enable the Empire to continue in existence." The Emperor accepted those suggestions and proposed to carry out the following reforms:

"(1) Reorganization of the State Finance; (2) Efficient Collection of Revenue; (3) Imposition of Indirect Taxes;

(4) Increase of the Salaries of Officials; (5) Granting of Concessions for the Exploitation of Mines and Construction of Railways; (6) Promotion and Protection of Commerce; (7) Revision of the Law Courts; (8) Modern Education; (9) Reorganization of the Army and Navy; (10) Amicable Relations with Foreign Powers.”¹⁰

It was thought that the reforms could be carried out by issuing edicts. Several edicts were issued during those “Hundred Days of Reform” which lasted from June 11 to September 22, 1898. The following are some of the important changes that were sought to be effected:

“(1) Abolition of the old examination system; (2) Foundation of a national university; (3) Establishment of an Official Bureau of Mining, Agriculture and Railways; (4) Abolition of sinecures; (5) The parasites thus deprived were to settle in the provinces; (6) Plan for the preparation of a State budget on modern lines; (7) Reward for technical inventions, industrial enterprises and agricultural improvement; (8) Freedom for the official press organs to criticise the Government.”¹¹

The Movement had not realized that the real power in the court rested not in the hands of the Emperor but in the hands of the Empress, Dowager Tzu Hsi. She did not like the reforms. There were many amongst the military leaders, administrators, and landlords who were alarmed by the changes proposed to be introduced. They regarded the reforms as an attack on the age-old institutions and traditions of the country. Acting upon their suggestion, Empress Dowager arrested the Emperor. Six leaders of the Movement were executed and Kang Yu-wei had to flee. The “Hundred Days of Reform” were thus terminated in a highhanded and cruel manner. The Empress suppressed the Movement but in a few days she had to recognise the necessity of bringing about some reforms. In 1901, she issued an edict recognising the necessity and began making some changes. The malady affecting the Empire was, however, beyond cure.

¹⁰ *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China* by M. N. Roy (Calcutta, 1946), p. 175.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 179.

The Boxer Uprising

The Boxer Uprising took place in 1899 and 1900. It was an elemental revolt of the people. "The Boxer Uprising was the culminating point of a movement which grew all over the country out of the desperate conditions of exploitation, destitution and intolerable misery of the masses. Since the conditions, by themselves not altogether new, had grown worse as direct result of the forcible penetration of imperialist trade and finance, it was but natural that a revolt, essentially against the feudal-patriarchal reaction, should be embittered with a hatred for the foreign invaders."¹²

The characterization is corroborated by the following from *The Vanished Empire* of Putnam Weals quoted by M. N. Roy on the same page:

"All the trials and tribulations of sixty years, all the humiliation which the sea had brought, all the weakness and evasion of the Court, had solidified into a massive, uncontrollable psychosis. The Earth God had risen to his wrath, and there was blood in the angry sky! Marching as in ancient days to an ominous drumming, the sword and spear-armed cultivators covered the country-side and entered the cities with terrible cry. Everything foreign was going—the dynasty as well as the red-haired barbarians."

The Uprising had no doubt an anti-foreign character. It received that anti-foreign character because the foreigners were identified with those factors which were responsible for the ruin and the destitution of the people. The foreigners were also disliked because they were introducing in the country a religion which ran counter to the religion of the country. They were exercising undue pressure over the Emperor besides insulting and humiliating him. There was a section amongst the ruling classes which was intensely anti-foreign because the foreigners had encroached on many of its rights and privileges. That section welcomed the anti-foreign character of the Uprising and gave it some encouragement and help. But it was essentially a revolt against the existing conditions and, if it had succeeded, it would have adversely affected the European

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 199.

powers as well as the rulers and the Chinese vested interests.

The Uprising flared up in many parts, but it was particularly violent in the northeast in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Peking and Tientsin were also scenes of bitter warfare. A large number of Chinese Christians and a few European missionaries and diplomats were killed in the rising. The killing of diplomats and missionaries gave an opportunity to the European powers to intervene and suppress the Uprising. In the name of quelling it foreign troops let loose for some time a reign of terror in many parts of the country. China had to pay a heavy penalty for this outburst of anger and resentment against the foreigners. All foreign powers combined and after quelling the rebellion enforced upon China a settlement which will have few parallels in history for its severity and vindictiveness. It was signed as a protocol on September 7, 1901. Some of the terms of the settlement were as follows: "(1) an official apology to Germany, through a special envoy, for the murder of her minister and the erection by China of a monument in his honour on the scene of his death; (2) punishment, by the Chinese, of the officials chiefly responsible for the atrocities (by agreeing to the infliction of these by the Chinese authorities rather than by foreign officials, something of face was preserved for China); (3) the suspension by imperial edict of the official examinations for five years in towns where foreigners had been killed or harshly treated; (4) apology for the murder of the chancellor of the Japanese legation; (5) the erection by China of expiatory monuments in foreign cemeteries which had been desecrated; (6) the prohibition for at least two years of arms and ammunition and of all material employed exclusively in their manufacture; (7) the payment of an indemnity of 450,000,000 teels (in United States currency, \$333,900,000), in thirty-nine annual instalments."¹³ The other terms of the settlement were equally oppressive and humiliating.

Danger of Disintegration

The peril that China faced at this time was the peril of complete disintegration. Some powers would have liked the

¹³ *A Short History of the Far East*, by K. S. Latourette, p. 439.

partitioning of the country which might have then disappeared as a separate entity. The United States of America, however, declared that it was her firm policy to "preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity." Later, Great Britain and Germany advocated the same policy. As a result the Chinese Government and its integrity as a national state were preserved. All the same "China emerged from the Boxer experience with a greatly enhanced debt, added humiliation, and, in effect, the position of a subject nation. The foreign legations were an armed fortress in her capital, and contingents of foreign troops were stationed there and at Tientsin to keep open the route to the sea and so to prevent the recurrence of such a siege as the summer of 1900 had witnessed. For the next quarter of a century foreigners, and especially Westerners, assumed, even though usually almost unconsciously, the attitude of conquerors in a vassal country. It was a situation which could not but be galling to a proud people."¹⁴

In spite of the "open door" policy which had been accepted by all, the rivalries between the powers continued. The rivalries were over getting leases of territories, over getting licences to build factories, construct railways or work mines and over securing financial arrangements. The rivalry between Russia and Japan over rights in Manchuria and Korea led to the Russo-Japanese war of 1905. China was not directly involved in the war, but the quarrel between the two belligerents was about territories which belonged to China and a part of the war was fought on Chinese territory and in Chinese waters. Japan emerged victorious out of the war. Defeat put limitations on Russian advances in China, but victory whetted the appetite of Japan and she became thereafter the most rapacious of the plunderers.

While these events were taking place, the Government of the Manchus was becoming weaker and weaker. Its hold over the provinces became very tenuous as military leaders became powerful in various parts of the country. It tried to introduce some reforms and improve the administration. Some of the reforms were of a radical character. For example, the reform of the educational system according to which the teaching of

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 439.

Confucianism was substituted by the teaching of modern knowledge was of far-reaching importance. Students were also encouraged to go abroad for studies and many "returned students" later played a prominent part in public life. The reorganisation of the army was taken in hand. Attempts were made to increase the powers of the central Government. But that brought it in conflict with provincial authorities. All in all, reforms were introduced too late and they were not in consequence able to save the dynasty.

Empress Dowager Tzu Hsi and the imprisoned Emperor, Kuang Hsue died in 1908 within a few hours of each other. Pu Yi, a child of three years, was placed on the throne. He was the last Emperor of the Manchu dynasty and also the last Emperor to rule over the Chinese Empire. Early in 1912, he was forced to abdicate for a revolution had taken place a couple of months earlier, and had decided to abolish monarchy and establish a republic. The revolution was mainly the work of secret societies. There were many of them in various parts of the country. They enjoyed the support of many sections in the society. Overseas Chinese merchants and students took a keen interest in them. The most notable amongst them was the Chung Kuo Tung Meng Hui (Chinese Covenant Society) organized by Sun Yat-sen in Tokyo in 1905. It had extensive contacts in all important centres and counted amongst its supporters many industrialists as well as some military leaders. The movement for reform that had developed in many parts of the country, more particularly amongst intellectuals, was also in favour of the revolution.

Revolution of 1911

The situation was ripe for a revolution in 1911. The Manchu dynasty had lost all its support amongst the people and had become an object of ridicule and contempt. A number of military leaders and provincial governors were also disaffected against it. On October 10, there was an accidental bomb burst in the city of Hankow in central China. It brought to light the existence of a secret society. The leaders were arrested and summarily executed. The next day the imperial troops stationed in the city mutinied. The contagion spread and

troops in other areas joined the mutiny. By December, the rebels captured Nanking. A national convention was held. A new republican government was set up. Sun Yat-sen who was in exile was asked to come back. He was made the first President of the Provisional Government of the new Republic of China.

The Imperial Government of the Manchus collapsed like a pack of cards. It lost all its supporters including General Yuan Shih-Kai. Later there were negotiations between Sun Yat-sen and Yuan Shih-Kai and it was decided that the Manchu Emperor should abdicate and the Republican Government should move to Peking. The Emperor abdicated on February 12, 1912. With his abdication ended the line of the Manchus which began its rule in 1644 and the system of Imperial Government which was in force in the country for over two thousand years.

The overthrow of the Manchus was achieved without much bloodshed. But it was not easy to accomplish the other tasks of the democratic revolution. In the first place, there was no unanimity about them amongst those who had joined together for dethroning the Emperor. Some amongst them were monarchists. They had no faith in the republican system of government. Prominent amongst them was Yuan Shih-Kai. He had become the President of the Republic after the transfer of the Provisional Government from Nanking to Peking. Sun Yat-sen had resigned to make room for him. He had a powerful army at his command and had some support amongst other army leaders. He desired to re-establish monarchy with himself as the first monarch. The attempt did not succeed and he died a disappointed man in 1916. There were others who wanted only a change at the top, the President to replace an Emperor, but were keen on maintaining the entire social and political structure as it was. There were others who did not want to do anything that would affect in the least the interests of foreign traders, industrialists and financiers. There were differences of opinion regarding the division of powers between the central and provincial governments. And to make matters worse there was no organised force in the country which could assume the leadership of the revolution and direct it towards the accomplishment of definite aims.

Sun Yat-sen was the leader of the revolution. He established in the course of the next year the Kuo Min Tang which acted for some period as the organizer of that revolution. The programme framed by him has come to be known as the Three Principles. The Three Principles were not, however, elaborated until 1924. They came to be generally associated with the three ideas of Nationalism, Democracy and Socialism. In the early days of the revolution, he was not able to adopt any clear and firm stand. Moreover he was outwitted and outmanoeuvred by other elements who were afraid of the revolution going further thus attacking their own rights and privileges. The Kuo Min Tang (People's National Party), which later became the party of the revolution, was established in 1912. It consisted of the various groups which had come together for the overthrow of the Manchus. It was formed in view of the elections to Parliament which were to take place early in 1913. The following was the programme of the kuo Min Tang. "(1) Establishment of a democratic government of five departments; (2) Local autonomy for the provinces; (3) Political equality for the five races inhabiting the old Empire; (4) Friendly relations with foreign Powers; and (5) Reform of the economic structure of the Chinese society."¹⁵ The Kuo Min Tang captured a clear majority of seats in the new Parliament which met in Peking in April 1913. This success was, however, short-lived.

Yuan Shih-Kai, the President of the Republic, who had no intention of allowing the revolution to go further, tried to strengthen his position by appointing his men to various posts and by securing loans from foreign financiers. This brought him in conflict with the radical elements in the Kuo Min Tang. The latter organized a revolt which is known as the "Second Revolution." It was defeated and many members of the Kuo Min Tang including Sun Yat-sen had to leave the country. Yuan Shih-Kai retaliated by depriving Kuo Ming Tang leaders of their membership of Parliament.

The revolution had a significant effect on some of the territories of the Empire. Sun Yat-sen desired to hold all of them, the Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Tartars and Tibetans to-

¹⁵ *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China* by M. N. Roy (Calcutta, 1946), p. 317.

gether under his first Principle of Nationality. But the people held in bondage by the Emperor had their own ideas. They tried to make use of the revolution for liberating themselves. Tibet threw out the Chinese army and declared her independence. This action of the Tibetans did not receive international recognition. That fact was to be held later against them to disprove their claim to be treated as a sovereign, independent people. In Sinkiang there was a lot of trouble, but China re-established her rule over the territory in the next few years. The Mongolians were more fortunate. They received the backing of the Russians. A separate government was established in Outer Mongolia. In later years China was compelled to recognize Outer Mongolia as an independent, sovereign state and it is now a member of the United Nations. Inner Mongolia, however, continues to be under the Chinese domination.

First World War

The First World War broke out within three years of the Chinese Revolution. The War kept the European powers busy. It also broke their unity in their dealings with China. Japan took advantage of this position to strengthen hers. As a party to the war against Germany, she assumed control over the German possessions in the Shantung. Later, in 1915, she presented her Twenty-one Demands which, if accepted, would have made China a vassal of Japan. China had no friends at this time to back her. She accepted some of the demands and stalled regarding the rest. The pressure of Japan continued to grow throughout the war period. China did not join the war in the beginning. She joined it in 1917 on the advice of the United States of America. That gave her the right to participate in the Peace Conference that was held in Paris after the termination of hostilities.

The National Government that was established in Peking was not able to keep the country together. It was split into a number of parts each under a separate military leader who in course of time developed into a warlord. They maintained only a nominal contact with the central Government in Peking. Some of the military leaders were no better than bandits who

preyed on the countryside. They had no difficulty in getting recruits for their armies as, agriculture being in a bad way, there were hundreds and thousands of ruined peasants who were prepared to join them even on nominal salaries. The armies of the warlords were a perpetual menace to cities, towns and villages and to normal economic activity. Moreover, there were constant conflicts amongst them resulting in bloodshed and destruction of property. The central Government had become a pawn in the hands of some of them and they were utilizing it for advancing their interests. It was moreover unable to resist the pressures of foreign industrialists and business men and was giving them one valuable concession after another. There was grave discontent against the Government and some amongst the military and political leaders took the step of establishing a rival government in Canton in 1921. Sun Yat-sen who was in exile was invited to become the Head of that Government. Thus, for a few years China had two Governments, one in Peking and the other in Canton. Both the Governments were represented in the Peace Conference in Paris.

The results of the Peace Conference and the Versailles Treaty were a big disappointment to the nationalists in China. Japan was allowed to retain all the illegal gains that she had made during the War. She became practically the master of Manchuria. The victorious European powers were left undisturbed in the enjoyment of the rights and privileges that they had secured by force in the seventy years before the War. China's expectations of a new deal after the War which she had helped to win did not come true. The only advantage that she got was the membership of the League of Nations and other international bodies. Weak and disunited as she was, the membership was of no particular significance to her for many years to come. About this time, there were big strikes in a number of industrial centres. They were directed as much against the employers as against the foreign powers who stood behind them. Some of them were essentially political in character. Through them the working class of the country entered for the first time the arena of political struggle.

The Russian Influence

Disappointment with the Western powers persuaded the nationalist leaders of China to turn their attention towards Russia. Russia had just completed her Bolshevik revolution and the Communist Party was firmly in control of the affairs of the state. That was the first period of the revolution when the revolutionary leaders were entertaining the hope of liberating the oppressed peoples all over the world. In that first flush of idealism and revolutionary enthusiasm, the Communist Government of Russia gave away to China all rights and privileges that the Tsarist Government had secured. This made a big impression on the nationalists. The Communist Party of Russia also showed interest in helping the nationalists in building up a powerful political party and a disciplined army.

Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the Kuo Min Tang, had his first meeting with the diplomatic representative of the Russian Government, Joffe in 1922. Eventually it was agreed to secure from Russia the help of political and military advisers to build up the political as well as the military organization. It was also agreed to send some capable men to Russia for training. Chiang Kai-shek was the first and the foremost amongst the persons that were sent.

The reorganization of the Kuo Min Tang was effected at a conference held in Canton in 1924. The conference adopted a statement prepared by Sun Yat-sen embodying the programme of the party. In that statement were elaborated for the first time the "Three Principles". The conference also decided about the structure of the party. The programme as well as the structure were decided in consultation with the Russian advisers. The point of departure at the conference was the acceptance of the fact that the Kuo Min Tang must have, if it were to succeed, "the support of the masses of the country, namely, the intellectual class, the peasants, the labourers and the merchants." The Communists now joined the Kuo Min Tang. In 1920, they had formed themselves into the Communist Party of China. They were active amongst industrial workers, peasants and intellectuals. Their association was an accession of strength to the Kuo Min Tang. Along with the reorganization

of the party steps were also taken to build up the military strength. A military academy was established at Whampoa with the help of Russian military advisers. Chiang Kai-shek was placed in charge of the academy and Chou En-lai, now the Prime Minister of the Communist Government of China, was appointed the political adviser.

The first task that the Kuo Min Tang had to accomplish was the reunification of the country. The Government in Canton was under the control of Kuo Min Tang. But there was a rival government in Peking which was backed by a number of military leaders who came to be known as Northern Militarists. The country could not be unified unless they were vanquished. At this time, there was a very favourable atmosphere both for action against the militarists as well as against the imperialists who were supporting them. The country was seething with discontent. Anti-imperialist as well as anti-foreign sentiment was spreading like wild fire. Students and industrial workers were in the forefront of the struggle. The struggle received a great impetus from what happened in Shanghai on May 30, 1925. There was a strike and workers had taken out a procession. When the procession reached the British sector, troops fired upon the workers causing the death of a large number of them. The news of the firing spread all over the country and united the people as never before.

The Kuo Min Tang decided to take advantage of this upsurge of popular emotions to strike at the twin evils of militarism and imperialism. It was decided to undertake the "Northern Expedition" with the intention of extending the Kuo Min Tang rule to northern cities and eventually to capture Peking. The Expedition started from Canton in July 1926. In a couple of months it went as far as the Yangtze. Everywhere the people welcomed it with open arms. City after city was captured. A number of military leaders joined it on the way and swelled the nationalist army. By March 1927, both Nanking as well as Shanghai were captured. The Han cities, collectively known as Wuhan, were captured much earlier. In some cities workers took the lead in liberating them from the hands of the militarists and the imperialists. Having liberated them,

they were not prepared to hand over power in those cities to the military leaders of the Kuo Min Tang.

The Kuo Min Tang and the Communists

This led to a split in the Kuo Min Tang and eventually to the disruption of the united front between it and the Communist Party. In the beginning the Kuo Min Tang split into a right and a left wing. Chiang Kai-shek was the leader of the former and Wang Chin-wei of the latter. For some time there were two rival centres and two rival Governments, one at Nanking and the other at Wuhan. The Communists were working with the left wing. The main difference was on the issue of the social and economic programme of the democratic revolution. The Communists stood for the broadening and the deepening of the revolution and the solution of the agrarian problem. The Kuo Min Tang had by that time become a heterogeneous organization consisting of reactionaries, conservatives, progressives and revolutionaries. The military leaders who joined the party in the course of the Northern Expedition had tilted the balance in favour of the reactionaries and conservatives. They were to be found in both wings of the party. In the end the left wing capitulated to the right wing and both turned together against the Communists. The break came in the middle of 1927 when the Communists were expelled from the Kuo Min Tang and the Russian advisers were asked to go back. The Communists had to pay heavily for their credulity, their opportunism and their adventurism. One after the other they passed through all the three stages. There was a Kuo Min Tang-directed massacre of Communists in Shanghai, and later in Hankow and Nanking. After this defeat they organized, as if to salvage their conscience, an adventurist action in Canton. The city was captured and a Soviet was organized. It was crushed mercilessly and a large number of workers, intellectuals and Communists were killed. The Communist experiment of developing the bourgeois democratic revolution into a socialist revolution by working in co-operation with the Kuo Min Tang thus ended in a miserable failure and in the slaughter of thousands upon thousands of workers and

students. A controversy has raged in Communist circles about apportionment of the blame for the debacle. Some have blamed the Chinese Communist Party, while others have placed the blame squarely upon the Communist International and its leader, Stalin who were directing it from Moscow. The Chinese people had to pay dearly for the blunders and the crimes of the Communists.

After the expulsion of the Communists, Chiang Kai-shek became the most prominent leader of the Kuo Min Tang. There were some occasional whispers against his authority, a couple of times he had to make a show of resigning his position, but there was never any serious challenge to his leadership. He made many compromises with the militarists, and allowed them to remain in control of the northern areas; but he waged a bitter struggle against the Communists. They were driven out of industrial towns and cities and had to retire to the mountains in the districts of Hunan, Kiangsi and Kwangtung. Even there they were not allowed to remain in peace. There were constant attacks upon them. In the end, in 1934, they decided to leave the area and embarked upon the "Long March" of roughly six thousand miles to Shensi in the northwest. It was one of the most heroic of adventures. Even before the "Long March" the Communists had built up their Red Army under the military leadership of Chu Teh and the political leadership of Mao Tse-tung. In far-off Shensi the nationalist troops could not give them much trouble. They consolidated their strength and established their Soviet Government with its headquarters at Yen-an. They were there until 1948 when, after a short period of retreat into Manchuria, they swept over the country and established their dictatorship.

The Japanese Invasion

Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuo Min Tang had to manage the affairs of a divided and devastated country. In some areas their writ did not run; in some others they had to agree to serious limitations on their authority to enable it to run; and in most areas they did not have a reliable and efficient agency for its execution. Every military leader wanted to pursue his

own policy directed towards his own personal ends, and none of them was prepared to reduce the number of the troops under his control, the one step that was necessary for conserving national resources. Corruption was another evil against which they had to fight. It was rampant in all spheres of administration and even men holding high positions were not free from it. And yet Chiang Kai-shek made a brave effort to set the country on its feet. The National Government which he had now shifted to Nanking was soon able to secure international recognition. It was also able to get some loans with which it started re-building the national economy. It introduced many reforms and tried to modernize China.

The efforts were thwarted by Japan's invasion of Manchuria which took place in 1931. Japan had already extensive commercial and industrial interests in the area and the invasion was undertaken on the pretext of protecting them. It was a clear breach of all international conventions. China raised the issue in the League of Nations. The League condemned Japanese action, but Japan paid no attention to it. Other powers were not then prepared to do anything more than make verbal protests. In a few months Japan consolidated her position and then established in the area a satellite kingdom giving it the name of Manchukuo. The dethroned Manchu Emperor, Pu Yi was made the puppet king of the kingdom.

The National Government in Nanking was not able to resist the invasion. It had no troops of its own in the area and the war-lords who could have resisted quietly went over to the Japanese side. Even in the National Government there were some elements who were secretly in sympathy with Japan. The invasion, however, gave rise to a strong anti-Japanese movement amongst the people. Students took a prominent part in organizing it. A boycott of Japanese goods, banks, railways and steamers became a prominent part of the movement. As a result of the boycott there were clashes at several places. In Shanghai there was a regular fight and Japan occupied the city in order to quell the boycott. The disturbances spread to other cities and areas. In course of time, Japan realized that if she were to retain her illegal gains she would have to extend her domination over the whole of China. With that end in

view she expanded her operations and captured Peking in July 1937 without much opposition. At that time the correspondent of a leading British newspaper wrote: "With the Japanese occupation, the fate of Peking and China has been settled for at least a hundred years."¹⁶

Far from settling the fate of Peking and China, the Japanese occupation of that Northern capital of the country set in motion a chain reaction which brought about national unity and eventually led to the complete defeat of Japan. Chiang Kai-shek and the National Government were compelled under popular pressure to redouble their efforts for driving out the Japanese. Even military leaders began to urge the intensification of war efforts. There was a suspicion in many quarters that more energy and resources were being devoted to the anti-Communist war than to the anti-Japanese war. There was a demand that the civil war should end and that the nation as a whole should concentrate all its energies on the defeat of the foreign invaders. In December 1936, there was a curious incident. Chiang Kai-shek was made a prisoner by one of his generals in the north when he went there on an inspection tour. He was held in captivity for two weeks. During that period there was a meeting between him and some leaders of the Communist Party and an agreement was arrived at for working together for the defeat of Japan.

The Second World War

In the first period of the war against Japan, China had to fight it single-handed and all alone. She received no help from the European powers or from the United States of America. Later, all of them got involved in the Second World War which began in September 1939. It was a life and death struggle for them and they were not in a position to help China. It was only when Japan attacked the United States of America at Pearl Harbour and the latter declared war on the former that the situation changed and China began to get active help from England and America. But by that time Japan had overrun a large part of the country and captured most of the cities

¹⁶ *The China Quarterly* (London), Jan.-March 1960, p. 6.

on the coast and in the northern and eastern parts. The National Government had shifted its headquarters from Nanking to Hankow and then to Chungking. It had the sympathy and the backing of the whole country, but it did not have enough of modern weapons and other materials which are essential for winning a war. The supplies that it was getting from England and America had to be transported by land and air routes over the Himalayan ranges. There was also an acute shortage of consumer goods as most of the industrial centres were in Japanese hands. Japan was not able to advance much farther as she would have been bogged down in the immense expanse of the country. At one time she tried to set up a puppet government under the leadership of Wang Chin-wei, but the attempt did not succeed. On the other hand, with the limited resources at her disposal China was not able to carry the war to its logical conclusion and throw the Japanese out. Thus there was a stalemate. It was ended only by the defeat of Japan in August 1945 after which she had to surrender and forego her territorial gains.

The united front between the Kuo Min Tang and the Communists did not work satisfactorily. Both had deep suspicions about each other. The Communists did not fulfil the conditions of the united front agreement that they had entered into in 1937. They did not dissolve either the Red Army or the Soviet Government. Mao Tse-tung had directed: "The arms of the people, every gun and every bullet must all be kept, must not be handed over." They made ample use of the opportunity that they got of working from Chungking to create dissensions in the ranks of the Kuo Min Tang, to discredit them in the eyes of the public and to strengthen their military and political position. The Kuo Min Tang also did not altogether stop their warfare against the Communists. The joint working was therefore terminated in 1940. Attempts to bring the two groups together began again in 1944. They began on this occasion on the advice and pressure of American generals and diplomats. They were impressed by the fighting abilities of the Communists and wanted them to be utilized for the anti-Japanese war. Taking the Communist Party to be like any other political

party, they thought that the quarrel over the form and the programme of the government could be decided after the war through a general election. They could not understand and appreciate the opposition of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuo Min Tang to joint work with the Communists. Protracted talks were held and a lot of pressure was exerted, but in the end the attempt did not succeed and the Kuo Min Tang and the Communist Party remained separate and hostile to each other.

The Civil War

It was hoped that at the end of the war there would be peace and security in the country, and that the leaders of the nation would be able to apply their mind to the solution of the domestic problems that had accumulated through the years. It was also hoped that, democracy having triumphed on the world stage, it would have a successful career in China and that she would emerge as a great Democracy of Asia. China had been already accorded a great power status in the comity of nations. She was one of the founder members of the United Nations and a permanent member of the Security Council along with America, Russia, Great Britain and France. The hopes were not, however, fulfilled. Civil war flared up immediately after the termination of the anti-Japanese war and it led to the establishment, not of a democratic, but of a Communist totalitarian government. China emerged as a great power, but for Communism and not for Democracy.

When the war ended, there were two rival centres of power in China. One was at Chungking and the other was at Yen-an. One was represented by the Kuo Min Tang and the other by the Communist Party. Immediately after the cessation of hostilities against Japan, fight began between the two rival centres of power. In the beginning, success appeared to favour the Kuo Min Tang. It attacked Shensi and compelled the Communists to fold up their government and retreat into Manchuria. But that became the turning point in favour of the Communists. In Manchuria, they came into the possession of vast quantities of arms and ammunitions which the Russians had seized from the Japanese and which they let fall into

the hands of their friends, the Chinese Communists. This help that was received from the Russians turned the scales of the war. As the ruling party throughout the sixteen years of the war, the Kuo Min Tang had to shoulder the entire responsibility for all the ills that had befallen the country. Most of those ills were the inevitable consequences of the war. But many of them had been aggravated by the wrong policies, the greed, the nepotism and the corruption of some of the leading members of the party. Many of them had feathered their own nests while the people had starved and suffered and died. The people held all these things against the Kuo Min Tang and transferred their loyalties to the Communists as soon as they appeared on the scene with enough power in their hands to beat down the opposition of the Kuo Min Tang. Many a time large sections of its armies went over to the Communists with all their weapons and supplies. In two years of fighting from July 1946 to June 1948, the Communists were able to capture over fifteen lakhs of Kuo Min Tang troops.

It was a fairly easy walk-over for the Communists. Many of the military leaders were in a state of demoralization. Some were won over. There was not much fighting anywhere after the Communists started rolling from Manchuria with their recently acquired arms and ammunition. They entered Peking in January 1949. They crossed the Yangtze in April. City after city fell to them without any struggle. By the middle of the year Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuo Min Tang realized that they had lost the battle. Immediately thereafter, they left mainland China, and repaired to Taiwan with about five lakhs of troops to bide the time when they would be able to return and defeat the Communist regime.

The Communist Government was established in Peking in October 1949. It is called the People's Republic of China. It is in effective control of the entire area of China except the island of Taiwan. After a long period the country is having a government which is both strong and stable. It has at its back a powerful army to enforce its will. It has at its command in addition lakhs of disciplined and devoted political workers, spread in cities and villages and in all walks of life, to carry its orders to all parts of the country and to see that they are

obeyed. No Government at any earlier period of Chinese history had such a political apparatus at its disposal. With that apparatus the new Communist Government is exercising unlimited control not only over the bodies but also over the minds and souls of seven hundred million people of China. The programmes and policies of the Government and its manner and method of exercising control will be discussed in the next chapter. The chapters that follow will show how the Communist Government is utilizing the vast powers that it possesses and the age-old Chinese urge to expand to extend its domination over other countries of Asia and how it was bound to bring it in conflict with the democratic Government of India.

The People and their Lot

This has been so far a narration mainly of political events in the long history of the country, of the rise and fall of dynasties, of the conquests and defeats of its rulers. Compared to other ancient countries, China has a much better record of her past. We get the names and dates of most of her rulers from about a thousand years before Christ, and of many of their exploits. The Chinese have a remarkable sense of history. They are always in the habit of justifying their present by reference to their past. Every Chinese ruler, administrator or scholar will try to find support for his actions and policies in the accounts and records of ancient times. This constant harking back to the past is an essential element of Confucianism which was the basis of Chinese polity until very recent times. The present Communist rulers of the country are also continuing that tradition. In the writings and speeches of Mao Tse-tung and other Communist leaders there are always many references to the past and many a time analogies are drawn from what the old historical figures did in particular circumstances. They seem to be keen on continuing this mode of thinking.

In Chinese history the people as such make their appearance very rarely. They must be responsible at least for some of the dynastic changes, for on some occasions there are references to popular discontent and revolts. But after the change they were again relegated to the background and the new ruler ruled

over them in the same manner as the earlier rulers. Agriculture has always been the most strenuous and back-breaking of professions in China. Early in her history there was a very indiscriminate cutting of trees and forests in order to secure land for cultivation. As a result, the country has been all along plagued by floods which from time to time wash away the top soil of thousands of acres of cultivable land and render them into arid deserts. There has been a constant struggle between man and nature. Owing to growth in population the people have been required to bring more and more land under cultivation and to divide and subdivide it into small plots. As a result, Chinese agriculture has taken on more and more the shape of horticulture. It is intensive rather than extensive. A peasant possesses only a small piece of land and cultivates it as intensively as a garden plot.

From the very beginning the lot of the peasant, who constitutes even today more than seventy per cent of the population, has been very miserable. The return from the land was scanty and precarious. Then there were the demands of the landlord, the moneylender, the trader and the state. That left very little to the peasant and even that little was taken away on many occasions by bandits or feudal chieftains. "Owing to its extraordinary backwardness, Chinese agriculture produced very little surplus. The existence of the numerous kinds of parasites, big and small, foreign and native, could be maintained by robbing the peasantry not only of the entire surplus produce but also of a considerable part of what little they required for their own subsistence. Hence the periodical famines which consume millions of human lives."¹⁷ In the middle ages, China rose on some occasions to the heights of prosperity and glory; the tiller of the soil had very little share of it.

The Chinese are known to be very industrious and hard-working. The fact has been acknowledged by many ancient and modern observers. As late as in 1946, Mr. K.P.S. Menon who was for some time Indian Ambassador both in China and in Russia wrote the following about this innate character:

¹⁷ *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China* by M. N. Roy (Calcutta, 1946), p. 490.

“In Chungking I have often been amazed at the toughness of the Chinese. It is a daily sight to see a Chinese coolie carrying, up the innumerable steps of the Yangtze, a load which three Indian coolies would find it difficult to bear. And I have often seen boatmen, bent double and on all fours, dragging overloaded boats and barges against the current up the Yangtze Kiang. It is this toughness which has enabled the Chinese, as a race, to survive famine, pestilence and political turmoils which used to recur with harrowing persistence.”¹⁸

The rulers of China made ample use of this industrious and hardworking mass of the Chinese people. They were utilised for building the Wall in the north which is one of the wonders of the world. They were also utilised for the construction of dams and canals and forts and palaces. Forced labour was common during those days. The Communists followed in the footsteps of those mediaeval rulers when they pressed into service a couple of years after establishing themselves in Peking thousands of labourers to work on their grandiose Husi river project. The practice has continued since then in many different forms.

Owing to the poverty of the people no military leader was ever short of recruits for his army. Thousands upon thousands of persons were always available in the countryside, as they were unable to draw their sustenance from the land. They were prepared to march with their commander to any place he may lead them to. Military service and adventure were preferable to grinding poverty and slow death in the villages. They were also prepared to go to new places and settle there. In the middle ages they moved into sparsely populated areas like Manchuria and Mongolia. In the nineteenth century they went to the United States and Europe and in much larger numbers to the countries of Southeast Asia. In many of the latter countries they constitute now a substantial portion of the population. The overseas Chinese number now over ten millions. They are regarded as an integral part of the Chinese people. The Communist regime has given them representation in the National People's Congress. After the conquest of Tibet it decid-

¹⁸ *Delhi-Chungking, A Travel Diary* by K. P. S. Menon, p. 156.

ed to colonise the area. A large number of Chinese are being settled in Tibet and, after some years, there may be more Chinese than Tibetans in Tibet.

The Mandate of the Heaven

The Government in China has been all along autocratic and despotic. But the sphere of its authority was circumscribed within very narrow limits. It had to maintain peace and protect the country from foreign invasions. It had to construct and keep in good repairs large-scale public works. It was entitled to get from the people taxes and tributes to enable it to carry on these functions. But beyond these limits it did not interfere in the life of the people.

The people were comparatively free from the restraints of the Government. It played a very small part in their day-to-day life. But they were bound by other restraints, the restraints of custom and tradition many of which were enshrined in the teachings of Confucius. As observed by Mr. Guy Wint, "In China, custom or Confucius was sovereign, not the emperor."¹⁹ The position has changed completely under the Communist regime. The Government is now possessed of all-embracing powers. It dictates and directs not only the actions but also the thought processes of all seven hundred million people of China in all spheres of life. As a recent book *Thought Reforms of the Chinese Intellectual* (Theodore H. E. Chen, Hong Kong) has pointed out, "the Communist revolution is a total revolution". It aims "to bring about radical changes in the entire social structure and in the pattern of human behaviour." Ideological reform is far more fundamental to it than economic, political, social or cultural reform.

The Government in ancient China was autocratic no doubt, but it was not lawless. It had to act according to law. The law was not a written law adopted by any popular assembly. It was enshrined in custom and tradition. The general belief was that the Emperor or the King ruled by the Mandate of the Heaven. He had the obligation to ensure the welfare and prosperity of the people. Any failure in that respect would lead to the

¹⁹ *China Quarterly* (London), Jan-March 1960, p. 26.

withdrawal of the Mandate. Any time the discontent of the people increased and there were disturbances and revolts, it was presumed that the Heaven was withdrawing its Mandate. A successful revolt was regarded as the proof of the withdrawal of the Mandate. The people's right to revolt was expressly recognised, but it had to be successful before it could be recognised as having received the blessing of the Heaven.

Being a vast country and the means of communication being slow, China was split on many occasions into a number of small and big kingdoms. But there was always the urge that the country should have one single government. Confucius had stated: "There are no two suns in the sky; no two kings in a land; no two princes in a state; no two chiefs in a family." True to that teaching of the sage, one amongst the several kingdoms, or some new adventurer would become more powerful than the rest and become the only ruler of the country. He would be then regarded as having received the Mandate of the Heaven.

The Commonsense of Confucianism

Confucianism was the religion of China for well over two thousand years. It was not a religion in the usual sense of the word. It did not deal so much with other-worldly affairs as with this-worldly affairs. It laid down how the society should be organized, how the government should be conducted and how man should behave with each other in the family, in the village and in the country. The religious life of the Chinese is a jumble of rites and ceremonies. They insist on the performance of the rites and ceremonies, but they do not insist on the acceptance of any particular dogma. Ancestor worship is an important feature of their religious life. But, in contrast to Indians and others, they are essentially a non-religious people. Confucianism began to lose its hold on the Chinese people in the latter half of the nineteenth century with the advance of Western knowledge and civilization. It is now facing a bigger adversary in Communism. But in certain respects there are many things common between the two and, in the interest of gaining an early hold on the Chinese mind, Communists are now seeking a *via media* with it.

Buddhism flourished for a number of centuries, but owing to its emphasis on other-worldly things it could never have much of a hold on the essentially this-worldly mind of the Chinese. Writing about its decline, K. P. S. Menon has stated: "It is sad to contemplate the fate which overtook Buddhism in China. In Sinkiang itself, it was overthrown by the sword of Islam. In the rest of China it died a natural death. By the tenth century it had become enfeebled; it no longer had that pristine vitality which carried it across the seas and mountains into many lands outside India. And the end was hastened by the revival of Confucianism which occurred in the twelfth century at the hands of the great Chinese philosopher, Chu-hsi. To the Chinese mind, practical, materialistic and pragmatic, the commonsense of Confucius made a far greater appeal than the metaphysics of the Buddha. True, during the sixth and seventh centuries, the mysticism, if not the metaphysics of Buddhism did make an appeal to the hearts, if not to the heads, of the Chinese; but before long that 'this-worldliness,' so characteristic of the Chinese, as compared with the Indian mind asserted itself; and China relapsed into the urbane philosophy of Confucius." Continuing, Mr. Menon has drawn our attention to what Han Yu who lived in the eighth and the ninth centuries and who was known as the Prince of Literature had stated in a memorial addressed to the King. The memorial stated *inter alia*: "Buddha was a barbarian. His language was not the language of China; his clothes were of an alien cut. He did not utter the Maxims of our ancient rulers, nor conform to the customs which they have handed down. He did not appreciate the bond between Prince and Minister, the tie between father and son."²⁰ Buddhism died a natural death as Confucianism was more congenial to the Chinese mind.

The Social Structure

In modern times, there have been many changes in the social structure. Life in industrial cities, the long-drawn-out civil war and migration have dealt it many blows. The land reforms and the system of Communes imposed by the Communists

²⁰ K. P. S. Menon, *op. cit.*, pp. 151-52.

may change it beyond recognition. But it is worthwhile to know about its main features as they existed for hundreds of years. The social structure was founded on the clan, *tsu* made up of a certain number of families, *Chia*. The clan included all individuals descended from a common stock. The clan held in common the title to property of various kinds. The seniormost living member used to be the chief of the clan. He used to decide in consultation with senior members of the families all important matters pertaining to the life of the clan. Within each family the patriarchal system prevailed. All members of the family had to act according to the instructions of the head of the family.²¹ In the cities and towns handicraftsmen and merchants and traders had their own guilds. Every person was required to be a member of the guild and to carry on his work in accordance with its rules. All agrarian societies had more or less a similar social structure. Industrialization is having the same impact upon them as in the Chinese society.

The Chinese are very proud of their culture. They equate their culture with human civilization. According to them, the Chinese constitute the civilized people of the world while the rest are barbarians. As pointed out by Prof. C. P. Fitzgerald, the well-known British authority on China, "it is bred in their bones that they were the most superior people in the world, the only civilized people." The Chinese regard the barbarians with contempt and they have no compunction in trying to impose their civilization upon them, if necessary by force. As long as they were powerful, they embarked upon many a conquest and many an invasion with the professed intention of civilizing the barbarians. The nineteenth century saw an eclipse of the Chinese power. It is reviving again in the second half of the twentieth. And with the revival of power there is also the revival of the ambition to spread the civilization and to dominate the world. The new dogma of Communism is now providing additional impetus to that age-old striving of the Chinese people.

China did not develop a caste system as in India. Originally she had two classes—the class of nobles and the class of manual

²¹ *Chinese Civilization* by Jean Escarre, Henry Vetch (Peking, 1940), pp. 80-82.

workers, consisting of peasants, handicraftsmen and others. As the classification was based upon the kind of work that was done it did not become rigid and many peasants were able to become noblemen and some became rulers of various principalities. Chinese society does not also recognize racial differences. Many races came to China and became amalgamated with the local population. Today the Chinese people are an admixture of a variety of races. The emphasis in China was not on race or family but on culture. "China to the Chinese has for most of its history been a civilization rather than a nation, a civilization into which anyone could be accepted."²² Every new group that came in was made to accept the Chinese culture. The process was painless as the Chinese culture of those days was far superior to the cultures of those groups. Effort was also made to carry the culture to nearby lands and territories. Whoever accepted the culture became a part of the Chinese society. They were then regarded as parts of the Chinese Empire. Many a time territorial conquest preceded cultural conquest. Whatever the order, a vast society was built up and because it was not based on race or caste it was and continues to be far more homogeneous than most other societies.

Cultural Unity

Cultural unity was preserved through the creation of a single language for writing. China had many dialects and a dialect of one part was not understood in another part. But she had one common language for the purpose of writing. It was understood in all parts. All books were written in that language. Whoever wanted to read books had to learn the language. It was a rather difficult language to learn, having as it did about six thousand characters. It required close application and long study. Knowledge of the books, which were mainly the classics of Confucianism and accounts of historical developments, and proficiency in the use of the language were essential for passing the civil service examinations without which nobody could find entry into the public services. Thus

²² *A Decade Under Mao Tse-tung*, by Roderick MacFarquhar (Hong Kong, 1960), p. 108.

a class of scholars grew up who were proficient in Confucianism. They were known as the *literati*. Apart from being public officials, they were the preachers and the administrators of *li*, the moral law which governed the affairs of the men and the state. They were held in high respect by all sections of society. Very few societies have accorded similar respect to men of learning. The scholars, the *literati* were a special class in Chinese society. It was not a caste, as anybody could appear for the examinations and become a scholar. They were the repositories of traditional knowledge and wisdom. They played a prominent part in public affairs. They held the society together when it had to pass through periods of anarchy and chaos. They began to lose their influence towards the end of the nineteenth century. Society was faced with new problems and to them the Confucian scholars had no adequate answers.

Until the West broke upon China in the nineteenth century with its industrial civilization and gun boats and soldiers, she had not been subjected to foreign influences in any significant manner. Buddhism which went from India exerted some influence for about a thousand years. But from about the fourteenth century it had ceased to have any influence. China was then possibly the most civilized country in the world. But she was at one end of the world. The Himalayas separated her from India and the inhospitable sandy deserts and mountains of Central Asia separated her from Europe. There was little of mutual intercourse. It appeared as if China was standing still. Many European thinkers were impressed by this unchangeableness and the stagnation of the East. Hegel remarked: "China and India still appear to live outside world history. . . . There is neither in China nor in India any progression on to something else." Karl Marx was also struck by the same characteristic. Calling China a "living fossil" he remarked: "the Oriental empires present us with permanent changelessness in the social substructure and restless change among the persons and tribes that seize the political superstructure." Marx and Marxists satisfied themselves by attributing it to the "Asiatic" mode of production.²³ Contacts with Europeans began in the

²³ Quoted by Karl A. Wittfogel in his article, "The Marxist View of China," *China Quarterly* (London), July-September 1962.

seventeenth century, but not until the middle of the nineteenth did they have much influence. The political and economic influence was of a most devastating character. It destroyed the independence of the country and economically bled it white. But there were some other effects as well. China came to know the new world that had emerged after the industrial revolution and became acquainted with its new knowledge and technological progress. She awoke out of her slumber of centuries. Immediately thereafter she was drawn into the maelstrom of world politics.

The Grave Menace

Early in this century, China was subjected to another influence. It also came from the West. It was the influence of a social, political and economic creed which stood for a revolutionary transformation of society. It went there after its success in Russia with the rich experience of the struggles that preceded it and with the resources of the new state. It had an immediate appeal to the intelligentsia. It struck roots in the land and built up a political party as well as a military machine. After some initial reverses, it conquered the country and China is now a Communist state. Communism is no longer a mere influence; it is a state religion which, with all the economic, political and military apparatus of the Government, is seeking to transform the "Asiatic" society and the Confucian soul of China.

The expanse as well as the population of China make her one of the big nations of the world. Under Communism, her industrial and military power is growing at a fast rate. The Communists are also training and disciplining her seven hundred million people and converting them into a mighty instrument of their will. China has been all along aggressive as can be easily seen from her long history. Whenever she was strong she has all along tried to incorporate into her empire as many of the nearby nations as she possibly could. So far as the south is concerned Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, NEFA, Burma, Indochina are all on her list of countries to be liberated. The Chinese, both nationalists as well as Communists, have on several occasions expressed their acceptance of these expansionist aims.

Mao Tse-tung wrote in 1939 in his *Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party*: "In defeating China in war, the imperialist states have taken away many Chinese dependent states and a part of her territory. Japan took away Korea, Taiwan, Ruyuku islands, the Pescadores, Port Arthur; England seized Burma, Bhutan, Nepal and Hong Kong; France occupied Annam and even an insignificant country like Portugal took Macao." Since then some of the territories have been already recovered. But he has his eyes on the rest and he will not mind resorting to a war to recover them. It will be, according to him, "a just war." Mao Tse-tung is not opposed to wars. As far back as 1938 he wrote: "We are the advocates of the omnipotence of the revolutionary war, which is not bad at all, but is good and is Marxist. With the help of guns the Russian Communists brought about socialism...the whole world can be remoulded only with the gun...war can only be abolished through war—in order to get rid of the gun, we must first grasp it in our hand."²⁴ Intervention in Korea, actions in Malaya and Indo-China and the "liberation" of Tibet prove that he has been true to his words. This makes new China a grave menace to the free countries of Asia and other continents. New China is a giant and, it appears, she is determined to behave like a giant. As Harold R. Issacs has observed in his new preface to his old work, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, China has become "a new power casting fearsome shadows on the future."

²⁴ *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. II (People's Publishing House, Bombay), pp. 272, 273.

2

China Under Communism

DEVIDAS KINI

NOTHING convinces like success and the successful coup d'état of the Bolsheviks in Russia under the leadership of Lenin impressed the Chinese intelligentsia. Up to that time Communism and the Marxist writings were almost unknown in China. Intellectuals frustrated by the debacle of the 1911 Revolution turned to Marxism. In 1918 a society for the study of Marxism was set up at the Peking University and many more such societies were formed all over the country. One such study group was organized by Mao Tse-tung, then a student, in Changsha. In 1920 Comintern sent two agents to China to help create an effective Communist Party. In July 1921 the First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party was held at Shanghai. It was a political spectrum of ideologies—"biblical socialism, social democracy, anarchism and various shades of Communism."

Though Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles—Nationalism, Democracy and People's Livelihood—were a widely accepted formulation of China's problems and objectives, he was in search of an effective instrument to translate these principles into practice, ideals into reality. Impressed by the Russian Revolution he negotiated with the Soviet Union for assistance in the reorganization of Kuo Min Tang in 1923. Russia readily agreed to this since it was in its own interest to keep China outside the sphere of influence of Western countries and Japan. Communists were allowed to join the Kuo Min Tang as individuals. This collaboration of the KMT and the Communists gave greater opportunities to the latter in spreading their doctrines in the country in general and in the KMT in particular. "Moscow's tactic... was to ride both horses in China as long as possible, to assist the KMT in gaining and consolidating national power, while at the same time preparing the way for

the Chinese Communists to seize control of the KMT at the 'correct' stage."¹

Communist Russia sent Mikhail Marcovich Borodin to assist Sun Yat-sen. Borodin and his colleagues began immediately to reorganize the KMT and Sun Yat-sen's army after the Soviet pattern. The party structure was shaped into a series of organizational units pyramiding upwards through sub-district, district and provincial levels to an annual National Congress, designed as the final authority on both party and governmental policy, and a Central Executive Committee to direct party affairs between the meetings of the Congress. The party structure was based on the Communist principle of democratic centralism, which means, in theory, free discussion in all party organs until a decision was reached and unconditional obedience thereafter.

The KMT-Communist honeymoon continued until the death of Sun Yat-sen in 1925. In 1926 Chiang Kai-shek, the young commandant of Whampoa, struck against the Communists to stop their infiltration. He declared martial law, surrounded the houses of his Russian advisers with troops and arrested all Communist political workers attached to units under his command. Chiang put Canton under his effective control. In April 1927, with a good part of the Yangtze conquered, Chiang completed the removal of the Communists from the KMT structure. After a brief attempt to rally round the left KMT government at Hankow, the Communists found themselves an outlawed party of insurrection.

Ch'en Ta-hsiu, the first Chinese Communist leader, who initiated the dual policy of collaboration with the KMT and the building up of an independent Communist movement (of course with the blessings from Moscow), was replaced by Ch'u Ch'iu-pai. The Party recognized the lack of military strength and decided upon a series of strikes in the cities and insurrectional movements in the countryside. The latter were led by Mao Tse-tung. By this time he had come to the firm conclusion that the road to political power in China could be

¹ W. W. Rostow, *The Prospects for Communist China* (New York, 1954), p. 22.

built only on the firm foundation of the misery, frustration and hopes of the peasantry. In the beginning Communists could not make much headway in the countryside nor could they attract workers in the cities. Loss of prestige due to their defeat in 1927 and the remarkable success of the KMT unions were the main reasons for their failure.

The Rise of Mao

After the experience of the Communist defeat in 1927, Mao formulated a plan for organizing the peasantry under the Communists with the Comintern's 1927 sanction to build up Communist military strength. This has been summarized well by Schwartz in his *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*.

"The first condition is the existence of a 'strong mass base.' Although it is not specified, the mass base is, of course, to be a peasant mass base. These peasant masses are to be won by a program of land reform designed to satisfy the basic grievances of the bulk of the peasantry within the area of Communist control. The second condition is the existence of a strong party, that is, of a party leadership organized along the lines prescribed by Lenin. The third is the existence of a strong Red army for, in an environment in which military power was decisive, a Soviet base could survive only by possessing its own military force. The fourth condition is the control of a strategically located territorial base, and the fifth condition is that the area in question be self-sufficient enough to maintain its population."²

In May 1928 Mao joined forces with the soldier Chu Teh in his native Hunan to implement his policies of peasant insurrection. Over the next two years, in the neighbouring mountains of Kiangsi, they organized a guerrilla force recruited mainly from the discontented peasantry. In November 1931 at Juichin, Kiangsi, a Chinese Soviet Republic was proclaimed. This was the first Communist rule in China. They followed the Soviet model in the governance of the area. Mao knew the land hunger of the peasantry, and had stressed the violent feelings which could be generated among the poorer peasantry

² Rostow, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

against the gentry. Land re-distribution was ruthlessly executed giving full play to the emotion of the poorer peasants. The simple peasants did not know the real intentions of the Communists. As early as 1905 Lenin had written:

“We support the peasant movement in so far as it is revolutionary and democratic. We are making ready (making ready at once, immediately) to fight it in so far as it becomes reactionary and anti-proletarian. The whole essence of Marxism lies in this double task. . . . At first we support to the end by all means, including confiscation, the peasantry generally against the land lords and then (or rather, not ‘then’, but at the same time) we support the proletarian movement against the peasantry in general. . . . we shall with all our might help the whole of the peasantry to make the democratic revolution *in order that* it may be *easier* for us, the party of the proletariat, to pass on as quietly as possible, to the new and higher task—the socialist revolution”³ [the italics are Lenin’s].

The Communists never made any secret of their real intentions—to use the peasantry like a cat’s paw and then to throw it away like a “squeezed-out lemon.” When Lenin says “double task” he just means “double talk.” But this the illiterate and confused peasantry realized only when it was too late.

Chiang Kai-shek launched five campaigns between 1930 and 1934 to destroy the Communist base. Scorched earth tactics and the tactics of encirclement were used against the Communist guerrilla tactics. Chiang successfully destroyed the Communist foot-hold in Kiangsi by 1934. Encircled by Chiang’s army and air force, the Communists started their 6,000 mile long march from Kiangsi to Shensi in North China in 1934. Only about 20,000 soldiers out of the 1,00,000 who had set out a year earlier reached Shensi.

United Front against Japan

Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped in December 1936 by Chang Hsuch-liang, the powerful northern war-lord, and this dramatic event led to the 1937 agreement between the KMT and the Communists to join forces against Japan. Chiang had avoided

³ R. C. North, *Moscow and Chinese Communists* (California, 1953), pp. 154-5.

a direct military clash with Japan up to this point realizing the Japanese military superiority and the political insecurity of his domestic base. The KMT-Communist united front against the invading Japan was just a change in the tactics so far as the Communists were concerned. They had at least three important reasons for this as the subsequent events have proved. First, they wanted Chiang to engage his military resources against the Japanese instead of destroying the Communists. Second, they could easily make themselves popular in the country by their show of patriotism. Lastly, they used the opportunity to extend their area of occupation.

A directive issued by Mao Tse-tung to the political workers of the Eighth Route Army in October 1937 exposes the Communist strategy and tactics during the united front period. The directive said:

“The Sino-Japanese War affords our party an excellent opportunity for expansion. Our fixed policy should be seventy per cent expansion, twenty per cent dealing with the Kuomintang, and ten per cent resisting Japan. There are three stages in carrying out this fixed policy; the first is a compromising stage, in which self-sacrifice should be made to show our obedience to the Central Government and adherence to the Three Principles of the People, but in reality this will serve as camouflage for the existence and development of our Party.

“The second is a contending stage in which two or three years should be spent in laying the foundation of our Party’s political and military powers, and developing there until we can match and break the Kuomintang and eliminate the influence of the latter North of the Yellow River. While waiting for an unusual turn of events, we should give the Japanese invader certain concessions.

“The third is an offensive stage, in which our forces should penetrate deeply into Central China, sever the communications of the Central Government troops in various sectors, isolate and disperse them until we are ready for the counter offensive and wrest the leadership from the hands of Kuomintang.”⁴

⁴ Sita Ram Goel, *Conquest of China by Mao Tse-tung* (Calcutta, 1954), p. 20.

Communist treachery has been well described by Dr. Lin Yutang, the famous author of *Wisdom of China*, in his book *Vigil of a Nation*.

"The plain fact is that the Central troops have not gone into Communist areas to attack them, but the Communists have come out to attack other Chinese Units in occupied areas in the name of fighting the Japanese. The Communists openly admit now that they have run all over Shantung, Hopei, Kiangsu, Anhwei and even Hupey, and are a little proud of their victories and their growing strength. But they have not captured these territories from the Japanese but from other Chinese by bloody battles. From the very beginning, the process of penetration and expansion was characterized by armed and underground conflicts with other Chinese soldiers, and by extremely subtle and able tactics of boring from within. In no instance have the Communists been able to capture territories which the Japanese intended to hold."⁵

Referring to the Communist book, *Four Years of the Chinese Party* by Chen Chung on which Dr. Lin Yutang's book is based, he says: "If the book was translated, with its material on sabotage and political machinations, I believe no political party in the world with such a record of internal disloyalty during a foreign war could retain the respect of decent-thinking men."⁶

The following extract from Dr. Lin Yutang's book throws further light on the Communist duplicity:

"Chen Chung's book, on which this account is based, quoted many minutes of Yen-an party meetings, decisions of the Yen-an military command, and orders issued to fighting units. According to Chen, the Eighteenth Army Corps held a conference on May 16, 1940, arriving at the following main principles, besides more specific instructions for military and political workers.

1. Give the troops in Shansi and Suiyuan the label of pacifists, and gradually eliminate them.
2. Bore the Central guerrillas from within and then plan to destroy them one after another.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁶ *Ibid.*

3. Avoid direct frontal clashes with the Central regular troops for the present. Split them politically and watch for an opportunity to destroy them at a stroke.”⁷

To the Communists the united front was a marriage of convenience to be broken at will. The war was a boon, a godsent opportunity to increase their strength. At the end of the war they emerged stronger than ever before. In 1937, Communists held some 30,000 square miles territory with a population of two million people. In 1945, they held about 300,000 square miles containing 95 million people, that is nearly 20 per cent of the Chinese population. The war years helped the Communists to carry out their five-fold programme of a strong mass base, effective party structure, well-equipped Red army, control of strategically located territorial base, and an area self-sufficient enough to maintain the army and the population.

During the war period Communist propaganda was trained on intellectuals and non-aligned people. They did all they could to project an image which was palatable to the people. Their success in this could be measured by the fact that even Western journalists took them to be just agrarian reformers. In this propaganda Mao's book *New Democracy* is a landmark. He played down their ultimate aim of concentrating all power, economic as well as political, in the hands of an oligarchy. He wrote:

“If the nature of the present Chinese society is a semi-colonial, semi-feudal one, then the progress of the Chinese Revolution is determined by it as a two-step one: the first step is to turn the semi-colonial, semi-feudal society into an independent democratic society; the second step will be to develop the revolution for the building up of a socialist society. The present plan of the Chinese Revolution falls obviously within the period of the first step.”⁸

“The Chinese Revolution can only be achieved in two steps: (a) New Democracy; (b) Socialism; and we should point out that the period over which the first step was extended will

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁸ Goel, *Conquest of China by Mao Tse-tung*, p. 216.

be a considerably long one. We are not idealists. We cannot place ourselves above the conditions of present day life.”⁹

“The thesis that the state form is the Dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes, and the Government form is the system of democratic centralism, is the political foundation of the New Democracy. This is what we would call republic of the New Democracy; the republic of the anti-Japanese United Front; of the People’s Three Principles, of the famous Three Politics. This is, in name and in fact, the Republic of China, which it is our responsibility to build.”¹⁰

Of course, Mao did not abandon his Communism here. But he gave the impression that the Communists were for a democratic society which would continue for a “considerably long” time. But this was a ruse to win over the wavering people in the ideological battle.

The Civil War

The Communists had well prepared themselves by the end of the war for joining the battle, for a fight to the finish, with the Kuo Min Tang. Soon after the V-J day both the Communists and the Nationalist governments sought to move in on Japanese-held areas. Nationalist government succeeded in installing itself in the major cities of Central, East and North China. The Communists occupied the hinterland of Manchuria and some parts of North China. The Communists received the surrender of many Japanese units and acquired their arms in violation of the agreement with the Nationalist government. After a period of negotiations for a year in 1946, the civil war broke out in 1947 in full swing. What happened within a couple of years is common knowledge. Mao proclaimed the People’s Republic of China on 1 October 1949.

What are the factors responsible for the Communist victory in China? Military help from the U. S. S. R., armaments and heavy-industry build-up by the Japanese in Manchuria, were the important and decisive factors which turned the scales in favour of the Communists. Communists have acknowledged

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

¹⁰ Goel, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

this in so many words though as usual couched in their jargon. This is what General Chu Teh declared on 23 February 1950:

“The Chinese people will never forget that the Soviet Union and the Soviet Army are our friend and ally who have given us the most help in our struggle against the persecution of the imperialists and their running dogs, and in our struggle for national liberation.

“Despite the heavy destruction she had suffered the Soviet Union gladly participated in the war against Japan after winning the war in Europe, annihilated the Japanese Kwangtang Army and helped China to liberate the Northeast. In the present people’s liberation war, the Soviet Union extended trading facilities to our Northeast Liberated Area.”

Again, on the 25th anniversary of the “Chinese People’s Liberation Army” he wrote:

“In co-ordination with the Soviet Red Army, the 8th Route Army and New 4th Army launched large-scale counter-offensives, wiped out large groups of Japanese and puppet troops and liberated a large number of medium-sized and small cities.”¹¹

The Politbureau of the Communist Party of India has summarized the factors which led to the Communist take-over of China very succinctly in November 1951.

“We cannot fail to note the fact that the Chinese Red Army was surrounded and threatened with annihilation again and again until it reached Manchuria. Thus with the industrial base in hand, and the great friendly Soviet Union in the rear, Chinese Liberation Army, free from the possibility of any attack in the rear, re-built itself and launched the final offensive which led it to victory.”¹²

It is pertinent here to recall the Communist adventure of “liberation” in Telengana in India during this period. Indian Communists had no such Manchurian base to support, nor “the great Soviet Union in the rear” to protect. It is said that Stalin asked the Indian Communists where exactly is Telengana and when he was told that it is in Central India, he expressed his inability to reach it.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 38.

Communism Comes to China

Consolidation of the regime was the main aim of the Communists immediately after the take-over. Economic recovery and effective control over the country were the two important things to be achieved. They employed the existing experienced personnel regardless of political background. This helped them in economic recovery as well as to show that they were carrying out Mao's promises spelled out in *New Democracy*. Centralization of administration, extension of the party structure, military and secret police, mass media and mass organizations were the weapons used to extend effective control over the people and their life.

The period between 1949 to 1952 in Communist China corresponds to the period between 1921 to 1928 in the Soviet Union. It was New Economic Policy in Soviet Russia while it was New Democracy in Communist China. Both tolerated private enterprise, of course, within strict limits. Rightly did Mao declare in his book, *On People's Democratic Dictatorship*, "The Communist Party of the U. S. S. R., is our best teacher, and we must learn from it."¹³ During this period their strategy was: "To unite with the majority, to attack the minority, to divide the enemies and to destroy the enemies one by one."

The Government promulgated some laws changing the structure of Chinese society. The Marriage Law was intended as an attack on the old family system. The freedom granted and guaranteed by this law to women was essentially freedom to work. Agrarian reform was a major instrument for land redistribution. This legislation helped the Communists in eliminating effective sources of possible opposition to the regime. This was also an effort to rally the poorer section of the peasantry and landless labourers round the Government. Regulations for punishment of counter-revolutionaries was a measure to liquidate all opposition to the Communist rule. Communist China occupied Tibet during this period and entered the Korean War. A campaign, "Resist America and Aid Korea," was launched to tighten the screw on the people,

¹³ R. L. Walker, *China Under Communism* (Yale University Press, 1955), p. 3.

both politically and economically. Three-Anti (anti-corruption, anti-waste, and anti-bureaucratism) and Five-Anti (anti-bribery, anti-tax evasion, anti-fraud, anti-stealing state property and anti-theft of state economic secrets) movements were launched to purge the party and discipline the business class.

The beginning of the First Five Year Plan in 1953 coincides with the second phase in Communist China. It was the first move towards industrializing the country. In the sphere of agriculture Mutual Aid societies were formed as a prelude to collectivization and finally communes. A Decree was passed by the Ministry of Public Security on 30 July 1953 setting out the regulations for the appointment of "people's supervision correspondents." This elevated spying into citizen's private affairs to the level of state policy. State monopoly in grain trading and food rationing were introduced throughout China. A new constitution was adopted by the National People's Congress. China signed the Sino-Indian treaty in 1954, which in its preamble enunciated for the first time "Panch Sheel" and in 1955 China attended the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference. In 1956 Mao announced his relatively lenient policy towards intellectuals, the famous "Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a Hundred Schools Contend." 1958 is the year of the Second Five Year Plan and "great leap forward."

The Peasant under Communism

Land reform is the most important reform in any economically under-developed country. The under-developed country has always an agricultural economy. There is a pressure of population on land. There is land-hunger among the masses. China is no exception to this general rule. But the Communists used it skilfully to serve their ideological dogmatism and bring the country effectively under their control.

There were three stages in the land re-distribution in Communist China. In the first stage the poorer section of the peasantry was incited against the landlords and the latter were subjected to summary trials. Many landlords were executed by the so-called People's Courts. These executions were no better than lynchings. The available land was distributed among the peasants. In the second stage, the Communist cadres

convinced the peasants that production in their "handkerchief" farms was very poor and that there would be greater production only through mutual aid teams and production co-operatives. The third stage was collectivization and communes, "the latest development, where we have gone one step ahead of the Soviet Union"¹⁴ as an official in Peking put it.

In the formal commentary on the Agrarian Reform Law which was promulgated on June 30 1950, Liu Shao-chi said:

"The essential content of agrarian reform is the confiscation of the land of the landlord class for distribution to the landless and poor peasants. Thus the landlords as a class in society are abolished and the land ownership system of feudal exploitation is transferred into a system of peasant land ownership. This is indeed the greatest and most thorough reform in thousands of years of Chinese history.

"Why should such a reform be made? In a nutshell, it is because the original land ownership system in China is extremely irrational. In general the land situation in old China is roughly as follows:

"Landlords and rich peasants, who constitute less than 10 per cent of the rural population, possess approximately from 70 to 80 per cent of the land and brutally exploit the peasants by means of their land.

"Poor peasants, labourers, middle peasants and others, however, who make up 90 per cent of the rural population, possess in all only 20 to 30 per cent of the land."¹⁵

There are three basic distortions in this argument.

"In the first place, there has been no feudalism, by Communist or any other definition, in China since the formation of the first Chinese Empire some two centuries before the birth of Christ. Chinese land has been freely bought and sold since then, and the intervening centuries have seen the rise and fall of Chinese rural families in a cyclical pattern somewhat similar to the rise and fall of dynasties. Yet in his *New Democracy* Mao maintained that Chinese society was feudal until the

¹⁴ S. Chandrasekar, *Communist China Today* (Bombay, 1961), p. 115.

¹⁵ Walker, *China Under Communism*, p. 129.

Opium War (1839-42), after which it became a "semi-colonial, semi-feudal society."

"The point may seem relatively minor to one not trained in Communist theory, but the 'feudal' argument becomes the critical item in the application of the Marxist theory of historical evolution to such Oriental type societies as China. Only by projecting the Marxist 'feudal stage of society' on to the Chinese scene are the Communists able to justify a class war in which the antagonists are the landlords and the peasants.

"This leads, of course, to the second basic distortion in Liu's statement. There are no class divisions in rural China corresponding to the artificial categories he sets up: landlord, rich peasant, middle peasant, poor peasant and farm labourers. After a careful study of the Chinese scene the English economist R. H. Tawney demonstrated that both the class conflict and the feudal argument were inapplicable to China."

Whatever her (China's) rural problems may be, they are not complicated by the existence of a landless proletariat. The typical figure in Chinese country life is not the hired labourer, but the land-holding peasant.

She possesses no landed aristocracy, no dominant class of junkers or squires, and few beasts. She is not afflicted by complicated inequities of feudal land law; manorial estates worked by corvees, if they ever existed, have left few traces; since animal husbandry is of secondary importance, the conflict over the use of common pastures and meadows, which kept European villages simmering for over a thousand years, presents no problem. Landlord and tenant are parties to a business contract, not members of different classes based on privilege and subordination.

With regard to the various "classes" in rural China mentioned by Liu, a Chinese long associated with rural reconstruction work, S. T. Tung, has stated that "never has the rural population been classified, or classifiable, into these categories. China has no 'landlord class'."

"This brings us to the third and the most crucial distortion, the matter of the landlords. If the Chinese system of landhold-

ing were as inequitable as Mao's and Liu's figures seemed to indicate, with 10 per cent of the people owning 70-80 per cent of the land, there might have been some excuse for waging a bitter class struggle for change. But where did the figures come from? There had never been a census of land ownership in China. The closest thing to it was a survey conducted by the Nationalist Land Commission before World War II. 'It covered 1,750,000 families,' Tung Shihtsin reports, 'in 163 *hsien* (counties) over 12 provinces. Nearly 80 per cent of the land was shown to be in the hands of owners of less than 100 *mou* (about 16 acres). Almost 99 per cent of the families were such small owners, while 1.34 per cent of the families owned 100 *mou* or more and only 18.32 per cent of the land belonged to such owners.' These figures were borne out by the studies of such scholars as J. C. Buck, who conducted a survey of some 17,000 farms in 22 provinces of China. Buck found that 54.2 per cent of the farmers were owners of their own land, 39.9 per cent were part owners, and 5.9 per cent tenants. He also found that only 28.7 per cent of the cultivated land was rented."¹⁶

Truly did Stalin say that statistics is a weapon in the class war and Mao has used it effectively against the peasantry.

"Land reform in a village was usually carried out in four stages. Cadres trained for the purpose were sent to a village. As soon as they arrived, it was cordoned off for the duration of the operation; but peasants from neighbouring villages were admitted if they came to accuse the landlord. The eye-witness accounts vary about the first thing the land reformers did when they set foot in a village. Usually they sought out the poorer peasants, pieced together the facts of the village economy, and stirred them up against the landlords, especially the more tyrannical ones. The task of the cadres was to inculcate among the peasants a hatred of the landlords. General indifference or mild discord had to be replaced by irreconcilable hostility.

"Cadres were instructed that they must never themselves take part in the attacks on the landlords. They were to direct and

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 129-31.

incite the attack; but actual assaults must be made by the peasants themselves. The Communist leaders were very frank in explaining the reason for the rule. They said that if the cadres made the attack, and the peasants were left to look on as spectators, the sympathies of the peasants might easily be on the side of the victims and against their persecutors. It was only if the peasants themselves struck the blow that the Communists regarded them as committed to their side.

“The second stage of the reform was to decide the class status of each farmer in the village. The rural population was divided into five categories—landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, poor peasants and landless farmhands. It was at this stage of land reform that errors and confusion became patent. For the smaller land owners the classification of status was often a matter of life and death. If a better-off peasant was classified as a landlord, it meant total dispossession, and even a more fearful fate; but if he was classified as a rich peasant he might retain the land tilled by himself and his hired labourers. Small landowners fought desperately to obtain the status of rich peasants.

“The third stage of the reform was the redistribution of property. Peasants might demand from the landlords the rentals of which they had previously been ‘exploited.’ The demands were sometimes so excessive that it became a farce. One labourer who carried water for his landlord worked out that he had been underpaid to the extent of 300,000 silver dollars or approximately £ 75,000 sterling in current purchasing power. In parts of Kwangtung Province the demands were made for refund of rent as far back as the Manchu Dynasty, which ended over forty years ago.

“At this stage violence was even more common than in the first or second stage. Torture was a general practice when the landlords failed to pay the amount demanded. As often as not torture brought results.

“The last stage of the land reform was more dignified. The landlords’ old title deeds and contracts of lease of land were burned publicly—a symbolic funeral for ‘feudalism.’ Equally symbolic of the defeat of the landed class was that in some

parts of the country-side landlords were ordered to kneel in surrendering their title deeds.”¹⁷

“It is officially estimated that about three million landlords were executed, but according to actual observers the number executed was closer to twenty millions,” says S. Chandrasekar in his *Communist China Today*.¹⁸

After two years the Communists started another intensive campaign to educate the peasants to form mutual-aid societies and producers’ co-operatives. Peasants were told that intensive cultivation, use of abundant fertilizers, mechanization, better land management were impossible on small plots and beyond the resources of individual peasant-owners. In the co-operatives the farmers cultivated land in common, but for a time retained the ownership of their individual plots. Peasants shared the produce on the basis of their ownership and work. From this to collectivization was but a little step. Here the peasants lost their ownership rights and became proletariat. The last phase in this land “reform” was commune—the ultimate in Communist way of life.

Commune is the merging of a number of villages into a single administrative unit which is responsible for the all-round development of the village. Commune merges the worker, the peasant, the trader, the student and the militiaman into one unit. It not only engages in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery but also runs factories, establishes banks and commercial organisations, handles credit and distribution, undertakes cultural and educational work, sets up militia and political structures, and becomes all-round, all-inclusive basic social organisation. All means of production, capital construction, public building and properties are put under the ownership of the people as a whole. The commune keeps all the food supply for its members, in accordance with the ration scales laid down by the state, and simply issues food tickets to them to buy meals from public mess halls and eat them collectively on the spot. Production brigades are formed along military lines and put under military control.

¹⁷ Guy Wint, *Spot-light on Asia*, pp. 97-9.

¹⁸ S. Chandrasekar, *Communist China Today*, p. 35.

Field command, local command, rear command, as well as iron and steel field army, water conservancy field army, railways corps, highway engineering command and army services transport corps are formed in accordance with different production tasks and labour capacities. In this way, industry, agriculture and military training are merged into one entity, and the foundation is thus laid for arming the entire nation.

With the establishment of people's communes, the peasants eat collectively in public mess halls; children are gathered together and put into the care of nurseries. Even lodgings are centralised in certain areas. In short, the family as a social unit is progressively and effectively destroyed.

"What is a working day like in this commune? Men and women wake up in the morning to the blare of the loudspeakers on the streets. Half an hour of exercise in the open air—there is tremendous emphasis on physical fitness—and they go off to the canteens for a communal breakfast. Then they break up to form different production teams based on the individual's ability and aptitude to work. Husbands and wives, parents and grown-up children are not necessarily on the same team. The teams go off to their allotted tasks in the fields or factories. They reassemble at noon at the various canteens (if they are working in far-off fields lunch is taken to them to save time) for a lunch of rice, cabbage and sweet potato and occasionally a little meat. Lunch over, they march off to their appointed tasks. In the evenings all have regular classes where they listen to the radio which pours out the latest editorial from the *People's Daily* in Peking. Then there is a film or a play or an acrobatic show. And last is the Party meeting which every worker attends. Here the art of self-criticism is practised. Thereafter everybody returns to his room for the compulsory eight hours of sleep."¹⁹

This description of a commune will not come as a surprise to anybody who has read George Orwell's *Animal Farm* and *1984*. Communists have not let him down!

It was not all smooth sailing for the Communists. They had to encounter opposition from the peasants. According to the

¹⁹ *A Decade Under Mao Tse-Tung* (Hong Kong, 1960), p. 31.

Southern Daily of Canton, after the establishment of people's communes the peasants "secretly scattered their stock of grain, dug up the unripe crop from their private plots and slaughtered their domestic fowls and animals." In Shansi and Hupey no less than three million piculs of grain became mouldy and rotten due to negligence. Some peasants remarked that "whether you work or not, you get one half catties of grain per day"; others publicly declared: "Why work hard, since you get not even one dollar for a whole day's labour? Why not save your energy in order to live longer and see more of communism?" According to Peking's *Ta Kung Pao*, cases of dissatisfied peasants putting poison into cadres' food had occurred. There were even few cases of revolt. Several thousand peasants in the town of Liusha in Pu'ning county of Kwangtung, robbed the granary in late September in 1958. In early October in Honan more than five thousand peasants in Kianghua county rebelled against the communes.²⁰

Dissatisfaction was widespread because of the poor quality of food and accommodation. *People's Daily* of August 9, 1958 said that in Honan "the commune members are dissatisfied because in many mess halls they can get nothing but sweet potatoes." An editorial in the *People's Daily* revealed that "the leading personnel of many people's communes have incorrect view on the question of food believing that as long as there is rice, whether there is any other dish or not doesn't matter." In Shengi province, according to Communist official investigations, the majority of the some 105,000 rural mess halls set up in a few months, "have very simple facilities; there are no dining rooms, and the masses have to take their meals in the open air." In Huahsien county, Honan, "the absolute majority of mess halls not only no dining rooms, but even have no facilities to keep the cooked rice and vegetables warm; consequently the commune members always eat cold meals."²¹

The widespread resistance, difficulties and problems encountered by the regime in introducing the communes, made the Communists adopt a policy of go-slow since 1958. They post-

²⁰ Cheng Chu-yuan, *The People's Communes* (Hong Kong, 1959), pp. 126-8.

²¹ Cheng Chu-yuan, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-60.

poned the setting up of communes in cities. Peasants were allowed what the Peking journal, *Ta Kung Pao* called "small freedoms." "One of the incentives", reported Mr. Sudhakar Bhat in the *Times of India* of September, 1961, "which have been offered to some Chinese peasants is a small piece of land, usually about 12 ft. x 10 ft. so that they may rear on it a pig or two or a couple of chickens or grow a few cabbages. The products of such 'private enterprise' are now being permitted to be sold at rural trade fairs which have been revived throughout China." Under the slogan of "big collective and small freedom," commune members eating in communal mess halls were allowed some freedom of choice; each household was allowed to keep its private cooking stove and some members were allowed to cook at home.

In spite of running into difficulties, in spite of encountering opposition, in spite of Soviet failure in increasing farm production through collective farming why did the Chinese Communists embark on collectivization and communes? There are at least four important reasons why the Communists have introduced them. The first reason is to abolish peasantry as a class, which with their sturdy individualism, is an obstacle to Communism. Lenin has stressed that "peasants constitute the last bourgeois class." The collectivization or communes reduce the peasant to the status of a proletarian. The second reason is to destroy the family system and to build a collectivized life on its debris. Family as a social unit is a source of individualism. The Communist state cannot tolerate any other point of loyalty and devotion besides itself. The communes have successfully eliminated the moral obligations between father and son, between husband and wife or between relatives and friends. The atomized individuals will naturally cling to the party or state.

The third reason is to build up capital, to increase savings by cutting the people's share of the produce. "In 1956 the Communist regime stipulated that 70 per cent of the total agricultural income should be distributed among peasants; in 1957, the income received by the peasants as compensation for labour still reached 53.2 per cent of the total agricultural income. Since the establishment of people's communes, however, expendi-

ture represents on the average only 30 per cent of the total income, and the other 70 per cent goes to savings and investment." In Sui'ing county in Honan Province the original 310 agricultural producers' cooperatives could only save 2.9 million *yuan* (Chinese communist currency) each year in the past; after setting up of 10 communes in the county, savings rose to more than 30 million *yuan*, an increase of more than ten-fold."²²

The fourth reason is to make everyone a soldier. Their slogan is to make people "become workers when entering factories, peasants when going to the field, and soldiers when taking up arms." The number of militiamen in Communist China has jumped from several scores of millions in the past to the present 100 million. The *People's Daily* editorially said on September 4, 1958: "In the commune, everyone should become a soldier. Young men eligible by age and all demobilized servicemen should be organized into militia, put under constant military training and required to shoulder the mission assigned by the state."²³

As a result of communes, the collective living and organization along military lines, the working capacity of male labourers has also increased by over 30 per cent as estimated by the Peking regime. The second result is that the communes have helped the regime tighten its iron grip over the rural areas. The third result is that the regime has been able to draft women into production. According to official Communist estimates, whereas in the past one person in each peasant household was required to attend to the domestic side, one person can now, since collectivization, manage the domestic affairs of, on an average, four households and, in this way some 90 million women from 120 million peasant households in China can be released to take part in production.²⁴

What is the achievement of the Communist regime in the field of agriculture? It is precious little. Of course, there is no doubt that the agricultural production has gone up. But at what terrible cost? Other countries have achieved more pro-

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 23-4.

²³ Cheng Chu-yuan, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-8.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-2.

gress both in terms of per capita and per acre production with much less human cost. Peasant proprietors would have served the purpose of greater production. But then, Communists are wedded to a theory which wants to make everybody a wage-slave.

The Communist leaders declare that they want to establish a classless society but in fact they have created a new class for the old, with a new form of ruthless exploitation. This is what *People's Daily* wrote editorially on 27th June, 1956: "...before the collectivization, when the peasants were still working independently, the tyranny of the local *kanpu* could take only the form of political pressure. But now that the greater part of the peasants have joined the collectives, the local *kanpu* can terrorize the people not only by political but also by economic means. They say 'since the land is owned by the collectives, we have the peasants, by the short hairs now (lit. can hold the hairs of the peasants in our hands), and they move as we wish'... anyone who is not obedient to the *kanpu* has his labour points reduced or his rights to work suspended. They employ these two forms of pressure at the meetings of the collectives and even in the cultural activities of the collectives."²⁵

There can be no better epitaph on Communist way of life.

The result of concentrating political and economic power in the administrative bureaucracy is always the rise of large number of puny dictators. These small men in brief authority will always follow the maxim, "he who will not obey shall not eat," as Trotsky put it.

The Intellectuals under Communism

"Freedom is always freedom for the man who thinks differently. This contention does not spring from a fanatical love of abstract 'justice' but from the fact that everything which is enlightening, healthy and purifying in political freedom derives from its independent character, and from the fact that freedom loses all its virtue when it becomes a privilege" wrote Rosa Luxemburg in *Die Russische Revolution* in 1918.²⁶ But in Communist China intellectual freedom is a luxury which intel-

²⁵ *China News Analysis*, 164, January 18, 1957.

²⁶ Quoted by Howard Fast in *The Naked God*.

lectuals cannot afford. According to the Chinese Communists, "the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin are a universal, all-powerful science applicable everywhere without exception."²⁷ Everything should conform and concur with this theology. Nothing is beyond this dogma and doctrine. Mao Tse-tung has said: "All culture or all present-day literature and art belong to a certain class, to a certain party, or to a certain political line. There is no such thing as art for art's sake or literature and art that lie above class distinctions or above partisan interests. There is no such thing as literature and art running parallel to politics or being independent of politics. They are in reality nonexistent."²⁸

The Communists started a three-pronged war against the intellectuals soon after their take-over. Brain-washing and self-criticism were direct methods and the indirect method was re-writing of books.

People's Daily of 16 April 1950 has laid bare their attitude towards the intellectuals. It said:

"The breath-taking rate at which the People's Liberation Army freed China's mainland led to many problems. One of the most urgent was the problem of sufficient cadres to introduce the policies of the people's government in the newly liberated regions and to mobilize the population for all-out production.

"The government has adopted the principle of making the greatest possible use of students, government personnel and other intellectuals of old society. But the minds of such people are thickly encrusted with the ideology of the feudal gentry and the bourgeoisie. And as long as these people retain the viewpoint of the former ruling classes, they cannot adequately carry out the programme of the new government, which is based on the interests of the labouring classes.

"This problem was met by setting up people's revolutionary colleges in all newly liberated sectors of the country. These educational centres specialize exclusively in transforming old-type students and intellectuals into the new-type of cadre willing to place all his talent and energy at the service of the

²⁷ Walker, *China Under Communism*, p. 180.

²⁸ Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

people. Utilizing the experiences of earlier political retraining schools in the Old Liberated Areas, these colleges now carry out this task so efficiently that the great bulk of their students have virtually become new people at the end of a six-month course.”²⁹

This short-term brain-washing or thought-reform course was meant mainly for young intellectuals who could be turned into party cadres. This organized indoctrination by means of criticism, self-criticism, discussion, and the continual study of selected Marxist writings was aimed at “steeling” the cadres to all sorts of violence and hardship, and at the same time making complete obedience of each one a spontaneous move. This process has been called “self-cultivation” by Liu Shao-ch’i. Liu quoted Confucius to the trainees in answering the question “Why must Communist Party members undertake self-cultivation?” Confucius said: “At fifteen, I had my mind bent on learning. At thirty, I stood firm. At forty, I had no doubts. At fifty, I knew the decree of heaven. At sixty, my ear was an obedient organ for the reception of truth. At seventy, I could follow my heart’s desire, without transgressing what was right.” The point was obvious and that was to make obedience to the will of the party so natural and automatic that it would at all times be the heart’s desire of the trainee. As Boyd Compton points out, the “purpose was the type of intensive indoctrination and training which would allow the party to operate with unanimity in a situation where close administrative control and inspection were out of the question.”³⁰

The method of criticism and self-criticism was for old intellectuals. This was used to frighten them into submission. It was meant just to humiliate them and make them subservient to the regime. The Ideological Remoulding Movement began on 29 September 1951 with a five-hour lecture by Chou En-lai to a group of Peking intellectuals. Chou instructed them to change their thoughts, to use criticism and self-criticism, and even criticized himself before the group. Within a month the chief intellectuals in the Peking-Tientsin area were organized

²⁹ Walker, *China Under Communism*, p. 53.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

into small discussion groups under Communist leadership, examining their thoughts and criticizing each other.

By the beginning of 1952 the results of the campaign to reform intellectuals were beginning to appear in a large quantity in the leading Communist journals in the form of recantations and confessions which reflected endless hours of discussion meetings, lessons in Communist theory, and the writing of autobiographies and diaries. Practically all leading scholars in China were involved. Not only are the texts of these confessions a key to the understanding of Communist methods and the goals which the rulers intended to achieve through the Ideological Reform, but many of them also bring out the nature of the "thought struggle" involved. A professor of physics at Tsinghua University stated frankly in his confession, "Such thought struggle has caused me great pain. It made me weigh constantly what I had to lose and what I had to gain. I wavered on the fence and did not know what to do."³¹

The usual confession or recantation begins with an autobiographical sketch of the author and an analysis of the influences which "distorted" his thinking. These are usually the "feudalistic background" or the bourgeois influence of Europe and America. The next part is a denunciation of all past work. Many of the writers confess that they imagined themselves to be progressive and following Marxist precepts but now see how far behind they have lagged. In the third part the writer usually tells of discovering the great "truth" of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism and the "thought of Mao Tse-tung." He states that he realizes now that these doctrines are universally applicable and offers thanks to Chairman Mao and to the Communist party for guidance, inspiration, and help in reforming his thought. The fourth part gives the writer's conclusions based upon his "study" and offers his humble promise to continue to follow the great leader Mao and the party.

One recantation or confession is usually not enough. Many of the foremost scholars have made three or sometimes even five published statements. Apparently the Communist leaders are never satisfied. Tsui Shu-chin explains the plight of the

³¹ Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 208

intellectuals as follows: "When a professor shows what the Communists call progress, he is accused of having made 'simulated progress'. When he admits too many mistakes, he is accused of confessing imaginary shortcomings in order to conceal the real ones, i.e. dissembling. And if he becomes too frank at the confession meetings, the Reds censure him for simulating reform for get-it-over-with purposes. On the other hand, if he refuses to confess, they condemn him as a reactionary. No matter what course he takes—right, left or middle—he is always wrong."

Despite the success which the regime claimed for the Ideological Remoulding Movement when it summed up achievements in mid-1952 and despite thousands of confessions extracted, the strict regimentation of so many minds has been recognized as a long-range problem. During the summer of 1953, more than 6,500 Peking and Tientsin professors and university staff members underwent further ideological training under the direction of Ai Ssu-ch'i. Almost a year later the *People's Daily* still complained about intellectuals who "do not make any effort to adjust their minds, ignore mental transformation, do not want to learn the Russian methods, and kind and polite, do not appreciate the method of mutual accusation and self-criticism."

What were the thoughts which the Communists wished to eliminate from the minds of the intellectuals? Actually some of the confessions themselves provide the most forceful answers. Ch'ien Tuan-sheng, now dean of the college of law at Peking National University, for example, in confessing his own sins took occasion to stress the decadent nature of the background at Peking National University under the great liberal scholar Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei. His confession illustrates how the professors were obliged to go into the countryside and participate in the violence of the Agrarian Reform class struggle as a part of Ideological Remoulding:

"Aside from the mental make-up of the general run of intellectuals hailing from the capitalist class, I am possibly even more handicapped by capitalist education. In my complete apathy, I thought that, having already discarded the old democratic ideals and individualism, I had only to read up on

Marxism-Leninism and the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung, and to emulate the Communist style of work in order to improve myself.

“But I was mistaken, completely mistaken. While it was impossible to acquire the new before discarding the old, it was also difficult for me to single out the old and the undesirable. Following the comparatively penetrating process I went through in the course of actual participation in the revolutionary process of agrarian reform, I realized the mistake of excusing myself on the grounds of such trifling reasons as ‘through force of circumstances’ and out of ‘good motives’, and the danger of overlooking these defects under the false impression that I have made progress....

“The undesirable ideology and style of work of the old intellectuals were also exhibited in the part I played in the administration of Peita (Peking National University).

“Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei should be held only partly responsible for Peita's laxity and liberalism, while the greater part of this responsibility should be put to the account of the senior teaching staff, including myself, who managed to retain for a long time in Peita the pedagogical philosophy of ‘freedom of thought’ and ‘freedom of study’ of Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei.”³²

There was real irony in Ch'ien's statement, for Peita had been one of the centres of leftist intellectual activity under Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei; under his “freedom of thought” philosophy Ch'en Tu-hsiu, the founder of the Chinese Communist party, had taught as a respected professor and organizer of student groups, and Mao Tse-tung had been influenced in the direction of communism there as a student.

One of the remarkably pathetic confessions came from Fung Yu-lan, great philosopher and author of *History of Chinese Philosophy*. This is what he “confessed”.

“Now I feel I also have been liberated. Marxism-Leninism and the thought of Mao Tse-tung as well as practices in the various aspects of the new society have changed my thought, turning from reaction to revolution, from service to individuals to service to masses, from abstract things to concrete things, from illusions to realities.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 209-11.

“Formerly I felt it strange that in the revolutionary camp a political leader should also be a philosophical and ideological leader, and attributed it to the results of controlled thought. Now I come to understand that a leader capable of leading a revolution and leading society too in its forward progress is always able correctly to understand the laws of the world and social development and able to apply it [*sic*] flexibly to concrete revolutionary practice. That he is able to do so is precisely because he establishes and develops, in the revolutionary practice of reforming the world, a revolutionary philosophy for reforming the world. A revolutionary philosophy for reforming the world is entirely different from the philosophy which maintains that it ‘interprets the world.’ It is precisely because of its inability to reform the world that it is also unable to interpret the world. I now come to understand that I should make an entirely new start in my study before I can make myself a philosophical worker in the new society. Formerly when I heard some people saying that they wanted to be the pupils of Chairman Mao, it seemed an exaggeration to me. But now I feel that I am even disqualified to be a pupil of Chairman Mao, and that I have to strive hard to be one.”³³

What a fall!

Frank Moraes has aptly summed up the situation of Chinese intellectuals in his book *Report on Mao's China*:

“Of the many things that impressed and repelled me during my stay in China nothing burned itself so strongly in my mind as the mental furtiveness of her intellectuals. In India during the British period I had often heard it said that the foreign rulers could imprison a man's body behind bars and barbed wires but they could not imprison his mind. In China I discovered that a man's mind could be chained, tethered and imprisoned. . . .”³⁴

“For the first time I realized what for many years I had sensed vaguely but never grasped. To have your body imprisoned behind prison walls is degrading. But to have your mind captive with invisible chains is far more degrading. In the

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 212.

³⁴ Frank Moraes, *Report on Mao's China* (New York, 1954), p. 33.

democratic beholder such a spectacle creates pain and nausea difficult to describe or overcome.”³⁵

Now we come to the third and the indirect method of dealing with intellectuals. The Communists know how to bring the erring intellectuals to book and that is to starve them of information and knowledge. That is to say, they deny them all literature except their propaganda literature or the literature which conforms to their doctrine and which is harmless.

In his talks on art and literature in Yen-an in 1942 Mao had stated that “literature and art” must form a “part of our revolutionary machinery.” Since the seizure of power all past literature was examined to determine which items serve the “revolutionary machinery.” After a thorough examination they destroyed or rewrote all books which did not conform to their ideology. On 6 January 1952 *Ta Kung Pao* of Shanghai published the following revealing report:

“In more than 50 years the Commercial Press has published approximately 15,000 titles of books and periodicals. It is estimated that in the summer of 1950 there were in stock approximately 8,800 titles of books, the majority of which were questionable in viewpoint, ideology, terminology and contents. In order to be responsible to the readers, all these items were examined. At the end of November 1951 the Commercial Press completed its examination of stock and found only 1,234 titles proper for circulation, constituting only 14 per cent of the titles listed.

“In respect of the examination of pre-liberation books and periodicals, the Chung Hua Book Company has used the same disposal and examination methods as the Commercial Press. The catalogue now lists 2,000 odd items, instead of the original 13,000. In the Shanghai office alone, from 1 to 23 November, 1951, 229,400,00 *yuan*s were gained from the sale of waste paper of more than 80 tons of destroyed books.

“Judging from the above stated facts, it may be seen that with a view to enabling themselves to serve truly as publishing organs of the people for strengthening their ideological education, the Commercial Press and the Chung Hua Book Com-

³⁵ Moraes, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

pany have carried out strong struggles against the business viewpoint of the past. They have demonstrated their will by destroying poisonous books and periodicals and by examining and revising pre-liberation books and periodicals.”³⁶

A member on the staff of the Kiangsi Library wrote a note on “How We Should Dispose of Bad Books” and it was circulated to all libraries. Some of the most famous libraries in China were consigned to flames. The Honan provincial government seized Wang Jen-ch’iu’s famous collection of masterpieces of literature and art in Hsiangtan and over 17,000 cases of books were burned on the spot. In Swatow more than 300,000 volumes containing the “vestiges of feudal culture” were collected and burned in a bonfire which lasted from 22 to 25 May 1953. Only very few works of China’s great literary heritage have escaped the fire. One of the Thirteen Classics, the Book of Odes, has been preserved, because it contains “popular” poems and chants of ancient times. A few poets such as Ch’u Yuan have escaped destruction because they have supposed to have written for the masses. The Chinese vernacular novels and plays have also been preserved. New commentaries have been provided to all these works to interpret their plots in terms of class struggle.

By destroying books and preventing the entry of books as well as periodicals from outside world into China, the Communist leadership has pushed back their country to the dark ages. The Communists have done a better and thorough job of destroying books than the barbarians of the Middle Ages.

And what is the result of the three-pronged attack on the Chinese mind? Robert Guillain has given some vivid glimpses of the stunted growth and the arrested mentality of the people due to the Communist indoctrination in his book, *The Blue Ants 600 Million Chinese under the Red Flag*: “On another occasion we met a group of journalists who explained to us how they worked. ‘Are you allowed to criticise your Government?’ asked my Filipino friend, Mauricio. The reply came without any hesitation—a magnificent reply when one thinks

³⁶ Walker, *China Under Communism*, p. 193.

that it was made by one journalist to another. 'We never criticize the Government's policy—it is always right.'³⁷

This is just another case of the medieval concept of "king can do no wrong."

The following instance quoted in the same book is still more interesting.

"Why is it that your papers give so little space to international news?" Emancelli asked one of our travelling companions. "But they do. We read it every day in the *People's Daily*." "Give us an example from to-day's paper." "Well", replied this young twenty-five year old Chinese, "there's a whole article this morning on the basket ball match between China and Rumania which was played yesterday in new People's Stadium."³⁸

What an idea of international news! What an achievement of the Communist China! Many dictators would be envious of Chinese achievements!!

"If the person you question has no prefabricated reply in his official stock of ideas, there is no reply. Or at least, he can give none. On a hundred occasions I asked a question which merely demanded a commonsense reply. But the man I questioned would suddenly disappear before I could stop him calling over his shoulder as he went, 'I'll go and ask'. To 'pass the buck' for a reply or thought is the most common reflex. Also to avoid all initiative and responsibility. 'I'll go and ask' means that you are willing to transmit a readymade thought but that you are afraid of evolving one for yourself. The man who had vanished would return after some time. He never said where he had been, but one understood that it was to the place where duly prepared replies were at his disposal. He brought one back wrapped up in the cellophane of pure doctrine."³⁹

All this goes to show that the Chinese have succeeded in creating perfect automatons. This abject surrender to the regime must have made Mao to declare "Never has our country been as united as it is to-day" and boldly say "Let a hundred

³⁷ Robert Guillain, *The Blue An's* . . . (London, 1957), p. 100.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 102-03.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

flowers bloom, let a hundred schools contend” in 1957. Mao expected the criticism to be as gentle as “a breeze or mild rain” but to his horror he found himself in the midst of a big storm of criticism. Instead of the mild rain there was a flood of criticism. This episode is unique in the annals of any totalitarian country and it is a verdict on the eight-year rule of the Communists. It puts a flood of light on the disenchantment and disappointment of the people. The Communist press published all these criticisms up to 8 June, 1957 and then started a counter-attack. This unprecedented record of criticism in a totalitarian regime has been collected and edited by Roderick MacFarquhar in his book, *The Hundred Flowers*. Few extracts from this book will show what it is to be under a Communist regime.

In a forum held by the *People's Daily* on 14 April 1957, Prof. Lei Hai-tung, head of the world history teaching research group of Nankai University said:

“...in regard to the new social science established by Marx and Engels, all people are unanimously agreed in theory that Marxism-Leninism should continue to develop. Actually, however, it ceased to develop long ago and has remained as it was when Engels died in 1895. After 1895, Lenin and Stalin put forward certain new ideas about the problems of revolution facing them at that time. As far as the understanding and sorting of mankind's several thousand years of historical experiences and the establishment of a new social science is concerned, Marxism has been on the whole stagnant since 1895.
...”⁴⁰

Perhaps the professor does not know that Marxism, Leninism, Stalinism and Maoism constitute the Holy Book of the regime!

New China News Agency carried a report on June 20, 1957:

“In mid-May, at the propaganda conference convened by the municipal party and thereafter, a few people took the opportunity of blooming and contending to discriminate a number of statements that were hostile to socialism.... Professor Yang Chao-lung of Fudan University—was of the opinion that the Communist Party merely advocated democratic centralism and

⁴⁰ MacFarquhar (ed), *The Hundred Flowers* (1960), p. 26.

that in practice, there was only centralism but no democracy.”⁴¹

The professor must be a victim of the bourgeoisie concept that practice should conform with precept.

Su P’ei-ying, member of the China Democratic League and Engineer of the Tientsin Civil Housing Designing Board, said: “When the Communists first entered Tientsin, they said this was a revolution and our revolution was not a change of dynasties. The way I look at it now is that the revolution was worse than a change of dynasties and living in such a society is heart-breaking. The intellectuals are more and more timid everyday, and they are living less peacefully than during the Chinese occupation or Kuomintang rule...” (*New China News Agency*, 9 June 1957).⁴²

A new class for the old!

The journalists’ symposium which adopted “Journalistic Work and the Contention of Diverse Schools of Thought” as the central theme for discussion was in session for two days on May 16 and 17 in Peking.... Present at the meeting were more than 200 journalists from Peking, Shanghai, Shansi and Liaoning. More than twenty persons spoke.... Chief editor Chang Li-Ch’un of the *Chinese Youth Newspaper* talked about the question of to whom should a newspaper be held responsible.... He thought that the present newspapers were actually playing a role of notice board, a gramophone.... The journalists were... incapable of thinking independently.

Teacher Mo Ju-chien of the Department of Journalism of China People’s University... said..., “The role of the newspaper as text book is over emphasised. It is always used to transmit orders from the upper echelons to the lower echelons” (*New China News Agency*, 17 May, 1957).⁴³

Can there be anything more glorious for a Communist journalist than being “His Master’s Voice” of the Party, which is always right!

Chou Shu-wen, Adviser, Nanking Agricultural College said: “It is said the reason why the No. 3 bus in Nanking has to make a detour through Kiangsu Road instead of following the direct

⁴¹ MacFarquhar, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 57.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

route through Ninghai Road is because a V.I.P.'s residence happens to be there. It is also at that place that big-wigs played tennis under thousands of lights glittering like daylight at a time when power was in short supply during February, March and April last year..." (*Kuang Ming Daily*, 21 May, 1957).⁴⁴

All are equal, but some are more equal than others!

This is what Chen Yang-chih of China Democratic League said about employment policy: "I have heard it said that the maxim 'employ the good and the talented' is superseded by 'employ only one's relatives and Party members.'" (*Kuang Ming Daily*, 5 June 1957).⁴⁵

Ch'en Yang-chih seems not to understand the simple truth that only party members and relatives can be good and talented!

Ko P'ei-chi, Lecturer, Department of Economics of China People's University said:

"I think that nothing can be wider apart than the relations of the Party and the masses to-day compared with those of pre-liberation days. The schools as well as the common people have the same feeling in this connection.... A mess has been made of planned buying and marketing. As a result there are tensions in the supply of commodities. A mess has been made of the movement for the suppression of counter-revolutionaries. The Party has committed mistakes and the leaders should submit for punishment. There is an acute shortage of pork, and the common people find the commodity unavailable. Some people attribute them to the elevation of living standards. Who are the people who enjoy a higher standard of living? They are the Party members and cadres who wore worn out shoes in the past, but travel in saloon cars and put on woollen uniforms now. To tell the truth, the acute shortage of commodities is caused by the mistakes perpetrated by the people who are entrusted with the enforcement of Party policies. For instance, where has all the pork gone to? The common people are not responsible for this. The shortage is brought about by deviations committed in enforcing planned grain buying and marketing policy which make the common folk unwilling to breed hogs.... If the Communist Party distrusted me, the distrust

⁴⁴ MacFarquhar, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

would be mutual. China belongs to 600,000,000 people including the counter-revolutionaries. It does not belong to the Communist Party alone... If you carry on satisfactorily, well and good. If not, masses may knock you down, kill the Communists, overthrow you. This cannot be described as unpatriotic, for the Communists no longer serve the people. The downfall of the Communist Party does not mean the downfall of China..." (*People's Daily*, 31 May, 1957).⁴⁶

Brave words boldly uttered but to what purpose? If words were as strong as bullets the Communists would have disappeared from China!

Liu Hsien, Professor, Biology Department, Fudan University said: "In discussing 'Let a 100 schools contend,' I better start with a concrete incident. In 1950 I wrote a book entitled *The History of Development from Ape to Man*. Shortly after its publication, a certain reader published a piece of criticism in the *People's Daily*, saying that it was an idealist book. The publisher immediately took back all the copies issued and destroyed them. I wrote a letter to the *People's Daily* stating some viewpoints different from those in the criticism, in the hope that it would be published and induce discussion. But the paper returned my letter, saying that my book was based on the old biological viewpoints of Darwin and exhorting me to study more of the new biological viewpoints of Michurn. To divide biology into the old and the new was really too much for me to take. In September 1955 the Academy of Sciences called a meeting to criticise idealist thinking. My book received 'condemnation-type' criticisms. After the meeting, the *Science Gazette* asked me to write an article, hoping that I would conduct some self-examination and write about my new understanding and appreciation. In my article I accepted some criticisms, and against those unacceptable opinions I put forward my own opposing viewpoints. But the editor of the *Science Gazette* was not satisfied with the article. He said that mistakes of my book had been established and the verdict confirmed. After the judgment of the Academy of Sciences, the Research Institute, the Biology Department

⁴⁶ MacFarquhar, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-8.

and the Marxism-Leninism Study Group of Fudan University immediately followed suit. In the first term of 1956 they devoted the whole term, holding a discussion meeting every two weeks, criticising my book, chapter by chapter and paragraph by paragraph....It was criticism for criticism's sake.... They even accused my book of having propagated a reactionary political ideology and harmed the study movement. Charges were many, but evidence was insufficient. These criticisms failed to solve the problems of ideology, but led to a conflict of feelings. Some comrades who took part in the criticisms had not studied my book and only expressed some pointless opinions. Marshalling a number of doctrines, some critics denounced all the viewpoints in my book which were not in agreement with the theory of Engels. In short, that book was torn to pieces by the critics....But criticisms had become a kind of spiritual pressure under which I was unable to express my own viewpoints fearlessly. If I did, some people would have accused me of resisting thought-reform. In this atmosphere, when a man's idealist ideology is subjected to criticism and regarded as reactionary, even intimate friends stay away from him..."⁴⁷ (*Kuang Ming Daily*, May 1, 1963).

In this atmosphere of fear can man be his best self which, after all, is the aim of any good society? In the Communist heaven full many a flower is born to blush unseen!

"We feel that many concepts in capitalist statistics such as the theory of sampling, normal curves, time-series and coefficient, etc. can be similarly used to analyse our socio-economic phenomena, but these have all been thrown out of the field of statistics, without discrimination. What remains of statistics today amounts to precious little apart from addition, subtraction, multiplication, division and simple averaging, with the result that it has become absolutely dull, simple and anaemic. Are we overexaggerating the class nature of certain branches of learning?..."⁴⁸ ("Some of Our Views on Current Work in the Science of Economics" by Ch'en Cheng-han, Hsu Tuch-t'an, Lo Chih-ju, Ku Ch'un-fan, Wu Pao-san, Ning Chia-

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 90-91.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

feng. Published as an Appendix to Ching-chin Yen-Chiu, *Economic Research* No. 5, October 17, 1957.)

Is there a capitalist or Communist science?

“Not long after the launching of the rectification campaign, a small reactionary group, known under the name of the ‘100 Flowers Society,’ made its appearance in Peking University. The key members of the society have openly declared that their purpose was not to help the Party in its rectification campaign, but to initiate a ‘movement for freedom and democracy,’ a ‘movement for the thorough reform of the political system.’ They cry, ‘Marxism is out of date,’ and ‘the dictatorship of the proletariat is out of date, and unless a change is made there will be a danger of being detached from the masses.’ They suggest ‘learning from the democracy and freedom of the capitalist countries’ and want a ‘new interpretation of capitalism....’ The ‘100 Flowers Society’...was the first reactionary group of the right-wing bourgeoisie among the students in the institutions of higher learning in Peking to attack the Party and Socialism. Inside and outside the university they cried: ‘The time has come! Hold high the torches and dispel the darkness!’ and ‘the tide of freedom, democracy and reason is rising all over the world, and once more the divine fire of life will blaze!’

“...They went to factories to ‘kindle fires’ and called upon the workers to rise ‘to overthrow the new oppression and new injustice’....

“All these key members of the reactionary group are youths in their early twenties and they have spent about one-third of their life in the new society...” (*New China News Agency*, July 12, 1957).⁴⁹

This is the “most unkindest cut of all” for the regime, because these students were mostly educated after the Communist revolution in the true Communist fashion. It is comforting to know that flames of freedom cannot be extinguished for ever.

“We cannot but admit that since the liberation of the country, our guiding theoretical ideas have been conservative and at the same time profoundly influenced by doctrinairism from

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 135-6.

abroad, which to a considerable degree has hindered and stunted the development and prosperity of literary and artistic enterprise..." (Liu Shao-t'ang in *Literary Studies*, No. 5, 1957).⁵⁰

Can totalitarianism and freedom of thought go together?

"When writing about the struggles between peasants and landlords or between workers and capitalists of a period before the liberation or even earlier, you are also obliged to put in a Communist Party member as an underground leader in order to reflect correctly the essentials of history. There is a joke that goes like this: After reading a manuscript on a farmers' uprising towards the end of the Ming Dynasty, a young editor with no knowledge of Chinese history said unhappily:

"This praises the spontaneous struggle. Why not point out the Party's leadership?..." (Yao Hsuch-yin in *Wen Yi Pao*, Journal of Literature and Arts, No. 7, May 19, 1957).⁵¹

The function of art and literature in a Communist state is to be the chariot-wheel of the Communist Party.

"Fan Po-tsai, Councillor of the State Council considered the State Council to be the root of bureaucratism, for if bureaucratism did not exist at the top level, it would not exist at the lower levels". (State Council forum for its non-communist officials, published in *New China News Agency*, May 29, 1957).⁵²

Communist state is always a bureaucratic state.

"As a result of repeated political campaigns in the past many people have become reticent...I don't even dare tell my own brother about my work." (Wang P'eng-fei, an engineer in *Kuang Ming Daily*, May 18, 1957).⁵³

This is fraternity!

Yang Chao-chun (staff member, National Education Department, Minister of Education) submitted his views on the schools for children of cadres. He said: "the masses have strong feelings about the fact that only the children of senior cadres can attend those 'aristocratic schools...' Whilst the cadres today want to identify themselves completely with the

⁵⁰ MacFarquhar, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

⁵² MacFarquhar (ed), *The Hundred Flowers*, p. 211.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 215.

masses, and to break down 'the walls', fill up 'the moats', nevertheless they still allow their children to continue to receive 'privileged education'; therefore these youngsters grow up in privileged and pampered conditions, and their life and scope of knowledge become narrow; quarrels often occur between fellow students. One would say: 'My father is a director of a bureau'; another would say: 'My father is a Minister who supervises your father.' Or else they quarrel over whose family has more cars. The teaching personnel also feel that these 'heaven pampered children' are quite a handful..." (*Kuang Ming Daily*, May 23, 1957).⁵⁴

A classless Society indeed!

Ch'en Hsin-Kuei, alternate member of the Central Committee of China Democratic League, said:

"The system adopted by the Soviet Union and the new Democracies is the dictatorship of the proletariat, through the vanguard of the working class — the dictatorship of the Communist Party. Is it any wonder that sectarianism thrives on a system which regards all outside the Party as pagan elements? What do we mean by the dictatorship of one party. . . . The dictatorship of the proletariat is the 'root' of it all. Unless we go to the source of the troubles we will only aggravate bureaucracy and sectarianism by trying to combat them. . . ."

Ch'iu K'o-hui: "...the discrepancy in material rewards between a Minister, a director of a bureau, a director of a department, a head of an office, a chief of a section and the ordinary rank and file cadres is far too excessive, and the distinction between them far too marked. . . . talk of sharing hardships with the masses in a hierarchical system such as ours!" (*Kuang Ming Daily*, June 8, 1957).⁵⁵

"Since last year, workers in the province (Kwangtung) have involved themselves in thirteen strikes and trouble-making incidents. The contradiction find main expression in the following points:

Irrational wage system. . . .

Want of democracy in factory management. According to the report of the Canton Committee, if all the factory superin-

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 222.

⁵⁵ MacFarquhar, *op. cit.*, pp. 227-8.

tendents in the municipality were elected by the workers, less than 50 per cent of the existing factory superintendents would get themselves elected..." (*New China News Agency*, May 14, 1957).⁵⁶

Dictatorship of the proletariat or dictatorship over the proletariat?

Li Hsiu-jen, deputy head of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions' General Office said that, "cases of labour trouble that came to my knowledge had one thing in common: trade unions were cast aside. These trade unions showed no concern and gave no support to the proper demands of the masses and even came forward to defend the bureaucracy of the administration and defend irrational resolutions and regulations. That is why some workers in Canton, Changsha, Wuhan, Hsinhsiang and Shihkiachwang dubbed their trade unions 'workers' control departments' led by the administration, 'tongues of the bureaucracy' and 'tails of the administration', etc.... Is it not a 'crisis' in the trade union work that trade unions are divorced from the masses in such a degree? ..." (*People's Daily*, May 9, 1957).⁵⁷

After all, trade unions are just "transmission belts" in a Communist state.

"They (religious leaders) thought that there were still cadres and those among the masses who did not treat religious leaders and believers with enough respect, and even discriminated against them. Some of the Christian priests remarked that in the minds of believers there was a sort of oppressiveness, and although they went to church services, on their return home they dared not admit that they are believers. Some of the people and the police interfered with the families of these believers in devious ways; for instance, the children of believers would be called for individual interviews; some school teachers would not allow children to attend Sunday school, telling them: 'If you go again, we will expel you'. A priest said: "My child goes to a certain middle school; he is good from every point of view but because I am a priest his

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 234.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

application to join the Youth League has been repeatedly turned down'." (*Kuang Ming Daily*, May 29, 1957).⁵⁸

Religious freedom indeed!

This is the verdict of the outraged and enraged people on the eight-year rule of the Communist Party. This is the indictment of China on its rulers.

The Communists cried a halt to the criticism and started a counter-attack. All those who criticised the regime were dubbed as rightists or counter-revolutionaries and were demoted, removed, imprisoned or executed. Those Communists who sympathised with the critics were dismissed and expelled from the Party. Students took a very important part in the movement. According to the *New China News Agency* report from Wuhan Wang Chien-Kuo, Chang Tu-wen and Yang Huan-yao were sentenced to death for leading the riot at the Hanyang First Middle School and were executed in front of 10,000 people. A thousand senior Party officials were transferred to work in universities and middle schools, 200 being assigned to top posts such as president or vice-president. Writers and teachers were subjected to reform through labour programmes. Over 560 faculty members from Peking University and 228 from Tsinghua University were demoted to lower levels of employment. According to the *People's Daily* of November 17, 1957 some 21,000 intellectuals were demoted.

Mao wanted to cultivate Communist flowers in his garden but to his surprise the Chinese Communist soil gave rise to so many bourgeoisie weeds. He nipped them in the bud.

The Workers under Communism

The fate of the workers under Communism is not far different from that of peasants and intellectuals. Though the proletariat is the most glorified and pampered section of the population it cannot expect a better standard of living due to the very nature of the Communist society. Since the Communists are more interested in building a war machine, whatever increase in production has been achieved goes to feed the war machine rather than to raise the standard of living.

⁵⁸ MacFarquhar, *op. cit.*, pp. 249-50.

Trade unions are mere "transmission belts" of the regime to help it increase the productivity. The preamble of the new constitution adopted in 1953 by the All-China Federation of Trade Unions had very clearly declared: "The trade unions of China led by the Communist Party have rallied the broad masses of the workers around the Party and have thus become transmission belts between the Party and the masses." The preamble also said that "the constant increase of labour productivity" and "the fulfilment and over-fulfilment of production plans" were union responsibilities. The principle of "emulation" was introduced into the unions as a means of extracting greater effort from the workers. "Model workers"—individuals who had achieved high production rates—were given some economic rewards and much flattering publicity. At the union meetings workers were exhorted to emulate the production rates of the "models". The workers were pushed to out-do each other in establishing higher quotas for themselves. Workers, through their unions, began "voluntarily" to give up their traditional rights—year-end bonuses, paid holidays and the right to strike.

The *People's Daily* stated that "railway workers in Shihchai-chuang on the Peking-Hankow line usually work upto 24 hours consecutively. In September 1951 thirty-six workers worked for 24 hours at a stretch; eleven worked for 27 hours at a stretch; three worked for 30 hours; and one worked for over 29 hours at a stretch."⁵⁹

A group of refugees from Communist China described their conditions as follows:

"Under the slogans of so-called 'work for the people' and 'work for the working class,' they demanded the workers to increase their working hours in order to increase 'class consciousness.' Through such agents as 'radicals' and 'progressive elements', a series of voluntary requests were being made for the prolongation of working hours as a display of the awakening workers' 'class consciousness.' Uptill now, the working hours have been raised to 12 hours per day. In reality it is even worse. Owing to the introduction of 'emulation', 'challenge,' 'increase

⁵⁹ Walker, *China Under Communism*, p. 163.

production and conservation', 'inspection system', and 'methods of increased production,' following each other in waves, the workers, in general, must work 14 hours or even more to achieve the required quota."⁶⁰

As a result of increased work load, there was a steep increase in accidents in factories as well as absenteeism and labour indiscipline.

The *People's Daily* reported that there had been almost 3,000 industrial casualties between March and August 1952 in the North China area alone. According to the same paper, on 26 August, 1952, Liu Lan-t'ao admitted that injuries and deaths in factories in Tientsin had shown a 42 per cent increase between January and June. In September 1953 the *People's Daily* reported: "During the first half year accidents were not only not reduced, but were actually more serious compared with the same period in 1952."⁶¹

The *New China News Agency* reported from Shanghai on 16 July 1953 :

"A number of workers in some factories have even resorted to all sorts of irregular means to get a sick leave slip from the doctor. They pretend to be afflicted with headache, abdominal pain and general malaise, which are difficult to diagnose, or even take some hot pepper or hot water before they go to the clinic for temperatures to be taken... In the Shanghai Electric Bulb Factory, where the working hours terminate at 5 p.m., many workers go to the toilet room at around 4.50 p.m. to wash their hands and get ready to leave... the workers eat candis and water-melon seeds, talk and laugh just as if they are attending a tea party. Instances like this are too numerous to mention."⁶²

The increased concern for the state of political consciousness of the workers and their indiscipline led to the establishment of "comrade workers' courts." These courts were set up in accordance with a resolution of the Second National Judicial Conference in 1953. According to the *People's Daily*:

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

⁶¹ Walker, *China Under Communism*, p. 165.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 172.

“The workers court is different from the people’s court in that the latter is an organ to carry out the duty and right of judgment on behalf of the state while the former is one organized by the workers and staff members themselves. But the workers’ court also differs from the practice of criticism and self-criticism as generally conducted, because the disciplinary education and actions taken by the workers’ courts are of a forcible nature and those who are brought under its sanction are obligated to comply.”⁶³

In August 1954 “labour reform” was added to the possible punishments for a break of labour discipline. In the Security Minister’s own words, these workers would be “forced, unpaid and subject to strict control.” They have also introduced the “labour book.” Every worker has to carry a record of his personal history and past employment. Any “black marks” against him are recorded in the book. No worker can change his job at will. To seek or to give employment without official authorization noted in the book is a serious breach of discipline.

The Communists have introduced some labour welfare measures but they usually go to the loyal party workers. Labour Insurance Regulations, first promulgated on 26 February 1951, were revised by a proclamation of 2 January 1953. Under the amended regulations certain categories of workers were awarded benefits including aid in sickness and injury, old age pensions, maternity care, compensation to families in case of death and disability subsidies. Actually the distribution of registration cards for possible benefits under the Labour Insurance Regulations is accompanied by the most careful scrutiny, with violent “struggle meetings”. In Hankow, where the workers were registered with too much haste, the ACFTU ordered that the whole process be repeated with “democratic struggle meetings,” so that no politically unreliable elements would be able to participate in benefits. That the Labour Insurance Funds will be used without hesitation to advance the political goals of the regime was confirmed in 1954 when the ACFTU issued a notice allocating funds for the “comforting” of People’s Liberation Army Units. This was, of course, done

⁶³ Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

with the "whole-hearted, unanimous, warm and enthusiastic support of the workers."

Economic Progress

What is the criterion of economic progress? Is it the steel and coal production figures or consumer goods available? Of course steel and coal, though cannot be consumed, are necessary for producing consumer goods. But then, it is only the consumer goods that give meaning and content to the standard of living. It is said that the production of steel is an index of economic development of a country. But an emphasis on heavy industries without a corresponding emphasis on light industries and food grains is not only lopsided but may bring about a disaster. This is exactly what has happened in Communist China. China followed the usual Communist technique, the "strategy of unbalanced growth" and concentrated only on heavy industry which has a long "gestation" period.

During the first Five Year Plan period, that is, between 1953 and 1957, the food grain production of China has gone up from nearly 155 million tons to about 185 million tons (19 per cent increase) and cotton cloth production from 4 billion yards to 5½ billion yards (nearly 40 per cent) whereas coal production has increased from nearly 66.5 million tons to 130 million tons (nearly 100 per cent increase) and steel, from 1.77 million tons to 5.35 million tons (more than 200 per cent increase). It is officially announced that industrial production has increased by 133 per cent during the period.

The second Five Year plan started in 1958. This is also the year of "the great leap forward" and the battle to "overtake Britain in 15 years or less". Their slogan was to "compress a hundred years' progress into a day" and to do everything "bigger, quicker, better, cheaper". The regime forced the entire population including the elderly and the crippled to work beyond the limits of efficiency and endurance. And the result was—65 per cent increase in gross industrial output within a year; steel output doubled; coal more than doubled; but cloth production went up only by 26.85 per cent.

What about the grain production? It was claimed at the end of 1958 that the food grain production has reached the mark

of 375 million tons, that is, nearly twice the 1957 figure. But in August 1959 authorities admitted their error in computing the figure. It was declared that the true figure for the year 1958 is 250 million tons and not 375 million tons. A three-year decline began in 1959, when the output fell to about 180 million tons. In 1960, bad weather, mismanagement and the "leap" together plunged the production to 155 million tons. In 1961 the harvests were a little better and the production climbed again to reach 165 million tons. In 1962, the recovery continued and the production is estimated at something more than 180 million tons. After ten years of planning food is scarce to-day in China. People pour out of China into Hong Kong in thousands. Food-parcels are being sent from Hong Kong to China by relatives. In 1961 China imported 5½ million tons of food grains costing 340 million dollars from Australia, Canada, France, Germany and Argentina on credit. So the leap forward has become the leap backward.

The same is the case with steel production. China used even primitive methods to increase the steel production, and the production reached 18,450,000 tons in 1960. But the widespread upheaval in the countryside caused by the introduction of rural communes and the set back in the agricultural production forced the authorities to slow down the steel production. It is estimated to have fallen to about 12 million tons in 1961 and below 10 million tons in 1962. The industrial output has declined by an estimated 40 per cent during the past two years.

Military Adventures of Mao

Mao started military adventures into neighbouring territories immediately after the take-over of China. China entered the Korean war and occupied Tibet in 1950. It supported all the local Communists in the neighbouring countries like Laos, Vietnam and Malaya in their subversion and armed conflict with the so-called bourgeoisie governments.

Mao Tse-tung had declared in the Constitution of the Kiangsi Soviet Republic drawn up in 1931 that: "The Soviet Government of China recognises the right of self-determination of the national minorities in China, their right to complete separation from China and to the formation of an independent state for

each minority. All Mongolians, Tibetans, Miao, Yao, Koreans and others living on the territory of China shall enjoy the full right to self-determination, i.e. they may either join the Union Of Chinese Soviets or secede from it and form their own state as they may prefer.”⁶⁴ But this, of course, did not prevent Mao from sending his army to “liberate” Tibet. According to the Communists Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, NEFA and Bhutan form the five fingers of Tibet. It is no wonder that the Communist China should try to “liberate” these areas too.

China entered the Korean war in October 1950. The Communists threw in some 200,000 regular troops in the fight. They claimed that these were just “volunteers” and not regular forces.

In Vietnam the Chinese Communists supported Moscow-trained Dr. Ho Chi-minh and supplied him with armaments and some 2,000 technicians and advisers to establish his regime in North Vietnam.

In Laos they supported Prince Souphanouvong, who in August 1950 established a “National United Front of Laos” and appointed a “Resistance Government” with himself as the Prime Minister as well as the Foreign Minister. In December 1952 a Viet Minh detachment crossed the frontier into Laos as “volunteers” supporting the Laotian “liberation army”.

The military adventures have served dual purposes of the Communist regime. They have extended Chinese sway in Asia and they have helped Communists tighten their grip on the people. It has served as a good excuse to divert the attention of the people from their economic troubles. Anybody who asks for benefits can be branded as counter-revolutionary and punished as such.

Mao believes in gun-boat diplomacy and his dictum is political power comes from the barrel of a gun. He has militarised China and Communism. One of the reasons why Mao embarked on communes is to militarise China. Chinese Communists are in military uniforms since 1927 and now they have made the whole nation a military camp. China is now a nation-in-arms against every other nation.

⁶⁴ *The China Quarterly*, Jan-March, 1960, (No. 1), P. 32.

One thing is certain and that is Mao wants to dominate Asia, if not the world. Only this can explain the recent Chinese invasion of India. India is the only country which can challenge China militarily, politically, and economically. It is Mao's aim to humiliate India militarily, isolate politically and cripple economically. Mao has restricted his military adventures only to military weak points. He has not extended it to Formosa and other areas which have been under-written by the Western powers.

Prison that Mao Has Built

We have tried to focus attention on three important segments of population of the Communist China to-day—the peasants, the intellectuals and the proletariat.

The peasants constitute an overwhelming majority. The Communists built their success and victory on the hope and aspirations of the peasantry but after coming to power, they dashed their hopes and sacrificed them at the altar of dogma and doctrine.

Intellectuals, though a minority, always constitute the most important section of any society. They are as important as the eyes, ears, heart and mind of a body and as delicate. Freedom is not a luxury to them, it is a necessity. Where there is no freedom, they perish. Society can be judged by the measure of freedom allowed to the intellectuals. If we are to judge the Chinese Communist regime on this basis, it is a miserable failure. The regime has cribbed, cabined and confined the intellectuals in the prison-house of Marxist dogma.

Workers have not fared better than the peasants or intellectuals. Theoretically People's Republic of China is a dictatorship of the revolutionary classes headed by the proletariat, but in practice it is a Communist Party dictatorship. The Party controls the unions so effectively that the unions have surrendered "voluntarily" their right to strike—a right which the workers gained after so much of sacrifice. In return they have been promised a pie in the sky!

There is no doubt that steel and other heavy industrial production has gone up considerably. But it has not made any difference to the life of the common man. The economy has

been geared to the production of guns rather than bread. They have mobilised people for the production of guns on the slogan of "capitalist encirclement". China is cleaner to-day than ever before. Trains are running on time. But people require not merely a ticket but also a permit to travel. Can all this be a good substitute for freedom? Is it not possible to achieve economic development without sacrificing freedom? Indian achievement in combining these two must be one of the reasons for the recent Chinese aggression.

A regime so ruthless with its own people cannot be expected to be different with neighbouring countries. "I won't mind to see half of China's people killed to enforce the pattern of Communism on half of the world" remarked Mr. Chou En-lai, the Chinese Prime Minister to an Indian friend during his visit to this country, according to Mr. Biswanath Das, the Governor of Uttar Pradesh.⁶⁵ Though Chou En-lai was joking, this explains the Chinese adventure in Korea, Laos, Vietnam and its occupation of Tibet as well as its aggression on India.

A Communist state is a totalitarian state. It is uncentered, not multi-centered. Everything is state-centered, state-controlled and state-directed. It is not a plural society, where there are many autonomous bodies working in their own spheres but working for the same purpose—to help man realize his best self. In the name of society, an oligarchy owns everything and rules everything. The oligarchy does not convince the virtues of its policies to the people but imposes those policies on the people. It is not a government by consent but by edict. It does not lead them but it drives them. Honest disagreement is treated as treason and punished as such. There is no question of propagation of one's differing views since all mediums of expression are the state monopolies. In fact public opinion can be created to suit the powers-that-be by giving only one-sided version of developments.

Supposing that income is equally or equitably distributed in a Communist society, what about the equality of status or position? Status or position acquires a new importance in a Communist society. The privileges that go with property in

⁶⁵ *Evening News* (Bombay, 8 November 1962).

other societies, go with status in a Communist society. While property can be equitably distributed in a democratic society, status cannot be distributed equitably in a Communist society. Marx over-emphasized one side of property; he ignored that it is also a condition of freedom.

Revolutions have come and gone but the eternal question—how to rule the ruler—has remained. The democratic answer is a government by consent—a government of the people, for the people and by the people. But the Communists have not answered the Question but demand a surrender of freedom by the people to the Communists, who are supposed to be the mythical and historical vehicle of advancement. They do not take people into confidence but they seem to distrust people and hence they want people to abdicate their freedom in favour of the Communists.

Ant-hill and bee-hive have perfect order. But what is the use in winning the whole world, if we lose our soul...freedom ...in the process?

Sino-Indian Relations

B. K. DESAI

1949-52 Period

INDIA and China, the two most populous and ancient countries in the world, are the birth-places of two great civilizations of the East, both of about the same age. If during the past two thousand years they have co-existed peacefully, it was mainly because of the fact that the mighty barrier of the Himalayas separated the two countries and prevented cultural and political contacts between them which were few and far between. The cultural contact between India and China started with the introduction of Buddhism from India into China in the first century A.D. According to the record of Chinese history, it is the year A.D. 67 when Buddhism formally reached China for the first time, though there are other numerous accounts which indicate that the date of introduction of Buddhism from India into China was much earlier even than the second century B.C.

After the introduction of Buddhism into China numerous Chinese monks and scholars came to India for studying and Indian scholars and missionaries went to China for preaching Buddhism. The most famous among the Chinese who came to India were Fa-Shien, Hsuan-Tsang and Yi-Tsing. Fa-Shien was the first Chinese pilgrim to visit India and was in India between A.D. 399 to 414. Hsuan-Tsang and Yi-Tsing, who followed him at separate intervals, were the two greatest of the Chinese translators of the Buddhist scriptures. Among the Indians who went to China, Kashyapa Matanga was the first Indian missionary to have preached in China and introduced the great religion of Buddha. From that time there was a continuous and uninterrupted flow of scholars, monks and missionaries to China of whom the most famous were Kumarjiva and Gunarata who translated many Buddhist scriptures into Chinese.

As a result of these efforts, Buddhism penetrated into China in the first century A.D., but in its new surroundings it took

on a new aspect, namely that of Mahayan Buddhism. The period of the greatest influence of Buddhism in China was during the Tang dynasty (A.D. 618-907). The Empress Wu (705-712) even tried to make it the state religion. However, thereafter, the ruling class never placed itself on the side of the Buddhist Church and, consequently, Buddhism was generally on the decline in China, while it disappeared from India, the land of its birth, even earlier.

However, since the beginning of the Christian era, these two civilisations have, for many centuries, overflowed into South-East Asia which, as a consequence, was divided up into two predominant spheres of cultural influence, Indian and Chinese. The area described as South-East Asia was for long known as Further India. From the first century A.D. to the middle of the fifteenth century, this entire area, with the possible exception of Burma, was politically within the Indian sphere. The Ramayana speaks of Java, and Chinese records testify to the existence of Indian kingdoms in Champa, Cambodia and Annam, as early as the first century A.D. Similarly, Chinese Junks penetrated as far as India and Africa in the first century of the Christian era and the Chinese trudged overland into Tongking (Indo-China) and other areas long before the birth of Christ. In fact, Chinese colonization of the Mekong delta began in the third century B.C. The Indian and Chinese civilisations thus existed in closest juxtaposition in South-East Asia greatly modifying the indigenous cultures of the region. These two great strains of culture flowed side by side and intermingled in many areas, but did not fuse in any way. In fact, they represented two distinct attitudes of mind and conflicting world-views, and exerted very little influence on one another.

Thus Indian and Chinese civilisations reacted on one another during the first few centuries of the Christian era though the impress of India on China, on the whole, has been much greater than vice-versa. The process of interaction on any significant scale ceased after about the tenth century A.D. Since then, the two countries lived, as it were, oblivious of each other's existence for over a thousand years until about the advent of the nineteenth century.

In the eighteenth century, by increasing its hold over India, the British East India Company managed to squeeze most of its European rivals out of the trade with China. At the turn of the century it had practically gained a monopoly of the China trade. But, not being satisfied with the situation, it tried to find a route to China through Tibet, but failed. The Company's chief line of trade was selling raw cotton from India. However, it also began, in the early 19th century, to engage in opium smuggling in a big way, growing the opium in India and selling it in China. As a consequence of the opium smuggling, there arose the First Opium War with China in 1840 which resulted in the Chinese Government signing the Treaty of Nanking in 1842. The treaty opened five Chinese ports to foreign trade and the British were granted certain extra territorial rights. This was followed by the Second Opium War in 1857 which ended in further treaties giving more concessions to the British interests in China. These two Opium Wars broke the back of the Manchu China which was already showing signs of weakness, decadence and disintegration and was passing into the grip of Western imperial powers. The Manchus also received further humiliating blows from other foreign powers until their dynasty was overthrown by the Chinese Revolution of 1911.

Meanwhile, the British rule was being firmly established in India. In 1816, British forces entered Nepal, which was at that time paying tribute to China, and by breaking Nepal's connections with China set up a residency there. Gradually, the British Government initiated steps to secure India's northern frontiers. In 1890, following the repelling of a Tibetan expedition into Sikkim, which had formerly been a tributary to Tibet, an Anglo-Chinese treaty was signed establishing a British Protectorate over Sikkim. Similarly, by the Anglo-Chinese treaty of 1893, the British Government secured the right to establish a trade mart at Yatung. However, the Tibetan Government refused to recognise these treaties and British attempts to induce the Dalai Lama to enter into negotiations proved unsuccessful. On the other hand, at the turn of the century, there arose an apprehension of Tibet being absorbed within the Russian sphere of influence and the British Government was alarmed by contacts between the Dalai Lama and Russian agents. To forestall

this danger, Lord Curzon, the then Viceroy of India, planned the Younghusband expedition of 1904. The Home Government in London was reluctant to give its approval as they viewed the Tibetan question from the standpoint of imperial policy. Lord Curzon, on the other hand, looked at it from the point of view of India's security and in the end he succeeded in securing the sanction of the Home Government for his plan. Accordingly, he dispatched a mission under Col. Younghusband with an armed escort which fought its way to Lhasa. As a result, an Anglo-Tibetan treaty was signed in September 1904, providing, among other things, for the opening of trade marts at Gyantse, Gartok and Yatung, Tibetan recognition of the Sikkim frontier and Tibetan guarantee to Britain against concessions to foreign powers. This treaty secured for Great Britain direct influence over the foreign policy of Tibet and provided for the promotion and encouragement of commerce between Tibet and India. A British commercial agent was stationed at Gyantse and was empowered to proceed, if necessary, to Lhasa. This treaty was confirmed by the Anglo-Chinese treaty of 1906 which, in effect, recognised Chinese suzerainty over Tibet for the first time.

However, by 1906, the British foreign office came to worry more about the growing strength of Germany than about Russia. The German threat brought both of them together, resulting in the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. By this Convention, both powers agreed to respect the integrity of Tibetan territory, abstain from any intervention in its internal administration and to deal with the Government of Tibet only through its nominal suzerain, China. Thus Tibet was set up as a buffer zone between the Russian Asiatic empire and India; recognition of Chinese suzerainty was regarded as a convenient but meaningless gesture. It was, as Lord Curzon put it, "a solemn farce". Even then, not content with this 'solemn farce', Lord Curzon, at the same time, urged the Home Government that steps should be taken to secure international *de jure* recognition of Tibet as a sovereign state. But he was over-ruled by the Foreign Office which regarded recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet as a harmless fiction which might as well be accepted since it would unnecessarily annoy the Chinese to repudiate it.

The Chinese claim to suzerainty over Tibet, however, has always been a tenuous one, without much historical validity. Tibetan civilisation began to take its distinctive form in the seventh century A.D. in the reign of the famous King, Song-Tsen Gam-po, whose armies conquered upper Burma and Western China and who encouraged the introduction of Buddhism from India. During the following 200 years, the Tibetan monarchy ruled over large areas outside Tibet proper; but by the tenth century the growth of monasteries was accompanied by a decentralisation of authority and a loosening of Tibet's military power. During the 13th century, Mongol armies intervened in Tibet. Kublai Khan, the first Mongol ruler of China, who became a convert to Lamaism in 1270, made the Abbot of Sakhya Monastery in Tibet the head of all Buddhists in the Mongol Empire, as well as King of Tibet.

Independence of Tibet thereafter remained intact until the Manchu invasion early in the 18th century. In 1718, Chinese forces entered Tibet to forestall a suspected Tibetan-Mongol alliance against China. In 1720, they occupied Lhasa and two Chinese Ambans, or residents, were introduced. Chinese authority in Tibet during the 18th century seems to have been partial and intermittent, but, following the repelling of a Gurkha invasion in 1792 by a combined Chinese-Tibetan army, Emperor Chien Lung exacted a formal recognition of Chinese suzerainty and administration of Tibet was brought more strictly under the control of the Ambans. The Ambans were, among other things, to aid in the selection of the Dalai and Panchen Lamas, who were to receive Patents of Investitures from the Chinese Government. However, even at this period, Chinese control was far from complete—twelve years after the issuance of these orders, the Tibetans chose a Dalai Lama without conforming to the Chinese rulers and the Chinese Government condoned the irregularity. During the later half of the nineteenth century, even this measure of Chinese control steadily weakened.

However, the Chinese Imperial Government tried to establish greater control over Tibet. In 1910, Chinese invaded Tibet and the Dalai Lama fled to India (Darjeeling) and was deposed by an imperial decree. But after the overthrow of the

Manchu Dynasty by the Chinese Revolution of 1911, the authority of China as the suzerain power in Tibet was speedily challenged and overthrown. The Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa in 1912 and drove out the Chinese garrisons stationed in Lhasa. The Government of the Chinese Republic at Peking, desiring to recover the lost prestige, sent a punitive expedition to Tibet which was prevented from recapturing Tibet by the representation made by the British Government. The latter took the ground that such action constituted a violation of the treaty of 1906 between Britain and China. While China's suzerainty was not disputed, the British Government could not consent to the forcible assertion of full sovereignty over a State which had established independent treaty relations with the British Government.

Before the end of 1912, the last of the Chinese forces had been driven out of Tibet, and on January 11, 1913, the Dalai Lama proclaimed the independence of Tibet by concluding a treaty with Outer Mongolia in the preamble to which Tibet was declared to have become independent.

The British Government in 1913 proposed a tripartite conference of Tibet, China and Britain at Simla, which met in October 1913. A convention was eventually initiated by the three plenipotentiaries on April 27, 1914. The chief provisions were: Tibet was to be divided into two zones, the frontier between them being roughly the Sino-Tibetan boundary of 1727 (a little to the West of the north-south line of the upper Yangtse). "Outer Tibet", the area to the west of the line (including Lhasa, Shigatse and Chamdo), was to be fully autonomous. China agreed to abstain from all interference in its administration but a Chinese Resident was to be re-established in Lhasa with a military escort of not more than 300 men. The escorts of the British Trade Agencies in Tibet were not to exceed three-fourths of the Chinese escort at Lhasa. In "Inner Tibet" which comprised of that portion of the country nearest to China (including Batang, Litang and Tachienly), whilst the Lhasa Government retained existing rights, particularly ecclesiastical ones, China might appoint officials and garrison or colonise the territory. Chinese suzerainty over the whole of Tibet was recognised, but China agreed not to con-

vert Tibet into a Chinese province, or to send troops into Outer Tibet.

The Chinese Government repudiated the initialling of the convention on the ground that they could not accept the proposed Sino-Tibetan boundaries. Therefore, in the absence of Chinese agreement, a convention almost identical to that agreed at Simla was signed by the British and Tibetan representatives. Agreement was also reached on the frontier between Tibet and India from Bhutan eastwards, the McMahon Line. With the exception of the Sino-Tibetan boundary clause, the Chinese Government was prepared to accept the Simla Convention as drafted, including the provision for Tibetan autonomy under Chinese suzerainty, and in 1919, this attitude was reaffirmed in a Chinese formal proposal to reopen negotiations for a settlement on the basis of the Simla Convention.

After the Simla Convention, Tibet remained, in effect, independent and the Chinese authorities, while maintaining that Tibet was part of the Chinese republic, were, until the establishment of the Chinese National Government in Nanking in 1928, in no position to reassert any claims against Tibet. In 1921, the British Government informed China that they did not feel justified in withholding any longer their recognition of the status of Tibet as an autonomous state under the suzerainty of China and intended dealing on this basis with Tibet in future.

The inter-war period did not bring clarification to Tibet's international position. During the Second World War, Tibet opened its own Foreign Affairs Bureau and "did not throw in her forces on the side of China" which was directly involved in the war. In fact, when in 1942, after the debacle in East Asia, the Chinese Government pressed for the opening of communications through Tibet, ostensibly for the purpose of war but in fact to reassert their political rights, the proposal was firmly resisted by the Tibetan Government which insisted on preserving its status of neutral power, and, as a result, the project was abandoned. If Tibet had really been under the sovereignty of China, there could have been no question of the former's neutrality in a war in which China was involved, nor could the claim of neutrality be accepted by such other powers

as the U.S.A. and the U.K. Again in 1947, the Kuomintang Constitution incorporated Tibet as a part of China, but the Tibetan goodwill mission visiting China at that time refused to sign the new Constitution as it (i.e. the Constitution) represented Tibet as a part of China. Similarly, in 1947, a Tibetan trade mission visited various countries, including Britain and the U.S.A., travelling on Tibetan and not Chinese passports. These facts showed that the Chinese claim to sovereignty or even suzerainty over Tibet did not possess the slightest semblance of justification.

Tibet thus was never a part of China and had her own distinct national and cultural identity. China never had any direct control over Tibet except by conquest and even the Chinese suzerainty was of a nominal character, which was challenged and repudiated by the Tibetans whenever conditions permitted. Except for two short periods of Chinese rule, both of which were ended by a national revolt, Tibet had been an independent state for centuries. Under the Manchu dynasty the Chinese had exercised a vague and remote suzerainty, based on a personal relationship between the Chinese Emperor and the Dalai Lama, but that ended with the Chinese Revolution of 1911. Since then Tibet had been completely independent. This was admitted by the British Government in 1950. Mr. Ernest Davies, the then Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated in the House of Commons on November 6, 1950, that the United Kingdom had over a long period recognised Chinese suzerainty over Tibet but only on the understanding that Tibet was regarded as autonomous. He further pointed out that "Tibet had enjoyed *de facto* independence since 1911." Similarly Mr. H. Richardson, who was officer-in-charge of the Indian Mission in Lhasa in 1947-50, has in 1959 reminded us through the columns of *The Observer* that "there was not a trace of Chinese authority in Tibet after 1912".

Britain and most other countries thus recognised Tibet's independence, though unofficially.¹ Officially the question never

¹ Even the Indian leaders and Government considered Tibet as independent until 1950. Mr. Nehru in his book, *Glimpses of World History* wrote that "Tibet was independent." Similarly, during the Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi in April 1947, Tibet was

arose till 1950. For, Tibet never sought recognition, never wanted to exchange ambassadors or open diplomatic relations and held herself aloof from all other nations. She only wanted to lead her own peaceful and secluded life in her own peaceful and traditional way.

After the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty in 1911, the destiny of the new Chinese republic appeared uncertain and even gloomy. The Revolution could be successful largely because of the support the forces of nationalism and reform got from the regional groups who had become powerful through the decline and disappearance of the power of the central dynastic rule over their areas. But these regional interests, with their military strength, hindered the progress of the Revolution. On January 1, 1912, the Republic of China was proclaimed at Nanking and Sun Yat-sen had to step aside as provisional President in favour of a military general. After the latter's death in 1916, Sun Yat-sen succeeded to presidency. Then followed a painful decade during which the nationalist forces made ineffectual attempts to unify China by subduing different warlords who controlled different regions of China with their own military forces. The Kuomintang (National People's Party) under Sun Yat-sen was the principal instrument of this Revolution. In 1923, Sun Yat-sen concluded an agreement with the Soviet Ambassador in China to secure Comintern assistance for total reorganisation of the KMT on the model of the Soviet Communist Party. The purpose of the agreement was to transform the KMT into an effective political and military organisation which would be able to generate effective force to implement its political programme. By this agreement, the Soviet Union offered to lend its moral support and advice to the KMT in its efforts to unify the country under its banner and not to support any Communist effort to seize independent power in China. Similarly, members of the Chinese

shown as a separate entity on the large map of Asia that decorated the wall behind the rostrum. And on another occasion, a reference was made to Tibet as an independent country in a documentary film made by the Indian Government.

Communist Party (which was founded in July 1921) were permitted to join, as individuals, and work within the KMT. Thus this agreement opened the gates of the KMT to the Communists who immediately proceeded to join it with vigour over the following four years. This step, however, ultimately paved the way for the disintegration of the KMT by creating factions—Right and Left—in it, and thereby destroying its effectiveness.

After Sun Yat-sen's death in March 1925, Chiang Kai-shek became the leader of the KMT and after the famous Northern Expedition, succeeded, in 1927, in bringing virtually the whole of China under a single authority. Thus by 1927, and during the following decade, the Nationalist Government, under Chiang Kai-shek, was able to fulfil, to a large extent, the Chinese aspirations by achieving dignified national unity and reorganising China's relations with foreign powers on the basis of equality in accordance with international law.

During this same period, India was engaged in the national struggle for independence under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi. The subjugation of India coincidental with the humiliation of China by the Western Powers naturally created mutual sympathy and identity of interests between the two countries. When in 1926, Britain and other Western powers made a show of force to intimidate China and rushed troops to Shanghai and other places in their attempts to retain their extraterritorial concessions, Indian leaders voiced their protest against the British intervention. In February 1927, at the Congress of the League Against Imperialism held at Brussels, of which Mr. Nehru was the Indian delegate, Indian, Chinese and British delegates issued a joint declaration denouncing the use of Indian troops in China to serve the British imperialist interests. The declaration demanded "the unconditional recognition of the Nationalist Government, the abolition of unequal treaties and of extraterritorial rights and the surrender of foreign concessions," and urged the need of "direct action, including strikes and the imposition of the embargo to prevent the movement of munitions and troops either to India or China or from India to China." Similarly in an article on China in the *Indian National Herald* (March 29, 1927)

Mr. Nehru gave his own evaluation of the Chinese Revolution. "The Chinese Revolution", he wrote, "is not an event of local interest and importance. It is a world phenomenon of the greatest historic importance. On the issue of China depends the future of Europe and Asia, and the country which will be most affected by the issue will be India. For us it is not a matter of pious hopes and empty sympathy." He also advocated, in the same article, a widespread campaign of popular enlightenment regarding China, interchange of delegations by the Kuomintang and the Indian National Congress and the dispatch of an Indian ambulance corps to China as a demonstration of India's sympathy with the Chinese nationalist movement.

When Japan invaded and occupied Manchuria in 1931 and again struck at China in July 1937, Indian people expressed their sympathy with the lot of the Chinese people in various ways. The Indian National Congress, at its Haripura session in February 1938, passed a resolution condemning the "brutal imperialist invasion" and expressing solidarity of the Indian people with the Chinese "in the common task of combating imperialism and achieving freedom." The resolution also called upon the Indian people to boycott Japanese goods. The Congress, besides, set up a China Aid Committee and dispatched a medical unit to China as a token of India's sympathy with the Chinese in their struggle against the Japanese aggression. Mr. Nehru, similarly, visited China's war-capital, Chungking, in August 1939 and paid a high tribute to the brave Chinese people and emphasised Sino-Indian co-operation as the key to world peace and freedom.

The Chinese people and their leaders, too, voiced their strong support to the cause of Indian independence. For example, during the Second World War, Chiang Kai-shek visited India in February 1942 to plead for concessions on the part of Britain so as to strengthen joint war efforts against Japan. He, however, failed in his mission, but persisted in his attempts to champion India's cause. On July 25, 1942, he sent President Roosevelt a fifteen-hundred-word, secret, coded cable on the Indian situation which had reached an extremely intense and critical stage at that time. He, therefore, wanted Roosevelt

to act and throw his weight behind the Indian people's struggle for independence. "Your country", Chiang wrote, "is the leader in this war of right against might and Your Excellency's views have always received serious attention in Britain. Furthermore, for a long time the Indian people have been expecting the United States to come out and take a stand on the side of Justice and Equality." He further insisted: "The wisest and most enlightened policy for Britain to pursue would be to restore to India her complete freedom." He therefore concluded: "My only feeling is that the United Nations should not lose time in adopting a correct policy towards the Indian situation and in striving for its realisation, so that our entire war situation will not suffer a major setback." President Roosevelt, in his reply, expressed his agreement with Chiang's opinion, but felt that the time was not opportune for such a move. On August 9, 1942, the Congress leaders were arrested and imprisoned by the British Government. Two days after the arrests, Chiang Kai-shek again wired Roosevelt repeating his request to intervene in the Indian situation. "At all cost", he stated in his cable, "the United Nations should demonstrate to the world by their actions the sincerity of their professed principles of ensuring freedom and justice for men of all races." President Roosevelt in his reply only repeated his previous argument and again advised Chiang not to do anything that would annoy the British Government.

Things moved fast thereafter. Japan and Germany were defeated in the War and the Allied powers established the United Nations with a view to solve post-war international problems in a peaceful manner. China emerged from the War as potentially the most important nation in Asia. Its Great Power status was formally recognised by the Allies who assigned her the constitutional status as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations in 1945. China thus replaced Japan, which had been a permanent member of the Council of the League of Nations, as the sole indigenous Asian state recognised as belonging to the Great Power group.

The contemporary strength of China, however, was hardly sufficient to justify her advancement to the highest rank among

the nations. China emerged from the war exhausted, and internally riven by the civil war between the Nationalist and Communist forces. When Chiang Kai-shek emerged, in 1945, from his war-time back country capital of Chungking, his power was largely confined to China's big cities. Communist forces, who had profited from chaos during the Sino-Japanese war, were now over a million strong and roamed the countryside at will. Moscow, besides, outwardly remaining friendly towards Chiang Kai-shek's regime, began giving military assistance to the Chinese Communists on a massive scale. Several Soviet army marshals visited China to plan campaigns and supervise field operations against the Nationalist forces. The U.S., on the other hand, holding the naive view that the Chinese Communists were no more than "agrarian reformers", made efforts to bring the Communists and Nationalists together and, consequently, succeeded in undermining the authority of Chiang Kai-shek who by December 1949, was forced to flee to Formosa with his shattered armies.

During the period 1945-47 while China was going through the civil war, India was making progress towards independence. The smashing electoral victory of the British Labour Party in 1945 accelerated the process and in 1946, the provisional national government headed by Mr. Nehru was installed in New Delhi. In March-April 1947, the Asian Relations Conference was convened in New Delhi under the auspices of the Indian Council of World Affairs to consider the common problems which all Asian countries had to face in the post-war period. The Conference was attended by representatives from practically all the countries of Asia, except Japan. The delegates from Nationalist China attending the Conference took serious exception to showing Tibet as an independent state in an Asian map that decorated the wall behind the rostrum. The Chinese delegates also protested that India should not extend official recognition to the Tibetan delegation.

After India attained independence, the Government of India, in April 1948, appointed Sardar K. M. Panikkar as India's first Ambassador to the Nationalist Chinese Government at Nanking. However, at that time the Kuomintang regime was already on its way out and it was only a question of time before

the Communists could take over. By the end of April 1949 the Communist forces captured the Kuomintang capital, Nanking and announced their decision to treat all ambassadors accredited to the Nationalist Government as ex-ambassadors. On October 1, 1949, the Central Government of the People's Republic of China, with Mao Tse-tung as Chairman, was proclaimed from the square of the Gate of Heavenly Peace in Peking. By the end of the year, the Government of India announced their recognition of the Chinese Communist Government.

The establishment of the Communist regime on the Chinese mainland was the most important event in post-war history. "Let China sleep", Napoleon had warned nearly a century and a half ago, "when she awakens, the world will be sorry." With the installation of Mao's regime in Peking, China was not only, for the first time in history, unified and brought under effective control of the central government—a fact which alone would have been a sufficient cause for apprehension—but it was transformed into a regimented totalitarian state which was able to utilise effectively the country's vast human and material resources on the lines dictated by its national and ideological interests. From now on, the world was faced with a totalitarian China of more than 500 million human beings whose explosive power had been captured by a group of ruthless men who had come to the top in the totalitarian system and were firmly committed by their theory to the policy of world conquest and to a total lack of scruple about the means used in achieving their goal.

The Communist Government had inherited the traditional expansionist urge of the past Chinese governments and was bent on playing the traditional Chinese role in Korea, Indo-China and Tibet, and other areas in South-East Asia, but with more vigour and ruthless determination. At the same time it was also wedded to Communist philosophy and animated by an ardent proselytising faith in world revolution. In fact, it had adopted the traditional expansionist aims of the past Chinese Governments as part of the Communist goal of world conquest.

In order to achieve this goal, the new Chinese rulers were not satisfied only with the total political mobilisation of their

500 million population, they were from the beginning determined to militarise the whole nation. The effective strength of the People's Army was about 18 lakhs when the Civil War ended and the conquest of territory was complete. With the auxiliary militias in the provinces this strength came to approximately 50 lakhs in 1950. Not content with this, the Communist Government began, from its inception, to increase considerably the strength of its regular army. China was thus being transformed, in 1950 alone, into a formidable world military power. Its leaders had learnt war not in the manuals, but in the hard school of long experience. And in the process, they had totally militarised even the doctrine and strategy of Communism. Mao had stated his fundamental belief in his *Problems of War and Strategy* :

Every Communist must grasp the truth: "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun"... We can even say that the whole world can be re-moulded only with the gun... war can only be abolished through war—in order to get rid of the gun, we must first grasp it in our hands.

It was thus obvious from the very beginning that Red China was building its military strength not for defensive purposes. Because of the totalitarian control, Red China was, even in 1949, invulnerable within its own territory and needed no boosting of its armed strength for the purpose of national defence. The Communist rulers were reinforcing their armed strength not for internal objects, but for objects that belonged to the sphere of international policy. And here the Chinese Communist rulers, like their Soviet comrades, were quite forthright and unambiguous in their pronouncements. For them the world was clearly divided, into two fundamentally hostile camps—the camp of peace and progress i.e. of the Communist bloc countries and the camp of imperialists and reactionaries and their lackeys. Every country in the world belonged to either of these camps, there was no place for neutralism. Mao Tse-tung had since 1926, repeatedly emphasised this basic principle of Chinese Communist foreign policy. On June 30, 1949, when the Chinese Communist forces were riding a whirlwind of military success to supreme power, Mao published a long

treatise commemorating the twenty-eighth anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. Therein he emphatically re-stated his position :

To lean to one side is the lesson taught us by the forty years of experience of Sun Yat-sen and the twenty-eight years of experience of the Communist Party. We firmly believe that in order to attain and consolidate victory, we must lean to one side. In the light of the forty years and twenty-eight years of experience, the Chinese people either lean to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. There is no exception to this rule. To sit on the fence is impossible and there is no third path. . . Not only in China, but in the whole world, one leans without exception either to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Neutrality is a hoax. The third path does not exist.²

The Red Chinese rulers had thus unequivocally declared war on non-communist countries of the East as well as the West and had served the notice on the neutralist régimes of Asia that their neutrality in the cold war was, in the Red Chinese eyes, a hoax. The Red Chinese leaders, besides, did not stop at expressing their uncompromising opposition to non-communist régimes in different Asian countries, they even arrogantly declared the "Chinese model" to be obligatory to all the underdeveloped countries. As Liu Shao-Chi stated in his address to the meeting of the Trade Union Conference of Asian and Australian Countries held in Peking in November 1949 : "The path taken by the Chinese people in defeating imperialism and its lackeys and in founding the People's Republic of China is the path which should be taken by the people of many colonial and dependent countries in their struggle for national independence and the people's democracy." Thus the Chinese Communists regarded themselves as an "advanced nation" and therefore obligated to extend assistance to "liberation movements" in other colonial and semi-colonial countries. Liu Shao-chi in the same speech called for "material and moral support to the fighters of national liberation wars" in various Asian

² *On the People's Democratic Dictatorship, 1949.*

countries, thus stressing the conclusion that armed struggle under Communist leadership should be the chief form of conflict. Needless to say, India, according to the Chinese Communists, was a "semi-colonial" country and was ripe for "liberation struggle" under the leadership of the Indian Communist Party actively assisted by its Chinese mentors.

The country most vitally affected by the installation of the Chinese Communist régime was India. Though much had been made of the traditional friendship between the two countries, the cardinal fact was that the two were the traditional rivals competing for the leadership of Asia. The two had started out practically at the same time on their respective paths of national development and had many common features—like racial affinity, an ancient culture, over-population, great poverty and more than a century of foreign rule and consequent national humiliation at the hands of the Western powers. Their problems and experiences were thus more relevant to each other than those of the countries differently placed. But the two countries had chosen two different paths of development which were incompatible with each other. While China had cast her lot with the countries of the Communist bloc, and chosen totalitarian collectivism as its way of life, India, consistent with her past tradition, had elected to follow a liberal democratic path for her development. This choice by these two countries of two fundamentally different paths had also sharpened the edge of rivalry between them, as on the success or failure of their respective paths depended the course which other under-developed nations in Asia would follow for their socio-economic developments.

India was first among the nations outside the Communist bloc (except Burma) to recognise the Chinese Communist Government in December 1949. Mr. Nehru, as noted earlier, was among the few Indian leaders who had foreseen the importance of the revolutionary developments that were taking place in China as early as 1926. He, therefore, made the friendship between India and China as the keystone of India's foreign policy. He welcomed the establishment of the People's Republic of China with cautious optimism. Explaining India's position on the question of recognition of the new Chinese

régime, he stated in Parliament (on March 17, 1950) : "It was not a question of approving or disapproving the changes that have taken place. It was a question of recognising a major event in history and appreciating and dealing with it. The new government was a stable government and there is no force likely to supplant it or push it away."

The Chinese Reds, however, were contemptuous of India's policy of friendship towards their régime and were arrogantly expressing their doctrinaire doubts about India's independence, which was, according to them, fake. India, to them, was still under imperialist dominance and Pandit Nehru and other bourgeois Indian leaders were "lackeys" of Western imperialists. In July 1949, for instance, when Tibetan local authorities expelled Chinese Nationalist officials and other Chinese in order to forestall Communist "liberation", the Chinese Communist claimed that the Tibetan action was inspired by British and American imperialists and "their stooge, the Indian Nehru Government." Similarly, in October 1949, Mao Tse-tung sent a message to Mr. B. T. Ranadive, the then Secretary of the Communist Party of India which was at the moment trying to overthrow the Indian Government by insurrectionary methods, a message of greetings and good wishes for the "liberation" of India and expressing the hope that "relying on the brave Communist Party of India... India will certainly not remain long under the yoke of imperialism and its collaborators" and that like free China "a free India will one day emerge in the socialist and People's Democratic family."

To be sure, the Red Chinese view that India was still to be "liberated" was held with equal firmness by the Soviet and other Communist parties. In fact, it was the result of the line laid down by Zhdanov, at the foundation meeting of the Cominform in September 1947 which declared the world to be divided into two camps and condemned even nationalist movements in under-developed countries that were not pro-Soviet as pro-American or dominated by the Western imperialists. The Chinese Communist Party, being an integral part of the world Communist movement, was only expressing the same view.

In December 1949, scarcely three months after he had become Chairman of the Central People's Government, Mao Tse-tung led a delegation to Moscow, ostensibly for the purpose of attending the celebration of Stalin's seventieth birthday. His main purpose was, however, the negotiation of a treaty between China and Soviet Russia. The negotiations lasted quite some time and it was not until February 14, 1950, that the negotiations culminated in the signing of a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance establishing a military alliance between the two nations. With the signing of the Treaty, the geo-political shift in the balance of power in Asia became quite marked.

The immediate result of the prolonged negotiations between the leaders of China and Russia from December 1949 to February 1950 was the invasion of South Korea by the Soviet-sponsored North Korean Army in June 1950. The conditions in Korea at that time were favourable for the Communist attempt to capture South Korea by force. The United States Government had announced in September 1947 its decision, against the advice of its military experts, to withdraw the American forces from South Korea because "the U.S. had little strategic interests in maintaining its present troops and bases in Korea...." Accordingly, the withdrawal of the American forces was completed on June 29, 1949. Having determined on the evacuation of South Korea, the U.S. was instrumental in persuading the U.N. to adopt a resolution recommending the departure of all foreign troops from the Korean peninsula. Soviet troops then left North Korea, but not before a large, well-equipped, well-trained North Korean army had been created. The American generals knew this was going on, but they did not expect North Korea to attack. After the withdrawal of American combat forces from Korea, the Americans not only left South Korea unprotected and ill-prepared to resist any attack, they even announced that South Korea lay outside the defence perimeter of the United States. For example, Dean Acheson, the then U.S. Secretary of State, in his statement on January 12, 1950, excluded South Korea from the U.S. 'defence perimeter' and asserted that in case of aggression, countries falling outside the defence perimeter, would have to rely on

their own sources and on the U.N. At the time when Mr. Acheson made this statement, the Soviet and Chinese leaders in Moscow were engaged in negotiations and planning their tactics. The U.S. announcement naturally encouraged them to assail South Korea.

The United Nations on June 27, 1950, passed a resolution condemning the North Korean invasion and urging for police action against North Korea. The Government of India accepted the U.N. resolution. Mr. Nehru expressed the Indian Government's view at a press conference on July 7, 1950: "When North Korea launched an invasion on South Korea, it was clear, even without a great enquiry, that this was a well-planned and large-scale invasion." Though India accepted the U.N. resolution, she, however, refused to furnish even a token contingent of combat forces. From the beginning, the Government of India made efforts to localise the conflict and to end it through negotiations through the U.N. As China had vital strategic interests in Korea, India, from the beginning of the Korean conflict, sought China's co-operation in resolving it and even advocated "China taking her legitimate place" in the Security Council of the U.N. Mr. Nehru, clarifying the Indian Government's position on this issue in his speech in Parliament (on December 8, 1950), said "Whatever happens in Korea is of the utmost significance to the Chinese people. We cannot ignore that fact unless one is prepared completely to ignore China and the Chinese people. . . . So our approach has always been that this problem of Korea can only be solved in co-operation with the Chinese, or, if you like, with their acquiescence."

India's initial moves at mediation between Moscow, Washington and Peking proved fruitless as the U.S. was not willing to relate the question of Peking's admission to the U.N. to the Korean conflict. In September-October of the same year, the North Koreans suffered defeats and were pushed back. At the beginning of October, China warned the Western Governments through Indian channels that if the U.N. forces crossed the 38th parallel, the Chinese Government would consider it as a grave danger to their own security and therefore would intervene in Korea. However, in spite of this warning, the United Nations, on the 8th of October 1950, formally adopted a

resolution authorising the U.N. forces to cross the parallel and bring about the unification of Korea. Eventually, when the U.N. forces proceeded vigorously to the Manchurian frontier, Chinese 'volunteers' launched a major offensive on November 25, and began driving back the U.N. forces. India immediately approached Peking with a request that China should declare that her forces would not move beyond the 38th parallel into South Korea. But the Chinese Government refused to accept the suggestion. India then led the Asian-Arab group of 13 nations in the United Nations which proposed two resolutions: the first for setting up a Committee to negotiate a cease-fire and the second suggesting a political conference in which Peking would be included to discuss Formosa and other Far-Eastern issues. This attempt proved abortive as both the U.S. as well as China turned down the proposal. In January 1951 when the U.N. passed a U.S.-sponsored resolution declaring Red China an aggressor, India and Burma voted against the resolution. Similarly, when, in May 1951, the United Nations adopted the resolution imposing arms embargo against China and North Korea, India refused to participate in voting on the resolution.

By the end of May 1951, it was clear that the Korean War had reached a stalemate with both the sides confining themselves to their respective sides of the 38th parallel. In June, the Soviet representative to the U.N., Mr. Jacob Malik, suggested that an armistice was possible. Consequently, truce negotiations were opened on July 10, 1951, at Kaesong in Korea.

At the height of the Korean crisis, the Chinese Communist régime showed its expansionist character in yet another way by invading Tibet. To be sure, the Chinese Reds had never concealed their intention of grabbing Tibet before they came to power. The Chinese Communist Party since its inception had made it clear that they would annex Tibet to the Chinese Communist Republic. As far back as May 1922, the Chinese Communist Party made its first statement on Tibet when it announced that it would "liberate" Mongolia, Tibet and Sikiang and unify them with China. The original 1931 Constitution for "A Chinese Soviet Republic", however, mentioned Tibetans among those who should "enjoy the full right to self-determina-

tion i.e. they may either join the Union of Chinese Soviets or secede from it and form their own state as they may prefer." But evidently this provision, like the similar provision in the U.S.S.R. Constitution, was included as a ruse to dupe the innocents. And, in any case, the 1954 Constitution of the Chinese People's Republic did not contain this provision.

From September 1949 to October 1950, after they came to power, the Chinese Communists repeatedly made it clear that they were bent on annexing Tibet to People's Republic of China. In a speech at the first meeting of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on September 24, 1949, Chu Teh, the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Army, pointed out that the "common programme demands the waging of the revolutionary war to the very end, the liberation of all territory of China including Formosa, the Pescadores, Hainan and Tibet."³ Similarly, on January 1, 1950, the Chinese Communist Government proclaimed the "liberation" of Tibet during 1950 as one of the "basic tasks" of the People's Liberation Army. Again, on August 4, 1950, General Lio Po-Chang outlined the "Tibetan Liberation Programme" to the South-West China Military and Administrative Committee stating that the army "must launch an attack on Tibet. . . .to enable the Tibetan people to return to the great family of the Chinese People's Republic while consolidating the defences of South-West China."

The Chinese Communists thus had left no doubt as to their aggressive intentions with regard to Tibet. There was, therefore, every reason to anticipate an early military invasion of Tibet by the Chinese Communists. But, inspite of this repeated and advance notice, the Indian Government failed to take a definite stand. It only preferred to place complete reliance on the verbal assurances of Chinese Communist leaders that the Chinese Government wanted to "settle" the Tibetan problem in a peaceful manner. Not only that, in the beginning it even refused to believe that the Chinese Communists would invade Tibet or would deprive the latter of her independence. For example, five days after Communist China proclaimed "liberation" of Tibet during 1950 as one of the "basic tasks" of the

³ *New China News Agency, September, 24, 1949.*

People's Liberation Army, Prime Minister Nehru told pressmen in Delhi (on January 6, 1950) that, "he did not suppose the Chinese Communist Government wanted to or could deprive Tibet of local autonomy."⁴ Similarly, later in the same year when reports of imminent Chinese Communist invasion of Tibet began circulating, Mr. Nehru discounted them as exaggerated.

One of the reasons for this failure on the part of the Government of India to foresee and prepare against the Chinese Communist invasion of Tibet was that the Government of India could not make up its mind with regard to the status of Tibet vis-à-vis China. The Indian Government was, of course, aware of Tibet's claim to be an independent and sovereign nation, and till 1950, it was even in sympathy with those aspirations. But faced with a strong and ruthless régime in Peking which was avowedly determined to grab Tibet, the Government of India thought it expedient to ignore the just claim of the Tibetans and follow the path of least resistance—that is, of surrender.

Besides, in 1950, even in the highest government circles in New Delhi, there was no unanimity with regard to the stand India should take in the matter. It is now well-known that many Indian leaders, including the late Sardar Patel, who was then the Deputy Prime Minister of India, wanted India to assist Tibet in her fight for survival as an independent country, and "there was also some support in the External Affairs Ministry for the view that India should act vigorously to protect Tibet."⁵ At the same time, there were others, who in their anxiety to work for better understanding between China and India, wanted India to let China occupy Tibet without any resistance or protest. Mr. K. M. Panikkar, the then Indian Ambassador in Peking, who was one of the chief architects of India's policy with regard to China, was the leading spokesman of this group and it was he who was largely instrumental in persuading Prime Minister Nehru to acquiesce in the Chinese conquest of Tibet. As stated by Mr. Panikkar, "the only area where our (India's and China's) interests overlapped was

⁴ *The Times of India*, 7 January, 1950.

⁵ *In Two Chinas* by K. M. Panikkar, p. 113.

Tibet, and knowing the importance that every Chinese Government, including the Kuomintang, had attached to exclusive Chinese authority over that area, I had, *even before I started for Peking*, come to the conclusion that the British policy (which we were supposed to have inherited) of looking upon Tibet as an area in which we had special political interests could not be maintained.”⁶ He, therefore, thought it politic that India should renounce all her special political rights in Tibet and surrender them to China—and not to the Tibetan Government. “The Prime Minister”, according to him, “had also in general agreed with this view.”

What was, therefore, left for India to do in the matter was merely to urge the authorities in Peking to settle the Tibetan problem “peacefully”. The latter, true to the Communist pattern, offered in their turn not to resort to military action, but to “liberate” Tibet peacefully! On August 24, 1950, for example, Mr. Nehru stated that the Indian Ambassador to Peking (Mr. Panikkar) had informally pointed out the desirability of settling the Tibetan question peacefully. To which the Chinese Government replied that “while the liberation of Tibet was a ‘sacred duty’ his (Chinese) Government were anxious to secure their ends by negotiations and not by military action.”⁷

But the Chinese Communists were in no mood to keep even this promise. In the first week of October 1950, the New China News Agency claimed that the Chinese Communist armies had invaded northern Tibet; and on October 25, 1950, the Chinese News Agency proudly announced that the Chinese army had been ordered to advance into Tibet “to liberate the people of Tibet, to complete the unification of China, to prevent imperialism from invading an inch of the territory of the fatherland and to safeguard and build up the frontier regions of the country.” Peking’s claim that the “invasion”—the phrase was their own—had been undertaken to liberate Tibet from “imperialist oppression” was rather significant. As a leading Indian weekly then pointed out, “The phrase could refer only to

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 105

India, which is the sole country to maintain a diplomatic mission in Lhasa.”⁸

When the Chinese invasion commenced, the Indian Government did no more than send protest notes expressing its surprise and regret at the Chinese action. To the first protest note from India, the Chinese Government replied in strong terms practically accusing India of having been influenced by the imperialists and claimed that China had not taken any military action but was determined to liberate Tibet by peaceful means. India's rejoinder to this, “though couched in equally strong words, recognised Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and disclaimed all desire to intervene in its affairs.”⁹ Thus it was the first time that the Government of India completely accepted China's sovereignty over Tibet. It should be noted that before this, the Indian Government had all along laid stress on the autonomy of Tibet within the framework of Chinese suzerainty.

The Chinese invasion began on October 7, 1950, but the vanguard units of the Chinese People's Liberation Army did not reach Lhasa until September 9, 1951. It was not a full-scale military operation, but was more in the nature of a military pressure on the Tibetan Government to force the latter to accept Chinese sovereignty. For, the Chinese after the initial military display were content to keep their armies on the frontiers and await the arrival of the Tibetan delegation for negotiations in Peking.

On the fall of the Kuomintang régime, the Tibetan Government had made unsuccessful overtures to the governments of several powers for munitions to defend Tibet against the Communists. When the Chinese Communist invasion actually commenced, the Tibetan Government again sought assistance—both military and diplomatic—from the Government of India. But the Government of India refused to comply with the Tibetan request and, on the contrary, advised the Tibetan Government to negotiate with the Chinese Government for a peaceful solution of the problem, which, in the context of the Chinese invasion, meant nothing else, or less than total

⁸ *Thought*, 3 November, 1950.

⁹ *In Two Chinas* by K. M. Panikkar.

surrender on the part of the Tibetan Government to the Chinese aggression. Besides, India's policy of neutrality in the dispute made it impossible for the Tibetan Government to secure military aid from any other country.

During the Tibetan crisis in 1950-51, the emphasis of the Government of India had all along been on the peaceful settlement of the question and maintenance of friendly relations between India and China; so much so that India even declined, though indirectly, to sponsor Tibet's case in the U.N. And when the Tibetan appeal came up for discussion in the U.N. General Assembly on November 24, 1950, the Indian representative opposed the inclusion of the question on the General Assembly agenda saying that "in the latest note received by his Government, the Peking Government was certain that the Tibetan question could still be settled by peaceful means, and that such a settlement could safeguard the autonomy which Tibet had enjoyed for several decades while maintaining its historical association with China." As a result, El Salvador's request to put the Tibetan appeal on the agenda was shelved and the U.S. delegate said that but for the Indian attitude he would have voted for its inclusion.

Thus, by the end of November 1950, the Tibetan crisis was "settled" by India abandoning Tibet to the mercy of the Chinese imperialist rulers. "Both the parties had made their point of view clear, and were content to let it rest there."¹⁰

In June 1951, Red China signed a Treaty with the Tibetan Government formalising her conquest of Tibet. The treaty advanced the frontiers of China more than 1,500 miles across Asia and brought democratic India face to face with Communist China on the Himalayas. The Peking Radio announced immediately after the conclusion of the Treaty, that "Tibet agreed to allow China to station troops on the frontiers of Burma, Pakistan and India." The implications of the announcement were only too obvious: the Chinese occupation of Tibet had not only destroyed the buffer state between India and China, it had also, for the first time in history, destroyed the effectiveness of the Himalayas as a protective barrier on India's northern frontier.

¹⁰ *In Two Chinas*, by K. M. Panikkar, p. 113.

Tibet had been an important element in India's defence planning for a long time. It is a land of high mountains and high plateaus separating three of the most populated realms of the world—China, India and Russia. In the past, an important factor in the security of India's northern borders had been the fact that beyond the Himalayan barrier lay an unorganised wasteland practically cut off from the rest of the world. This naturally had eased, for the Indian Government, the burden of guarding the two thousand mile long border in the north. With the establishment of a Communist regime in China closely aligned with the Soviet bloc, there occurred a definite geopolitical shift in the balance of power on the Eurasian continent which was detrimental to India's interests. The destruction of the Tibetan buffer zone only aggravated the danger and made it more real. Tibet henceforth posed a real formidable challenge to India's security on her northern strategic frontier.

During the British régime, the Government of India, to safeguard India's security had carefully built up two lines of defence along the Himalayan frontier—an outer line constituted by Tibet as a buffer zone and an inner line constituted by the British protectorate over the border states of Sikkim, Bhutan and Nepal. When the outer line was destroyed as a result of China's seizure of Tibet, the border states lay exposed to the subversive influences from the north. These border states had a large majority of their populations following the Tibetan type of Buddhism and looking to Lhasa as their spiritual home. This rendered them extremely vulnerable to infiltration and subversion from across the border.

The Chinese Communists, besides, had also openly shown that they had evil designs against these border states. When, in the latter half of 1949, the Indian Government took control of the administration of Sikkim, the Chinese press raised a hue and a cry over India's aggression against a country "traditionally under Chinese suzerainty."

The Government of India showed its awareness of the possible Chinese threat to these border states. Mr. Nehru, for example, speaking in Parliament on December 6, 1950 said:

“Our interest in the internal conditions of Nepal has become still more acute and personal because of the developments across our borders, to be frank, especially those in China and Tibet.... We are also interested in the security of our own country. From time immemorial, the Himalayas have provided us with a magnificent frontier. Of course, they are no longer as impassable as they used to be, but are still fairly effective. We cannot allow that barrier to be penetrated because it is also the principal barrier to India. We cannot allow anything to go wrong in Nepal or permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened, because that would be a risk to our own security.”

Accordingly, the Indian Government took positive measures to strengthen its position along the Himalayan frontier. It signed a Treaty with Bhutan on August 8, 1949, which enabled India to take control of the external relations of Bhutan in return for an annual subsidy of Rs. 5 lakhs. Similarly, on July 31, 1950, the Indo-Nepalese Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed to strengthen the “neighbourly friendship” between the two countries and providing that “the two Governments undertake to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighbouring state likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two Governments.” India, at the same time, extended assistance to Nepal for training an army and civil service and for building roads and setting up schools. With regard to Sikkim, India entered into a similar treaty with it on December 5, 1950, which stipulated that “Shikkim shall continue to be a protectorate of India and... shall enjoy autonomy in regard to its internal affairs.” The Government of India, by the treaty, undertook the responsibility for “the defence and territorial integrity of Sikkim” and acquired the “right to station troops anywhere within Sikkim.”

Side by side, the Government of India also took some steps to guard the country's frontier in forward areas near the Indo-Tibetan border in Ladakh, U.P. and the North-East frontier area. However, these measures were only in the nature of extending the Government's administrative and political control

in the hitherto unguarded or neglected region and were in no way adequate to meet the growing Chinese threat. China, on the other hand, right after its conquest of Tibet, began to consolidate its position and set up military posts along Tibet's border with India. By August 1951, it had garrisoned Gartok, which is on the main trade route from Simla to Tibet, and deployed well-equipped troops at places of strategic importance on Tibet's frontier with India. The Chinese also, in 1951, undertook a road-building programme to connect Gartok to Lhasa, a distance of 800 miles by a motorable road, and began connecting distant places by wireless and by roads that could be used for motor transport. Similarly, airstrips were built ostensibly for a Chinese-Russian air company, but obviously these airstrips could be used as air bases when the need would arise.

In 1951 only Tibet was thus being transformed by the Chinese into a forward base for political penetration and military operations. In the middle of 1951, the Central Office of the Chinese Communist Party sent a message to the Nepalese Communist Party saying: "After the liberation of Tibet, the Chinese people and the Nepalese people will unite in closer solidarity in the common struggle for the sake of defending Asia and world peace." The implications of this message were made only too clear when in January 1952, the Nepalese Communist Party made an attempt to seize power in which infiltration from Tibet was found to have played a major part. The insurrection was, however, unsuccessful and its leader, Dr. K. I. Singh, escaped into Tibet where he received honoured asylum. When the direct attempt at the seizure of power through their agents in Nepal failed, the Chinese immediately changed their tactics and began exploring ways for indirect subversion from within by establishing diplomatic relations with Nepal. They could not do this on their own as Nepal was considered to be within India's sphere of influence. The Chinese leaders therefore, tried to persuade the Indian Government to assist them in this matter. In April 1952, Mr. Chou en-Lai indicated to Mr. Panikkar in Peking "that he would welcome our good offices for the establishment of direct diplomatic relations with Nepal." India, of course, was not averse to such a step, but as Mr. Panikkar explained to the Chinese

Prime Minister, "the position in Nepal was a little confused and uncertain and that it would be better to wait for a time before taking up the matter."¹¹

Another development during the period having a bearing on Sino-Indian relations was India's decision not to participate in the San Francisco Conference held in September 1951 to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty. The Conference was jointly sponsored by the U.S.A. and the U.K. Of all the Asian countries concerned with the Peace Treaty, only India and Burma boycotted the Conference. India declined to participate in the Conference because, as Mr. Nehru in his statement made in Parliament on August 27, 1951, said, "the Anglo-American draft did not fully satisfy India's insistence that the treaty should concede to Japan a position of honour, equality and contentment among the free nations", and secondly, that "the terms failed to fulfil India's condition that the treaty should enable all countries especially interested in the maintenance of a stable peace in the Far East to subscribe to the Treaty, sooner or later." India refused to attend the Conference because, to put it more concretely, the Treaty failed to restore Formosa to China, and continued the prevalent legislative and administrative control of U.S. over the Ryukyu and Bonin islands which should have properly been Japanese territory and provided for the retention of the U.S. occupation forces in Japan. The Chinese Communist rulers were deeply impressed by the Indian Government's stand.

In 1951, the Chinese Communist Government first launched their programme of so-called cultural exchanges between India and China. In the spring of the same year, an India-China Friendship Association was formed with Mr. Tripurari Chakravarty, Professor of Chinese History at Calcutta University, as Secretary of its Organising Committee. Soon branches of this Association mushroomed in many of the important cities in the country. In April 1951, Dr. M. Atal visited China as the Indian delegate to the World Peace Council. Though Dr. Atal was the first unofficial Indian leader to visit China, the first important Indian delegation to visit China was the group led by

¹¹ Panikkar, *op. cit.*

the noted Gandhian, Pandit Sunderlal, who later became one of the prominent worshippers of Red China. The group contained a large number of outstanding intellectual figures, the majority of whom were fellow-travellers. It included Mr. R. K. Karanjia, Editor, *Blitz*, Prof. Tripurari Chakravarty, Mrs. Hannah Sen, President — All India Women's Conference, Dr. J. C. Kumarappa, noted Gandhian, Prof. V. K. R. V. Rao, the then Director of the Delhi School of Economics, Dr. Mulk Raj Anand, well-known fellow-travelling writer, Prof. Mohammed Habib from Aligarh Muslim University, Prof. Nirmal C. Bhattacharya from Calcutta, Mr. K. A. Abbas, fellow-traveller, Mr. Raja Hutheesing, journalist, Prof. Mohammed Mujeeb of Jamia Millia Islamia, Delhi, Mr. Mata Din Bagheria, journalist, and Pandit Sunderlal. The delegation was on a conducted tour in China from 22nd September to 30th October. Most of the delegates toured China with pre-conceived notions and uncritical mind and accepted as a true picture whatever their hosts told them during their stay. Mr. Panikkar, Indian Ambassador in Peking, also encouraged them to suspend their critical faculties by giving them information on China, at the beginning of their tour, which seemed almost like Chinese Communist propaganda. For example, on the second day of their stay in Peking, Mr. Panikkar briefed them on conditions in China. The nature of Mr. Panikkar's account of conditions prevailing then in China can be judged from the report written by Pandit Sunderlal after his return. Mr. Panikkar, according to Sunderlal, told them, among other things, the following:

The (Chinese) Government adheres strictly to the principle of religious liberty and observes perfect neutrality in religious matters.

It is wrong to say that the press in China is entirely controlled by the Government. There are more than forty-three private-owned dailies in the country over whose policy the Government does not exercise any control.

There is no compulsion in China in the matter of work. If you want to sit quietly in your house, nobody will disturb you.

When it is said that several million soldiers of Chiang Kai-

Shek were 'liquidated,' the meaning is that they were only disarmed and put out of action.

The Trade Unions here (in China) do not function for increase of wages. There is no need for it.

The Chinese have no aggressive or territorial designs against any other country.

Tibet today not only enjoys full religious and other liberties, but also, as a part of the great People's Republic of China, is safe against any aggression.¹²

With such "briefing", it is no wonder, they moved from place to place in China making such astounding statements as "The great leaders of the People's Republic—Chairman Mao Tse-tung, General Chu Teh, Premier Chou en-Lai, Vice-Chairman Lio Shao-Chi—are household names in India" (Pandit Sunderlal), or "I can tell you as a professor, who mixes with young people, that we in India know that China stands for peace. We know that your volunteer army is fighting in Korea to preserve peace in Asia" (Dr. V. K. R. V. Rao). On their return to India, many of them wrote glowing accounts of what they saw in New China. These accounts were full of praise for Chinese 'achievements' contrasting them, in many cases, with India's 'failures' in the respective fields. Their attitude could be judged from the following statement Mr. Karanjia made in his article "How China Solved Its Problems and Ours" written soon after his return from China:

"We, in our non-violence, have forgotten Gandhi. The Chinese have somehow resurrected him through the violence and vitality of their revolution. And that is also one of the many miracles you have to go to China to see for yourself!"¹³

In return for the visit of the Indian goodwill mission, a Chinese cultural delegation of 15 scholars, artists and scientists, led by China's Vice-Minister for Culture, came to India in November 1951 for a five-week stay. This was one of the first Chinese delegations to visit a non-communist country. This delegation, during its stay in India, refused to visit Kashmir

¹² *China Today*, Pandit Sunderlal, 1952.

¹³ *Ibid.*

because refugees from Tibet and other parts of China had found asylum there at that time. The last days of the stay of the delegation in India were marred by a controversy between the India-China Friendship Association and the West Bengal Government which objected to the Association's holding a public reception to the delegation at the Calcutta Maidan. The Government asked the Association to hold the reception at one of the city halls instead of at the Maidan. It feared that if the function was held at the Maidan it would attract large crowds and thereby would give valuable and gratuitous publicity to the Communists on the eve of the first general election. The Association refused to change its venue and the programme had to be eventually dropped.

The result of the first exchange of goodwill missions between India and China was favourable to the Chinese much beyond their expectations. It generated blind pro-China enthusiasm in India and many of the Indian delegates after their return willingly became enthusiastic salesmen of the Chinese régime. This naturally prompted Peking to intensify its cultural diplomacy and widen the scope of exchanges between the two countries in subsequent years. Mao Tse-tung's works were translated into English and into some of the Indian languages; branches of the India-China Friendship Association proliferated and pro-China books and articles began to appear in prominent Indian journals. In 1952, literally hundreds of Indians visited China in various delegations. There were trade union delegations for the May Day celebrations, the first official Indian Government's Cultural Goodwill Mission led by Mrs. Vijayalaxmi Pandit and the 60-member delegation to the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference in September 1952. There were many individual visits on the special invitation of the Chinese Government and there was even a visit of an Indian table-tennis team. The most important delegation was, however, the one led by Mrs. Pandit which included, among others, Acharya Narendra Dev, Dr. Amaranath Jha, Prof. P. C. Bagchi, Dr. B. N. Ganguli, Mr. Frank Moraes, Mr. Chellapati Rao, Mr. N. S. Bendre and Mr. Raja Hutheesing. The delegation visited China on the occasion of the May Day celebrations. It was representative in character and balanced

in its composition. A few of the delegates after their return published their observations of the "New China" which were in refreshing contrast to the unbalanced accounts of Chinese 'miracles' published by many of the delegates included in the first unofficial delegation. The most notable among these were *Report on Mao's China* by Mr. Frank Moraes and *Window on China* by Mr. Raja Hutheesing. Both of them, being skilled and well-informed journalists, could critically assess the achievements and significance of the Chinese experiment. Their accounts covered many important aspects of the Chinese communist régime and attempted to answer many important questions relating to the future course of developments in China and their likely consequences on India-China relations.

The period 1949-52 was a formative period of India's foreign policy. These were the years of India's initial encounter with the outside world—both the East as well as the West—as an independent country. As a country which had recently achieved her independence, she was naturally much conscious of her colonial past and consequently jealous of her independence. Internally, she was resolved to eradicate prevalent backwardness and poverty and accomplish her transition to the twentieth century within the shortest possible period. Externally, she was determined to avoid all entangling alliances and assert her independence by judging each issue on its merits in the light of her own wisdom and consistent with her own national interests.

India's achievement of independence had marked the beginning of the end of the Western colonial era in Asia. It was accompanied by a startling growth of national liberation movements in most of the Asian countries. Because of her strategic position, India had come to be looked upon as the natural leader and spokesman of resurgent Asian nationalism. This Asian nationalism was not ready to allow the Asians to be treated like dead weight in the world balance of power. It was insisting on an equality of status for Asian nations in international councils and demanding that the Asian view must be given due importance, especially in the settlement of Asian problems.

All these factors naturally shaped India's foreign policy during this period. In regard to China, India from the very

beginning advocated diplomatic recognition of the Chinese Communist regime and held the view that "any system of international relations which ignores the major fact of the emergence of a new, united and powerful China cannot be conducive to peace or good understanding and that the primary condition of a peaceful settlement of Far Eastern questions is the frank acceptance of the change that has taken place in China". Coupled with this was the strong belief that henceforth peace in Asia would depend very much on how India and China behaved towards each other. Friendship between India and China became, consequently, the most important element in India's foreign policy. But, unfortunately, in the initial stages of the formulation of its China policy, the Government of India failed to take note of the basic fact of the Chinese revolution, viz., that Chinese rulers were Communists first and last and hence were fundamentally committed to expand the frontiers of Communism in Asia. A revitalised and over-populated country, like China, with a Government irrevocably committed in its ideology to the ultimate goal of world conquest, was sooner or later bound to seek expansion of its land frontiers. This became apparent within a year of the Communist rule when the Chinese Communist regime showed its aggressive character in three different directions—Korea, Indo-China and Tibet. That India was also one of the potential victims of the Chinese expansionist greed was clear from Mao's writings—published as early as 1939—wherein he had indirectly laid claim to Bhutan and Nepal. It was also clear from the Chinese Communist characterisation of Mr. Nehru as a "running dog of imperialism." But the most clear warning was provided by the Chinese Communists in their official maps published immediately after they came to power. These maps, published in 1950, showed China's boundary upto the Brahmaputra and including portions of Assam and certain Himalayan valleys. In February 1951, the Chinese Communists, in reply to India's protest, assured the Government of India that these maps "are not official maps" but were the old maps prepared during the Chiang Kai-shek regime. But at the same time, that is, at the beginning of 1951, the Chinese Ambassador in Burma

also was officially displaying a map of China that included the Indian territories in question.

But, when the Chinese Communists, during 1949-52, had adopted a policy of violent expansion, ideological as well as territorial, the Government of India steadfastly refused to believe that the new Chinese rulers were either Communists or expansionists. It tried to find excuses for Chinese aggressive activities which it considered as mere aberrations to be attributed to the initial enthusiasm and exuberance of the Chinese revolution and to the Chinese fear of Western imperialists. When the Chinese Communist army invaded Tibet in 1950, Mr. Nehru, for example, stated that the "apprehension in Peking that the U.S.A. was bent on the destruction of the new régime in China was rightly or wrongly very real", and he wondered whether their apprehension "might not have influenced the Chinese decision to move into Tibet" (*Times of India*, October 31, 1950).

To be sure, the Indian Government's will to resist on the Tibetan issue was paralysed by the overwhelming fear of the possible outbreak of a world war during the period because of the Korean conflict. Addressing a public meeting in Bombay on November 7, 1950, Mr. Nehru expressed his fear that "another disastrous global war might break out in the next fifteen months and plunge the world into irrecoverable chaos." Red China was principally involved in these developments and India, as the uncommitted Asian country, was favourably placed to mediate between the contending parties, specially because she was on friendly terms with China. Speaking in Parliament on December 6, 1950, Mr. Nehru stated: "India has a rather special responsibility with regard to China because, apart from the countries of the Soviet group, India is the only country which could find through its Ambassador what the reaction of the Chinese Government is to developing events." These factors naturally prompted the Indian Government to win the Chinese friendship in exchange for Tibet's independence.

The Korean War gave India the first opportunity to make spectacular attempts at mediation between the Communist bloc and the West. India's attempts at conciliation failed because of the very nature of the conflict which was essentially

a part of the global conflict between the Communist and the non-communist world. The Korean armistice negotiations could begin only when both the sides realised that the conflict had reached a stalemate and no further advance was possible unless yet another major offensive was launched for which none of them was willing. The Korean war itself was started by the North Koreans with the full backing of the Chinese and Soviet Communists. But when the American forces drove back the North Korean Army and crossed the 38th parallel, Peking was confirmed in its fear that the Americans and their allies were using the war to break Communism in China. The irony was that the Korean operation had been intended against Russia and there was no serious intention on the part of the West to carry war into China. In fact, when the Chinese Communists set up their régime in Peking, the Americans had prudently withdrawn from China and, for a short time thereafter, were even inclined to recognise the new Chinese régime. If Peking had shown some accomodating spirit, it would almost certainly have been recognised before long by America. The Korean War, however, destroyed all the chances of any rapprochement between the U.S. and China.

The Government of India throughout this period (1949-52) clung to the view that the trouble in South-East Asia was due to the Western failure to recognise China as a Great Power. The Communist Government, according to New Delhi's thinking, was merely following the traditional Chinese policies in respect of Korea, Japan, Tibet, Indo-China and Formosa, and no settlement in these areas was possible unless China was a party to any agreement pertaining to them. However, in her excessive anxiety to champion China's cause, India frequently adopted a double standard of value-judgement. For, China's traditional interests in these areas were nothing other than her expansionist claims. Tibet was the stark example of China's imperialist expansionism. And the Government of India, in spite of its basic anti-colonial stand, meekly conceded China's imperialist claim to Tibet. Similarly, India took the stand that Formosa legitimately belonged to Red China and that by extending protection to Chiang Kai-shek régime, the U.S. was interfering in the Chinese civil war. Here also, India never considered

whether the Formosans desired their island to be a part of Red China. And while opposing the U.S. intervention in the Chinese civil war, India overlooked the fact—the initial Soviet support to the Chinese Communists before 1949 in their civil war against Chiang's régime. India's position on the issue of the Japanese Peace Treaty was also a case of one-sided neutrality. India objected to the continuation of the American trusteeship of Ryuku and Bonin islands, but had nothing to say about the Russian occupation of Sakhalin and the Kurile islands. Besides, if the American occupation troops had been withdrawn, as India desired, Japan would have been laid open to Communist aggression. India thus completely overlooked the Communist character of the New Chinese Government and treated it only as an Asian power. In fact, India tended to think that cold war—or the struggle between the Communist and the non-communist world—was "Europe's legacy of conflict" from which Asia was free. The Western plans to check the Communist expansion in Asia, therefore, were frequently construed as the West's interference in Asian affairs.

The story of India-China relations during the period, 1949-52, can never be complete without some sort of evaluation of the role of Mr. K. M. Panikkar, India's Ambassador in China during the period, in the formulation of India's China policy. Mr. Panikkar was in China from 1948 to 1952, that is, he was India's Ambassador to the Chiang Kai-shek Government in Nanking as well as later to Mao's Government in Peking. Mr. Panikkar, whose entire training had been "in the liberal radicalism of the West", to quote himself, "had no sympathy for a political system in which individual liberty did not find a prominent place." He had therefore no illusions about Communism as such. However, during his four years' tenure in Peking as India's Ambassador, he more or less completely ignored the profound implications of the basic Communist character of the Red Chinese Government and considered it only as the "culminating event of Asian resurgence" and interpreted China's anti-West attitude and policy solely in terms of the Chinese reaction to their experience of a hundred years of humiliation at the hands of the Western powers. He considered the Chinese Communists as having "no desire to be anything other than

Chinese” and was impressed by “Red China’s desire to maintain the continuity of her life and culture” when actually the Chinese Reds were destroying completely the traditional Chinese life and culture. He not only encouraged the false notion that “there was absolutely no difference between the policies pursued by all previous Governments in China and the present government”¹⁴ but even went to the extent of asserting categorically that Mao’s Government was not a Communist Government.¹⁵

Mr. Raja Hutheesing, who visited China in November 1951 and in May 1952, has described Mr. Panikkar in his book *Window on China* as having “acquired the habit of mind which wants to please the powers that be at all times.” This may, perhaps, explain the fact that “in Chiang Kai-shek’s China he was a believer in Kuomintang invincibility and from Nanking advised the Government of India to enter into a pact with Chiang in 1948. When I met him in Peking in October 1951, after a lapse of many years, I listened to his discourses on the achievements of the New Democracy only to find that all his ‘facts’ were Chinese Communist propaganda.”¹⁶ No wonder, with such a complacent attitude and superficial understanding of the Chinese mind, Mr. Panikkar, when he left Peking in 1952 was “happy to feel that there was no outstanding issue between us and the Chinese at the time of my departure.”¹⁷

During the first two years of its existence, the Chinese perspectives, as noted earlier, were dominated by the “two world” thesis and the denial of the possibility of a third or neutral road. By the time of the second anniversary of the establishment of the Chinese Communist Republic, the Chinese leaders had begun to abandon that position in favour of the “peace camp” thesis. During the negotiations on the Korean crisis at the U.N. and elsewhere, China had begun to discover the sympathies of nationalist Asia. She realised that non-communist Asian nations considered China less as a Communist state than as a leading Asian power and were friendly to her.

¹⁴ *Indian Foreign Policy* by Karunakar Gupta.

¹⁵ See *Radical Humanist*, November 18, 1951.

¹⁶ *Window on China*, p. 11.

¹⁷ *In Two Chinas*.

Ambassadors of leading Asian countries like India and Burma were also advising the Chinese leaders in Peking that "there is not only a neutral opinion but a considerable pro-Chinese feeling in countries like India and Burma" and that China by her rigid "two camp" outlook had only "enforced a blockade against herself so far as the non-communist world is concerned."¹⁸ The Chinese leaders thus became aware that a 'neutral bloc' directed against the West could be formed. The group of neutral Asian countries could in part be turned into an instrument by which means China could play a dominant part on the world stage.

This change was facilitated by the failure of the Communist armed uprisings in non-communist Asian countries like India, Burma, Philippines and Indonesia and the gradual change of perspective in the Communist world as a whole which ultimately resulted in the formulation of the "peace offensive" strategy. This new line was contained in an article reproduced by the *People's Daily* from the Cominform journal *For A Lasting Peace, For A People's Democracy*, which stated:

"The peaceful aspirations of the Chinese people are threatened by American imperialism. . . . The Chinese people are administering a merited rebuff to the imperialist machinations. In the united camp with all peace-loving people, they are defending their revolutionary gains and the cause of world peace."¹⁹

According to this new line, all the neutrals belonged to the peace camp and American imperialism was the common enemy of the Communist and the neutral countries. The result of this new definition of the situation was gradually becoming evident. No more did Mr. Nehru remain a "running dog of American imperialism." On the contrary, Mao now "spoke (at the reception meeting held on January 26, 1951, in Peking) in warm terms about Nehru and said that he hoped to be able to see him in China soon."²⁰ This switch-over was also a signal for the launching of the "bhai-bhai" campaign with the slogan of

¹⁸ *In Two Chinas.*

¹⁹ *New China News Agency*, Oct. 5, 1951.

²⁰ *In Two Chinas.*

“thousands of years of friendship” between the two countries. “The Indian people are a fine people”, as Mao said at the above-mentioned meeting, “there have been thousands of years of friendship between the people of India and China.”²¹ This strategy was to remain in force for the next five years.

1953-55 Period

On July 10, 1951, Korean truce talks were initiated between the United Nations and the Communists at Kaesong in North Korea. After several weeks of negotiations, the two sides managed to agree upon the subjects upon which a settlement had to be reached. These were (1) the fixing of a ceasefire line between the two sides and of a demilitarised zone based on it, (2) the supervision of the carrying out of the terms of the armistice, (3) the procedure to be adopted for the disposal of the prisoners-of-war (POWs) and (4) recommendations to be made by the two sides to their respective Governments regarding the future political status of Korea. Of these, agreement could be reached by the spring of 1952 on all the subjects except the third. The question of the disposal of the prisoners-of-war became the most controversial and crucial issue threatening to wreck all the chances of a settlement till the middle of 1953.

At the beginning of the negotiations, the United Nations had held nearly 1,40,000 Communist prisoners-of-war, while the North Koreans had only about 12,000 Allied prisoners-of-war with them. What brought the problem of prisoners into the centre of attention was the discovery on the U.N. side that a very large number of prisoners did not wish to be repatriated after the armistice. With the increasing awareness of the feeling in the prison camps and of the large number of prisoners who were objecting to repatriation, the United Nations laid down the principle that all prisoners should be allowed to choose for themselves whether or not they would return to their home countries. But the North Koreans and the Chinese objected to this principle on the ground that it would be an “interference in internal affairs” to give prisoners the right to refuse to go home. This, they contended, would violate the Geneva Convention on the rules of war. By April 1952, there

²¹ *Ibid.*

was a complete deadlock on this issue and the negotiations were consequently suspended for some time.

In April, the United Nations published the results of the screening which they had carried out to discover the desires of prisoners-of-war in their hands. The results showed that of the total 96,000 North Korean prisoners held by the U.N. 65,000 opted for repatriation, while of the total 21,000 Chinese prisoners, only 5,000 chose repatriation. These results were startling and they exposed the myth of Chinese 'volunteers' joining the war to assist their North Korean brothers in "repelling the U.S. aggression."

The United Nations insisted on the principle of voluntary repatriation mainly on the humanitarian ground that no prisoner should be forced against his wishes to go back to his home country and face the consequences of his refusal to return. There was, besides, another important consideration, which prompted the U. N. side to insist on the prisoners' right to refuse repatriation. The experience of a very large number of their own soldiers refusing to go back to their countries, it was felt, would deter the Communist Chinese from launching an aggressive war in future and would thus ensure that there would be no repetition of the Korean War after the armistice. But precisely for the same reasons, the North Korean and the Chinese Governments were determined to oppose the U.N. proposal. Thus the deadlock remained complete.

In November 1952, India proposed a plan to settle the Korean War prisoners dispute. It was debated by the U.N. General Assembly and adopted on December 3, 1952 by a majority of 54 while the five Soviet bloc countries opposed it. The Indian plan recommended that a new 'neutral' commission should be set up to handle the exchange of prisoners and there should be no use of force either to "prevent or effect" repatriation of prisoners. The Indian plan was rejected in advance by the Soviet Union and Red China and the Soviet Union even submitted its rival plan proposing forcible return of prisoners. The Russian plan was rejected by the U.N. General Assembly. But what was peculiar about the whole affair was the violent attack on India made by the Russian representative at the U.N., Mr. Vishinsky, and the Chinese Government in spite of the fact that

95% of the Indian resolution, as Mr. Nehru disclosed later on, was "taken down sentence by sentence from what had been said to us by the parties concerned."²² Mr. Vishinsky, criticising the Indian plan, said: "We question the right of any side for speaking for all Asian peoples. . . . The future will show as to who defends the interests of all Asian peoples. . . . You do not want to put an end to war." A few days later, Peking Radio went even further. "The Indian delegation" it charged, "which had entered to act as a mediator has already entered the Anglo-American camp. . . ." "The Indian delegate said without reason", it continued, "that he spoke as a representative of the people of Asia. No one except the U.S.-dominated bloc had given the Indian delegate such authority."²³

With the rejection of the Indian plan by the communists, the deadlock appeared more rigid than before. On March 5, 1953, Stalin died and within a short time thereafter, the communists made it known that they wished to resume serious negotiations on Korea. India, as a result, renewed its efforts as a mediator. Consequently, by the beginning of June, agreement was at long last arrived at on the prisoners of war issue. On June 8, 1953, the Korean armistice agreement was signed at Panmunjom by the U.N. and North Korean representatives. According to the agreement, there was to be no forcible repatriation of prisoners, but the Governments of either side were to have the right to send interviewers or "explainers" to see the prisoners who were refusing repatriation. These interviewers could only try to persuade them to return. Prisoners who still refused to return were to be set free as civilians after 120 days if a major political conference on the Korean issue to be held after 90 days failed to solve their problem.

The agreement also stipulated that a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission composed of Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and India would take charge of prisoners who had refused to return to their homelands. India alone would supply sufficient armed forces to the Commission and would serve as its Chairman and "umpire". It was also

²² Quoted in *India Without Illusion* by A. D. Gorwala, p. 30.

²³ *Ibid.*

agreed that "no force or threat of force shall be used to prevent or effect" repatriation of prisoners.

In accordance with the agreement, the communists released 12,763 Allied prisoners of war and the U.N. handed back 74,000 North Korean and about 6,000 Chinese prisoners of war who were willing to be repatriated. The Indian custodian force arrived in October and both the sides delivered reluctant prisoners into the Indian hands. General Thimayya was the Chairman of the NNRC. The Commission began its function in October. However, the task of the NNRC was very difficult as there were many fierce disputes between the two sides with regard to the Commission's procedure and the interpretation of clauses in the agreement. The brunt of the attack from both the sides was borne by the Indian custodian force, and especially by its Chairman, Gen. Thimayya. His position was exceedingly awkward as he was a referee in the bitter game of political warfare. But he did his work extremely well.

The time allowed for explanation, 90 days, ended on December 24, 1953. But there were still about 25,000 prisoners to be interviewed. A fierce dispute again arose about their fate. Ultimately, Gen. Thimayya handed them back to their former captors, that is, the U.N. which ultimately set them free. Thus ended the first phase of the Korean dispute. India as a mediator played a very important role in solving this dispute. The final compromise proposal which made armistice possible in Korea had the closest similarity with the original Indian resolution and India played an important role in getting it accepted by the Chinese as well as the U.N.

In 1953, two major events took place in world affairs that were to affect deeply the course of developments in Asia for the next five years. In January, the Republican Party came to power in the U.S. and in Russia, Stalin died on March 5. With the assumption of power by the Republicans, the U.S. Government began to adopt an increasingly hostile attitude towards the neutral Asian countries and principally towards India. It also began to seek a military solution of the problem of communist expansionism in Asia. On the other hand, Stalin's successors in Russia adopted a policy of apparently seeking

relaxation of international tension, moderated the asperities of their diplomacy and began wooing the neutrals.

The U.S. attitude of hostility towards the neutrals was expressed by Mr. Dulles in the latter half of 1953 in his statement that neutralism was an immorality arising from an inability to distinguish between right and wrong and based fundamentally on dishonesty. The U.S. impatience with Asian neutralism found its open expression on the issue of the Korean Peace Conference which was to be held, according to the Korean armistice agreement, in December 1953. The U.S. first opposed the Soviet suggestion to include India among the invitees to the proposed Conference on the ground that according to the strict interpretation of the agreement only those countries which took part in the Korean war could be invited to participate in the Conference. Even when a British-backed resolution to invite India to the Conference was introduced in the U.N. General Assembly, the U.S. openly opposed it. Later on, Mr. Dulles openly said in a speech on September 2, 1953, that India's exclusion from the proposed Korean Peace Conference was the "price" India had to pay for her neutrality in the Korean Conflict. "India did not want to be identified with the communist side and it had preferred not to join with the forces fighting aggression in Korea," Mr. Dulles said. "That was India's privilege. But like most privileges, it cost a price." The Korean Peace Conference ultimately could not take place as the Soviet Union and the U.S. could not agree on the scope of the conference. It, however, dramatically showed that the U.S. and India henceforth were to follow increasingly conflicting policies in international affairs.

In December 1953, the U.S. decided to give military aid to Pakistan and rumours began to circulate that the U.S. and Pakistan were about to negotiate a trade of American air bases in Pakistan for U.S. military aid. Though the aid was given to Pakistan primarily for countering the communist threat of aggression, it aroused deep misgivings in India, as Pakistan considered India to be her main enemy. Earlier, on November 15, 1953, Mr. Nehru had therefore issued a clear warning that India would regard the U.S. military aid to Pakistan as an unfriendly act. When the U.S. decision to give arms aid to Pakistan

became known, Mr. Nehru denounced it, (in his speech in Parliament on December 23, 1953), as endangering peace and tending towards colonialism. It threatened, he added, India's efforts to make Asia an area where war would not come. In January, he attacked the U.S. decision as "it will certainly bring world war nearer in the matter of time and also nearer India's frontiers."²⁴ In February, he described it as "a challenge to India's manhood."²⁵ Thus it was clear that the gulf between India and the U.S. was rapidly widening. While India was trying to establish an area of peace in Asia, the U.S. was determined to implement her plan of collective security to check communist expansion in Asia.

The armistice in Korea was followed in the latter half of 1953 by the intensification of the war between the French-controlled Vietnam and the communist-dominated Vietminh in Indo-China. Mr. Ho Chi-Minh, the leader of the Vietminh, was a confirmed communist leader and there was no doubt that the Vietminh forces were predominantly communist in character and were being amply supplied by the Chinese Communists with arms and volunteers to fight the French forces. The intensification of the Indo-Chinese war posed a serious problem to the West. The loss of all of Indo-China would have opened the sluice-gates to a communist flood that might inundate Malaya, Thailand, Burma and Indonesia and splash against the walls of India. Indo-China, consequently, concerned the whole of South-East Asia. Yet, Mr. Ho Chi-Minh was masquerading as a nationalist engaged in an armed struggle against a Western imperialist power and naturally the governments and peoples of Asia sympathised with him. The supply of American arms to the French in Indo-China only served to convince the Asians that the civil war in Indo-China was a part of the larger struggle between Asian nationalism and Western imperialism. When, therefore, the U.S. leaders, gravely concerned over the implications of a communist victory in Indo-China, began thinking by the beginning of 1954, in terms of a strategy of "massive retaliation", the prospects of a Korean type conflagration flaring

²⁴ *Sunday Chronicle*, Jan 31, 1954.

²⁵ *Times of India*, February 6, 1954.

up in Indo-China became only too obvious, they were none too pleasing even to the communists.

In the first week of January, a Four-Power Conference to discuss the German problem was held in Berlin. It was attended by the Foreign Ministers of the U.S., Britain, France and the Soviet Union. The Conference failed to arrive at any agreement on Germany, but it decided to call a further conference at Geneva on April 26, 1954, to seek "a peaceful settlement of the Korean question" and also to discuss "the problem of peace in Indo-China."

During the three months when the Geneva Conference was announced and it met, three important developments took place. (1) The Vietminh in Indo-China, in keeping with the usual communist tactic, increased the vigour of their campaign with a view to occupy as much area as possible before a settlement could be reached at Geneva. The result was that the French forces in Indo-China began moving on to the fatal denouement of Dien Bien Phu. (2) The increasing pace of communist success in Indo-China prompted the U.S. Government first to draw up plans for a massive intervention in Indo-China on the French side. But when it found itself faced with stiff opposition from Britain and France, the U.S. began, in April, canvassing for an idea of a South-East Asian collective security pact against Communist aggression. (3) Preparations were set afoot for the Conference of the Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan which took place in the last week of April at Colombo. In the meanwhile, speaking in Parliament on April 24, 1954, Mr. Nehru adumbrated his six-point proposal to solve the Indo-Chinese tangle. The Colombo Conference discussed the attitude that they should take towards such problems of common interests as peace in Indo-China, the recognition of Red China in the United Nations and the ending of colonialism in Tunisia and Morocco. On Indo-China the Colombo Conference accepted in the main Mr. Nehru's stand and it was to have a real influence in shaping the Geneva Agreement.

The Geneva Conference was one of the most dramatic international assemblies during the post-war period. Though it was originally convened to discuss the Korean and Indo-Chinese problems, its scope widened during the course of its meeting. It

ultimately assumed the character of a test case to judge whether Communist China could be persuaded to live on non-aggressive terms with its neighbours. It was, besides, the first confrontation of nationalist Asia and the West. As, at that moment, the main tension between the East and the West was in Indo-China, the Korean issue was completely eclipsed and the Conference concentrated its energies on the settlement of the problem of Indo-China. The holding of the Conference, in a sense, was a triumph for China as it was the first time that China's position as one of the great powers of the world was recognised and it was admitted that the fate of South-East Asia depended, more than anything else, on China's attitude.

During the Conference, which lasted till July 21, 1954, the U.S. tried to rally the non-communist part of the world into setting up in South-East Asia a line of resistance against communism. Its attitude towards the Conference was, accordingly that it would judge the Conference a success only if the line of resistance was brought into being. Realising the implications of the U.S. attitude, the Chinese Communists, during the course of the Conference, concentrated their efforts on thwarting the establishment of such a line of resistance, and limited their objective to gaining equality of status for China with the West and the admission to the U.N. as one of the big powers. In accordance with this limited objective, China and Vietminh both renounced their claims to Laos and Cambodia and agreed to the partition of Vietnam limiting the communist control upto the 17th parallel only. On July 21, the Geneva Conference concluded with the signing of separate ceasefire agreements covering Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, thereby bringing to an end the war in Indo-China which had lasted nearly eight years.

During the same period many other important developments were taking place having a bearing on Sino-Indian relations. In November 1953, it became known that the Chinese Communists had promoted a so-called "Free Kachin Committee" near the Sino-Burmese border. The Kachins being the tribe living on the northern fringe of Assam as well as in the northern strips of Burma, the establishment of the Free Kachin Committee was a threat to India's as well as Burma's territorial integrity. In fact,

one of the avowed objectives of the Committee was to create an autonomous Kachin State on the plea of self-determination. This development was an unmistakable pointer that China was going to exploit some day the ethnic and religious ties between the Tibetan people and the people living in the NEFA and other Himalayan border areas of India. Commenting on this development one prominent Indian weekly warned: "In diplomacy hope is permissible, but precaution is imperative. The talks about Tibet (which were going on at that moment between India and China) must not therefore be confined to the question of trade and pilgrims, as the Prime Minister has led many people to believe. There must be an over-all long range settlement so that all possible points of friction between the two neighbours may peacefully be eliminated. The Government of India will do well to insist on a clear definition of the Indo-Tibetan boundary line. Needless to say, this should include the boundary line between Nepal and Tibet. . . . Along with this question may also be taken up another, obviously of a more delicate nature. The Chinese are reported to be militarising Tibet. But Tibet's continuance as a demilitarised zone between India and China is the minimum that India can expect from Peking as a token of its confidence in her."²⁶

But the Government of India was in no mood to heed these warnings. Negotiations were held in Peking from December 31, 1953, to April 29, 1954, between Indian and Chinese delegations on relations between India and China on the "Tibet Region of China", and on April 29, India signed an agreement with China on "trade and intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India." By this treaty, India, by officially recognising Tibet as the "Tibet region of China", set its seal of approval over the Chinese conquest of Tibet. It was, ironically, in this Treaty that the famous five principles of peaceful co-existence were first enunciated as the basis for agreement between the two parties. These five principles were :

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
2. Mutual non-aggression;

²⁶ *Thought*, Delhi, November 28, 1953.

3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
4. Equality and mutual benefit; and
5. Peaceful co-existence.

Under the terms of the agreement, which was to remain in force for eight years, the Government of India surrendered some of the rights and privileges previously enjoyed by it as the legacy inherited from the British Government in India. These rights were the right to station an Indian political agent at Lhasa, the right to maintain trade agencies at Gyantse, Gartok and Yatung as well as post and telegraph offices along the trade route upto Gyantse, and the right to maintain military escorts at Yatung and Gyantse for the protection of Indian trade agencies as well as the trade routes. India also agreed to transform her political agency at Lhasa into a Consulate-General, withdraw her military escorts from Tibet altogether and surrender her communications installations together with equipment operated by India in Tibet to the Chinese Government "free of cost and without compensation" as a "gesture of goodwill." Thus India tried to do her best to befriend the Chinese Communist Government. However, the question of clearly defining the Indo-Tibetan border in the Treaty was not taken up by the Indian Government with the Chinese régime. The disastrous consequences of this misplaced and one-sided generosity were to become evident within a few months of the conclusion of the Treaty.

Another important development took place in June 1954. In the interval between the first and the second of the Geneva Conference meetings, Mr. Chou En-lai, Chinese Prime Minister, visited New Delhi on June 26 at the invitation of Prime Minister Nehru. Both the Prime Ministers reviewed the progress of the Geneva Conference and discussed many matters of common concern to India and China. On June 28, 1954, they issued a joint statement which again included the five principles of peaceful co-existence—or the Panchsheel—as the principles "which should guide the relations between the two countries." The statement further added: "The Prime Ministers reaffirmed these principles and felt that they should be applied in their relations with other countries in Asia as well as in other parts of the world. If these principles are applied not only between various

countries but also in international relations generally, they would form a solid foundation for peace and security and the fears and apprehensions that exist today would give place to a feeling of confidence.”

Mr. Chou En-lai's visit was accompanied by a fanfare of publicity and effusive, inspired write-ups in the Indian press on the Chinese visitor. But it was evident that the character of the visit was exploratory to both the Prime Ministers from their respective points of view. The five principles of peaceful co-existence, which later came to be much applauded and considered as the sure guarantee of international peace and friendship were, however, no more than the rehash of generally accepted standards of behaviour between nations. All civilised communities accept them almost as axiomatic in civilised international behaviour. The enunciation of these principles was, therefore, not a special contribution of India or China towards world peace. Moreover, as history was to prove later, enunciations like these could be of little value if they were not accompanied by an adequate machinery to enforce them.

However, by including them in the joint statement, Mr. Nehru secured China's open acceptance of non-interference as the cardinal principle of international behaviour. India, thus, succeeded in making Peking openly commit itself, at least on paper, to the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other countries. But, here again, New Delhi failed to grasp the fundamental contradiction in China's commitment to the five principles of peaceful co-existence and the avowedly expansionist character of the Chinese Communist ideology which governed Peking's international behaviour. Perhaps it was hoped that the public commitment to the Panchsheel would eventually persuade the Chinese rulers to abandon their expansionist ideology.

However, within three months of signifying their adherence to the Panchsheel, the Chinese rulers showed their scant regard for it by violating, in August 1954, India's frontier at Bara Hoti in U.P.

In the meanwhile, the U.S. and its allies were busy in their attempts to set up in South-East Asia a defence wall against communism. For the U.S., the Geneva Agreement represented a cutting of losses—the amputation of the gangrenous part of

Viet Nam. It was, therefore, necessary to thwart the communist efforts to complete the conquest of Vietnam. It had therefore appended to the Geneva documents in July 1954 a unilateral declaration reserving freedom to carry on the fight against communism. On July 21, 1954, that is, on the day of the signing of the Geneva Agreements, President Eisenhower stated that the U.S.A. "is actively pursuing discussions with other free nations with a view to the rapid organisation of collective defence in South-East Asia to prevent further direct or indirect communist aggression in that area." The results of these talks were evident the same year, when the representatives of Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines and the U.S., France, Britain, Australia and New Zealand met at Manila from September 6 to 9 and signed a South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty. The Treaty not only covered the area of the signatory states, but, by a special protocol, unilaterally extended its protection even to the Indo-Chinese states of Cambodia, Laos and South Viet Nam. Thus the SEATO pact was not only against the basic approach of the Geneva Conference, it also offended the Asian susceptibilities by seeking to establish in Asia a sort of protectorate states of the Western powers. Criticising the SEATO agreement, Mr. Nehru said in Parliament on September 28, 1954: "It seems to me that this particular Manila Treaty is looking dangerously in the direction of spheres of influence to be executed by powerful countries...Some internal development in that area might entitle those countries to intervene. Now does it not affect the whole conception of integrity, independence and sovereignty of the countries of the area?"

The SEATO Pact was brought into being avowedly to provide protection to South-East Asian countries against the Chinese Communist threat. That this threat was not an imaginary one was obvious from the Chinese-inspired formation of the Free Thai Government by Pridi Phanomyong who was at that time broadcasting regularly on the Chinese Radio appeals to the Thai people to rise in revolt against the established government. Mr. Nehru also was aware of the Chinese threat to the Asian countries. Speaking in Parliament in October 1954, he remarked in his characteristic manner that because

of their size and potential strength, China and India inspired natural apprehensions in the smaller countries of Asia. Mr. Nehru sought to remove these apprehensions by establishing in Asia an area of peace—an area dominated or influenced by neither of the world power blocs nor by any of the major Asian powers—and hoped that China would co-operate with India and all other neutral Asian countries in their efforts in this direction.

In October 1954, Prime Minister Nehru went to China at the invitation of the Chinese Government. This was in the nature of a reciprocal gesture in return for Mr. Chou En-lai's visit to New Delhi at the invitation of the Indian Government. It was a truly momentous event as Mr. Nehru for the first time had the real opportunity of meeting the rulers of revolutionary China as well as gaining a first-hand knowledge of conditions in China. The chief purpose of his visit, as he himself stated during his stay in China, was "to improve China's relations with the outside world, including the nations unfriendly to China..."²⁷ In other words, it was a part of his continuous search for co-existence as the only means for establishing lasting peace in the world. Mr. Nehru, however, returned from China without being able to assess with certainty the intentions of the Chinese hosts. Addressing a mammoth meeting in Calcutta on the day he returned to India, Mr. Nehru, while recommending the Panchsheel, said that while his own faith in the five principles remained undiminished, he could not guarantee their implementation by the other side. What was beyond question, he added, was that India would not go to war unless attacked.²⁸ This significant statement, made soon after his return from China, showed that his talks with the Chinese leaders did not dispel the doubts and anxiety in his mind with regard to the sincerity of the Chinese professions of peaceful co-existence. However, he preferred to suppress his doubts and soon began giving a hopeful report to the people. "I am convinced," he stated in November 1954, in New Delhi, "that China, entirely for its own sake, wants peace,

²⁷ *Hindu*, October 24, 1954.

²⁸ *Thought*, November 13, 1954.

wants time to develop itself and thinks in terms of three or four five-year plans.”²⁹

Mr. Nehru described his visit to China as historic. He was deeply impressed by what he saw and studied in China during his stay there. As a result of his visit, as he described it, he developed a “sense of kinship with the Chinese people. I have had some glimpses of this great country and seen the enormous activity, vitality, enthusiasm and hard work of the people.”³⁰ On another occasion he said: “With India and China facing identical problems, India could with profit study how China tackled those problems....China like India had a huge population with inadequate land for distribution.... India has much to learn from China....China had her own political and economic structure and the rulers were confirmed communists. Their political set-up was completely opposed to Parliamentary democracy. Only time would show whether the price paid by the Chinese was worth it.”³¹ He, however, was impressed by the “results” of the Chinese revolution. “Whatever the Chinese Government was called,” he remarked, “it was getting results in the progress and development of the nationIn the final analysis that system is best which pays dividends best from the point of view of human welfare.”

Though he was impressed by the Chinese progress, he was convinced that India in her exciting quest for prosperity, freedom and security had to follow her own method and that the Chinese system was not suited to Indian conditions and was basically opposed to the Indian way of life. “I have great respect for the Chinese system of working” he said. “I do not oppose it. But if anybody tells me to copy the Chinese method or the American or the Russian way, then I do not understand it and ascribe it to lack of intelligence.”³² Nevertheless, “while conceding that the authoritarian approach may yield results which a democratic approach does not yield, Mr. Nehru felt that the ‘basic economic approach’ apart from the ‘compulsory

²⁹ *Hindu*, November 14, 1954.

³⁰ *Times of India*, October 29, 1954.

³¹ *Hindu*, November 14, 1954.

³² *Hindu*, November 29, 1954.

aspect' was worthy of consideration."³³ On another occasion, addressing a meeting of the Indian Development Council, Mr. Nehru posed the challenging question: "If China could achieve such a rapid increase in agricultural output, why should we find it impossible?"³⁴

With regard to some of the points of friction in Sino-Indian relations, Mr. Nehru, during his visit, could not apparently succeed in persuading his Chinese hosts to show the spirit of accommodation. One such issue at the time was the asylum the Chinese had given to the Nepalese rebel leader, Dr. K. I. Singh. Asked to comment on it, Mr. Nehru said: "This case was mentioned by me, not as affecting us, but as an instance. I was told that the political asylum had been given to him in the normal way and nothing more. There was no further argument about it. I do not think Dr. K. I. Singh will function in future."³⁵ But in spite of China's none too co-operative attitude towards India, Mr. Nehru allowed the Chinese to derive marked advantage from the calculated hospitality they showed him. It was reported that, as a result of Mr. Nehru's visit, the Chinese would soon have direct diplomatic relations with Nepal. The Chinese Communists, of course, reportedly gave a verbal assurance, in return, that China would respect India's special relations with Nepal. But as the later events proved, the Chinese were soon to forget this assurance and exploit the concession to drive a wedge between India and Nepal.

Thus, Mr. Nehru's visit to China did not contribute much to Sino-Indian understanding and amity. On the contrary, it fostered the illusory atmosphere of *Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai* and encouraged a tendency among the Indians to build a "co-existentialist wall of words" as a substitute for realistic concrete arrangements to safeguard India's interests. Leading Indian journals were soon filled, as the following examples will show, with naive accounts of the results of Mr. Nehru's visit to China, rousing false expectations and hopes in the reader's mind:

"The General feeling of the Chinese people towards Nehru

³³ *Indian Express*, May 13, 1956.

³⁴ *Hindu*, November 1, 1954.

³⁵ G. K. Reddy, *Times of India*, October 23, 1954.

is one of deep gratitude for all he has done to understand and interpret the New China to the outside world... to the common people of China, he is India's Mao—a great leader and inspirer of 360 million Indians.”³⁶

“Mr. Nehru is returning from China firmly convinced that at least the present generation of Chinese leadership does not want war....Mr. Nehru was convinced that China was now safe in the hands of these four remarkable men...the great leaders of China have come to look upon Mr. Nehru as not only the principal spokesman of all independent peace-loving nations in Asia...he has become in the Chinese eyes a symbol of the resurgent Asia—a new Mao Tse-tung to them.

“It was whispered (in China) that if Mr. Eisenhower had witnessed this spontaneous display of the genuine affection of the Chinese nation for the Indian people, he would have silently dissolved the SEATO and won over the co-operation of China and other Asian nations.”³⁷

Thus, wishful thinking guided all the statements on China. There were, to be sure, a few shining exceptions. A few well-informed columnists refused to be swept off their feet: “the enthusiastic welcome (to Mr. Nehru in China) was brought about by regimentation as was obvious in some places (and) the hospitality accorded was according to plan.”³⁸ There were also some warning voices who refused to join the bhai-bhai chorus and boldly expressed their doubts. “Has Mr. Nehru been able to convince the Chinese rulers of the ethics and efficacy of co-existence as he understands it? Spontaneous or staged popular demonstrations of hospitality to him personally can be little guide to understanding in this matter. For, popular sentiment and opinion in China are the least effective in determining China's national policy abroad as well as at home... with its almost inexhaustible human resources and natural potentialities harnessed to the unrestrained will and ambition of a highly competent dictatorship, China poses a problem to every-

³⁶ *Times of India*, October 30, 1954.

³⁷ *Free Press Journal*, October 20, 1954.

³⁸ *Insaf in Hindustan Times*, October 26, 1954.

body.”³⁹ However these warning voices were soon drowned in the deafening chorus of *Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai*.

The Prime Ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan at the conclusion of their meeting at Colombo on 2nd May 1954, issued a statement expressing the “desirability of holding a Conference of Asian-African nations” and favoured a proposal that the Prime Minister of Indonesia might explore the possibility of such a conference. Thus the move was initiated to hold the Conference of Asian-African nations which ultimately met at Bandung in Indonesia from 18th to 24th April 1955. The final decision to convene the Conference was taken at the Colombo Power meeting held at Bogor in Indonesia on 28th and 29th December 1954. The communique issued at the end of the Bogor meeting clarified the purposes of the Conference. The basic purpose of the Conference, it stated, was that the countries concerned should be better acquainted with one another’s point of view. The Conference would therefore discuss the ways and means of promoting goodwill and co-operation between Asian-African nations, consider socio-economic and cultural problems and the relations of the participating countries and consider the problems of “special interest to Asian and African peoples – like the problems affecting national sovereignty, racialism and colonialism.”

The Bandung Conference was a landmark in the history of Asia as it dramatized the emergence of resurgent Asia on the world scene. Twenty-nine independent countries from Asia and Africa were represented at the Conference by their Prime Ministers or Foreign Ministers. Comprising amongst themselves half of the world’s population and about a third of its territory, these nations were bound to exercise considerable influence on the course of world events. At the Geneva Conference in 1954, the Asian countries like India and other Colombo Powers had already played a prominent role in putting an end to the war in Indo-China. Thus the Asian nations were now determined to exercise their influence not merely individually, but also collectively.

For Mr. Nehru, the Bandung Conference was, more than

³⁹ *Thought*, November 13, 1954.

anything else, the expression of Asia's determination to shape its own destiny without outside interference. The dominant thought in his mind at the time was the resentment of the practice of the Western Powers to determine the affairs of Asia without regard to or in spite of the opinions of Asian governments. The Geneva Agreement was a further step in his search for co-existence. "The whole conception lying behind the Geneva Conference", as he remarked, "was a conception of co-existence." But the SEATO Pact that followed the Geneva Agreement upset it completely. By establishing SEATO, the Western powers had tried to "solve the problems of Asia without the people of Asia". SEATO, in fact, had "not much to do with Asia at all". He was, therefore, very much resentful of the Western attempts to interfere in Asian affairs. At Bandung again he expressed the same view: "For long years, the countries of Asia and Africa were 'nonentities' in political, economic and international affairs. Their destinies were controlled by others. Asia was an outer fringe of Europe". "But," he warned, "Asia is no more passive today; it was passive enough in the past. It is no longer a submissive Asia; it had tolerated submissiveness too long. Asia today is dynamic; Asia is full of life". On another occasion, at Bandung, he said, "No dictation there is going to be in future, no yes-men in Asia, I hope, or in Africa."

While, for Mr. Nehru, the Bandung Conference was the expression of Asia's quest for freedom, peace and progress through co-operation on the basis of the equality, for Mr. Chou En-lai, on the other hand, it was an opportunity for projecting Red China's image as a peace-loving Asian power ready to co-operate with others in establishing peace in Asia. The Geneva Agreement had already enhanced Red China's prestige in Asia. At Bandung, Mr. Chou En-lai was determined to convince the participating countries that they had nothing to fear from China. He adopted a very conciliatory and accommodating attitude and refrained from raising or discussing controversial issues. He assured the Conference that small nations of Asia had nothing to fear from their great neighbour China. He invited all the delegations present at the Conference, and more particularly China's neighbours, to visit China and

see for themselves if China was carrying out any war activities as threats against them and declared that where the border line between China and a neighbouring country had not yet been fixed, China was ready to undertake the determination of common borders and use only peaceful means to settle them. During the Conference week, he even signed an agreement with Indonesia on the question of citizenship of the people of Chinese origin in Indonesia. Regarding the peaceful unification of Korea, he suggested that "the parties concerned should speedily seek the solution through negotiations". As a dramatic gesture, he even announced that "China and the U.S. should sit down and enter into negotiations to settle the question of relaxing and eliminating the tension in Taiwan area." These tactics helped the Chinese regime to improve its international position and identify itself with the common aspirations of the Asian people. Most important of all, these tactics helped the Chinese communist régime to identify itself with the "Bandung spirit."

The Chinese communist tactics, however, did not succeed completely. During the discussion on the question of colonialism, the Prime Minister of Ceylon raised the question of communist imperialism and demanded the dissolution of the Cominform and of local communist parties in Asia and Africa as a condition precedent to any useful discussion of co-existence. He pointed out that "local communist parties regarded themselves as the agents of the great communist powers — Russia and China—and their rôle in Afro-Asian affairs had been to create as much disruption as possible so as to prepare the way for armed insurrection or other forms of subversion, more insidious but no less deadly." The Ceylonese Prime Minister's statement raised a hornet's nest about his ears. He was supported in his stand by pro-Western Asia nations. Mr. Nehru did not agree with the Ceylonese Prime Minister's stand. In the end, because of the rule of unanimity, the specific mention of Soviet communism as a new form of colonialism was not made in the final resolution which only expressed its opposition to "colonialism in all its manifestations."

With regard to the question of defence pacts, the Bandung Conference recognised the right of each nation to defend it-

self, singly or collectively, "in conformity with the Charter of the U.N.", but opposed the use of "arrangements of collective defence to serve the interests of any of the Big Powers." Thus it reflected a compromise between the positions of pro-Western nations like Pakistan which had entered into defence pacts with the Western powers and the neutral Asian countries like India which were opposed to such pacts.

The Conference adopted many other resolutions on vital issues of the day and at the end issued a communique embodying Ten Principles which were the expanded form of the Panchsheel. Before the Conference met, it was feared that it would turn out to be one more anti-West platform and demonstration. But the proceedings of the Conference belied those fears. The independent nations of Asia and Africa came together and gave expression in dignified terms to their aims and aspirations. However, in retrospect, the Conference cannot be said to have served its purpose. It was convened with the purpose of promoting mutual co-operation among Afro-Asian nations and for creating a favourable atmosphere for the reduction of international tensions and the promotion of world peace. But the achievement of these objectives depended essentially on the implementation by the participating countries themselves of the obligations they had morally undertaken by adopting the final communique. And, here, the biggest Asian power, China, because of the very character of its regime, was going to be the chief betrayer of the "Bandung spirit". In the absence of any effective machinery to implement its decisions, the Bandung Conference only succeeded in fostering an atmosphere of make-belief in Asia and giving much-needed respectability to the Red Chinese regime. That the Conference could not achieve its purpose has been clear from the fact that though the final communique recommended the convening of the next meeting of the Conference, no second "Bandung" could take place till today.

Two months after the Bandung Conference, China, in July 1955, opened diplomatic relations with Nepal. After the abortive communist attempt to overthrow the Nepalese Government in January 1952, the Government of India had co-ordinated Nepal's foreign policy and economic and military

affairs with those of India and it was universally recognised that India had special relationship with Nepal. But during Mr. Nehru's visit to China in October 1954, Peking succeeded in securing his consent to its establishing diplomatic relations with Nepal while promising to respect India's special position with regard to it.

The actual establishment of diplomatic relations between Nepal and China in July 1955 was portentous in its implications to India. The Chinese Ambassador to India, who was concurrently accredited to Nepal, was given in Khatmandu extraordinary reception and send-off, with 19 guns booming salute. Besides, contrary to practice everywhere, the Chinese Ambassador was also given the unusual opportunity of receiving delegations from Nepal's different political parties. This extraordinary and extravagant consideration shown to the Chinese Ambassador by the Nepalese Government became a source of worry to New Delhi. But already the stage had passed when it could persuade the Nepalese Government to adopt a cautious policy towards its northern neighbour.

During the period 1953-55, pro-China enthusiasm in India rapidly rose till it reached climax in the latter half of 1955. Peking used the post-Geneva Agreement atmosphere to derive for itself the fullest possible advantage by intensifying its cultural diplomacy. The visits of a variety of Indian delegations to China were arranged in 1954. In October-November 1954, for example, Mrs. Uma Nehru and Dr. Gyan Chand led a 35-member friendship delegation on behalf of the India-China Friendship Association. Similarly, at the same time a 10-member Women's delegation, a youth delegation, a trade union delegation, and leading Indians like Dr. S. S. Sokhey, N. N. Mookerjee, Mayor of Calcutta, etc., visited China. On October 14, 1954, the first trade agreement and an agreement on the exchange of students between India and China were signed. In accordance with the student exchange agreement, two Chinese students went to India to study Hindi and one Indian student went to China to study Chinese.

In 1955, an expanded agreement on the exchange of scholars was signed between India and China in the euphoric post-Bandung mood. There were also many cultural events and

delegations. An 11-member Indian film delegation visited China as honoured guests to attend an Indian Film Festival held throughout China in October. The Film artists were even treated to an interview with Mr. Mao Tse-tung. A volley-ball match between a 15-member Indian National Team and the Team of the Central Athletic Institute of China was held in October which was watched by Chairman Mao himself. Distinguished visitors to China in 1955 included Smt. Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, the then Central Minister of Health, who spent three weeks in China; a number of M.P.s, Mr. B. N. Dey, President of the Indian Society of Engineers, and Dr. Raghu Vira, M.P. and distinguished Orientalist, who spent four months travelling the remoter regions of China. Similarly, Dr. C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyer led a delegation of 32 university teachers and students, Mr. A. K. Chanda led a cultural delegation and Dr. M. L. Ahuja led a medical delegation to China. There were numerous other delegations from India that went to China on a variety of missions. In the latter half of 1955, 10 Chinese students went to India to study in various schools and 10 Indian students were awarded government scholarships for study in China.

As expected, most of the Indian visitors to China on their return paid homage to communist China and assisted the Chinese rulers in their efforts to popularise the Chinese Communist regime in India. There were even systematic attempts made to influence the Indian Armed Forces by publishing pro-Chinese material in the issues of the Indian Armed Forces journal, *Sainik Samachar*. But there were a few distinguished dissenting voices among the visitors to China. Dr. C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyer, for example, after his return from China in November 1955, criticised education in China as being "rigidly based on Marxist principles, from top to bottom completely based on Marxist principles, was from top to bottom completely regimented". Similarly, Smt. Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, after her return, stated that India "was more advanced than China in regard to health services". Another slightly different, but more courageous, example of such a refusal to swallow the Chinese communist bait was the abrupt return of nine members of a 32-member Indian Trade Union delegation that visited China on the occasion of May Day celebrations in 1955. The nine

members cut short their stay in China as a protest against the Chinese Communist attempts to misuse their presence in China to form a new communist-sponsored trade union organisation for Asia and Africa. But such forthright exercises of independent judgement were exceptional among the hundreds of visitors to China. The overwhelming majority of the visitors returned to India full of admiration for the Chinese regime and joined the pro-Chinese "bhai-bhai brigade".

The Bandung Conference was followed by Mr. Nehru's visit to the Soviet Union, in June 1955, where he was accorded a hearty and tumultuous reception by the Soviet people. In return, the Soviet leaders, Mr. Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev, came to India as the guests of the Indian Government in November-December 1955. They were accorded a big State-inspired and State-organised reception everywhere. Thousands of officials and citizens were persuaded by the Government to leave their work and line the roads by which the guests went, children were drilled to wave flags, shower flowers and shout slogans welcoming the Soviet leaders. The Soviet leaders abused the hospitality shown to them and indulged in unjustified and unseemly attacks on the Western countries in their various speeches delivered at different places in India. In a patronising tone they even offered their help to protect India's independence against the Western imperialist threats. "Young nations, like the saplings on the highways in India", Mr. Khrushchev openly said on one occasion, "had to be protected". The smiling Soviet diplomacy was a continuation of the cold war by other means, but the Indian leaders did not seem to realise its implications.

There were many by-products of this excessive official flirtation with Russia and China. The first and foremost was, obviously, the exchange of "goodwill missions" between India, Russia and China which reached its climax at this time. The air was thick with missions and delegations flying to and fro between New Delhi and the Red Meccas of Peking and Moscow. This compelled a leading Indian journal to warn editorially: "If our foreign policy is independent, let us, for our own sake if for nobody else's, have a little less of this political commuting." Another by-product was that the pro-

communist or fellow-travelling tendencies were greatly encouraged in official and political circles and there arose everywhere a strange crop of half-baked "progressives," professional opportunists and calculating communists who looked at and wrote about Russia and China either with utter incomprehension or with uncritical and reverent adulation. Many of the views expressed during the period would make a strange reading now and would make even their authors blush at their own stupidity. Of the many stupid comments made at the time, this one surely deserves to be repeated and remembered for its daring originality: "History has annointed him (Nehru) the Grand Executor of Lenin's dream of India, China and Russia joining in common victory of peace and common tasks of construction." Such were the views that were flaunted as "pearls of wisdom" during this pink period of India's post-Independence history.

For the Chinese Communist regime, the period upto 1955 was one of consolidation of its position at home and strengthening of its influence abroad—that is, in Asia. The Chinese annexation of Tibet was legitimatised by the Sino-Indian agreement in April 1954. Tibet was subdued and militarised. The Chinese troops were stationed along the Indo-Tibetan border. The direct diplomatic relations with Nepal were established and Dr. K. I. Singh was also sent back to Nepal and was given pardon by the Nepalese Government. In South-East Asia, after the failure of the initial insurrectionary tactics, the Chinese Government switched over to the smiling diplomacy and preferred to advance and consolidate its interests by diplomacy and trade and weaken its opponents by peaceful means. It co-operated in the liquidation or limitation of incidents where communist interests were at stake—such as Korea and Indo-China. At Bandung, China emerged from the Conference with her prestige enhanced as the leading and peace-loving Asian power which was prepared to behave reasonably even with the United States over the issue of Formosa. Thus by the end of 1955, Red China's image as the benevolent Big Brother was successfully projected in the Asian mind.

From 1956 onwards, the Chinese Communists began abandoning their cautious and outwardly friendly and peaceful

approach towards their Asian neighbours. Internally, the Chinese Government launched, in January 1956, the 12-year agricultural programme which called for full collectivisation of land by 1957 or 1958 according to the area. The drive for rapid collectivisation naturally resulted in large-scale dissatisfaction. In June 1956, the Chinese Minister for Public Security openly admitted that "counter-revolutionary elements infiltrated agricultural co-operatives and committed assassination, murder, arson, poisoning, injury to animals and other sabotage activities". However, from India's point of view, the region most vitally affected by the introduction of the land reforms was Tibet. The first major revolt in Tibet occurred during the spring of 1956 and was reported in Indian and Western newspapers in May and June. In late July, the London *Daily Telegraph's* special correspondent in Darjeeling reported that the Tibetan revolt was spreading and that the Tibetans had formed a resistance organisation to fight the Chinese Communists. The *New China News Agency* in a dispatch on August 7, 1956, admitted that "military measures" had been taken against "the rebels".

In November-December 1956, when the Dalai Lama visited India at the invitation of the Indian Government to participate in the Buddha Parinirvana celebrations, he was invariably accompanied everywhere by Chinese officials which indicated the strained relations between him and the Chinese Government. The Dalai Lama, inspite of the continuous Chinese watch, managed to convey subtle disagreement with the Chinese Communists in his public statements. For example, participating in a symposium in New Delhi on Buddhism's contribution to Arts, Letters and Philosophy, the Dalai Lama stated: "I am glad to have an opportunity of expressing my humble appreciation of the efforts which many peace-loving great countries are making day and night towards the freedom of small countriesI feel that it is to live an entirely aimless life if the Dharma which was brought to our land by great scholars at such immense cost is allowed to decay. For my part, I shall make every effort within my power to keep the Dharma alive, and I shall be grateful for your help and advice in the task of strengthening the Dharma and making it everlasting." The tone and sub-

stance of the Dalai Lama's speeches and statements were in marked contrast to those of the Panchen Lama, who also had accompanied him. The latter made primarily political statements with a heavy accent on the Panchsheel.

It was also reported later that, during his visit, the Dalai Lama had expressed his desire not to return to the communist-dominated Tibet. It was only after good deal of persuasion by Mr. Nehru that he agreed to return to his country. The Dalai Lama's visit to India was much against the wishes of Peking. He was allowed by the Chinese Communists to come to India mainly because of New Delhi's pressing the invitation to him and the Dalai's pressing the acceptance of it. This in turn prompted Mr. Chou En-lai to pay a visit to New Delhi in the last week of November 1955. It was reported that, during his talks, the Chinese Prime Minister assured Mr. Nehru that the Chinese Government would respect Tibet's autonomy and Mr. Nehru conveyed that assurance to the Dalai and promised to visit Tibet after some time. During his visit, Mr. Chou En-lai praised Mr. Nehru in his public speeches. Mr. Nehru, he said, "has a greater understanding of the world situation than we have." He also stated that he had come to "learn from India." Similarly, addressing the cadets of the National Defence Academy at Khadakvasla, he confessed that in technology and industry, "India is far ahead of China." It is anybody's guess whether the Chinese Prime Minister, by his statements, was expressing his sincere appreciation of India's achievements and leadership or expressing his gratitude to Mr. Nehru who had lent the Chinese government a helping hand and avoided its possible discomfiture over Tibet which would have certainly followed if the Dalai Lama had refused to return to his country.

The year 1956 also saw China's worsening of relations with Burma. In July, the Burmese Government announced that "some Chinese troops have entered the Wa State in Burmese territory near the Burmese-Chinese border and encamped in the State." On August 7, the Burmese Prime Minister announced that Chinese troops had attacked a Burmese column in the frontier area in November 1955, and that about 500 Chinese troops were still in the Wa State. He also charged that Chinese

civilians had been entering Burma illegally. Though the question of the Wa State section of the Burma-China border was settled in 1941 between the British Government and the Chiang Kai-shek regime, the Peking *People's Daily* on August 4, 1956, asserted that "on the question of the demarcation of the frontier, Burma holds a different view from China" and that pending negotiations both sides should maintain the *status quo*, meaning thereby that the Chinese should retain the possession of the areas illegally occupied by them.

The Chinese were also carrying on their probing activities along the Sino-Indian border. On 18 July, 1956, for example, a PTI message from New Delhi stated: "A party of Chinese troops which had by mistake crossed the Indo-Tibetan border into India, near Chini, a week ago, has withdrawn back to Tibetan territory, according to official information."

In 1956, the Chinese Communists pressed further the advantage they had secured in Nepal and established for themselves a position of parity with India. In January, King Mahendra ended his eleven-month-old personal rule in favour of a caretaker government headed by Mr. Tanka Prasad Acharya. In March, India signed an agreement with Nepal which included a grant of Rs. ten crores by the Government of India to Nepal. In May, a high-powered Chinese delegation visited Nepal and "made its presence felt", as a columnist in the *Hindustan Times* commented with a deliberate understatement, "leaving behind the impression that some Chinese diplomats may not be averse to playing the Rana game." In September, the Nepalese Prime Minister went to China and it was announced that he was on a *private* visit to Peking. But the purpose of his visit became evident when the Sino-Nepalese Treaty was signed in Peking which was a direct off-shoot of the Sino-Indian Treaty on Tibet of April 1954. The treaty provided the Chinese Communists sanctuaries in Nepal in the form of a Consulate in Khatmandu and trade agencies elsewhere. The treaty also stipulated intermittent flow, between Nepal and Tibet, of "traders" enjoying immunity normally available to diplomats only, thus opening the gates for the infiltration of Chinese "traders" into Nepal. The Chinese also uti-

lished the Nepalese Prime Minister's visit to announce an outright grant of Rs. 5 crores to Nepal with a stipulation that there would be no Chinese technicians to accompany the grant. Nearly all the Nepalese political parties reacted to this announcement of "aid without strings" with expressions of public gratitude. Thus Nepal was rapidly being detached from India, the growing Chinese influence on Nepal's internal and external policies was soon to become evident. During Mr. Acharya's stewardship, Nepal veered round towards a policy of "non-alignment" as between India and China. The Government of India, after allowing the Chinese to gain a foothold in Nepal, could not do anything to stop this dangerous trend. As the New Delhi correspondent of the *Hindu* (October 12, 1956) put it: "The official view in New Delhi is that there is nothing India could do about it, consistent with her own foreign policy, except to be watchful and vigilant and trust China's professed faith in Panchsheel."

In 1956, the Chinese used the Buddha Jayanti celebrations to promote their cultural diplomacy. They prepared two beautifully printed folios of reproductions and made a gift to the Nalanda Pali Research Institute of about 500 rare Chinese volumes on Buddhism and 16 volumes of a comprehensive dictionary of Sanskrit-Chinese Buddhist terms. The Dalai Lama also presented, on behalf of the Chinese Government, the cranium of Hsuan Chuang, who had spent several years studying Buddhism in Nalanda in the early seventh century, along with 1335 volumes of his translations. In the summer, the Indian Planning Commission sent a number of study-teams to China, including one under Mr Pitambar Pant, Private Secretary to the Chairman of the Commission, to study the Chinese economy; a seven-member team led by Mr R. K. Patil for three months to study agrarian co-operatives; and a six-member agricultural team, under Deputy Minister Mr M. V. Krishnappa, to study Chinese agricultural planning and techniques. The team led by Mr R. K. Patil on its return submitted a report on Chinese agricultural co-operatives which sparked off a great controversy and was answered by a minority report prepared by the Indian Co-operative Union. Though most of these teams returned favourably impressed with China's progress, on the

whole, during the year the pro-China enthusiasm was not so much marked as it was in 1955. The reason, perhaps, was that the general ferment produced by Khrushchev's secret speech delivered at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February and the subsequent developments which took place in Poland and Hungary in October and November, had given a rude jolt even to the "progressive" intellectuals in India. The same events, however, produced the first serious clash between Peking and Moscow which was later to develop into a serious rift.

The year 1957 marked a decisive shift in the Chinese internal as well as foreign policy. In February-March, the Chinese Communists launched with much fan-fare their liberalisation campaign with the slogan "Let hundred flowers bloom". But the outburst of student rioting and anti-communist statements that followed gave clear evidence that the regime had forfeited the enthusiasm of the intellectuals as well as the people in general. The Chinese rulers, consequently, reversed the campaign and resorted to the method of widespread suppression, especially of the intellectuals. The intellectuals were treated as suspect and were forced into "remedial" manual labour by the hundreds of thousands. As a result of this "rectification campaign", there appeared a power-shift within the Chinese leadership itself. The shift brought into key decision-making positions a group of men devoted to the belief that great leaps in development were possible, that virtually inexhaustible energies could be created and harnessed by mobilisation and strict regimentation of the masses, and that the absolute control of all developments by the vanguard party was the key to success.

At this time there also took place a major shift in the overall Chinese line on international problems. It was the result of the conviction that a decisive shift in the world balance of power, symbolised by Sputnik I, had occurred and that Soviet developments in military technology constituted a real breakthrough. Of equal importance was the estimate, widely publicised at the time, that the Soviet economy was capable of outstripping the West.

As a consequence of this major shift, the Chinese foreign policy assumed openly aggressive character by the end of

1957. It was about this time that the Chinese began the construction of the illegal Aksai Chin road through the Ladakh region of Kashmir.

The year 1958, officially announced as the year of "the great leap forward", saw increasing Chinese belligerence in foreign affairs which also reflected a hardening of her internal policies. At the Party Congress in May 1958, Mr. Liu Shao-chi officially launched the policy of accelerating China's economic development (the "great leap forward"). It was therefore necessary for the Chinese Communists to build up certain amount of tension to help them maintain pressure upon their people to produce "more and quicker" and to pursue their 'anti-Rightist' campaign against the dissidents. In May, China followed the Soviet Union in condemning the Yugoslav revisionism, but the Peking *People's Daily* (5, May 1958) was far in advance of Soviet propaganda, both in the violence of its denunciation and in proclaiming that the 1948 Cominform resolution had rightly condemned Yugoslavia for "bourgeois nationalism", view only later endorsed by Russia.

In July, after the overthrow of the Nuri-es-Said regime in Iraq, when the U.S. troops landed in Lebanon and the British troops in Jordan, the Soviet leaders deliberately built up tension in Moscow by propaganda and Mr. Khrushchev announced that the world was "on the brink of a major catastrophe". The Chinese heightened the tension by bellicose pronouncements over Formosa area and by offers of army volunteers to go to the Middle-East while Mr. Khrushchev was openly expressing his view that the "participation of volunteers from other countries in events in the Middle East would mean a real war." On July 19, Mr. Khrushchev proposed a five-power Summit Conference on the situation in the Middle-East to include India as a representative of Asia alongside the U.S., Britain, France and the Soviet Union. This was the unkindest cut of all to the Peking rulers as it meant the Soviet Union's recognition of India, instead of China, as a member of the Big Five. Mr. Khrushchev thus showed his open preference for India over China disregarding China's rivalry of status with India. Peking expressed its resentment at the Soviet attitude which forced Mr. Khrushchev to visit Peking on July 31, and sub-

sequently to give up his demand for India's inclusion in the Great Power Conference. The rivalry between India and China for the leadership of Asia and the big power status was thus gradually coming to the surface and was becoming one of the factors aggravating the Sino-Soviet differences.

In the meanwhile, the Sino-Indian relations were gradually becoming strained over the question of growing unrest in Tibet. In July 1958, it was reported that the Chinese, having themselves invited Mr. Nehru to visit Tibet, were required to request him to postpone his visit indefinitely because of a new wave of political unrest in that region. The Government of India also became seriously concerned about the possible effect of the Tibetan unrest on the Sino-Indian relations as well as its repercussions in the matter of India's border security. In September the same year China again gave a warning of its expansionist designs by publishing a map of China showing NEFA, Ladakh and other Indian territories inside the Chinese frontiers. This naturally caused irritation in Delhi and also served to underline the need for great vigilance on India's part.

All these developments naturally prompted Mr. Nehru, in September-October 1958, to visit the border kingdom of Bhutan. The Bhutan border having no less than 14 passes to Tibet was perhaps the most important from India's strategic point of view. But, in spite of this fact, Bhutan, till October 1958, had been rather neglected by the Government of India. Mr. Nehru's visit was, however, a demonstration of India's growing interest in the border state. The Prime Minister, during his stay in Bhutan, emphasised the point that freedom of Bhutan and India should be safeguarded so that "no one from outside could do any harm to them." He also advised the Bhutanese "not to admit too many outsiders" into their territory. At the same time, he offered aid for the economic development of the State and on his return underlined the need of establishing direct communication lines between India and Bhutan. Accordingly, projects were drawn up for building two direct road links between India and Bhutan on a priority basis.

It was reported at this time that when Mr. Nehru, on his way to Bhutan, passed through the Chumbi valley in Tibet, a force of warring Khampas, estimated at some 300, tried to

enter the Chumbi valley to present a petition to him. They were stopped by Chinese troops at Phari at the head of the Chumbi valley and ordered to disperse. They refused to disperse and a skirmish ensued as a result of which casualties were reported on both sides. (PTI message, September 24, 1958.)

By the middle of December, rumours also began circulating that the Dalai Lama "is pleading with the Indian Prime Minister for political asylum" and that "Mr. Nehru has already turned down the Lama's two requests." (*Indian Express*, December 15, 1958.)

It was thus becoming evident by the end of 1958 that Tibet was the key to understanding and amity between India and China. It was also becoming increasingly evident that India's one-sided friendship with China would soon come to an end because of the growing unrest in Tibet.

On September 10, 1958, the New China News Agency published the official party directive on the "people's communes." Emphasising the ideological implications of the directive, the Chinese Communist Party made bold to assert: "It seems that the attainment of communism in China is no longer a remote future event." This assertion conflicted with the Soviet claim to leadership of the communist bloc which was based on the assumption that Russia had been in the "advanced stage of building communism." The establishment of the communes in China commenced at a breath-taking pace which staggered everyone's imagination. But, because of its very inhuman nature, the experiment soon ran into difficulties and the Chinese economy began to show signs of strain and breakdown. In December 1958, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party decided to slow down the pace of communitisation. By the first week of January 1959, it was evident that the Chinese economy was in a very much chaotic condition. Chinese newspapers admitted that there were serious food shortages and a new campaign was under way for the "planned consumption of food." On January 26, the Peking *People's Daily* advised its readers: "Over-eating is harmful to health. . . and will affect digestion and soon cause gastric troubles. Too many calories will also cause one to become fat and this will affect one's physical strength and labour efficiency." The fact that

the *People's Daily* was required to advise, in a serious vein, its readers, who were already under-fed, to eat less reflected growing deterioration and dislocation of the Chinese economy. Within a few months, the Chinese Government officially admitted that serious famine conditions were prevailing in China because of the "natural calamities."

Alongside with the news about the widespread famine conditions in China, there began, from the first week of March, appearing reports which clearly indicated that the situation in Tibet had reached the exploding point. On March 5, 1959, Mr. Jigme Dorji, Prime Minister of Bhutan, in an interview warned: "Trouble is brewing in Eastern Tibet, but it is difficult to gauge its dimensions and the precise aims and ability of the rebel leadership." There was evidence, he further warned, that "active rebels had moved very close to the northern border of Bhutan with China." On March 11, for the first time, the Indian Foreign Office got a message from the Indian Consul-General in Lhasa that there was some excitement in the town and that a large number of Tibetan people had visited him and complained to him about the Chinese authorities there. On March 16, speaking in Parliament, Mr. Nehru said that he did not wish to express any view on the situation in Tibet, since, apart from being embarrassing, it might make "difficult position more difficult." "I do not say," he added, "that there has been any large-scale violence; the situation there at present is more of a clash of wills than a clash of arms of physical bodies." A week later, Mr. Nehru informed Parliament of the "outbreak of violence in Lhasa itself." In the meanwhile, the Chinese Radio announced from Lhasa that the Dalai Lama had fled from the capital. On April 3, Mr. Nehru officially confirmed in the Lok Sabha that the Dalai Lama had crossed into Indian territory on March 31 and announced that political asylum had been granted to the Dalai at the latter's request.

On April 18, the Dalai Lama made his first public appearance on Indian soil at Tezpur. In his statement issued at the time he declared that he had left Tibet "of his own free will and not under duress." The statement explained the reasons for his decision to flee from his own country and exposed the nature of the Chinese regime in Tibet. The same day, addressing the

Chinese National People's Congress in Peking, Mr. Chou-En-lai insisted that friendship with India should not be shaken "on account of a handful of rebels." But on April 19, the *New China News Agency* released an official commentary on the Dalai Lama's statement wherein, for the first time, reference was made to "Indian expansionist elements inheriting the British legacy in Tibet." From April 18 to May 6, Peking unleashed an anti-Indian campaign, but care was taken to attack Mr. Nehru only indirectly. On April 27, Mr. Nehru, in his speech in Parliament, replying to the Chinese criticism, charged that the Chinese "have used the language of cold war regardless of truth and propriety." He also stated that the "revolt in Tibet is of a considerable magnitude and the basis of it must have been a strong feeling of nationalism." Mr. Nehru's speech was later reproduced in full in the Chinese press and, on May 6, the *People's Daily* published a long article, "The Tibetan Rebellion and Mr. Nehru's Philosophy", which tried to reply to the points raised in Mr. Nehru's speech. The publication of the article marked the virtual end of the initial violent attacks on India.

On August 25, Chinese Communist troops crossed the Sino-Indian boundary and, encroaching upon Indian territory, opened fire on Indian frontier guards at Longju. This incident naturally roused a strong national feeling of anger in India. Mr. Nehru, however, tried to play down the incident. Replying to a question in Parliament on August 28, he said that he could not imagine that these incidents (at Longju) were a precursor to something more serious. Such a development would be foolish and the Chinese probably realised that. (*Times of India*, 29 August, 1959). He repeated his view in his speech in the Lok Sabha on September 12, 1959. "I do not expect and I do not want anyone to imagine", he said, "that something serious is going to happen in our frontiers. I do not at all expect it—it is not an easy matter to happen either. . . ." (*Hindustan Times*, 13 September, 1959). Again at a press conference in Calcutta in October, Mr. Nehru said that he did not think that there was any 'major idea' behind the recent Chinese incursions into Indian territory. "I am inclined to think that all these are tagged on to Tibet." At the same press conference, he expressed his

view that "I consider the Soviet Union is a territorially satisfied power. I do not think they want any territory at all.... But China has not got over the first flush of its revolutionary mentality" (*Hindustan Times*, 22 October, 1959).

The Chinese soon opened fire again on Indian frontier guards in Ladakh. Immediately thereafter, addressing a public meeting in New Delhi on November 1, Mr. Nehru warned the people that "the border question was a big one and had possibilities of becoming bigger in the future. A new chapter opened between the relations of the two countries when Chinese opened fire at Longju and in Ladakh." (*Times of India*, November 2, 1959). In the same speech Mr. Nehru said: "The whole world, except China, is trying to go towards peace." However, by the end of the year 1959, Mr. Nehru became more precise and forthright. Giving his assessment of the Chinese motives, Mr. Nehru, on December 20 (in a TV interview for Columbia Broadcasting System's Programme) said: "I think it (Chinese expansionism) is traditional, typically Chinese....the urge (is) made stronger by two factors. One is, of course, their growing strength. When you are weak, you cannot indulge in it, and communism also helps the process; but I think it is more Chinese than communistic."

4

The Border Problem

INDU PATEL

When the enemy comes forward, I withdraw;
When the enemy withdraw, I go forward;
When the enemy settles down, I disturb him;
When the enemy is exhausted, I fight him.


—Mao Tse-Tung

THE IMPREGNABLE Himalayas have collapsed giving way to waves after waves of Chinese hordes who in one massive sweep have over-run, in matter of days, nearly fifty thousand square miles of our mountainous territories. With a swift, sudden thrust in the North East Frontier Agency, the People's Government of the People's Republic of China have proclaimed, loud and clear, to the countries along its borders that even the mighty Himalayas could offer no defence and that in their operational planning on an admittedly difficult battle-field they could be cunning, ruthless and devastating.

This Government has been merciless on its own people, has been shamelessly cruel on the Tibetans and can be unimaginably brutal on people they call the enemy. Except India, none of the Asian countries could ever hope to put into battle as many soldiers as China and in the matter of combat experience few in the world could match them. Theirs is the third largest air force in the world.

It is the Will of History that the people of India should stand up to such a callous bully. That is why the smashing, severe military blow in the Himalayas, far from stunning our senses, have sharpened them. The conscience and hearts of crores of men, women and children throughout the land have been galvanized into a stupendous upsurge towards common endeavour in defence of the Himalayan borders.

INDIA-CHINA BOUNDARY



THE STATES OF SIKKIM AND BHUTAN HAVE SPECIAL TREATY RELATIONS WITH INDIA.

For fifteen years since Independence we have busied ourselves with the planned socio-economic development, primarily of the sub-continent, leaving the Himalayas in wilderness to the mercy of Nature and greedy, unscrupulous neighbour. To defend this wilderness we have to develop it, we have to settle it with people. Where not a blade of grass grows we must learn to live, survive and prosper so that the future generations of our people may peacefully live in pursuits of happiness.

The Himalayas are young in age. Some millions of years ago gigantic volcanic upheavals thrust these mountain ranges out of the seas pushing them higher and higher as far as the subterranean pressure could lift them. For thousands of years thereafter the stresses and strains of this volcanic pressure continued arranging and re-arranging these ranges, pushing up new ones, pulling down others, cracking up, sliding back and endlessly changing directions of ridges creating in the process an utterly fantastic scenic grandeur. Then for millions of years the wind and rain, snow and ice, land-slides and rock-falls earth-tremors and earth-quakes created the almost impassable, barren Himalayan wilderness.

Ranges after ranges, strings after strings of these mountains stretch from Afghanistan to Burma. As the crow flies this stretch varies in width from 100 to 300 miles across. Beginning with hills and small mountains mostly in south-north direction these ranges follow one after the other in ever increasing heights till the tallest ones average around 20,000 feet. Thereafter these level down, the major part of these ranges at least, into the Tibetan Plateau on a mean height of 16,000 feet. Standing on the highest ridge one could observe range after range of mountains and hills in ever decreasing height for hundreds of kilometres right up to the Gangetic plains. On the other side of this ridge, on the plateau, stands China.

These rows, ranges and ridges of mountains are separated by sheer falls, gorges, small plateaus and valleys, some narrow and short, some wide and long, full of ponds, lakes, streams and rivers. Many of the ranges are heavily wooded but above certain heights they are barren and rocky with peaks covered with perennial snows. Nothing really grows there. Some of the valleys like Kashmere, Kulu and Kangra are fertile and rich.

The rivers originate from the glaciers. They flow between and along the ranges. If we observe the area from a great height we could notice streams and rivers through the valleys and gorges in different directions along the curves and shapes of the ranges but in one Grand Pattern. All along the length of the Himalayas runs a line of ranges which largely divides the direction of flow of the streams and rivers. From this ridge some rivers flow northwards into Tibet and Sikiang while the others flow into the Indian sub-continent. Some rivers after flowing for hundreds of miles do curve and cut into opposite direction but by and large there is this one stretch, one chain, of ranges which divide the direction of the flow of water. This is the Watershed. In the Himalayas it is the highest ridge, the crest, beyond which lies Tibet, now a part of China.

Over a period of some millions of years, rock-falls, landslides and earth-quakes, glaciers and rivers have at places, cut across the ranges of mountains creating passable gaps and openings. Sometimes it is possible to go over a low range, sometime one may go round a short range but some ranges are too high and too long—just impassable, unless mother nature has hewn through them gaps and openings which, in other words, are called passes for the people to go across. These passes are sort of rare gates through which people of one side can go to the other on pilgrimage, for trade or for war. For centuries men have laboriously and diligently cut along the ranges and ridges, trails, path-ways and roads upto the passes which have been woven into the cultural fabric of our people. There are many passes on lower ranges within our territory but the important ones are those at the highest ranges which open on to the neighbouring countries. The apex of such passes are generally accepted as the border between the neighbouring countries and are usually under joint control to facilitate cross movement of people on either side. In times of war control of approaches to these passes is of prime strategic importance.

Since it is not possible to patrol every inch of such difficult 2000-mile long mountain border, the passes are considered as marking-posts along which the border between the neighbouring countries is supposed to lie. The border patrols guard

the passes while between the passes, along the ranges and routes, are set up check-posts, out-posts to prevent unauthorized entries and check anti-social elements. Administrative control is exercised over areas inhabited either by farmers or nomads for revenue purposes. And this control extends up to the apex of the passes.

Military safeguards become necessary at the passes and along the border when neighbouring areas become danger spots. Normally quiet borders may develop into potentially dangerous areas when the neighbouring country gets a totalitarian regime which is growing strong militarily and is threatening to extend its empire. Or where the regime is weak and there arises a possibility of internal conflict leading to civil war conditions. Fearing that either of the contending factions may operate from our territories, military precautions are taken. In normal times when the neighbour is docile and peaceful and, when its military potential is almost non-existent, there does not arise any need to fortify the difficult border like the Himalayas. Fortunately the balance of military power during modern history has been in favour of our country. That explains the total absence of any border conflict barring minor skirmishes and consequent complacency about the impending danger.

With the annexation of Tibet by the Chinese Communist Government in 1950 this balance of military power abruptly tilted, almost snapping the scales, against our country. The forcible colonization of Tibet and the flight of Dalai Lama let loose a chain reaction of antagonism which created conditions of civil war and fed the fires of the legitimate Khampa revolt. The Khampas bravely, but vainly, fought back the Chinese from the Tibetan territories too close to our borders. The military fortifications of our borders, therefore, particularly that of the passes, should have been seriously undertaken in 1950 when the Chinese, over-running Tibet, stood fully armed at our gates on the Himalayas.

Our border begins at a point where our territory meets that of Afghanistan and China. From there it stretches upto the border of Nepal. The next stretch extends from Bhutan to Burma. The border moves more or less along the highest range, the crest, behind which lies the Tibetan Plateau. This

range is also the Watershed which divides the major river systems. The border in both of its stretches is not demarcated in the sense that it is on level ground, mile after mile, but is established in tradition to be along the passes on the Watershed ranges.

The border moves from Kilik Dawan pass at the Afghanistan border to Mintaka pass. Then along the ridge come Khunjerab pass, Aghil pass, Marpo La, Shaksgam pass, Karakoram pass, Qara Togh pass, Hali Langar pass, Lanak La, Kone La, Jara La, Charding La, Imis La in Kashmere; Shipki La in Himachal Pradesh; Thaga La, Tsang Chowk La, Mana Pass, Tun Jun La, Shaishal pass, Barcha Dhura pass, Kiogad pass, Kungri-bingri pass, Dharma pass and Lipu Lekh pass in Uttar Pradesh. In NEFA the important passes are Bum La near Bhutan border and Kangri Karpo La. These passes have been considered for a long time to be the landmarks along the Indo-Tibetan border.

After rampaging, ravaging and completely subjugating the people of Tibet in four years, during which the Chinese troops acclimatized themselves thoroughly to the climatic vagaries of the Himalayas, Mr. Chou En-lai flew into New Delhi in April 1954 to soothe the nerves of our Prime Minister who was troubled by the events in Tibet. The ruling leaders of over 100-crore people spontaneously liked each other, raised the meaningful slogan of *Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai* and proclaimed to the world the Five Principles—*Panch-shila*. That the mountain passes do form the land-marks along the Indo-China (Tibet) border was conceded and that Shipki La, Mana Niti, Kungri-bingri, Darma and Lipu Kekh are such passes was accepted in the Sino-Indian Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibetan Region of China and India. Impression gained ground that the border problem between India and China did not exist. We led ourselves to believe that they had accepted our boundary and our maps.


Hardly was the ink dry on the proclamation of Five Principles and the subsequent trade agreement when the Chinese started nibbling at our territory, swallowing one after the other the border passes.

On 17 July 1954 the Counsellor of China in India gave the

OUTLINE MAP OF NEFA

SCALE 1"=16 MILES (APPROX)

LINE OF ACTUAL CONTROL SEPARATING CHINESE AND INDIAN FORCES ON 7 SEP 62
AREA OF DEMILITARIZATION 30 KM ON EITHER SIDE OF THE LINE OF ACTUAL CONTROL AS DEFINED BY THE CHINESE
AREA OF DISPUTE REGARDING INTERPRETATION OF McMahon LINE



LEGEND

- NEFA DIVISIONAL LINE
- CHINESE CLAIM LINE OF 1960

following and the first note to the Ministry of External Affairs: "According to a report received from the Tibet Region of China, over thirty Indian troops armed with rifles crossed the Niti Pass on 29th June, 1954 and intruded into Wu-Je of the Ari Area of the Tibet Region of China [Wu-Je is about one day's journey from the Niti Pass]. The above happening is not in conformity with the principles of non-aggression and friendly co-existence between China and India, and the spirit of the Joint Communiqué issued recently by the Prime Ministers of China and India. It is hoped that the Government of India would promptly investigate the matter, and order the immediate withdrawal of the Indian troops in question from the above-mentioned territory of the Tibet Region of China. We shall appreciate it if you will let us know at the earliest opportunity the results of the steps which you are to take in the above matter." This note was followed by another on 13 August 1954 which gave more details about the above alleged intrusion in this area.

Our reply of the 27 August denied the allegation of intrusion, stating that "A party of our Border Security Force is encamped in the Hoti Plain which is south-east of Niti Pass and is in Indian territory. None of our troops or personnel have crossed north of the Niti Pass." On the contrary, "we have received reports that some of the Tibetan officials tried to cross into our country in Hoti Plain."

With this ended the year 1954—creating uncertainty about the ownership of the Niti Pass and the geographic location of Wu-Je/Hoti area.

On 28 June 1955 we reminded the Chinese Counsellor about the contents of our previous letter and reported that a party of Chinese are camping at Hoti with "5 tents and 20 horses..." "We requested that they be withdrawn across the border over the Tunjun La and restrained from entering Indian territory unless they are in possession of proper documents..."

The Chinese reply of 11 July 1955 denied that the Chinese personnel had crossed the border in the vicinity of the Niti Pass. They stated that 30 Indian soldiers who crossed Wu-Je on 29 June 1954 withdrew on 19 September but came back

again on 25 June 1955 and were engaged "in constructing fortifications at places very close to our garrison forces stationing there."

A week later we stated that the outpost maintained at Bara Hoti is a seasonal one and hence the withdrawal during winter. The note further stated that "We are not aware of the exact location of Wu-Je, though the Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy (Mr. Kang) mentioned that it was 12 kilometres north of the Tunjunla. But we are quite confident that our troops have not under any circumstances crossed the border into the Tibet region of China. The only party of Indian troops in the area is the party camping in the Hoti Plain." We repeated our request to withdraw their troops camping nearby on our territory.

On 19 August, we wrote again saying that "the Sarji, a Tibetan official with the Chinese troops at Bara Hoti on the Hoti Plains in India has realized grazing tax from Indian herdsmen grazing in the area. This is a new development which we would request the Chinese authorities to stop forthwith." The Chinese note of the 26 September harped on the intrusion of Indian personnel in the Wu-Je area and curtly stated that "since no Chinese personnel has crossed the border, there could not have been such situation as stated in your informal note of the 19th August, 1955." On 5 November we once again denied having ever intruded into Wu-Je. We reiterated that Bara Hoti situated as it is 2 miles south of Tunjun La Pass is in India and that the Chinese troops camping there should be withdrawn. Our troops have never entered Wu-Je which according to Mr. Kang is 12 kilometres north of Tunjun La. We were 2 miles south of it. We wrote again on the same day pointing out that our own troops were held up by Chinese troops near Damzan, which is 10 miles south of Niti Pass and therefore certainly in our territory.

With that was over the year 1955 with Niti Pass more or less lost and doubts cast about another Pass—Tunjan La—in Uttar Pradesh.

On 2 May 1956 the commander of our Border Security Force reported the presence of 12 Chinese soldiers, including one

officer, equipped with tommy and sten guns and telescopes near Nilang which area right up to Tsang Chokla Pass is clearly within Indian territory and has always been in our possession. We requested the Chinese to withdraw these troops beyond the said Pass. Next month we wrote clarifying the exact geographical location of Bara Hoti and informed that a party of 20/30 Chinese troops were preparing to cross over Tunjun La Pass into our territory.

The Chinese Government denied on the 8 June that Tunjun La is a border Pass and emphasized that Wu-Je area was always under the jurisdiction of Daba Dzong of the Tibet region and therefore within China. They agreed to "joint investigation" to settle location of Wu-Je and suggested that both parties refrain from sending troops to that area. In their following note of 26 July they withdrew Mr. Kang's statement that Wu-Je is 12 kilometres North East of Tunjun La. Tunjun La, they argued, not being the border Pass, cannot be taken as a landmark to decide the location of what the Chinese call Wu-Je and we call Bara Hoti.—It took two years for us to clearly ascertain the meaning of the Chinese terminology. By accepting joint investigation to locate Wu-Je (Bara Hoti) we were to concede by implications that Tunjun La Pass was entirely theirs. Early in September we reported trespass by 10 Chinese troops into our side of the Shipki La Pass and two weeks later we again wrote to say that their commander had clear instructions that the Chinese border extended up to Hupsang Khad, well within our side of the Shipki La Pass. This was too much for us to swallow; so we warned the Chinese Government to take immediate action on this complaint or otherwise "there might be an unfortunate clash on our border which will have undesirable results." In early October we regretfully referred to the change in their stand about possession of Tunjun La Pass and indicated the exact location of the Pass to avoid its being confused with any other. We still had a lurking hope that the Chinese were claiming Tunjun La by error!

With that came to close the year 1956—Tunjun La and Shipki La Passes came under Chinese possession and we could do, physically, nothing about it. Ownership of Tsang Chokla Pass

was also claimed. The year 1957 passed without exchange of any notes between the two governments on the border problems. But the events of the year 1958 were too bad and should have shaken out of our heads the illusions about the efficiency of the Panchshila to settle border problems by mere exchange of notes.

The later half of the year 1958 opened with the Chinese visit to Khurnak Fort which lies within the Indian frontiers of the Ladakh region of Kashmir. They alleged that the Indian troops had entered their territories of Wu-Je, presumably under direct instructions from the Government of India in contravention of agreement to refrain to do so during the period of joint consultation. This we explained was the routine revenue settlement operation by officers of the U.P. Government.

However, the biggest shock of this year was the fact that we came to know about the construction of a motor road across our territory in Ladakh. Our Note says: "This road seems to form part of the Chinese road known as Yehcheng-Gartok road or Sikiang-Tibet Highway the completion of which was announced in September 1957. The road enters Indian territory just east of Sarigh Jilgnang, runs north-west to Amtogar and striking the western bank of the Amtogar lake runs north-west through Yangpas, Khitai Dawan and Haji Langar which are all in indisputable Indian territory. Near the Amtogar lake several branch tracks have also been made across our territory."

Finally, the Note stated that an Indian party consisting of 3 military officers, 4 soldiers, one guide, one porter, six pony-owners and thirty-four ponies who were out on routine patrol duties have been missing since the end of August. Search for them had been in vain and so a request was made to the Chinese to help to locate them. Pat came the reply on 3 November that the persons concerned were arrested on 8 and 12 September by the Chinese Frontier Guards, being caught snooping on the Sikiang-Tibet Highway which is in Chinese territory. They complained about intrusions over their air-space by our planes and stated that these prisoners were deported through Karakoram Pass on 22 October. Our Ambassador at Peking could only express his surprise and regret that the Chinese

should have kept us in dark about the detention of our men for five weeks.

Before the year ended, once again the Hoti/Wu-Je featured into a note dated 10 December. The location and ownership of this area was under joint investigation. However the Chinese by their action took military control of it. Further, when the Indian check-post retired this year on the onset of winter the Chinese came over and set up their out-posts at Laphthal and Sangcha Mala both within the Indian side of Balcha Dhura Pass considered as traditional boundary between India and China. The Chinese army walked into our territory claimed by them. We could never arrest or detain them for they came in large numbers as the army of occupation.

During this period they also alleged that "the American Chiang-kai-shek clique and local special agents and Tibetan reactionaries operating in Kalimpong have recently stepped up their conspiratorial and disruptive activities against Tibet region of China—these activities cannot but enrage the Chinese Government and people and put them on alert." This, of course, was a baseless allegation and we said so giving refutation, item by item, on 2 August 1958.

On 24 August 1958 we protested for the first time, against the Chinese Map published in the *China Pictorial* magazine which claimed (i) four of the five divisions of NEFA, (ii) some areas in the north of U.P., (iii) large area in Ladakh and (iv) a big slice of Bhutan. When the attention of Mr. Chou En-lai was drawn in 1954 about inaccuracies in Chinese maps, he assured that they were old maps and that his Government had not had the time to rectify them. We offered them our Political Map of India—3rd Edition, 1956 (*scale*: one inch to seventy miles) wherein was shown clearly our northern borders. What was our border, we erroneously assumed, would naturally be accepted as the Chinese border.

To this offer the Chinese Foreign office gave a characteristically cunning reply to our government on 3 November 1958: "With the elapse of time, and after consultations with the various neighbouring countries and a survey of the border regions a new way of drawing the boundary of China will be decided on in accordance with the results of the consultations and the survey."

It was clear that they were not accepting our map. It also appeared certain that they would stick to their maps which were being reprinted and distributed year after year. This added a new, sinister, dimension to the nature of our border conflict and caught the personal attention of the Prime Minister, for the first time in four and a half years, to steady Chinese occupation slice after slice of our territories. In a personal letter to the Prime Minister of China, Mr. Chou En-lai, on 14 December 1958, Mr. Nehru stated:

“...You will remember that when the Sino-Indian Agreement in regard to the Tibet region of China was concluded, various outstanding problems, including some relating to our border trade were considered. A number of mountain passes were mentioned which should be used for purposes of travel between the two countries. No border questions were raised at that time and we were under the impression that there were no border disputes between our respective countries. In fact we thought that the Sino-Indian Agreement which was happily concluded in 1954 had settled all outstanding problems between our two countries.

“Somewhat later, my attention was drawn to some maps published in China. The maps I saw were not very accurate maps, but nevertheless the frontier as roughly drawn in these maps did not correspond with the actual frontier. In fact it ran right across the territory of India in several places. I was surprised to see this, as I had not been aware at any time previously that there was any frontier dispute between our two countries. No mention of this had been made in the course of the Sino-Indian talks which resulted in the Agreement of 1954.

“Subsequently, in October, 1954, I had the privilege of visiting your great country and the happiness to meet you and other leaders of the Chinese People’s Republic. We had long talks and it was a pleasure to me to find that we had a great deal in common in our approach and that there was no dispute or problem affecting our relations. In the course of our talks I briefly mentioned to you that I had seen some maps recently published in China which gave a wrong borderline between the two countries. I presumed that this was by some error

and told you at the time that so far as India was concerned we were not much worried about the matter because our boundaries were quite clear and were not a matter of argument. You were good enough to reply to me that these maps were really reproductions of old pre-liberation maps and that you had had no time to revise them. In view of the many and heavy pre-occupations of your Government, I could understand that this revision had not taken place till then. I expressed the hope that the border line would be corrected before long."

Our Prime Minister then referred to a discussion he had with Mr. Chou En-lai about the McMahon Line during his second visit to India towards the end of 1956, and continued:

"You told me then that you had accepted this McMahon Line border with Burma and, whatever might have happened long ago, in view of the friendly relations which existed between China and India, you proposed to recognise this border with India also. You added that you would like to consult the authorities of the Tibetan region of China and you proposed to do so....

"...A few months ago, our attention was drawn again to a map of China published in the magazine "China Pictorial" which indicated the border with India. This map was also not very clearly defined. But even the rough borderline appeared to us to be wrongly placed. This borderline went right across Indian territory. A large part of our North-East Frontier Agency as well as some other parts which are and have long been well recognised as parts of India and been administered by India in the same way as other parts of our country, were shown to be part of Chinese territory. A considerable region of our neighbour country, Bhutan in the north-east was also shown as being on the Chinese side. A part of the North-East Frontier Agency which was clearly on the Indian side of what has been known as the McMahon Line, was shown in this map as part of Chinese territory.

"The magazine containing this map was widely distributed and questions were asked in our Parliament about this. I gave answers to the effect that these maps were merely reproduc-

tions of old ones and did not represent the actual facts of the situations.

“We drew your Government’s attention to this map some time ago this year. In a memorandum in reply to us, it has been stated by your Government that in the maps currently published in China the boundary line between China and neighbouring countries including India, is drawn on the basis of maps published before the liberation. It has further been stated that the Chinese Government has not yet undertaken a survey of the Chinese boundary nor consulted with the countries concerned, and that it will not make changes in the boundary on its own.

“I was puzzled by this reply because I thought that there was no major boundary dispute between China and India. There never has been such a dispute so far as we are concerned and in my talks with you in 1954 and subsequently, I had stated this. I could understand four years ago that the Chinese Government, being busy with major matters of national reconstruction could not find time to revise old maps. But you will appreciate that nine years after the Chinese People’s Republic came into power, the continued issue of these incorrect maps is embarrassing to us as to others. There can be no question of these large parts of India being anything but India and there is no dispute about them. I do not know what kind of surveys can affect these well known and fixed boundaries. I am sure that you will appreciate our difficulties in this matter.

“I am venturing to write to you on this subject as I feel that any possibility of grave misunderstanding between our countries should be removed as soon as possible....”

With this letter came to an end the fateful year 1958 with loss of Khurnak Fort and China properly entrenched in the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh; the detention of our police patrol for many weeks; unilateral occupation of Bara-Hoti during the pendency of joint-consultations; setting up of their out-posts in Laphthal and Sangcha Malla on our side of Balcha Dhura Pass in Uttar Pradesh.

The Chinese Prime Minister, Mr. Chou En-lai’s reply of the 23 January 1959 confirmed in no uncertain terms that the misunderstanding of the Government of India about the non-

existence of the boundary dispute was indeed grave if not tragic. For, "setting forth the views and stand of the Chinese Government," he categorically stated:

"...historically no treaty or agreement on the Sino-Indian boundary ever has been concluded between the Chinese Central Government and the Indian Government...."

"So far as the actual situation is concerned, there are certain differences between the two sides over the border question. In the past few years, questions as to which side certain areas on the Sino-Indian border belong were on more than one occasion taken up between the Chinese and the Indian sides through diplomatic channels. The latest case concerns an area in the southern part of China's Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region, which has always been under Chinese jurisdiction. Patrol duties have continually been carried out in that area by the border guards of the Chinese Government. And the Sinkiang-Tibet highway built by our country in 1956 runs through that area. Yet recently the Indian Government claimed that that area was Indian territory. All this shows that border disputes do exist between China and India.

"It was true that the border question was not raised in 1954 when negotiations were being held between the Chinese and Indian sides for the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet Region of China and India. This was because conditions were not yet ripe for its settlement and the Chinese side on its part had had no time to study the question...."

"An important question concerning the Sino-Indian boundary is the question of the so-called McMahon Line. I discussed this with Your Excellency as well as with Prime Minister U Nu. I would now like to explain again the Chinese Government's attitude. As you are aware, the 'McMahon Line' was a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet Region of China and aroused the great indignation of the Chinese people. Juridically too it cannot be considered legal. I have told you that it has never been recognized by the Chinese Central Government. Although related documents were signed by a representative of the local authorities of the Tibet Region of China, the Tibet local authorities were in fact dissatisfied with this unilaterally drawn line. And I have also told you formally about

their dissatisfaction. On the other hand, one cannot, of course, fail to take cognizance of the great and encouraging changes: India and Burma which are concerned in this line, have attained independence successively and become states friendly with China. In view of the various complex factors mentioned above, the Chinese Government, on the one hand finds it necessary to take a more or less realistic attitude towards the McMahon Line, and, on the other hand, cannot but act with prudence and needs time to deal with this matter. All this I have mentioned to you on more than one occasion. However, we believe that, on account of the friendly relations between China and India, a friendly settlement can eventually be found for this section of the boundary line.

“Precisely because the boundary between the two countries is not yet formally delimited and some differences exist, it is unavoidable that there should be discrepancies between the boundary lines drawn on the respective maps of the two sides. On the maps currently published in our country, the Chinese boundaries are drawn in the way consistently followed in the Chinese maps for the past several decades if not longer. We do not hold that every portion of this boundary line is drawn on sufficient grounds. But it would be inappropriate for us to make changes without having made surveys and without having consulted the countries concerned. Furthermore, there would be difficulties in making such changes, because they would give rise to confusion among our people and bring censure on our government. As a matter of fact, our people have also expressed surprise at the way the Sino-Indian boundary, particularly its western section, is drawn on maps published in India. They have asked our government to take up this matter with the Indian Government. Yet we have not done so, but have explained to them the actual situation of the Sino-Indian boundary. With the settlement of the boundary question—which, as our government has repeatedly pointed out, requires surveys and mutual consultations—the problem of drawing the boundary on the maps will also be solved....”

Our Prime Minister was surprised at this reply. However, exactly two months later (22 March 1959) he wrote another letter pointing out where the traditional frontiers lay and drew

the attention of the Chinese Prime Minister to certain historical agreements in this regard.

“On receipt of your letter I have again examined the basis of the determination of the frontier between India and the Tibet Region of China. It is true that this frontier has not been demarcated on the ground in all the sectors but I am somewhat surprised to know that this frontier was not accepted at any time by the Government of China. The traditional frontier, as you may be aware, follows the geographical principle of watershed on the crest of the High Himalayan Range, but apart from this, in most parts, it has the sanction of specific international agreements between the then Government of India and the Central Government of China. It may perhaps be useful if I draw your attention to some of these agreements:

(i) Sikkim: The boundary of Sikkim, a protectorate of India, with the Tibet Region of China was defined in the Anglo-Chinese Convention 1890 and jointly demarcated on the ground in 1895.

(ii) The Ladakh Region of the State of Jammu and Kashmir: A treaty of 1842 between Kashmir on the one hand and the Emperor of China and the Lama Guru of Lhasa on the other mentions the India-China boundary in the Ladakh region. In 1847 the Chinese Government admitted that this boundary was sufficiently and distinctly fixed. The area now claimed by China has always been depicted as part of India on official maps, has been surveyed by Indian officials and even a Chinese map of 1893 shows it as Indian territory.

(iii) The McMahon Line: As you are aware, the so-called McMahon Line runs eastwards from the eastern borders of Bhutan and defines the boundary of China on the one hand and India and Burma on the other. Contrary to what has been reported to you, this line was, in fact drawn at a Tripartite Conference held at Simla in 1913-1914 between the Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of China, Tibet and India. At the time of acceptance of the delineation of this frontier, Lonchen Shatra, the Tibetan Plenipotentiary, in letters exchanged, stated explicitly that he had received orders from Lhasa to agree to the boundary as marked on the map appended to

the Convention. The line was drawn after full discussion and was confirmed subsequently by a formal exchange of letters; and there is nothing to indicate that the Tibetan authorities were in any way dissatisfied with the agreed boundary. Moreover, although the Chinese Plenipotentiary at the Conference objected to the boundaries between Inner and Outer Tibet and between Tibet and China, there is no mention of any Chinese reservation, in respect of the India-Tibet frontier either during the discussions or at the time of their initialling the Convention. This line has the incidental advantage of running along the crest of the High Himalayan Range which forms the natural dividing line between the Tibetan plateau in the north and the sub-montane region in the south. In our previous discussions and particularly during your visit to India in January 1957, we were gratified to note that you were prepared to accept this line as representing the frontier between China and India in this region and I hope that we shall reach an understanding on this basis.

“Thus, in these three different sectors covering much the larger part of our boundary with China, there is sufficient authority based on geography, tradition as well as treaties for the boundary as shown in our published maps. The remaining sector from the tri-junction of the Nepal, India and Tibet boundary upto Ladakh is also traditional and follow well-defined geographical features. Here, too, the boundary runs along well-defined watersheds between the river systems in the south and the west on the one hand and north and east on the other. This delineation is confirmed by old revenue records and maps and by the exercise of Indian administrative authority up to the boundary line for decades. . . .

“...I do hope that a study of the foregoing paragraphs will convince that not only is the delineation of our frontier, as published in our maps, based on natural and geographical features but that it also coincides with tradition and over a large part is confirmed by international agreements. I need hardly add that independent India would be the last country, to make any encroachments beyond its well-established frontiers. It was in the confidence that the general question of our com-

mon frontier was settled to the satisfaction of both sides that I declared publicly and in Parliament on several occasions that there is no room for doubt about our frontiers as shown in the published maps. We thought that our position was clearly understood and accepted by your Government. However, as unfortunately there is some difference of views between our two Governments in regard to the delineation of the frontier at some places, I agree that the position as it was before the recent dispute arose should be respected by both sides and that neither side should try to take unilateral action in exercise of what it conceives to be its right. Further, if any possession has been secured recently, the position should be rectified. . . .”

“That there is a fundamental difference between the positions of our Governments on the Sino-Indian boundary question” surprised Mr. Chou En-lai very much and he admitted that he had to take a longer time—almost six months—to consider a reply which was finally sent out on 8 September 1959. He leaned heavily on the “British Imperialist” for support of his case.

“The Sino-Indian boundary question”, he wrote, “was a complicated question left over by History”, particularly recent history when the British “conducted extensive territorial expansion into China’s Tibet region and even the Sikiang region.”

Contrary to their expectations, he alleged, the Government of India was applying “all sorts of pressures on the Chinese Government, not even scrupling the use of force to support this demand” that “the Chinese Government give formal recognition to the situation created by the application of the British policy of aggression.” He repeated his suggestion made in his last communication that “as a provisional measure, the two sides should maintain the long-existing status quo of the border, and not seek to change it by unilateral action, even less by force,” he continued.

“...In my letter to Your Excellency dated January 23, 1959, I pointed out that the Sino-Indian Boundary has never been formally delimited. In your letter of March 22, 1959, Your Excellency expressed disagreement to this and tried energetically to prove that most parts of the Sino-Indian boundary had the sanction of specific international agreements between the

past Government of India and the Central Government of China. In order to prove that the Sino-Indian boundary has never been formally delimited, I would like to furnish the following facts....”

(i) *Concerning the boundary separating China's Sinkiang and Tibet regions from Ladakh.*

He emphasised that 1842 peace treaty between Kashmir and Tibet was not ratified by China, is vague and does not formally delimit the boundary. A mere statement in 1847 by a Chinese official to a British representative that the boundary was clear does not confirm formal delimitation. A suggestion by the British Government in 1899 to undertake formal delimitation was turned down by China. And added: “Your Excellency also said on August 28 this year in India's Loksabha: ‘This was the boundary of the old Kashmir State with Tibet and Chinese Turkestan. Nobody has ever marked it’,”

(ii) *Concerning the section of the boundary between the Ari Area of China's Tibet and India.*

“It can be seen from your letter that you also agree that this section of the boundary has not been formally delimited by the two countries. Not only so, there have in fact been historical disputes between the two sides over the right to many places in this area. For example, the area of Sang and Tsungsha, southwest of Tsaparang Dzong in Tibet, which had always belonged to China, was thirty to forty years back gradually invaded and occupied by the British. The local authorities of China's Tibet took up this matter several times with Britain, without any results. It has thus become an outstanding issue left over by history.”

(iii) *Concerning the Sino-Indian boundary east of Bhutan.*

“The so-called McMahan Line was a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet region of China and has never been recognised by any Chinese Central Government, and is therefore illegal.” “This illegal line aroused the great indignation of the Chinese people,” and following the independence of India in 1947, the Tibet authorities “cabled Your Excellency asking India to return all the territory of the Tibet region of China south of this illegal line.” This piece of territory is as big as ninety thousand square kilometres. “Mr.

Prime Minister, how could China agree to accept under coercion such an illegal line, which would have it relinquish its rights and disgrace itself by setting out its territory—and such a large piece of territory as that?

“It can be seen from the above that the way the Sino-Indian boundary has always been drawn in maps published in China is not without grounds and that at first British and Indian maps also drew the Sino-Indian boundary roughly in the same way as the Chinese maps. As a matter of fact, it was not Chinese maps, but British and Indian maps that later unilaterally altered the way the Sino-Indian boundary was drawn. Nevertheless, since China and India have not delimited their mutual boundary through friendly negotiations and joint surveys, China has not asked India to revise its maps. In 1954, I explained to Your Excellency for the same reasons that it would be inappropriate for the Chinese Government to revise the old map right now. . . .

“As stated above, the Chinese Government has all along adhered to a clear-cut policy on the Sino-Indian border questions: on the one hand, it affirms the fact that the entire Sino-Indian boundary has not been delimited, while on the other, it also faces reality, and, taking specially into consideration the friendly relationship between China and India, actively seeks for a settlement fair and reasonable to both sides, and never tries unilaterally to change the long-existing state of the border between the two countries pending the settlement of the boundary question.

“Regarding the eastern section of the Sino-Indian boundary, as I have stated above, the Chinese Government absolutely does not recognise the so-called McMahon Line, but Chinese troops have never crossed that line. This is for the sake of maintaining amity along the border to facilitate negotiations and settlement of the boundary question, and in no way implies that the Chinese Government has recognised that line. . . .”

This letter was received by our Prime Minister with surprise, distress and great shock. He wrote on 26 September 1962 that he had “no idea that the People’s Republic of China would lay claim to about 40,000 square miles of what in our view has been indisputably Indian territory for decades and in

sectors for over a century.” He expressed the deepest resentment of the Parliament and people against the allegation that we were seeking to benefit from the British aggression against China. “Your suggestion that the Government of India applied all sorts of pressures including the use of force,” he wrote, “is the reverse of what the Government of India did” and pointed out in a long and comprehensive note innumerable instances of Chinese military invasion and occupation of our territories at various places all along the border, including Bara-Hoti/Wu-je, the location of which was under negotiation (joint consultation). “The long existing status quo on the border” though favoured by India, he emphasised, has been repeatedly violated by the Chinese Government. He then set out for the benefit of Mr. Chou En-lai, once again, positive historic evidence to prove the correctness of India’s boundary with China. It was futile to believe that with more detailed and comprehensive evidences, Mr. Chou En-lai could be won over!

“It is true that the Sino-Indian boundary has not been formally delimited along its entire length. Indeed the terrain of the Sino-Indian border in many places makes such physical demarcation on the ground impossible. But the entire length of the border has been either defined by treaty or recognised by custom or by both and until now the Chinese Government have not protested against the exercise of jurisdiction by the Government of India upto the customary border. You have yourself acknowledged the fact that no armed clash ever occurred along our border until the beginning of this year. All Chinese Governments were weak is no answer. Not even a protest was registered in accordance with established state practice in this regard, as was done in the case of Burma between 1906 and 1937.

“Concerning the boundary between Tibet and Ladakh, it is incorrect to say that the then Chinese Central Government did not send anybody to participate in the conclusion of the treaty between Tibet and Kashmir in 1842. The treaty was signed by the representatives of both the Dalai Lama and the Emperor of China. Kalon Sokon, one of the signatories, though by birth a Tibetan, had Chinese rank. Even the Tibetan version

of the treaty makes it clear that China was a party to it. Thus, it asserts that "there will never be on any account in future till the world lasts, any deviation even by the hair's breadth and any breach in the alliance, friendship and unity between the King of the world Siri Khalsaji Sahib and Siri Maharaj Sahib Raja-i-Rajagan Raja Sahib Bahadur, and the Khagan of China and the Lama Guru Sahib of Lhasa."

"It is true that the 1842 treaty referred merely to the "old established frontiers." This was because these frontiers were well-known and did not require any formal delimitation. Even the treaty of 1684 between Ladakh and Tibet stated that "the boundaries fixed in the beginning, when Skyid-Ida-ngeema-gon gave a kingdom to each of his three sons, shall still be maintained." Reference in the Ladakhi chronicles of the 17th century indicate that the boundary was well-established. Cunningham, whom Your Excellency has referred to with approval, toured the area in 1846. He stated in 1854 that the eastern boundary of Ladakh "is well defined by piles of stones, which were set up after the last expulsion of the Sokpo or Mongol hordes in A.D. 1687 when the Ladakhis received considerable assistance from Kashmir." (*Ladakh*, 1854, p. 261.) Thus it is clear that for nearly two centuries the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet was well-known and recognized by both sides. There was a constant flow of trade between Ladakh and Tibet during these centuries as provided for by these treaties, and no boundary conflicts ever arose.

"It has been stated in your letter that China never ratified the 1842 treaty. That China recognised the treaty is clear from the fact that the Chinese official in 1847 informed the British Government: "Respecting the frontiers I beg to remark that the borders of those territories have been sufficiently and distinctly fixed, so that it will be best to adhere to this ancient arrangement and it will prove far more convenient to abstain from any additional measures for fixing them." There was no suggestion that the Chinese Government regarded the treaty as invalid. It is also clear from the statement quoted that not merely was the boundary known, but the boundary was distinctly and sufficiently fixed and there was no divergence of opinion as to where it lay.


“Further evidence of Chinese acceptance of the 1842 treaty is provided by the fact that the other provisions of the treaty regarding exchange of goods and presents were in operation right up to 1946 without any hindrance from the Chinese Government.

“It is incorrect to say that down to 1899 the British Government proposed formally to delimit this section of the boundary but that the Chinese Government did not agree. No proposals were made between 1847 and 1899 for any such formal delimitation. The proposal made in 1899 by the British Government referred not to the eastern frontier of Ladakh with Tibet but to the northern frontier of Ladakh and Kashmir with Sinkiang. It was stated in that context that the northern boundary ran along the Kuen Lun range to a point east of 80° east longitude, where it met the eastern boundary of Ladakh. This signified beyond doubt that the whole of Aksai Chin area lay in Indian territory. The Government of China did not object to this proposal.

“So Ladakh, Tibet and China had all accepted that the frontier between Ladakh and Tibet was the customary boundary. You have stated that the boundary as shown in the Chinese maps follows more or less, that shown in the map of ‘Punjab, Western Himalaya and adjoining parts of Tibet,’ compiled by Walker and attached to Cunningham’s book published in 1854. Walker’s Map states in the Compilation Index that the document used for this sector is the ‘Map of Ladakh and Nari Khorsum by Capt. H. Strachey.’ Now, Strachey toured only a part of Ladakh in 1847-48. He knew little or nothing about Aksai Chin, having never visited the area, and drew the boundary where he thought the main water-parting, which was the natural and old established frontier in this area, lay. Thereafter a number of exploration and survey parties were sent by the Government of India to this region. These parties ascertained the customary frontier on the basis of natural features and such local evidence as was available. Johnson visited the area in 1865 and Frederick Drew, an Englishman in the employ of the Maharaja of Kashmir as Governor of Ladakh, in 1869. Other survey parties in the nineteenth century were those of Hayward, Shaw and Cayley in 1868, Carey in

OUTLINE MAP OF LADAKH

SCALE 1"=16 MILES (APPROX)



Legend:
- - - - - International Boundary
- - - - - Administrative Boundary
- - - - - Road
- - - - - River
- - - - - Contour Line
- - - - - Spot Height

1885-87, Hamilton Bower in 1891, Littledale in 1895, Welby and Malcolm in 1896, Deasy and Pike in 1896, and Aurel Stein in 1900. Accurate maps of the whole Ladakh area thus became possible only from 1865, after the aforementioned surveys had ascertained the exact line of the watershed; and it is significant that most of the maps since that date show the customary boundary in accordance with the line shown by us in our map rather than that claimed by China. The later Map of Turkestan of Walker himself published in 1867-68, Drew's Map attached to his book *Jammoo & Kashmir Territories* (1875), Johnston's *Atlas* (1882), and maps attached to the *Gazetteers of Kashmir* published from 1890 onwards all showed boundary lines more or less similar to our present frontier. Even official Chinese maps of the late nineteenth century showed a boundary approximating to our line. It is only in official Chinese maps of the twentieth century that the Chinese Government included large parts of our territory. On the other hand, *The New Atlas and Commercial Gazetteer of China*, published in Shanghai sometime after 1917 by the *North China Daily News and Herald* on the basis of authoritative surveys, shows a boundary in the northwest similar to our alignment and a boundary in the north-east which approximates to what later became known as the McMahon Line. I may add that the Chinese maps do not follow even Walker's Map of 1854 where it does not support the assertion made on behalf of China. Thus Walker shows the areas north of Demchok and north of Pangong in India but recent Chinese maps have not followed Walker's map in regard to these areas.

"You have referred to the sector of the boundary between what is known as the Ari area of Tibet and India. We are told that Ari, which is an abbreviated form of Ngari Khorsum, is south-western Tibet. This is the sector of the boundary between the Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh in India and the Tibet region. You have stated that the boundary in this sector has never been formally delimited. In fact, there should be little doubt about the boundary in this sector. Article IV of the 1954 Sino-Indian Agreement specifies six passes in this area. There was discussion of these passes between the Chinese and Indian representatives before the Agreement was concluded.

ed. Your original draft contained the following: 'The Chinese Government agrees to open the following passes.' On behalf of India Mr. Kaul then said that these were Indian passes. After some discussion both sides agreed on the following text: 'Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes.' Your Vice-Foreign Minister remarked in that context. 'This was the fifth concession on our part.' This was recognition of the passes as border passes. In fact the Government of India have always been in control of the Indian ends of the passes.

"I am particularly surprised by your statement that 'the so-called McMahon Line was a product of the British policy of aggression against the Tibet Region of China.' You further state that the agreement in regard to the frontier between India and Tibet was concluded between the British representative and the representative of the Tibet local authorities and that it has never been recognized by any Chinese Central Government. From this you draw the conclusion that the agreement is illegal. The facts, however, are otherwise. The arrangements for the Simla Conference were made with the full knowledge and consent of the Government of China. The Foreign Minister of China wrote to the British representative on the 7th August 1913 that the Chinese plenipotentiary would proceed to India 'to open negotiations for a treaty jointly' with the Tibetan and British plenipotentiaries. It is clear from the proceedings of the conference that not only did the Chinese representative fully participate in the conference but that the Tibetan representative took part in the discussions on an equal footing with the Chinese and the then British Indian representatives. Not only were the frontiers of India with Tibet discussed at the conference, but also the boundaries between Inner Tibet and China, and Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. At no stage, either then or subsequently, did the Chinese Government object to the discussions on the boundary between India and Tibet at the conference. In the circumstances the agreement which resulted from the conference in regard to the McMahon Line boundary between India and Tibet must, in accordance with accepted international practice, be regarded as binding on both China and Tibet. In fact this was not the first occasion

when Tibet concluded an agreement with other countries. In 1856 Tibet concluded an agreement on its own with Nepal. The Convention signed by Britain and Tibet in 1904 was negotiated by the British and Tibetan representatives with the assistance of the Chinese Amban in Tibet.

“You have stated that for a long time after the exchange of so-called secret notes between Britain and Tibet Britain did not dare to make public the related documents. You have also contended that the McMahon Line ‘was later marked on the map attached to the Simla Treaty.’ I am afraid I cannot agree either with your facts or your conclusion. The Chinese representative at the Simla Conference was fully aware of the McMahon Line boundary between India and Tibet. This particular line was discussed between the Tibetan and British Indian representatives, but when the draft convention emerging from the conference was presented on the 22nd April 1914 for signature by the British, Indian, Tibetan and Chinese representatives it had attached to it a map showing the McMahon Line boundary as well as the boundaries between Inner Tibet and China and Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. Later, the Chinese Foreign Office in a memorandum, dated the 25th April 1914 listed a number of objections to the boundaries between Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet and China. It did not raise any objection to the boundary between Tibet and India as shown in the map attached to the tripartite Simla Convention. Thereafter, on the 27th April, the Chinese representative initialled both the convention and the map without any objection. Subsequently, in their memorandum, dated the 13th June 1914, the Chinese made fresh proposals regarding the boundaries of Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. It is significant that no mention was at all made in this memorandum of the boundary between Tibet and India. Almost five years later, on the 30th May 1919, the Government of China again suggested some modifications of the Simla Convention with a view to reaching a final settlement. These modifications related only to the boundaries between Inner Tibet and China and Inner Tibet and Outer Tibet. No reference at all was made to the boundary between Tibet and India (McMahon Line). Looking into the old papers, we find that the British Government

withheld the publication of the Simla Convention for several years in the hope that there would be an agreement about the status and boundary of Inner Tibet. The Simla Convention was published in the 1929 edition of Aitchison's Treaties and the McMahon Line was shown in the official maps from 1937 onwards. These maps were circulated widely but neither then nor subsequently was any objection raised by the Chinese authorities.

"I entirely disagree with the inference drawn by you from the exchange of two communications between the Tibetan Bureau in Lhasa and the new Government of India in 1947. The facts are that our Mission in Lhasa forwarded to us a telegram, dated the 16th October 1947 from the Tibetan Bureau. The telegram asked for the return of alleged Tibetan territories on boundaries of India and Tibet 'such as Sayul and Walong and in direction of Pemakoe, Lonag, Lopa, Mon, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and others on this side of river Ganges and Lowo, Ladakh etc., upto boundary of Yarkhim.' It will be seen that the areas claimed by Tibet had not been defined. If they were to be taken literally, the Tibetan boundary would come down to the line of the river Ganges. The Government of India could not possibly have entertained such a fantastic claim. If they had the faintest idea that this telegram would be made the basis of a subsequent claim to large areas of Indian territory, they would of course have immediately and unequivocally rejected the claim. Not having had such an impression, they sent a reply to the following effect: 'The Government of India would be glad to have an assurance that it is the intention of the Tibetan Government to continue relations on the existing basis until new agreements are reached on matters that either party may wish to take up. This is the procedure adopted by all other countries with which India has inherited treaty relations from His Majesty's Government.' It would be unfair to deduce from this reply that India undertook to negotiate fresh agreements with Tibet on the frontier question. When the British relinquished power and India attained freedom on the 15th August 1947, the new Government of India inherited the treaty obligations of undivided India. They wished to assure all countries with which the British Government

of undivided India had treaties and agreements that the new Government of India would abide by the obligations arising from them. All that the Government of India intended to do in the telegram mentioned in Your Excellency's letter was to convey an assurance to that effect to the Tibetan authorities. There could be no question, so far as India was concerned, of reopening old treaties with Tibet with a view to entertaining, even for purposes of discussion, claims to large areas of Indian territory.

"It is wrong to say that the frontier east of Bhutan as shown on Chinese maps is the traditional frontier. On the contrary, it is the McMahon Line which correctly represents the customary boundary in this area. The water-parting formed by the crest of the Himalayas is the natural frontier which was accepted for centuries as the boundary by the peoples on both sides. The tribes inhabiting the area south of the McMahon Line—the Monbas, Akas, Daffas, Miris, Abors, and Mishmis—are of the same ethnic stock as the other hill tribes of Assam and have no kinship with the Tibetans. The Tibetans themselves regard these tribes with contempt and group them all together as 'Lopas.' It is true that the boundary of two adjacent countries is not determined by the ethnic affiliations of the people living in these countries. Some sort of cultural intercourse between the peoples living on both sides of the frontier is also not uncommon. All the same it is significant that the tribes mentioned above have not been affected in the slightest degree by any Tibetan influence, cultural, political or other, and this can only be due to the fact that the Tibetan authorities have not exercised jurisdiction at any time in this area. On the other hand, Indian administration gradually moved up to these areas. Agreements were signed with the Akas in 1844 and 1888, the Abors in 1862-63 and 1866, and with the Monbas in 1844 and 1853, extending the authority of the Government of India over them. It was the British Government's policy generally to leave the tribes more or less to look after themselves and not seek to establish any detailed administration of these areas such as was to be found in the rest of British Indian territory. All the same British Political Officers visited these areas for settling disputes and such like purposes. Finally,

the Sadiya Frontier Tract, approximately 10,000 square miles in area, was formed in 1912, and the Balipara Frontier Tract also comprising about 10,000 square miles, was formed in 1913, i.e., before the Simla Conference met. The Atlas of the Chinese Empire, published in London by the Chinese Inland Mission in 1906, shows as the frontier in this area an alignment which is almost identical with what was settled at Simla in 1914. The area was extensively surveyed in 1911-13. The Lohit area was surveyed by the Mishmi Mission in 1911-12, the Dibhang Valley was surveyed in 1912-13, and the Abor area in 1913. Captain Bailey carried out extensive surveys of the southern limits of Tibetan jurisdiction in the whole area in 1913-14. It was on the basis of all this detailed information that the boundary was settled between India and Tibet in 1914. It is clear, therefore, that the McMahon Line was not an arbitrary imposition on a weak Tibet by the Government of India. It formalized the natural, traditional, ethnic and administrative boundary in the area.

“Your Excellency has referred to a map published by the Survey of India in 1917 and a map in the 1929 edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica. The Survey of India map shows the line claimed by China but on the same sheet, in the index map, the McMahon Line is also shown. The reason for this is that the British Indian Government were reluctant to issue new maps of India showing only the McMahon Line in the hope that China would accept the Simla Convention as a whole. As for the map in the 1929 edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, it is true that in the eastern sector it shows roughly the line now claimed by China. But the same map shows the whole of Aksai Chin as part of Ladakh. It would therefore be unfair to quote the authority of the Encyclopaedia Britannica in support of the Chinese claim in one sector of the boundary and to reject it in respect of the other. In fact, if maps published privately in other countries are to be cited as evidence, we can refer to a large number of such maps in our support. For example, the map of *Asie Meridionale* published by Andriveau-Coujon in Paris in 1876 and the map of *Asie Orientale* published by the same firm in 1881 show the whole tribal area as outside Tibet. The Atlas of the Chinese Empire publi-

shed by the China Inland Mission in 1906 shows a boundary which approximates to the McMahon Line. The British War Office Map of the Chinese Empire published in October 1907 shows almost the entire tribal territory in India. The map in Sir Francis Younghusband's volume *India and Tibet* published in London in 1910 shows the Tribal area in India; and so does the map in Sir Charles Bell's book *Tibet Past and Present* (Oxford, 1924).

"It is not clear to us what exactly is the implication of your statement that the boundaries of Sikkim and Bhutan do not fall within the scope of the present discussion. In fact, Chinese maps show sizeable areas of Bhutan as part of Tibet. Under treaty relationships with Bhutan, the Government of India are the only competent authority to take up with other Governments matters concerning Bhutan's external relations, and in fact we have taken up with your Government a number of matters on behalf of the Bhutan Government. The rectification of errors in Chinese maps regarding the boundary of Bhutan with Tibet is therefore a matter which has to be discussed along with the boundary of India with the Tibet region of China in the same sector. As regards Sikkim, the Chinese Government recognised as far back as 1890 that the Government of India 'has direct and exclusive control over the internal administration and foreign relations of that State.' This Convention of 1890 also defined the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet; and the boundary was later, in 1895, demarcated. There is thus no dispute regarding the boundary of Sikkim with the Tibet region.

"You have stated that the Sino-Indian boundary is about 2,000 kilometres in length, is wholly undelimited, and that it is not Chinese maps but British and Indian maps that have been unilaterally altering the Sino-Indian boundary. In fact, the Sino-Indian boundary (apart from the boundary of Sikkim and Bhutan with Tibet) extends, over 3,520 kilometres. It is wrong to say that this long boundary is wholly undelimited. The frontier east of Bhutan has been explicitly delineated on the 1914 treaty map. The frontier of Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh has been clarified by implication by the mention of six passes in the 1954 Agreement. As for the charge that

British and Indian maps have been unilaterally altering the boundary, the fact is that early British maps showed the boundary roughly where the British thought the water-parting was at the time. Later, as more topographical as well as local information about the water-parting was obtained, the boundary was shown with greater precision on the subsequent maps. The discrepancies between the earlier and later maps are also explained in part by the fact that British cartographers as a rule showed in their maps the administrative boundaries irrespective of the actual alignment of the frontier. Therefore, as administration was gradually extended in the frontier areas, corresponding changes were made in the boundaries on the later maps. Thus the map of India published by the Survey of India in 1895 (1 inch-128 miles) showed the unadministered areas, of the northern Burma and north-eastern India upto what subsequently came to be known as the McMahon Line by a light orange colour wash as distinct from the deeper colours used for the rest of the Indian territory. The Memorandum on Native States in India published by the Government of India in 1909 has a map in Volume II showing this whole tribal area as part of India. The fact is that the present frontiers of India have always been the historic frontiers but administration in the British period was only gradually extended up to these frontiers. Shortly after India attained independence in 1947 the Government of India decided, as a matter of policy, to bring these frontier areas under more direct administrative control to enable them to share in the benefits of a welfare state subject to the protection of their distinct social and cultural patterns. It is not true to say that it was only after the recent Tibetan crisis and the entry into India of a large number of Tibetans that Indian troops started advancing steadily in the North-East Frontier Agency. In fact administrative personnel, civil and police, had been functioning in these areas right up to the McMahon frontier for several years before the recent disturbances broke out in Tibet. However, we did not have any military force anywhere in the border areas. There was only armed constabulary in support of the civil personnel and even the frontier posts were manned by this constabulary. It was only when our outpost at Longju

was overpowered by superior Chinese military force and our personnel elsewhere along the frontier were being intimidated only by Chinese forces that we decided to place the responsibility for the protection of the frontier on our army.

“It should be clear from what has been stated in previous paragraphs that it is the Chinese maps that have altered the boundary alignments through the years to include large areas of Indian territory in China. It should also be stated that Chinese maps published even after 1949 have not adhered to any definite frontier. Different maps show different alignments in the same sector.

“I am sorry to have to say that it is the Chinese Government who have been trying unilaterally to change the long-existing state of the border. There is no other explanation for the presence of Chinese personnel in Bara Hoti and of Chinese troops in the Aksai China area, Khuranak Fort, Mandal, Spanggur, Khinzemane and Longju, and for Chinese intrusions in the Spiti area, Shipki pass, the Nilang-Jadhang area, Sangcha, Lapthal, and the Dichu Valley. Nor is it correct to say that Chinese troops have never crossed the McMahon Line. Both Khinzemane and Longju are south of this line....

“...Mr. Prime Minister, I regret that I have had to write to you at this length and in such detail. But I must frankly say that your letter of the 8th September has come as a great shock to us. India was one of the first countries to extend recognition to the People’s Republic of China and for the last ten years we have consistently sought to maintain and strengthen our friendship with your country. When our two countries signed the 1954 Agreement in regard to the Tibet region I hoped that the main problem which history had bequeathed to us in the relations between India and China had been peacefully and finally settled. Five years later, you have now brought forward, with all insistence, a problem which dwarfs in importance all that we have discussed in recent years and I thought settled. I appreciate your statement that China looks upon her south-western border as a border of peace and friendship. This hope and this promise could be fulfilled only if China would not bring within the scope of what should

essentially be a border dispute, claims to thousands of square miles of territory which have been and are integral part of the territory of India.”

The Chinese Prime Minister in his letter of 7 November 1959 squarely blamed us for the border clashes and stated “your letter of September, 26 contain many viewpoints to which the Chinese Government cannot agree and would like to state my view on another occasion.” Then he made his now famous proposal of 7 November 1959.

“...In order to maintain effectively the status quo of the border between the two countries, to ensure the tranquillity of the border regions and to create a favourable atmosphere for a friendly settlement of the boundary question, the Chinese Government proposes that the armed forces of China and India each withdraw 20 kilometres at once from the so-called Mc-Mahon Line in the east and from the line up to which each side exercises actual control in the west, and that the two sides undertake to refrain from sending their armed personnel again to be stationed in and patrol the zones from which they have evacuated their armed forces, but still maintain civil administrative personnel and unarmed police there for the performance of administrative duties and maintenance of order.”

This was followed by a proposal for a meeting of Prime Ministers to hold talks in the immediate future.

Our Prime Minister promptly replied on 16 November mentioning that though “the cause of the recent troubles is action taken from your side of the frontier, the two governments should come to an agreement without delay to eliminate risks of border clashes.” He deplored repeated Chinese interrogation of our personnel detained by them at Chang Chemo Valley and reiterated that “our border check-posts were manned by civil constabulary and that only after the recent unfortunate incidents that we asked our Army to take over responsibility for the protection of our border.”

In view of the fact that the terrain is difficult and that at no point along the length of McMahon sector are posts on two sides situated within sight of each, he pointed out, there is no need to withdraw 20 kilometres. The object of maintaining

status quo could be achieved if each side does not send out patrols.

Longju, he said, was in our territory and has been forcibly occupied by the Chinese army. This must be vacated. We on our part will not re-occupy it. He reiterated that Khinzemane is in our territory. After stating that in the middle sector there was no ambiguity, our Prime Minister proposed the following interim measure for Ladakh:

“The Government of India should withdraw all personnel to the west of the line which the Chinese Government have shown as the international boundary in their 1956 maps, which, so far as we are aware are their latest maps. Similarly, the Chinese Government should withdraw their personnel to the east of the international boundary which has been described by the Government of India in their earlier notes and correspondence and shown in their official maps. Since the two lines are separated by long distances, there should not be the slightest risk of border clashes between the forces on either side. The area is almost entirely uninhabited. It is thus not necessary to maintain administrative personnel in this area bounded by the two lines on the east and the west.”

Welcoming Mr. Chou En-lai's proposal for a meeting of Prime Ministers, he stated: “It is our common desire that such a meeting should bear fruit. The nature of the discussion at our meeting should, therefore, be such that we do not lose ourselves in a forest of data. Our correspondence has shown that the issues involve a mass of historical data, maps, etc. It is necessary, therefore, that some preliminary steps are taken and the foundation for our discussion laid. Unless this is done, there is danger of the meeting not leading to a successful result, which we so much desire and disappointing the hopes of millions of people in our two countries.”

In his reply on 17 December Mr. Chou En-lai reiterated his proposal of 7 November for the withdrawal of the armed forces of the two countries 20 kilometres respectively along the entire border.

Indicating that in the western sector of the Sino-Indian border, armed Indian personnel are up to now in occupation of

Shipki Pass, Parigas, Sang, Tsungsha, Puling-sumdo, Chuva, Chuje, Sanghcha and Laphthal, definitely belonging to China, he welcomed the suggestion that no armed personnel of either side be stationed at any of them.

He characterised the separate proposal for Ladakh as unfair, unconvincing and, in effect, a backward step. He asked whether the "Indian Government would be willing to apply the same principle to the eastern sector where the Chinese boundary extends up to the foothills" and once again harped on the fact that the Sino-Indian border has never been delimited.

Referring to his proposal, about a meeting of the Prime Ministers he emphasized that it should be held earlier to lay down some "guiding principles" to prevent "the concrete discussion by officers from bogging down in endless and fruitless debates."

Within a week Mr. Nehru wrote back stating that once again Chinese Government reiterates "claims to extensive areas which by history, by custom or by agreement have all along been integral part of India," and asked in his reply of 21 December, "How can we, Mr. Prime Minister, reach an agreement on principles when there is such complete disagreement about the facts? I would, therefore, prefer to wait for your promised reply to my letter of September 26 and our note of November 4, before we discuss what should be our next step."

In reply to the above a Chinese Note was received on 26 December 1959—the first documentation from the Chinese Government of their historical data to substantiate their claims about the Sino-Indian boundary. This data was tabulated as replies to three simple questions:

- (a) Has the Sino-Indian Boundary been formally delimited?
- (b) Where is the Traditional Customary Sino-Indian Boundary Line?
- (c) What is the proper way to settle the Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute?

The answer to the first question was an obvious NO, in proof of which the Note (1) repeated their vague arguments about our border in Ladakh which were mentioned in the Chinese

Prime Minister's letter of 8 September 1959; (2) said that the concession to list a few Passes in the Article IV of the Sino-Indian Trade Agreement of 1954 was "made by the Chinese Government only to adopt a wording which does not involve the ownership of the passes" in the Middle Sector; and (3) emphasized that as regards the Eastern Sector, (i) they consider Simla Convention void of legal validity; (ii) they insist that the Simla conference did not discuss China-India boundary; (iii) they did send protest against McMahon Line in 1947 to the independent Indian Government; and (iv) they just stated that the validity of McMahon Line was for a long time questioned by the Indian and the British Governments.

In answer to the second question they produced scanty data. (a) they laid claim to 30,000 square kilometres of our territories in Ladakh saying that (i) it was not under any kind of Indian administration; (ii) that every time India sent out patrols to exercise its jurisdiction they are detained and deported by Chinese Border Guards; (iii) that their maps have consistently shown this as their area for 100|200 years; and (iv) that watershed principle here is mis-applied. (b) About the Middle Sector they refused to follow watershed principle because it does not conform to the actually exercised jurisdiction. (c) About the Eastern Sector they claimed the area from the so-called McMahon Line up to the foothills of the Himalayas as being under Chinese jurisdiction until recent times and alleged that the Government of India has been successively changing the boundary here though the data referred to was far from adequate, much less precise.

The answer to the third question was attempted by raising further five questions: (i) whether the Chinese Government has ever agreed that the boundary was delimited and accepted the Indian Government's claim regarding the boundary and changed its stand afterwards; (ii) whether the Chinese Government scrupulously respects the status quo of the border; (iii) whether the Chinese Government has earnestly avoided using force; (iv) whether China wants to engage in "aggression" and "expansion"; and (v) where lies the key to the settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question—the answers to which

were more or less summaries of the innumerable notes they have written to the Government of India since 17 July 1954.

Even as the correspondence on the border problem between the two Prime Ministers continued, the year 1959 saw the first reported incursions of the Chinese troops into NEFA. They penetrated as deep as Walong in the Lohit frontier division of this area. This was confronted by the Chinese note of June 1959 where they alleged imaginary intrusion and occupation by 200 Indian troops of Migyitun, Samgar Sanpo and other places in the Tibetan region of China in collusion with the Khampa rebels. That we did nothing of the sort was emphasized in our note of 26 June. On the contrary some 200 Chinese troops violated our borders at Khinzemane, then out-flanking our Long-Ju out-post they fired at it for what they claimed to be in retaliation of the intrusion mentioned earlier. The NEFA was indeed getting hot.

On 30 July we complained that one officer and five constables who confronted a Chinese armed detachment into our territory at Spanggur just disappeared. Pat came a reply on 6 August to the effect that they were arrested while intruding into Chinese soil. What was admittedly our territory was claimed as theirs and it was insisted that Spanggur and Khurnak Fort were both in Chinese territory. A week later we gave the details of delimitation of the international boundary of the Ladakh region to refute their claim on Spanggur and Khurnak Fort but to no avail.

But the most disquieting happening in 1959 was the death and capture of a number of Indian Police personnel on routine patrol by the Chinese army on 19/20 October 1959 at Hot Springs in the Chang Chenmo Valley south of Kongka Pass. This is the now famous Karam Singh episode who along with his party was released on 14/15 November. During this period their photographs were taken; the Chinese version of encounter plan was drawn and the incident re-enacted for the purpose of taking further photographs and films. He was made to sign a statement of which subsequently tape-recording was also made. There was incessant and repeated interrogation and deliberate efforts at indoctrination. They were denied by the Chinese

Prime Minister as regardless of "basic facts...and truth of the border clash."

If the intentions of the Chinese were not cleared by the contents and tones of their Prime Minister's letters, well, then, here was the incident about which our Prime Minister protested in strongest terms and was constrained to state to the Prime Minister of China that "our efforts to explore all avenues to reduce the present tension between our two countries will not succeed if we ignore facts."

There was no doubt that the illusion that there was no border dispute was shattered to pieces. Not only that, by the end of the year 1959 we knew that it was not just a minor dispute of border delimitation and adjustment here and there but potentially a major conflict involving vast territories of our land. Part of this in Ladakh was already occupied by the Chinese army.

Since the middle of 1954 a mere complaint of border encroachments became the delimitation problem all along the 2000 miles of our border. This problem became a dispute. And this dispute soon became a conflict. Something had to be done to prevent it from becoming a fight, a war. The question was how. It was quite clear by now that what we were facing was not just a border problem but in reality the Chinese problem. How should we deal with them was the question.

Alleging that the 30 Indian troops had crossed the Niti Pass to occupy Wu-Je, one day's journey from there, they claimed the territory on our side of it. Keeping us at the negotiation table, they occupied Bara-Hoti; accepting Tunjun La Pass as a landmark they grabbed it; conceding that certain passes are border passes they claimed those too; assuring us not to worry about their old maps they began enforcing them, claiming thousands of square kilometres of our territory; when we were busy elsewhere they grabbed, occupied, built roads in Aksai Chin area of Ladakh; every evidence of last hundred years or so was summarily dismissed as the work of the British Imperialists. They contested everything—history, geography, tradition, custom, agreements, treaties, usages—they accepted nothing. Looming above all this was their military build-up.

It was in this diabolical state of affairs that we began the year 1960 with our Prime Minister writing to Mr. Chou En-lai on 5 February 1960. A separate note in detailed reply to theirs of 26 December 1959 was sent on the 12 January. Referring to their note, Mr. Nehru was constrained to state that "on that basis there can be no negotiations." Nevertheless the logic of the situation was such that an invitation was extended to Mr. Chou En-lai to visit India for a full discussion on the problem. The invitation was accepted by Mr. Chou En-lai who came during the 19-25 April of 1960. Prior to Mr. Chou's visit our Government also received on 3 April a note from the Chinese Government in reply to our Note of 12 February 1960. The Note repeated the earlier submitted data in form of answers to one simple question: Has the Sino-Indian boundary been delimited and is there any need to delimit it formally?

The Prime Minister of India and the Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China met in Delhi from 19 to 25 April 1960 to discuss the above differences relating to the border areas which had arisen between the Government of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China. The two Prime Ministers explained fully the respective stands of the two Governments and as a result, there was a better appreciation of the points of view of the two Governments. The talks, however, did not resolve the differences that had arisen and the two Prime Ministers decided that officials of the two Governments should examine the factual material in the possession of the two Governments in support of their stands.

The Joint Communique issued on 25 April 1960 at the conclusion of the talks between the Prime Ministers in Delhi embodied their decision and served as broad directive for the official teams who were to undertake the examination envisaged by the Prime Ministers. The Joint Communique *inter alia* stated:

"The two Prime Ministers, therefore, agreed that officials of the two Governments should meet and examine, check and study all historical documents, records, accounts, maps, and other material relevant to the boundary question on which each side relied in support of its stand, and draw up a report for submission to the two Governments. This report would list the points

on which there was agreement and the points on which there was disagreement or which should be examined more fully and clarified. This report should prove helpful towards further consideration of these problems by the two Governments.

It was further agreed that the officials should meet from June to September, 1960, alternately in the capitals of the two countries. The first meeting should take place in Peking and the officials would report to the two Governments by the end of September, 1960. During the period of further examination of the factual material, every effort should be made by the parties to avoid friction and clashes in the border areas."

The officials of the two teams held three sessions in fulfilment of the assignment given to them. In accordance with the communique the first session of the meeting of officials took place in Peking from 15 June to 25 July during which 18 formal meetings took place. At this session the agenda pattern was discussed and determined and the first item of the agenda (Location and Natural Features of the boundary) was completed.

The second session was held in Delhi from 19 August to 5 October during which 19 formal meetings were held. At this session discussions on the second item of the agenda (Treaties and Agreements; Tradition and Custom) and the third item (Administration and Jurisdiction) were completed, thereby concluding the entire substantive work of examining the factual material in the possession of the two sides. To complete the work on hand an extension of time limit was sought and granted by both the Governments. The third and final session of the talks started at Rangoon on 7 November and after 10 formal meetings the team concluded its report on 12th December 1960.

The Indian representatives suggested the following area-wise grouping of the entire border to facilitate the determination of the actual border by referring to relevant data to be produced on both sides in relation to each sector. These sectors were as follows:

- (i) Western Sector (the boundary between Jammu and Kashmir of India and Sinkiang and the Tibet region of China);
- (ii) Middle Sector (the boundary between the States of

Punjab, Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh of India and the Ari district of the Tibet region of China);

(iii) Eastern Sector (the boundary between the North East Frontier Agency of India and the Tibet region of China);

(iv) Northern boundaries of Bhutan and Sikkim on the one hand and the Tibet region of China on the other.

For facilitating systematic work it was proposed that the documentary material in respect of all the sectors could be grouped under such heads as historical agreements, maps, surveys, evidence of jurisdiction and administration, travellers' accounts, etc.

The Chinese side obviously had different view on the subject and proposed that the entire question should be considered on the basis of the following points :

(i) whether the Sino-Indian boundary had been formally delimited;

(ii) the Location and Terrain Features of the traditional boundary and its basis;

(iii) Ascertaining the line of present actual control between the two countries.

Further, the Chinese said that the question of borders of Bhutan and Sikkim fell outside the purview of these meetings. Secondly, they raised for the first time an issue regarding our border west of Karakoram Pass by stating that the boundary on that side was never a subject of discussion between the two Governments.

Through discussions and consultations between the two sides however, the following Agenda pattern was adopted for completing the work assigned to the two teams: (1) Location and Terrain Features of their border; (2) Treaties and Agreements; Tradition and Custom; (3) Administration and Jurisdiction; (4) Miscellaneous. Items (1) & (2) were to be dealt with separately for the entire length of the border. Items (3) & (4) were to be dealt with sector-wise, i.e. by finishing one sector before proceeding to the next sector. The two sides agreed that the Agenda would provide the general frame-work and certain degree of flexibility should be allowed in the submission of the

documentary evidence in support of the stands of the respective Governments.

The delegations exchanged maps supported by explanatory notes showing the boundary alignments claimed by them. To consider the question with greater detail the Indian side offered to exchange 1:1 million scale maps but the Chinese could offer only 1:5 million scale maps. Secondly, the Indian side produced supplementary maps of different periods and from different sources, but the Chinese delegations produced no maps earlier than 1950. Thirdly, the explanatory note given by the Indian side clearly and precisely detailed the features along which alignment lay and furnished spherical co-ordinates of all the model-points, while that provided by the Chinese was vague and generally worded containing only a few specific co-ordinates. The Chinese team sought clarification on 58 items of the Indian note and received complete and comprehensive replies to all of them except one about the McMahon Line which was considered irrelevant to the issue. On the other hand, out of 118 questions raised by the Indian side only 59 were replied—many of the replies were either incomplete or partial. Whereas the Indian side could pin-point every land-mark, the Chinese could not. Their knowledge of the local topography was almost nil.

The Indian side strictly adhered to the geographic principle of Watershed which marked the border between China and Nepal and China and Burma. But the Chinese did so only to a point and deviated always and often into our territory. At some places their line of demarcation swerved widely into our territories without any reference to geographical factors.

The Indian side provided 630 items of evidence as against 245 of the Chinese to substantiate the correctness of demarcation of their border, historically, legally, traditionally and administratively. Moreover, the evidence of the Indian side, vast and varied as it was, was precise, consistent and logically presented to prove conclusively the validity of the boundary as shown on their maps. The Chinese side, therefore, naturally could not succeed in demolishing these evidences nor could they muster enough vital material of their own to back up

their alignment of the border. It was plain to see that what they could gather was too scanty, somewhat scrappy, often ambiguous, generally inconsistent and even contradictory.

The incontestable wealth of facts marshalled in the masterful report jointly prepared by the two teams could leave no doubt in the minds of fair-minded people about the rightness of India's case. If there was any doubt about the location of the Sino-Indian boundary, here was a report to dispel it. That this boundary is not marked by milestones all along the frontier is irrelevant. This border is clear and precise, conforms to the unchanging Himalayan features, has been recognized for centuries and is confirmed by agreements and treaties.

The Indian side produced continuous revenue and tax records and other official archives stretching over centuries for all the disputed areas as against the Chinese producing one or two documents of occasional and vague nature pertaining to a few odd places. There was not a single revenue or any other form of regular administrative record for the whole of western sector a big chunk of which the Chinese have illegally occupied. The dispute, it was evident, has been created, deliberately by China. The border is only a pretext.

With the publication of this report in December ended the year 1960 without any noteworthy incident taking place on the border. There were, of course, exchanges of notes containing complaints and allegations on either side but nothing really serious happened.

As the year came to a close, the text of the Burma-Chinese Boundary Treaty was published. Soon on 30 December 1960 we wrote to the Chinese Government: "The traditional boundary of India west of the Sino-Burmese Boundary follows the watershed between D-Chu in India, Lat-te in the Tibet region of China; and the tri-junction of India, Burma and China is 5 miles north of the Dipu L'ka Pass and not at the Dipu L'ka Pass itself" as indicated in the map attached to Sino-Burma Boundary treaty of October 1960.

In reply, the Chinese Government wrote on 21 February 1961 to say: "there is no basis whatsoever for the Indian Government to think that the delineation of any part of the Sino-

Burmese boundary in the maps attached to the Sino-Burmese Boundary Treaty has an adverse implication on the territorial integrity of India” and took the opportunity categorically to state that “the traditional customary Sino-Indian boundary east of Bhutan follows in the main, the southern foot of the Himalayas and Chinese maps published throughout the years have all shown the location of the line.” Then the routine exchange of notes on this subject continued up to almost the end of year 1961.

In these notes, however, one cannot fail to notice the steady change in the tone and tenor of our language. For instance on 19 September 1961 the Indian Government stated in its note to the Chinese Government: “It is a travesty of history for the Chinese Government to assert that the traditional Indian boundary which has been well-known and recognised for centuries, is a product of British imperialism. In fact, it is the Chinese Government who have, during the last few years, shown aggressive designs and imperialist ambitions by unauthorisedly occupying large areas of Indian territory in violation of the solemnly agreed Panch Sheel principle of respect for each other’s territorial integrity. It is this aggression by China on Indian territory that is the cause of difference between India and China.”

5

The Invasion And After

V. B. KARNIK

THE YEAR 1962 will remain for long a crucial year in the relations between India and China. It began rather calmly, with the Chinese contenting themselves with some patrol activities in the Ladakh area. But as the year progressed the offensive activities of the so-called "frontier guards" of Communist China grew and developed towards the end into a massive invasion.

In the earlier years, China had cunningly and surreptitiously gobbled up about 12,000 square miles of Indian territory in Ladakh. But she had so far confined herself only to the arid and inhospitable region of Ladakh where owing to the nature of the terrain and lack of communications it was difficult to resist her and even to know in time what she was doing. In 1962, she turned her attention to the more populous and far more vital NEFA at the other end of the frontier. The McMahon Line is the frontier in this region. It runs along the highest watershed of the Himalayas. It has for centuries been recognized as the boundary between Tibet and India. The McMahon Line had, as stated in the Memorandum attached to Prime Minister Nehru's letter of November 14, 1962, to his Chinese counterpart merely "formalised what was the traditional and customary boundary in the area which lies along the highest Himalayan watershed ridges." The Chinese had all along recognized this line and had never in the course of the last eight years crossed it, except for one incident at Longju which took place in 1959.

The first illegal crossing of the McMahon Line took place on 8 September 1962. That is why India has been demanding since then the restoration of the position as on September 8 as a precondition for the opening of any talks for the settlement of the problem. This would, of course, leave a large

chunk of Indian territory in Ladakh estimated at about 14,000 square miles (the Chinese had gobbled up another 2,000 square miles of territory in the earlier part of 1962) in Chinese occupation. There is on that account a good deal of feeling in India against this position adopted by the Government and there is a vigorous demand that there should be no talks until the aggression in Ladakh is also vacated. However, if the condition is accepted the Chinese will be compelled to disgorge at least the area occupied by them in NEFA after their aggression and invasion of 1962. At the moment of writing the Government of China do not appear to be in a mood to accept this condition of the Government of India.

The Chinese advance took place near Tawang in the Kameng Division of NEFA. They encircled the Indian post at the trijunction of NEFA, Bhutan and Tibet. The Chinese committed the aggression, but began accusing India of aggressing on their territory when she sent some troops in her own area to help the encircled post. It became clear pretty soon that what had taken place was not a mere intrusion, but that the Chinese had far-reaching intentions. The Government of India realized that the situation was serious and started making some preparation for meeting the menace of aggression. There were immediately thereafter some armed clashes near Dhola, called Chedong by the Chinese, and a number of Indian soldiers were wounded.

Turn for the Worse

As a result of this Chinese action, the situation in NEFA suddenly took a turn for the worse. Even at this late hour, the Government of India, anxious as they were to avoid a clash and to pursue a policy of peaceful settlement, renewed their offer of opening talks for reducing tensions. The Chinese were however adamant and no negotiations could take place.

Hostilities continued during the next few weeks, but they were confined mostly to the area near Dhola. On September 25, it was reported that the Chinese were two miles south of the Thagla ridge on the Indian side of the border. Indian posts were strengthened and Indian troops succeeded in throwing the Chinese beyond the border. On October 10 there was a rather serious clash when there was another intrusion. Heavy

casualties were inflicted on the Chinese and they were forced to go back.

In the meantime efforts were continuing for securing a peaceful settlement. The Chinese were not, however, agreeable to the vacation of aggression as a pre-condition to the opening of talks. Their note of October 3 stated that the Indian demand for withdrawal from the territory occupied in Ladakh was "absolutely unacceptable to the Chinese Government." This was followed by another note which stated that the McMahon Line is "null and void and has never been recognized by any Chinese Government"! This indicated the temper of the Government of China. Reports were current about this time of military preparations and movements in Tibet. Heavy concentration of troops had taken place, it was reported, in areas just north of NEFA. The Chinese were also active on the propaganda front. They tried to show that it was the Indians who were the aggressors. They complained of "frenzied attacks" of Indian troops on Chinese frontier posts. They represented that the Indian "invasion of Chinese territory" was imminent. Very soon they announced that they had ordered their troops to launch offensive patrolling and to set up new military posts. This warlike and intransigent attitude of the Chinese defeated all attempts at peaceful settlement.

It was not difficult for the democratic world to see through the game. It was realized that India was the victim of an unabashed aggression. There were many expressions of sympathy in the capitals of the world as well as at the gatherings of the United Nations. In a speech to the General Assembly, Lord Home, British Foreign Secretary, supported India's case and denounced China as an aggressor. The delegate of Malaya expressed the opinion that if China behaved so arrogantly and aggressively towards India, there was little security for small nations. The delegate of Philippines pointed out that since the invasion of Korea, China had continued to commit acts of aggression and subversion against neighbouring countries. Kenya was one of the other smaller countries which backed India. The African state of Liberia made an appeal to both India and China to stop hostilities and to seek a peaceful settlement. In a reply to that appeal a spokesman of the External Affairs

Ministry of the Government of India restated Indian position. It deserves a mention here as it recapitulates the sequence of events: "In July and August, the Government of India made repeated proposals to China for talks with a view to reducing the tension on the northern sector which prevailed as a result of Chinese aggression. India's desire was to create an appropriate climate for calm and dispassionate discussions on the border question. Even as these exchanges were going on, China committed aggression in another sector of the border belying all her professions of a peaceful settlement."¹

By this time news had spread all over the country about the fresh aggressions and also about the preparations that were being made by China. There was a wave of anger and resentment accompanied by a feeling that the Government was not sufficiently firm and energetic. A number of meetings were held throughout the country demanding stern action against the aggressor. In some places organizations like Committees to Resist Chinese Aggression were formed and there were demonstrations in front of Chinese Consulates. The press gave powerful expression to this sentiment of the people and urged upon the Government to drop the idea of talks and negotiations and resort to military measures for resisting the aggression. In the end, Prime Minister Nehru was himself convinced that the Chinese were bent upon aggression. In a press conference in Colombo he said on October 15: "The attitude of the Chinese Government is to seize territory and then have talks. India is not prepared for that. China cannot be permitted to occupy Indian territory and hold it for further bargaining." The day before the President of India, Dr. Radhakrishnan, had given to the country a call for unity to halt Chinese aggression. He said that the conflict with China had assumed "somewhat large proportions, much to our sorrow and much against our will and we have been obliged to take part in it."

The invasion began in the early hours of October 20. It began in NEFA as well as in Ladakh. In NEFA the Chinese overran the Dhola post, crossed the Namkha Chu river and gained control of all the five bridges on the river in the Thagla

¹ *Times of India*, 20 October 1962.

ridge area. In Ladakh they attacked in the Chip Chap valley in the north as well as in the Pangong Lake area in the south. They succeeded in capturing a number of Indian posts. With their large numbers and superior weapons, the Chinese simply swept away the Indian troops. The latter fought bravely at each place, but they were overwhelmed by the Chinese. Explaining the Indian reverses, the Defence Minister, Mr. Menon said, "the Chinese have very considerable superiority in numbers and fire power." He expressed the confidence, however, "whatever the difficulties are, if we have to fall back we will fall back, but still we will continue to fight."²

Popular Upsurge

The nation was stunned by the news of the invasion and by the news of the reverses. The people had been confidently told earlier that the defences in NEFA were in good shape and that the Chinese would not be allowed to advance an inch further in the area. Prime Minister Nehru had stated in Parliament in November 1959: "I can tell the House that at no time since our independence have our defence forces been in better condition and finer fettle and backed by greater industrial production than today. . . . Our defence forces are well capable of looking after our security." The people were therefore shocked by the reverses. The Chinese had of course the advantage of the initiative. As aggressors they had chosen the moment and the place of the attack. They had besides prepared for the attack for many months. Moreover, they had no value for human life. They were recklessly throwing masses of their men into the battle and were repeating their "human sea" tactics which they had followed in Korea. The Indian troops were not accustomed to such tactics. Besides, as it became clear later they were ill-armed and ill-equipped. In some cases they did not have sufficient warm clothing and other essential requirements. The initial reverses were therefore inevitable, but the country was not prepared for them.

The news of the invasion at the same time electrified the country. It rose as one man to help repel the aggressors. In a

² *Times of India*, 22 October 1962.

moment, all differences, political, social, religious, linguistic and regional were forgotten and everybody became animated by the one common desire of defending the country and resisting the invasion. The whole country rallied behind the Government and assured it and the Army all possible support. The Prime Minister gave a clarion call to the people. It found an echo in every heart. In the course of a talk broadcast on the radio he said:

“Comrades, friends and fellow-countrymen, I am speaking to you on the radio after a long interval. I feel, however, that I must speak to you about the grave situation that has arisen on our frontiers because of continuing and unabashed aggression by the Chinese forces. A situation has arisen which calls upon all of us to meet it effectively.

“We are men and women of peace in this country, conditioned to the ways of peace. We are unused to the necessities of war. Because of this, we endeavoured to follow a policy of peace even when aggression took place on our territory in Ladakh five years ago. We explored avenues for an honourable settlement by peaceful methods.

“That was our policy all over the world, and we tried to apply it even in our own country. We know the horrors of war in this age today, and we have done our utmost to prevent war from engulfing the world. But all our efforts have been in vain in so far as our own frontier is concerned, where a powerful and unscrupulous opponent, not caring for peace or peaceful methods, has continuously threatened us and even carried these threats into action.

“The time has, therefore, come for us to realise fully this menace that threatens the freedom of our people and the independence of our country. I say so even though I realise that no power can ultimately imperil the freedom we have won at so much sacrifice and cost to our people after long ages of foreign domination. But, to conserve that freedom and integrity of our territory, we must gird up our loins and face this greatest menace that has come to us since we became independent.

“I have no doubt in my mind that we shall succeed. Everything else is secondary to the freedom of our people and of

our motherland and, if necessary, everything else has to be sacrificed in this great crisis.”

Continuing, he paid a well-deserved tribute to the Army. He said: “I am grieved at the setbacks to our troops that have occurred on the frontier and the reverses we have had. They were overwhelmed by vast numbers and by big artillery, mountain guns and heavy mortars which the Chinese forces have brought with them. I should like to pay a tribute to our officers and men who faced these overwhelming numbers with courage.

“There may be some more reverse in that area. But one thing is certain—that the final result of this conflict will be in our favour. It cannot be otherwise when a nation like India fights for her freedom and the integrity of the country.”

The people had girded up their loins for the war with China even before the Prime Minister spoke to them and placed before them the facts of the situation. They had instinctively realized that events were moving in the direction of war and that it was necessary to meet force with force. The press, the opposition parties, some members of the Congress Party and a number of unattached individuals played a prominent part in making the people aware of the menace of Chinese aggression and in building up their enthusiasm and determination. After the invasion there was complete unity throughout the country. From the Himalayas to Cape Comorin and from Cutch to Calcutta people thought and talked only of the invasion and of the ways and means of repelling it. Citizens Committees were formed in big and small places and collections were made for the National Defence Fund which was immediately set up. Rallies and public meetings were held at hundreds of places and millions of men, women and children took solemn pledges to fight unitedly and resolutely for the defence of the country. Hundreds of women began knitting woolen clothes for the soldiers. Workers voluntarily gave up their right to strike and worked on holidays and contributed their earnings to the Defence Fund. Merchants and traders and industrialists contributed their mite and agreed not to raise prices and create difficulties for the public. Thousands offered themselves as blood donors and as recruits for the

Army. Young and old and rich and poor all joined the fight for defence of the country's independence and integrity. Political parties and other organizations held special meetings and adopted resolutions assuring full support to the war efforts. The general tendency was to fold all separate flags and unite under the national flag.

There was only one exception and that was provided by the Communists. Owing to their regard for and attachment to China as a Communist state they were not prepared to look upon her as an aggressor. They were all along appealing to the Indian Government to settle the border problem peacefully through negotiations. They continued singing that tune even in September and October when not a week passed without a fresh clash between Indian and Chinese troops. Immediately after the invasion they effected a slight change in their position. But there was a strong pro-China group amongst them and it did not conceal its opposition to the change. The people were therefore justifiably angry with the Communists and regarded them as fifth columnists and insisted that they should be kept out of citizens committees and other activities in support of war efforts. Later, under public pressure, they effected a further change and accepted that the Chinese were guilty of aggression. But that did not satisfy the people. There was a feeling that it was a mere tactical move and need not be taken seriously. Moreover, members of the pro-China group remained unrepentant and there was no move to expel them from the party. In the end, when the war situation became more serious, the Government arrested and detained many of them under the Defence of India Rules. A few escaped arrest and are still operating in an underground manner.

The invasion had created a state of emergency. The Government of India recognized it by issuing a proclamation on 26 October declaring a state of emergency. At the same time an Ordinance was issued promulgating the Defence of India Rules. They were the same Rules that the former British Government had issued during the emergency created by the Second World War. The Rules invested the Government with powers for dealing with the emergency.

The Chinese continued their attacks in both the eastern as well as the western sector. Besides numbers, they had the advantage of more modern weapons and, having built roads, they were also able to use trucks to transport troops and supplies. All this gave them immense superiority over the Indian defenders. In Ladakh they used tanks on the third day to overwhelm and destroy an isolated Indian post in the Pangong Lake area. In NEFA they extended the fight on the border from Bhutan to Burma. After a good deal of fighting they succeeded in penetrating in some places to the distance of about twelve miles. In the next couple of days they reached the Bumla pass and were on their way to Tawang. They also went as far as Brokenthang and Zamithang after capturing Khinzemane which is one of the important posts on the frontier. In Ladakh they continued their progress though Indian troops fought tenaciously and bravely in a number of places.

World Support

While India was thus fighting heroically to defend her borders, the news had travelled to the four corners of the world and there were immediate and spontaneous expressions of sympathy for her in most places. It was the Communist world alone which was silent and significantly enough some of the Afro-Asian countries. Later, Prime Minister Nehru addressed to all Governments a communication detailing the facts of the conflict, how India tried to solve it through peaceful means and how her efforts were frustrated by the intransigence of China. Explaining the character of the conflict he wrote: "This is not a mere boundary dispute or a question of small territorial frontier adjustments. Apart from the vast and fantastic claims that China has made, China had already occupied 12,000 square miles of Indian territory during the last five years. While notes were being exchanged for arranging talks and discussions to ease tensions and even dates and places were being suggested, further aggression by China started on 8 September and further areas of Indian territory were occupied in a new sector. The issue involved is not one of small territorial gains, one way or the other, but of standards of international behaviour between neighbouring countries and whether the world will allow

the principle of "Might is Right" to prevail in international relations." Continuing he stated: "The story of aggression is a long one going back several years. The most recent aggression in our Eastern sector which began on September 8 and has, since the Chinese massive attack along the entire India-China frontier which started on 20th October, resulted in serious conflicts, has brought matters to a crisis. This crisis is not only of India but of the world and will have far reaching consequences on the standards of international behaviour and on the peace of the world. We cannot submit to this law of the jungle which affects our integrity and the honour of our motherland." In the end he appealed for sympathy and support, "because our struggle is in the interest of world peace and is directed to the elimination of deceit, dissimulation and force in international relations."³

The earliest response was from the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rehman who happened to be in India during the first days of the invasion. Addressing a press conference in Madras, he said China was attacking India because she "does not want a rival in this part of the world." Continuing he said, "We knew what was going to happen when China took Tibet. They had their eyes on India and wanted to get nearer to the Indian borders. . . . The attack on India does not surprise us. They want to show off their strength. What they do next God only knows." Later, after he went back to his country he gave concrete expression to his sympathy by starting a fund.

Equally quick was the response from the United Kingdom. Mr. Duncan Sandys, the Commonwealth Relations Secretary issued a statement condemning Chinese aggression and reaffirming acceptance of the McMahon Line. He said in the statement: "As the Foreign Secretary indicated on 27 September at the U.N. General Assembly, the British Government profoundly deplors the attack by China against a fellow-member of the Commonwealth.

"It has the utmost sympathy with the Government and people of India and admires their patience and restraint in the face

³ *Chinese Aggression in War and Peace* by Publications Division, Government of India p. 33.

of repeated provocations." It added: "The British Government has always recognised the McMahon Line as the frontier of India and, of course, continues to do so. The two Governments are in close touch about the development." A few days later Queen Elizabeth expressed the same sentiment. Opening the new session of Parliament, she said: "My Government has been shocked by the invasion of Indian territory by Chinese armies. It fully supports India's decision to defend its rightful frontiers."

The United States was equally quick. In the course of a debate in the United Nations, her representative, Mr. Adlai Stevenson drew attention to the "naked aggression" perpetrated by China against India for which, he said, "they had been steadily building up for three years." In the course of his speech, he said that 'the Chinese regime was a dictatorship, its ideology was power and its aim-professed with pride and arrogance-was conquest.' He added: "It is a new imperialism, a new colonialism that seeks to carve out a new empire—not only in Asia—and dash the hopes of liberty the world over." These sentiments expressed by the representatives of Great Britain and the United States were of great value as they were in the next few days to extend the sorely needed help of weapons and supplies. Similar sentiments were also expressed by West Germany, France, Canada, Australia and a number of other countries. Later some of them also gave invaluable material help.

Chinese Proposals

About this time the Chinese Defence Ministry issued a statement which served clear notice upon India and the world that what was contemplated was not a mere border fight but a full-scale invasion of India. It said: "In its effort to seek a friendly settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question through peaceful negotiations, the Chinese Government has repeatedly declared that 'we absolutely do not recognise the illegal McMahon Line in the eastern sector but we will not cross this line.' But the Indian Government has once and for all broken the bounds of this line. Now the Chinese side formally declares that, in order to prevent Indian troops from

staging a comeback and launching fresh attacks, the Chinese frontier guards no longer need to restrain themselves to the bounds of the McMahon Line." It did not, however, forget to add hypocritically that "it is a consistent stand of the Chinese Government to have the Sino-Indian boundary question settled peacefully."

It was clear therefore that India had to face a major invasion. The Chinese troops had crossed the McMahon Line days before their Defence Ministry issued its statement. On October 25 they captured Tawang, a monastery town at a distance of 12 miles from the boundary. Earlier they had overrun Longju and Kibitoo near the Burmese border. In Ladakh they subdued the Galwan Valley post and the posts in the Chip Chap valley and Pangong Lake area. At each place, Indian soldiers put up a brave resistance but the terrain was disadvantageous to them and the Chinese were fighting with superior arms and vastly superior numbers. The Defence Minister, Mr. Menon referred to this when he stated at a public meeting in Bombay: "We have been heavily outnumbered and outweaponed." It was reported later that the Chinese deployed over thirty thousand troops in NEFA.

While the fighting was thus going on the Chinese made their first so-called peace offer. It was their "three-point proposal for the settlement of the boundary question." The three points were: 1. Both parties (India and China) should affirm that the Sino-Indian boundary question must be settled peacefully through negotiations. Pending a peaceful settlement, the Chinese Government hoped that the Indian Government would agree to both parties respecting the line of actual control along the entire Sino-Indian boundary and that the armed forces of both sides should withdraw 20 kilometers from this line and disengage themselves.

2. Provided the Indian Government is agreeable to the above proposal, the Chinese Government, through consultations between the two parties, will withdraw its frontier guards in the eastern sector to the north of the line of actual control. At the same time India should agree not to cross this line and the traditional line in the middle and western sectors. Matters

relating to the disengagement of forces shall be negotiated by officials to be designated by the two sides.

3. In order to seek a friendly settlement, talks must be held between the Prime Ministers of the two countries. The Chinese Government would, therefore, welcome Mr. Nehru's visit to Peking or, alternatively, Mr. Chou En-lai would visit New Delhi.

The proposal then stated: "Fierce fighting is now going on. The occurrence of this grave situation pains the Chinese Government and people and disturbs Asian and African countries and people." Thereafter it asked grandiloquently: "After all, what issue is there between China and India that cannot be settled peacefully? What reason is there for bloody clashes to occur between China and India?" To add force to the questions it stated the plain untruth: "China does not want a single inch of India's territory." It concluded then with an appeal to Governments of Asian and African countries to make "an effort to bring about the materialisation of the three proposals."

India's reply was quick. It stated *inter alia*: "It is the Government of China which, on the morning of October 20, hurled its vast armies at various points on all sectors of the India-China boundary and enlarged the conflict. These Chinese forces have advanced in all sectors into Indian territory and are still advancing. If the Chinese professions of peace and peaceful settlement of differences are really genuine, let them go back at least to the position where they were all along the boundary prior to September 8, India will then be prepared to undertake talks and discussions, at any level mutually agreed, to arrive at agreed measures which should be taken for the easing of tension and correction of the situation created by unilateral forcible alteration of the status quo along the India-China boundary."

It added towards the end: "India is always prepared to resolve differences by talks and discussions, but only on the basis of decency, dignity and self-respect and not under the threat of military might of any country, however strong it may be."

Russian Attitude

Communist Russia had so long maintained a stony silence

on the issue of Chinese aggression. It was regarded as her pose of neutrality between India and China. But as soon as the threepoint Chinese proposals were published, Russia threw off her mask of neutrality and came down heavily on the side of China. The support was declared through an editorial article published in *Pravda*, which supported the Chinese proposals and appealed to "progressive-minded people" to apply commonsense and not impose conditions for a settlement. It characterized the Sino-Indian border dispute as "a legacy of those times when British colonisers were ruling on Indian territory." It stated: "Imperialists are seeking how to make mischief between the two great Powers and also how to upset the friendship of the Soviet Union for brotherly China as well as for friendly India." The article made a significant distinction between Chinese brothers and Indian friends. It did not have a word to say about the methods used by Peking. It amounted to an advice to New Delhi that "these are the best terms you can get; accept them."⁴

The *Pravda* article came as a shock to some in the Government of India. They were counting upon Russia maintaining an attitude of strict neutrality. Some of them had even hoped that Russia would exert her influence upon China and persuade her to desist from inflicting any further harm on India. It also created additional difficulties for the Communist Party of India. Under the pressure of public opinion, the party was thinking of adopting, at least as a tactic, an attitude of support to the national war effort. The *Pravda* editorial made it difficult for it to discipline its recalcitrant members. The people as a whole, however, took it in their stride. They had never expected Russia to support them in their fight against China. They knew that Communist Russia would always support Communist China. Other Communist countries followed, as usual, in the footsteps of Russia.

There was, however, a good deal of shock and surprise at the attitude of non-aligned Asian and African countries. As a non-aligned power India had special relationship with them. She had rendered material help to some of them in their hour

⁴ *Times of India*, 26 October 1962.

of need. It was therefore expected that after the naked aggression by China they would be the first to rush to India's aid. But Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia remained silent. Ghana not only did not help, but even objected to Great Britain giving any help. Egypt made some helpful statements, but did not go beyond that. Yugoslavia was silent for some time, but later expressed her sympathy.

Another disappointment was the attitude adopted by Pakistan. As a close neighbour and as part of the sub-continent, it was expected that she would extend whole-hearted support. The attack on India also represented a potential danger to her. The response of the Head of the Government, President Ayub Khan was encouraging. But the country as a whole behaved in a different manner. It regarded this as a golden opportunity for demanding the solution of the Kashmir problem. The press and the politicians were loud in their denunciations of India and insisted on a settlement of all outstanding disputes as a precondition for any support. They refused to see that China represented a common danger to both India and Pakistan and that the sub-continent could be effectively defended only if the two countries acted in concert. They opposed the extension of aid to India by Great Britain and the United States of America and expressed their apprehension that it might later be used against Pakistan. This attitude was extremely embarrassing to the two countries who were equally friendly towards Pakistan and India and were anxious to help the latter in her hour of need. They made efforts later to bring the two countries together to discuss their outstanding differences. China, on the other hand, was delighted by these differences and this lack of understanding between the two and tried to draw Pakistan to her side by assuring an early settlement of the border problem with her.

U.S. and U.K. Support

The countries which were in a position to render substantial help were only two, namely, the United States of America and Great Britain. Both were prompt as well as generous in their help. Initially there was some hesitation on the part of Prime Minister Nehru to ask them for military aid. It was thought that it

might damage the non-alignment policy. But the worsening military situation and the growing public pressure to accept aid from wherever it was available at last persuaded him to approach the two countries. The response was immediate. They gave whatever they were asked to give. Within a day or two of the requisition air lift was arranged and supplies started arriving in Calcutta and other places by planeloads.

They gave arms, munitions as well as transport planes and other supplies. No conditions were made about payment. The only condition that was made was that whatever was received should be used only for resisting the Chinese aggression. No demand was made that the country should change its non-alignment policy. Aid was given as freely and liberally as if India were a member of a military alliance. Later, high level delegations of the two countries visited New Delhi to ascertain our requirements and discuss the manner and method of their delivery. Mr. Duncan Sandys led the British delegation, while Mr. Averrel Harriman was the leader of the American delegation.

Russia was also in a position to help, but she extended no help. She had promised some MIG planes. The original promise was of twenty-four planes, but later on the number was reduced to six. The six are also to be delivered in two or three instalments in the course of a few months and they are not to be used as fighter planes. Until the end of the year not one of them had arrived. India has to satisfy herself now with the promise, which has been again repeated, of building a factory for the manufacture of MIGs. The factory may or may not be built, but it will be of no help in the present struggle against the Chinese invasion. It is obvious that Russia makes a clear distinction between "brothers" and "friends". While "brotherly" China is getting ample supplies of petrol and other essential materials, "friendly" India is being fed only on promises. Czechoslovakia and other Communist countries are, it is reported, supplying China with arms and munitions.

The situation on the frontiers was daily getting from bad to worse. The Chinese attacked Walong at the Burma end of the frontier on October 26. About the same time they advanced in a threatening manner towards Se La pass near the Bhutan

end. In Ladakh they mounted a new attack on Damchok. On November 4 Daulet Beg Oldi, main stronghold at the foot of the Karakoram Pass, had to be evacuated. Pressure on Chushul was intensified by bringing in tanks. The situation at all these places was precarious. The Indian troops were hopelessly outnumbered. Their weapons were also of an inferior type. They also lacked woollen clothes and many other essential requirements. After a visit to the front in NEFA the President, Dr. Radhakrishnan was constrained to say, "we have been credulous and negligent." All the same, they fought bravely and many are the tales of their courage and heroism that came to light later. They inflicted heavy casualties upon the Chinese, but their own casualties were also heavy. The news of the reverses, of the shocking unpreparedness and of the heavy casualties created a new situation in the country. Many had entertained since long grave suspicions about the abilities of the Defence Minister, Mr. Krishna Menon, and about the correctness of many of the policies that he had advocated and followed. There was a strong feeling moreover that he was a supporter and sympathizer of Communist countries and had deliberately neglected the defences against Communist China. The happenings on the front confirmed those suspicions and a demand developed throughout the country for the replacement of the Defence Minister. It was a universal demand and had substantial support even amongst members of the Congress Party. The Prime Minister had to take note of it and on November 4 he took over the Defence Ministry but retained Mr. Menon as Minister of Defence Production. Nobody was satisfied by this arrangement and the demand persisted for his expulsion from the Central Cabinet. Even members of the Congress Parliamentary Party joined in the demand and as a result of their pressure the Prime Minister was compelled to agree to drop him from the Central Cabinet. On November 7, he accepted Mr. Menon's resignation, though "very regretfully," as he thought it necessary to add. The exit of Mr. Menon removed the one obstacle in the way of national mobilization. With its disappearance the effort progressed with redoubled energy. Later, the Chief Minister of Maharashtra, Mr. Y. B. Chavan was invited to become the Defence Minister. The

appointment was welcomed by all, and it reinforced the people's confidence in the Government. About the same time a change was also effected in the supreme command of the Army. General Thapar was allowed to go on leave and General Chaudhari was appointed to take his place.

Nation's Pledge

The National Development Council, the highest policy-making body, consisting of Chief Ministers of States and members of the Planning Commission, met in New Delhi on November 4 and 5. The main issue that it had to consider was the Chinese invasion. At the end of its two-day session it adopted a resolution which stated the following: "Fifteen years ago we won our freedom. Today that freedom is being threatened. The Chinese invasion is a turning-point in the history of our motherland. The National Development Council, meeting at this hour of grave crisis, declares the determined will of the nation, transcending all differences, to stand solidly united behind the leader. The National Development Council hereby pledges the nation to every effort and sacrifice to effect the vacation of the Chinese aggression.

"Free India has always pursued a policy of peace and friendship with the peoples of the world. Towards China, India acted as a true friend. When border disputes were raised by China, India was ever willing to get them resolved by peaceful and friendly negotiations. In spite of this China has chosen the path of violence and aggression and has invaded the territories of India.

"The Chinese aggression is not merely a violation of the country's territorial frontiers but an attack on our freedom, our democratic values and our national philosophy of international peace and progress. It is a breach of all recognised standards of international behaviour. We realise that today we are facing a strong, ruthless and unscrupulous aggressor. A supreme effort is called for by the people to meet this challenge.

"In the face of this danger the response of the people all over the country has been magnificent. The soul of the nation has been stirred into a new awakening. In this crisis what is needed is discipline and sustained effort by the people. The energies

of the people will have to be properly canalised. Millions of our willing youths must be trained for national defence. The country's entire resources will have to be mobilised and the national efforts directed towards this supreme end.

"Our men and officers in the battlefield, in spite of the difficulties of terrain, have shown epic heroism in facing the superior numbers of the aggressor. Our soldiers at the front will have to be backed by the productive efforts of the people in the field and factories. The National Development Council, therefore, considers the country's plans of development an integral part of the national defence....

"We are fighting for our freedom and our honour to save the democratic way of life adopted in our Constitution. With faith in the justness of our cause we dedicate ourselves to protect our motherland."

A couple of days later the National Defence Council was formed. It has a membership of thirtyone with the Prime Minister as the President. It associates with the Government at the highest level some prominent non-officials and also some retired Generals. There was a demand in the country for such association in order to give the Government the benefit of the talent and experience of persons not belonging to the Congress Party.

Mediation Efforts

About this time there were some efforts at mediation. The most prominent was the one made by Egypt. Egypt was in general agreement with the Indian stand that talks could not take place without the restoration of the September 8 position. As China was not agreeable to accepting that position the effort could not make any progress. Russia also made an attempt and there was an exchange of letters between Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Nehru. *Pravda*, the organ of the Russian Communist Party, published another editorial on November 5 appealing to both China and India "to refrain from doing anything to aggravate the situation, to stop fighting and get round a table to settle their differences by negotiations." There was a slight difference between this editorial and the earlier one as it did not endorse the Chinese proposal and did

not brand Indian supporters of war efforts as chauvinists. It did not, however, fail to play upon its usual theme of imperialist powers trying to kindle the flames of war. It said: "The main members of the aggressive military bloc of the Western Powers would like to warm their hand at the flames of hostilities taking place in the Sino-Indian frontier. They are persistently trying to wedge themselves into the conflict and with obstinacy worthy of being in better causes pouring oil in the flames by pressing arms and assistance on one side, thus calculating on the expansion of the scale of the conflict. It is not fortuitous that no appeals for a cease-fire are to be heard from American or other Western leaders."⁵

India replied to all these mediation suggestions pointing out that the Chinese proposal for a cease-fire and withdrawal by 20 kilometres by both sides from "the line of actual control" was not only vague and deceptive, but was unacceptable on two other grounds :

1. It is based on a proposal made by the Chinese in November, 1959 which was rejected on merits after a dispassionate consideration. It could not become more acceptable after the Chinese launched a massive invasion of India.
2. The Chinese proposal for both sides not to cross the "traditional line" in the western sector does not apply to the McMahon Line. In effect, the Chinese proposal meant that they would retain what they have got in Ladakh by aggression. As far as NEFA was concerned, it would only be a temporary arrangement.

Parliament's Resolve

The nation's Parliament met in an emergency session on November 8. The first few days were devoted to a consideration of the situation that had arisen as a result of the Chinese invasion. Prime Minister Nehru opened the session with a long speech outlining the course of events and emphasising the character of the danger that faced the country. He said that the premeditated invasion of China would mark a turning point in the history of not only India and Asia but of the world. He

⁵ *Times of India*, 6 November 1962

added that China had emerged as a neo-imperialist and expansionist power and was "a menace to our integrity and freedom." He concluded: "We accept the challenge with all its consequences." The controversy in the country had been stilled by the exit of the Defence Minister. There was therefore no dissentient voice in Parliament and the Government received the full and unanimous support of all sections in the House. Two resolutions were adopted, one gave approval to the proclamation of emergency and the other affirmed "the firm resolve of the Indian people to drive out the aggressor." The following is the full text of the second resolution :

"This House notes with deep regret that, in spite of the uniform gestures of goodwill and friendship by India towards the People's Government of China on the basis of recognition of each others' independence, non-aggression and non-interference, and peaceful co-existence, China has betrayed this goodwill and friendship and the principles of the Panchshila which had been agreed to between the two countries and has committed aggression and initiated a massive invasion of India by her armed forces.

"This House places on record its high appreciation of the valiant struggle of men and officers of our armed forces while defending our frontiers and pays its respectful homage to the martyrs who have laid down their lives in defending the honour and integrity of our motherland.

"This House also records its profound appreciation of the wonderful and spontaneous response of the people of India to the emergency and the crisis that has resulted from China's invasion of India. It notes with deep gratitude this mighty upsurge amongst all sections of our people for harnessing all our resources towards the organisation of an all out effort to meet this grave national emergency. The flame of liberty and sacrifice has been kindled anew and a fresh dedication has taken place to the cause of India's freedom and integrity.

"This House gratefully acknowledges the sympathy and the moral and material support received from a large number of friendly countries in this grim hour of our struggle against aggression and invasion.

“With hope and faith, this House affirms the firm resolve of the Indian people to drive out the aggressor from the sacred soil of India, however long and hard the struggle may be.”

There was a similar discussion in the Upper House, the Rajya Sabha. The Home Minister, Mr. Lal Bahadur Shastri initiated it. In the course of his speech he said: “There has been pre-meditated and well-planned aggression by China... The internationalism of the Chinese and the Albanians was crude, narrow and bigoted. It is imperialism in a veiled form. What China has done and is wanting to do to others is expansionism in its naked form... We are fighting a dangerous enemy and we should be prepared for gains as well as reverses. The preparation of the Chinese is on the whole of the Himalayan frontier. Their concentration is almost on every important point.”⁶ In this House as well there was unanimous support to the Government.

By this time more and more nations and more and more organs of influential public opinion in their respective countries had rallied to the support of India. Prominent among the nations were: Nigeria, Ireland, Mexico, Bolivia, New Zealand, Australia, Holland, Sweden, Norway, Iran, Greece, Lybia, Japan, Italy, Thailand and the Philippines. Some others like the U.K. the U.S.A., Canada, West Germany and France had not only declared their support but were actively supporting the war efforts. Conspicuous by their absence from the list were the Communist states. However, even amongst them Albania was the only country which sent a communication supporting China.

Comment of World Press

It is not necessary to mention here the comments of newspapers in the U.K. and the U.S.A. They were uniformly friendly and sympathetic, interspersed sometimes with critical remarks about past policies. It will be useful, however, to note the comments of some influential newspapers of other countries.

Il Popolo of Rome, the official organ of the Christian Democratic Party, said in an editorial, “the Chinese aggression on India seems to take the shape of a test for the whole world.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 14 November 1962.

There is no doubt who the aggressor is. India did not represent any danger for the aggressive neighbour. Peking is condemned not only by the West, but also by neutral countries as Egypt and Yugoslavia. Mao's regime is aggressive. It is a menace to the whole world."

Eldiario Siric-Libanes, a Spanish-Arabic bilingual paper and mouthpiece of the Arab community, said, "India wants to live in peace with all nations of the world... India's neutrality and foreign policy without territorial expansionism has placed her always in the position of a friendly mediator..."

La Nacion, one of Argentina's leading Spanish dailies, said, "Communist China in her deep advances into Indian territory has assumed the role of an invader... with expansionist aims, causing alarm in the West."⁷

Yomiuri Shimbun, a Japanese daily, in an editorial said — "Whatever justification China may plead for its action, it cannot escape the charges of aggression against India. China's action gives Peking's protestations of loyalty to the Bandung spirit and the five principles of peaceful co-existence, a fraudulent ring... justifiably, in our view, India refuses to open talks unless China withdraws its troops to the line that existed before September 8."

At Manar, a leading Damascus paper, in a commentary said: "Duty, logic and gratitude should force the Arab nations to respond to Mr. Nehru's appeal to stand by his side on the question of the Chinese aggression. The Arab countries should take a bold and clear stand to condemn this aggression."

Dimasho, another daily of Damascus, supported "Mr. Nehru's determined stand against the Chinese and justified his request for arms to defend India."

Another paper, *Al Fidas* of Hama, in an editorial, described India as a "friend of all peace-loving nations and condemned China for committing aggression."

In Canada, *The Telegram* in an editorial, expressed the view that "India has remained the foremost bastion of freedom in Asia and, therefore, let us make no mistake. This is our fight. India must win it, whatever the cost to us of the

⁷ *Times of India*, 12 November 1962.

free world in arms, in materials or in the markets of China." Describing India's confrontation with China as the greatest in Asia, the paper observed: "India seeks the solution of her problems within the framework of free institutions and with respect for the dignity of the individual, while China applies the machinery of a police state."

The Times of Ceylon, in an editorial, said: "It is Ceylon's duty to help India keep to the narrow path of non-alignment to which we are both committed. Once this bridge of peace between the two great warring camps is destroyed, there can be very little hope for the future of the world."

The official Yugoslav newspaper, *Borba*, described as "impermissible" the crossing by the Chinese troops of the McMahon Line. It called for the withdrawal behind this line of all troops, so that negotiations could start. The McMahon Line, the paper said, had been drawn up taking into consideration the "natural boundary between India and China."

An Argentinian paper, *Buenos Aires Herald*, in an editorial said that "Democratic nations immediately recognized the self-evident fact that India, a victim of flagrant aggression and lacking adequate defensive equipment, merits immediate support."

The Daily Nation, of Kenya in an editorial captioned "A Time for Unstinted Aid" said: "No free country whether aligned with the West or non-aligned can have any doubts where its sympathy and its duty must lie in regard to the border conflict between India and China."

The *Tanganyika Standard*, in an editorial, drew attention to the urgency implicit in the recognition of the seriousness for the world of the Sino-Indian conflict. Under the subhead, "Bitter Disillusion", the editorial said: "Mr. Nehru has good reason to feel bitterly disillusioned. At the time of the Bandung Conference in 1955, the Chinese and Indian relations appeared excellent. Today, the Chinese Government is not only laying claim to considerable areas of what has been undisputably Indian territory; it is seeking to assert these claims by military action. In these circumstances it is difficult to see how any free country—let alone a fellow member of the Commonwealth

—can remain aloof. In this hour of need India needs all the moral support she can get.”

Diplomatic Offensive

During this period there was a lull in the fighting on the front. The Chinese who had made substantial gains in both the sectors were possibly regrouping and replenishing their forces. They utilized the time for waging their war on the propaganda and diplomatic fronts. The propaganda was carried on through the press, the radio and notes to Governments. Their aim was to portray India as the aggressor and China as fighting only in self-defence. India was unreasonable and obstinate, it was pointed out, in not accepting the fair proposals of China. It was moreover hinted that India had abandoned her policy of non-alignment and was now playing the game of the imperialists. The propaganda did not meet with any result. On the diplomatic front the Chinese Premier, Mr. Chou En-lai addressed a new note to the Government of India. It was an elaboration of the October 24 proposal. Defining the meaning of the term “actual line of control” mentioned in the proposal, Mr. Chou said: “In the eastern sector it coincides in the main with the so-called McMahon Line. . . On the western side in Ladakh it coincides in the main with the traditional customary line which has been consistently pointed out by China.” He refused however, to accept the Indian demand for the restoration of the pre-September 8 position, saying that it was “unfair and pregnant with the danger of border conflict and hence could not be restored.” The Indian condition, he said, is “humiliating.” Claiming that “the Aksaichin area has always been under Chinese jurisdiction,” he said, “back in 1950 Chinese communist troops went through that area from Sikiang and entered the Ari District of Tibet when they conquered Tibet. In 1956-57 the Chinese built through that area the Sikiang-Tibet Highway involving gigantic engineering work.” He reiterated his offer of opening talks on the basis of October 24 proposals.⁸ India could not accept it as it did not meet with her basic demand for the restoration of the September 8 position.

Along with the propagandist and the diplomatic offensive

⁸ *Times of India*, 8 October 1962.

the Chinese were also building up their military strength. News began to appear about this time of the military build-up near both Tawang and Walong and in Ladakh. It was reported that heavy artillery and tanks had been moved up near the front. According to a U.S. Intelligence report, the Chinese had mobilized some 9,000 motor vehicles and massed in Tibet and near about one lakh troops. On November 11 the Chinese practically served a notice on India through a lengthy article in the *People's Daily* of Peking. The article stated that India was no longer non-aligned and that it was only by waging the "necessary struggles against India's rabid adventurists would it perhaps be possible to make them a bit more sober." Increased military pressure would, the article stated, "make Mr. Nehru change his mind" and accept the October 24 proposals.⁹ The Chinese also alleged that a large number of troops had been massed by India at both ends of the border and that they had opened heavy artillery fire in preparation for a new attack. Some more intrusions were also alleged.

Massive Onslaught

Having thus prepared the ground, the Chinese struck their blow on November 16. It was a massive onslaught on forward positions in the Walong area. The Chinese attacked in a wave after wave. After heroic resistance of over twenty-four hours Indian troops had to evacuate the forward positions as well as the town. A similar attack was launched in the Tawang area on Jang. The Chinese had built roads to connect their front areas with their bases. They were therefore far superior in numbers as well as in supplies. About the same time began the attack on Chushul in Ladakh. In the Tawang area the Chinese scored a spectacular success in the next couple of days. They outflanked the Indian troops stationed at the Se La pass. Se La fell on November 18. The next day they captured Bomdi La, the headquarters of the Kameng Division of NEFA. This was, indeed, a serious military set-back for India. The Chinese were now only a few miles away from the plains of Assam having advanced over 150 miles into Indian territory. In the Walong area they were not far away from the oil fields and the tea

⁹ *Times of India*, 12 November 1962.

plantations of north Assam. The Chinese menace had advanced from the heights of the Himalayas into the foot-hills overlooking the plains. As Mr. B. G. Verghese stated in his dispatch to the *Times of India* of October 20, "it is no longer the McMahon Line or NEFA but all of Assam that is threatened by the Chinese." In Ladakh, Chushul still remained in Indian hands though almost all its outer defences were overrun by the Chinese.

Prime Minister Nehru spoke to the nation on November 19. He gave the people the "very serious and very saddening news" of the fall of Bomdi La. He said: "I do not want any Indian, man, woman or child to get dismayed because the Chinese forces have won some successes in the beginning. This is war and in a war successes come and failures come also. What counts is the end and not the intermediate stage of the war." He added: "We shall see this matter to the end and the end will have to be victory for India." Describing China as the "imperialist of the worst kind", he condemned her disregard for truth and decency in international behaviour and said: "We must stand up to it: not only we, but all decent-minded persons and decent-minded countries who value their freedom anywhere—in Asia, Africa, Europe and America." He expressed his grateful thanks to the friendly countries for the speedy help that they had given and said: "We shall require more help... because it is a matter of survival for us." In Parliament he said, "We have asked for every kind of aid. There is no inhibition about it."

How the Government was totally unprepared for facing a state of emergency became clear by what happened in Tezpur in the next couple of days. Tezpur was about many miles away from the front line. But immediately after the fall of Bomdi La panic spread to Tezpur and the Government had no arrangements for meeting the situation. The Government machinery itself failed, which led to greater confusion and worse panic. There was no proper liaison between the military and civil authorities and for over twenty-four hours nobody had definite information about what was happening at the front. Contradictory orders were issued, government offices were closed and the people felt themselves deserted. A report in *Current*

stated: "Indian currency was burnt, the State treasury emptied to pay three months' salary to Government servants, and the gates of the Mental Hospital and the District Jail were thrown open, letting loose lunatics and criminals on a town which was already witnessing a ghastly devils' dance with people fleeing, officials deserting and rumours of imminent capitulation."¹⁰ At this time some non-official organizations did good work and did not allow the situation to deteriorate any further. The abnormal situation lasted only for a day and a half, after which civilian authorities returned and normality was restored. The incident is mentioned here only to serve as a warning against similar emergencies in the future.

There was a certain amount of evacuation as the war situation became graver and the front line came nearer. The tribes inhabiting the areas exposed to war danger preferred to evacuate to the plains rather than face life under the Chinese. The Government of Assam arranged to give them food and shelter. A number of Europeans and Americans also left the tea gardens and their other establishments and went away for safety to Calcutta and other places. In contrast to them labourers on the tea gardens did not leave their places of work. This is a fact which deserves special mention.

The Government of India took at this time the necessary step of arresting throughout the country a number of Communist workers. They belonged mostly to the pro-China group in the Communist Party. They were openly in sympathy with the actions of the Government of China and might have, if left free, indulged in activities harmful to the country's war effort. The arrests were effected under the Defence of India Rules.

Cease Fire and Withdrawals

After scoring spectacular successes in NEFA and after advancing in Ladakh practically as far as her claim line of 1960 China made on November 21 her dramatic announcement of a cease-fire from the midnight of the day. It was also announced that "beginning from December 1, Chinese frontier guards will withdraw to positions 20 kilometres (12½ miles) behind the

¹⁰ *Current*, 8 December 1962.

lines of actual control which existed between China and India on November 7, 1959."

The statement issued in Peking said the Chinese Government was taking these actions to reverse the present situation along the border and to bring about the realization of its three-point proposals of October 24. It pointed out that after withdrawing, "the Chinese frontier guards will be far behind their positions prior to September 8, 1962."

The statement went on: "Provided that the Indian Government agreed to take corresponding measures, the Indian and Chinese Governments can immediately appoint officials to be at places agreed upon by both parties in the various sectors of the border to discuss matters relating to the 20-kilometre withdrawal of the armed forces of each party to form a demilitarised zone, the establishment of check-posts by each party on its side of the line of actual control as well as the return of captured personnel." It said that when the results of these talks had been put into effect, Mr. Nehru and Mr. Chou En-lai could meet either in Peking or in New Delhi to reach an overall agreement on the border question.

The statement went on: "The Chinese Government sincerely hopes that the Indian Government will make a positive response. Even if the Indian Government fails to make such a response in good time, the Chinese Government will take the initiative to carry out the above-mentioned measures."

It added that there were three "possible eventualities" in which China reserved the right to fight back in self-defence.

1. If Indian troops continued their attacks after the Chinese frontier guards had ceased fire and when they are withdrawing.

2. If, after the Chinese had withdrawn 20 kilometres, "the Indian troops should again advance to the line of actual control in the eastern sector, i.e. the illegal McMahon Line, and/or refused to withdraw but remain on the line of actual control in the middle and the western sectors.

3. If, after the Chinese 20-kilometres withdrawal, Indian troops cross the line of actual control and recover their position prior to September 8.

The statement said: "The Chinese Government solemnly

declares, should the above eventualities occur, China reserves the right to strike back in self-defence and the Indian Government will be held completely responsible for all the grave consequences arising therefrom." It again accused India of provoking the border war¹¹.

The statement was followed on November 28 by a letter from Mr. Chou en-lai to the Indian Prime Minister. The letter stated: "Beginning from December 1, 1962 the Chinese frontier guards, in pursuance of the Chinese Government's decision, will withdraw on their own initiative all the way to positions on the Chinese side 20 kilometres behind the line of actual control as of November 7, 1959". "The withdrawal by China alone", the letter stated, "cannot ensure the disengagement of the armed forces of the two sides nor cannot prevent the recurrence of border clashes. On the contrary, in case the Indian side should refuse to co-operate, even the ceasefire which has been effected is liable to be upset." The letter concluded: "The Chinese Government has taken the first step, i.e. cease-fire, and is going to take the second step, i.e. withdrawal. I hope the Indian Government will give a positive response and make efforts in the same direction."¹²

India's immediate reaction to the Chinese move was expressed by Prime Minister Nehru when he stated in Parliament that there could be no talks and no negotiations unless the Chinese withdraw to the line they held prior to September 8. It was not, however, rejected out of hand. It was necessary to find out firstly, if the cease-fire would actually take place, secondly, if the Chinese would withdraw as declared and lastly, what was the exact meaning of the phrase "the line of actual control of November 7, 1959." In order to ascertain the last point Prime Minister Nehru addressed a letter to the Chinese Premier on December 1. It was also a reply to the latter's letter of November 28. Pointing out the contradictions in the Chinese position Mr. Nehru stated: "You are aware that in November 1959 there were no Chinese posts of any kind either at Qiziljilga, Shinglung, Dehra, Samzungling or any areas to

¹¹ *Times of India*, 24 November 1962.

¹² *Chinese Aggression in War and Peace* by Publications Division Government of India pp. 42-4.

the west of these locations nor did the Chinese have any posts to the south or west of Spanggur. Despite this, 'the line of actual control as on November 7, 1959', as your Government now claim in Ladakh, is along the line of control established by your forces after the massive attacks mounted since 20th October 1962.

"This is a definite attempt to retain under cover of preliminary cease-fire arrangements, physical possession over the area which China claims and to secure which the massive attack since 20th October 1962 was mounted by your forces." Continuing he wrote: "In any case, if the Government of India are to take any attitude to the so-called unilateral measures of cease-fire and withdrawals announced by the Chinese Government, they must clearly know what the "line of actual control as of November 7, 1959" is, nor can that line be unilaterally determined by the Chinese Government either on the basis of their alleged claims or on the basis of the position reached as a result of their further aggression."¹³ In view of these discrepancies he appealed to the Chinese Prime Minister to accept the clear and straightforward proposal of the restoration of "*status quo* prior to 8 September 1962."

The country as a whole reacted violently to the Chinese proposal. It was regarded as deceitful and treacherous. There was a demand that it should be rejected forthwith. Most people did not believe that the Chinese would stop fighting. Even if they stopped for a while, they would start it again on one pretext or other. It was thought moreover that they would not withdraw. The general feeling was that India should not consider herself bound by the Chinese declaration of cease-fire and withdrawal. She should retain her freedom to strike at them whenever she found it opportune to do so. Many leaders of opposition parties and others gave expression to that feeling. Some of them even suggested that the Chinese troops should be harried and harassed in the course of their withdrawal. A guerilla type of warfare was suggested for the purpose. The Government of India did not accept any of these suggestions.

¹³ *Chinese Aggression in War and Peace* by Publications Division, pp. 26 and 28.

They practically accepted clause one of the proposal by not firing on the Chinese after the cease-fire. Prime Minister Nehru made a statement to that effect after a few days. Regarding the rest there was a demand for clarifications.

The need for securing help from friendly countries did not end with the cease-fire. In the first place nobody knew how long it would continue and nobody could be sure that the Chinese would not resume their attacks at any time that suited them. India had therefore to prepare herself for the defence of her long northern border. The reverses had brought to light the grave inadequacies of the existing arrangements and had highlighted the need and the necessity of securing adequate help from abroad. Throughout the country there was an insistent demand for asking for and securing massive military aid from U.K. and U.S.A. The Prime Minister had accepted the demand after some initial hesitation and the two countries had responded in a noble and generous manner. It was, however, necessary to make more adequate and satisfactory arrangements. To discuss those arrangements and to get a better idea of the requirements high level delegations of the two countries visited India in the last week of November. The members of the delegations and their leaders Mr. Duncan Sandys and Mr. Averrel Harri-man met the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister, the Heads of the defence services and others, and discussed with them the various problems of defence requirements. They also paid visits to NEFA and Ladakh to study the problems on the spot. As a result, adequate arrangements were evolved for the satisfaction of the immediate and short-term needs of India. Later, the question arose about long-term needs, how India would be able to finance them and how far U.K. and U.S.A. would be able to help.¹⁴

¹⁴ The matter was considered by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan in their conference at Nassau. It was generally agreed that all possible help should be given to India and that the expenses should be borne jointly by the United States and the Commonwealth. A White Paper on Defence published by the British Government in London on 20th February reiterated the "undertaking to give all possible aid to help India resist the Chinese aggression," and stated that Indian requirements were being assessed in consultation with Indian authorities. About the same time President Kennedy renewed in very

Indo-Pakistan Relations

It was apprehended at one time that Pakistan's opposition might make it difficult for U.K. and U.S.A. to give help to India. Pakistan had made no secret of her annoyance at the help that was being extended and had demanded that similar help should be made available to her. Some extreme elements had even gone to the extent of suggesting that if that were not done Pakistan should break off her ties with the West and should move closer to China and the Communist bloc. President Ayub Khan had stated that help from the West might prolong and enlarge the conflict between India and China. U.K. as well as the U.S.A. allayed the fears and suspicions of Pakistan by assuring her that the aid given to India would be, as she had already agreed, utilised only for resisting Chinese aggression. They were not prepared to go beyond that and advised Pakistan, on the other hand, to settle her differences with India and help in the common defence of the sub-continent.

clear terms his promise "to help India maintain itself against attack if such an attack should come again". Describing India as key area of Asia, President Kennedy said: "It was attacked without warning after trying to follow a policy of friendship with countries on its border. The balance of power in the world would be very adversely affected if India should lose its freedom." He concluded by assuring: "We will be responsive to India."

A joint U.S.-Commonwealth air delegation was in New Delhi for over three weeks in the month of February. The object of the mission was to assess the air defence requirements of India. The mission consisted of experts and senior officers from the United States, Britain, Canada and Australia. The mission has yet to submit its report. It will be then for the Governments of the four countries to decide in consultation with the Government of India about the practical steps that require to be taken.

The visit of the mission and the various reports that appeared in the press about "air umbrella" and other measures gave rise to a lively controversy. Communists and their fellow-travellers were quick to seize it for their propaganda against Western Powers. They represented that the mission had been imposed upon India and was sent in order to drag her into the Western military alliance. They raised a hue and cry about military bases and foreign troops. The Government of India ought to have intervened immediately and stopped this false propaganda which was giving the country a bad name in Europe and America. A feeling grew in Washington, as evidenced by Mr. H. R. Vohra of the *Times of India*, that India wanted American assistance "only if

The visit of the two delegations was also important from the point of view of directing attention to the improvement of relations between India and Pakistan. Early in their study of the defence requirements the two delegations came to the conclusion that Chinese aggression against India was equally a threat to the independence and integrity of Pakistan, that the two countries must work together for defending the sub-continent and that, therefore, it was of paramount importance to improve the relations between the two. Some farsighted men in the country had also arrived at the same conclusion. It was felt that understanding between the two countries was worth scores of plane-loads of U.S. weapons. The leaders of the two delegations expressed this view to the two Governments and pleaded with them for renewed effort to settle the Kashmir and other outstanding problems which were spoiling the relations between the two countries. Mr. Sandys and Mr. Harriman did not suggest any concrete solution. They were also careful to add in their talks with the Indian Prime Minister that they were making the suggestions not as a price for the military help that the two countries were giving but as a requirement for the successful defence of the sub-continent. As a result of the efforts of the two diplomats Prime Minister Nehru and President Ayub Khan agreed to meet together again to find a solution to the Kashmir and other problems. A joint statement to that effect was issued on November 29. It is as follows :

it came unseen and preferably unsung and certainly unaccompanied by American personnel”:

Prime Minister Nehru made the position clear in the third week of February. He stated categorically that the mission was in India on the invitation of the Government of India and that the Government had invited it in order that steps that may be necessary may be taken for strengthening the country's air defences. He made it clear that there was no question of stationing foreign air forces or the establishment of foreign air bases and that “none of the friendly countries have made any such suggestion”. The statement that he laid before the Parliament made clear the genesis of the mission as well as the task that it had to perform. It stated *inter alia*:

“Since the Chinese massive attack last October, the Government of India has been in close touch with various friendly governments in connection with measures to be taken to build up

“The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India have agreed that a renewed effort should be made to resolve the outstanding differences between their two countries on Kashmir and other related matters, so as to enable India and Pakistan to live side by side in peace and friendship. As a consequence, they have decided to start discussion at an early date with the object of reaching an honourable and equitable settlement. These will be conducted initially at the ministerial level. At the appropriate stage, direct talks will be held between Mr. Nehru and President Ayub.”

Both Mr. Nehru and General Ayub Khan hailed the statement, as a “historic document”. A little misunderstanding arose the next day as a result of a statement made by Mr. Nehru but it was cleared immediately.

effective defence against the Chinese attack. Prompt and generous help has come from various friendly countries, more specially from the United States and the United Kingdom, and for this we are grateful.

“Apart from the reorientation, reorganisation and strengthening of the Indian Army and the obtaining of suitable equipment, there was also the question of building up an effective air defence both to meet the emergency like the one created by the Chinese advance into NEFA in November and to meet the long-term threat posed by China. Both these have to be kept in view: in either event, the strengthening of the Indian Air Force has to be tackled immediately. In the event of a sudden emergency arising, the Government will have to deal with it in the light of developments with support from friendly countries, which may become suddenly necessary and be available.

“These matters were discussed by the Government with friendly Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom during November and December, and a visit of the U.S.-Commonwealth air team was suggested so that the problem of strengthening India’s air defence could be studied by them with the Indian technical air staff and prompt action taken to implement the decision.

“The U.S.-Commonwealth air team has been in India for about three weeks and will be completing their study and discussion soon. These discussions between the U.S.-Commonwealth air team and the Indian Air Force experts have led to speculation in the press about the establishment of foreign bases and foreign planes as an “air umbrella” in India. These reports are incorrect and greatly exaggerated.

Extremists in both countries were critical of the move, but their criticisms had no effect upon the two Governments. The ministerial level conference contemplated by the statement was held in Rawalpindi in the last week of December. The Ministers held talks for three days. At the end they issued a joint statement in the course of which they agreed "to make a joint appeal to leaders, officials, the press, radio and other media of publicity in the two countries to help in creating a friendly atmosphere for resolving outstanding differences on Kashmir and other related matters and to refrain from any statements, criticism or propaganda which might prejudice the success of these negotiations or tend to create discord between the two countries". They will meet again in New Delhi in the middle of January 1963. It is to be hoped that wisdom will prevail

"The U.S.-Commonwealth air team, in their discussions with the Indian Air Force experts have been dealing with the assessment of the Chinese air threat and the extent to which the Indian Air Force requires strengthening in order to meet it. The preliminary action that is considered necessary the extension of the existing air strips, improvement in ground control and communication system, etc. to be taken in connection with air defence arrangements. These steps will make it possible for the Indian Air Force to function more effectively and, should a sudden emergency arise, to be helped from friendly countries."

From the reports in the press it appears that there is difference of opinion regarding the requirements. The Indian Air Force, it seems, would like to get "at least three or four modern fighter-bomber squadrons." According to Western experts they may not be necessary and the present purpose could be well served by slower and cheaper fighters. There are differences also regarding the need of ground-to-air and air-to-air-missiles. They are due to differences in the assessment of the danger. They are sure to be resolved in course of time. It appears clear now that in case of a renewed Chinese attack India will receive from the West all the military and air support that she may need. She is already accepting help from that quarter in the matter of the modernisation of her army. And, hereafter, one can be reasonably sure that there will be no inhibition in asking for and accepting the assistance. The form and the extent of the support will depend upon the size and the character of the danger. In view of this fact of life, controversies over air umbrella and air squadron and over alignment and non-alignment appear to be irrelevant. As stated by U.S. Ambassador, Prof. J. K. Galbraith in the course of a lecture, "it is hard to be non-aligned against an invader".

on both sides and that a solution will be found to the Kashmir problem which has plagued the relations between the two countries since the dawn of their independence.

China did not react favourably to the decision of the Governments of India and Pakistan to meet together to settle their differences. She was anxious to isolate India. She pursued with vigour, therefore, her border talks with Pakistan. The talks which were going on from October were brought to a successful conclusion in December. The agreement was announced in a communique issued on December 27, the day of the first meeting of the Indian and the Pakistani Ministers. The timing of the announcement was significant. Contrary to China's expectations, however, it did not have any adverse effect on the Ministers' meeting. The communique said the agreement was reached following talks which started in Peking on October 12 "in pursuance of the decision of the two Governments on conducting negotiations through diplomatic channels on the question of the boundary between China's Sinkiang and the contiguous areas whose defence is under the control of Pakistan". It then said: "The two parties are highly satisfied with the speedy attainment of the agreement in principle on the boundary question left over by history, and mutually agree that the proposed boundary between the two countries should be signed on this basis as soon as possible. The boundary agreement fully safeguards the rights and interests of both the countries and demonstrates the efficacy of negotiation as a peaceful method for resolving international disputes on the basis of mutual respect and good will."¹⁵ The last sentence is an obvious jibe at India.

¹⁵ The formal border agreement between Pakistan and China was signed in Peking on 2 March 1963. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan Mr. Z. A. Bhutto went all the way to Peking along with a big delegation for the signing of the agreement. The Minister and his colleagues were accorded a big and very cordial welcome.

The agreement determines the boundary between the Sinkiang area of China and the Pakistan-occupied area of Kashmir. The boundary between the two areas is about three hundred miles in length. Article I of the agreement states that the boundary is being delimited "on the basis of the traditional customary boundary line". In effect, however, it has been delimited on the basis of a good deal of horse-trading.

While clarifications were being sought of the exact location of their "line of actual control", there was a debate in Indian Parliament on the Chinese proposal. In the course of his speech in the debate, Prime Minister Nehru spelled out the Indian reaction. He said that "the Chinese version of the actual line of control on November 7, 1959, the central point of Peking's formula was clearly unacceptable to India." Regarding the cease-fire, he said: "We accepted it and nothing has been done on our behalf to impede the implementation of the cease-fire declaration." Reiterating the Indian demand for the restoration of the *status quo* of 8 September 1962, he said that it was

Pakistan gave away certain areas and in return received certain other areas.

Estimates of the gains and the losses of Pakistan have varied. One Indian estimate, based on the 1962 Survey of Pakistan maps, has put the Pakistan loss at thirteen thousand square miles. Pakistan has pointed out, however, that India had abandoned that boundary line a number of years back. She claims that she is the gainer as she has acquired over seven hundred square miles of valuable and strategically important area in Hunza which was already in the occupation of China. It appears clear, however, that Pakistan has accepted the Karakoram range as the boundary instead of the historically established and traditional Aghil and Kunslun ranges. China had been demanding this alignment along the Karakoram range since long. Pakistan has now accepted that demand and this will help China in establishing her claim over the disputed areas in Ladakh.

In view of the dispute over Kashmir, the agreement provides in Article VI for the reopening of negotiations with the sovereign authority that may be established "after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between Pakistan and India". It provides, however, that "in the event of the sovereign authority being Pakistan, the provisions of the present agreement . . . shall be maintained in the formal boundary treaty to be signed". The agreement has further provided for the setting up of a "joint boundary demarcation commission".

India has taken strong exception to the agreement. Kashmir is in law a part of India and Pakistan has no right to sign an agreement regarding the boundary of a part of Kashmir only because she happens to be in illegal occupation of that part. The agreement has no validity in law. On this basis India has registered her protest against the agreement both with China and Pakistan and also with the United Nations as Pakistan's action is also a breach of the cease-fire agreement.

Apart from these legal arguments, the agreement is objectionable because it gives away a good chunk of Indian territory to China. Naturally, therefore, there is strong resentment in the country against the

based on the principle that "aggression must be undone before an agreement for a peaceful consideration can be arrived at". Characterizing the Chinese policy as one of "unabashed chauvinism" and giving expression to his conviction that "the word of the Chinese Government cannot be relied upon", he said, "What China has done is an insult to the conscience of the world". The Prime Minister made on this occasion the novel

agreement and against both Pakistan and China. There was a demand that the scheduled talks with Pakistan for the settlement of the Kashmir issue should be cancelled. Prime Minister Nehru did not accept the demand. He, however, expressed his strong objection to the agreement saying that it was objectionable and its timing was extraordinary. He said "One would almost think that it was done deliberately to upset our (Indo-Pak) talks." He characterised it in another speech as "a strange and unprincipled alliance".

China is, as should be expected, happy over the agreement. She regards it as another diplomatic victory over India. Chinese leaders are utilising the occasion for renewing their demand for direct talks between India and China for the settlement of the border dispute. India had in her protest note alleged that China was exploiting the Indo-Pakistani differences for her aggressive and expansionist activities. Rejecting the allegation, China levelled the counter-allegation that India was trying to entice Pakistan into a joint anti-China campaign. The Chinese note stated: "This is no secret at all. Pakistan has repeatedly exposed such an attempt by India." The note rejected India's protest and asserted that the agreement had not only "promoted friendship between the Chinese and Pakistani peoples" but was also "in the interests of Asian and world peace". The claim is obviously unfounded. There is more substance, it should be clear, in the statement made in the latest Indian note that China is following an "insidious policy of poisoning mutual relations between the countries of Asia and creating tensions and conflict in the region".

Pakistani Foreign Minister, Mr. Z. A. Bhutto, expressed his surprise at the "sinister motives" attributed to the agreement. He regretted that the special proviso for the reopening of negotiations on the settlement of the Kashmir dispute had been ignored in India. It was inserted, he said, "in the interests of good relations between India and Pakistan". He asserted that Pakistan had not surrendered any territory and had on the contrary gained seven hundred and fifty square miles of "an economically viable and strategically important area." President Ayub Khan expressed similar sentiments and assured that the agreement would not prejudice Indo-Pakistani talks on Kashmir.

The Western allies of Pakistan did not react favourably to the agreement. They expressed concern about its likely effect on the Indo-Pakistani talks. They are worried by Pakistan's drift towards China.

proposal that the dispute on the boundary question can be referred, if China were ready, for adjudication to the International Court of Justice. Concluding, he stated: "Even though there is no actual fighting at present, the emergency and danger continue and will continue so long as China's present policy and military postures continue to be a threat to our independence and integrity. . . . This struggle or war will be a long one. It may even last five years or more. It is a long and big effort that we have to make. I feel—I speak in all honesty—confident that we shall win." What the Prime Minister stated was the general feeling prevalent in the country. It was the universal feeling that the war had not ended, that the Chinese were treacherous, that they would come back in greater force and that the country must prepare itself for fighting that onslaught.

Colombo Conference

While these events were taking place the neutral nations had not given up their efforts for bringing the armed clash to an end and for evolving a peaceful solution of the conflict. After a good deal of negotiations through diplomatic channels they met in a conference in Colombo on December 10. Ceylon, Egypt, Ghana, Burma, Indonesia and Cambodia participated in the three-day conference. The conference adopted a resolution suggesting a *via media*. It was decided that it should be communicated to the two Governments through a special messenger and that later the Prime Minister of Ceylon Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranayake should visit the two capitals, meet the two Prime Ministers and persuade them to enter into conversations with each other on the basis of the resolution. Accordingly, an emissary of the Government of Ceylon visited New Delhi on December 14. Mrs. Bandaranayake reached Peking on the last day of the year.¹⁶

¹⁶ Mrs. Bandarnayake was in China for about a week. Her discussions with the leaders of the Chinese Government took place from January 1 to 4. She was joined in those discussions by the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Dr. Subandrio. At the end of the visit a joint communique was issued which stated that the Chinese Government gave a "positive response to the proposals of the Colombo Conference". Neither the proposals nor the terms of the Chinese Government's "positive response" were published at that time.

China was anxious to secure as early as possible India's commitment to her unilateral declaration of cease-fire and withdrawal to be followed by a resumption of talks. India had in fact accepted the cease-fire as she did not take any steps against the Chinese invaders after they stopped firing. But she had asked for several clarifications on other points. China regarded this as delaying tactics and sent on December 9 a five-thousand-word note asking for a "clear and definite" reply.

Mrs. Bandaranayake then went to Delhi. She was joined there by Mr. Ali Sabri of the United Arab Republic and Mr. Kofi-Azante Afori-Atta of Ghana. The three had discussions with Prime Minister Nehru and other members of the Government. In the course of the discussions the representatives of the three countries gave certain clarifications which were later made a part of the proposals. On the basis of those clarifications, the Government of India came to the conclusion that together with them the proposals provided by far and large for the undoing of the Chinese aggression after September 8, 1962. They were of the view therefore that the proposals should be accepted. They decided, however, to place them before the Parliament and await the decision. Mrs. Bandaranayake and others were informed accordingly.

The Indian Parliament met in New Delhi on January 23 for the consideration of the proposals. The proposals were published on January 19. They are as follows:

1. The Conference considers the present *de facto* cease-fire period as a good starting point for a peaceful settlement of the India-China conflict.

2. (a) With regard to the Western sector, the Conference appeals to the Chinese Government to carry out the withdrawal of their military posts by 20 kilometres as has been proposed in the letter of Mr. Chou En-Lai to Mr. Nehru dated November 21 and 28, 1962. (b) The Conference appeals to the Government of India to keep their existing military positions. (c) Pending final solution of the border dispute, the area vacated by the Chinese military withdrawal will be a demilitarized zone to be administered by civilian posts of both sides to be agreed upon without prejudice to the rights of the presence of both India and China in that area.

3. With regard to the Eastern sector, the Conference considers that the line of actual control in the areas recognised by both Governments could serve as a cease-fire line to their respective positions. The remaining areas in this sector can be settled in future discussions.

4. With regard to the problems of the Middle sector, the Conference suggests that they be solved by peaceful means without resort to force.

5. The Conference believes that these proposals which could help in consolidating the cease-fire once implemented, should pave the way

The note rejected as "utterly unacceptable" what it called the "brazen demand" for the restoration of the *status quo* which

for discussion between the representatives of both parties for the purpose of solving the problems entailed in the cease-fire positions.

6. The Conference would like to make it clear that a positive response to the appeal will not prejudice the position of either of the two Governments as regards its conception of the final alignment of boundaries.

The following are the clarifications of the proposals given by the delegations of Ceylon, UAR and Ghana:

Western Sector

(1) The withdrawal of the Chinese forces proposed by the Colombo Conference will be 20 kilometres as proposed by the Chinese Prime Minister Mr. Chou En-Lai, to the Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, in the statement of the Chinese Government dated November 21 and in Prime Minister Chou En-Lai's letter of November 28, i.e., from the line of actual control between the two sides as on November 7, 1959, as defined in Maps III and V circulated by the Government of China.

(2) The existing military posts which the forces of the Government of India will keep will be on and up to the line indicated in (1) above.

(3) The demilitarised zone of 20 kilometres created by Chinese military withdrawals will be administered by civilian posts of both sides. This is a substantive part of the Colombo conference proposals. It is as to the location, the number of posts and their composition that there has to be an agreement between the two Governments of India and China.

Eastern Sector

The Indian forces can, in accordance with the Colombo conference proposals, move right up to the south of the line of actual control, i.e., the McMahon Line, except for the two areas on which there is a difference of opinion between the Governments of India and China. The Chinese forces similarly can move right upto the north of the McMahon Line except for these two areas. The two areas referred to as the remaining areas in the Colombo conference proposals, arrangements in regard to which are to be settled between the Governments of India and China, according to the Colombo Conference proposals, are Chedong or the Thagla Ridge area and the Longju area in which cases there is a difference of opinion as to the line of actual control between the two Governments.

Middle Sector

The Colombo conference desired that the *status quo* in this sector should be maintained and neither side should do anything to disturb the *status quo*.

prevailed prior to September 8. It further made it clear that the Chinese wanted to retain in the eastern sector Dhola (Chedong according to the Chinese) and Longju and in the central sector Barahoti which they called Wuje. There was also a clear hint that the fighting might start again if India did

Public opinion in the country was outraged by the proposals. Nobody had expected full-throated condemnation of the aggressor, but nobody was prepared for failure to recognise the aggression and for the attempt to put India and China on the same level. It was felt that the might of China had blunted the conscience and blurred the vision of the six neutral and non-aligned nations. The reaction would have been much stronger but for the long established ties of friendship and co-operation with those countries.

After a good deal of discussion in which all opposition members except the Communists and some Congressmen were ranged against the Government, the Parliament accepted the position that the Government would approve the proposals and be prepared to enter into negotiations with China on that basis. It is noteworthy to observe, however, that no specific motion approving the proposals was placed before the Parliament. The general feeling in the House and the country was that there should be no talks with China until she vacated the entire aggression. But the Government was committed to the demand for the restoration of the September 8 position. It was the Prime Minister's case that the Colombo proposals read with the clarifications satisfied in the main the Indian demand for the restoration of the September 8 position. It must be admitted that the contention is correct in most material particulars. It was specifically agreed by the Government that there would be no talks with China unless she accepted the Colombo proposals in toto.

There has been so far no acceptance of the proposals by China. Her "positive response" and "acceptance in principle" were mere deceitful manoeuvres. She is now complaining that the proposals contain "ambiguities and inconsistencies". Her position is that the Colombo powers should bring the two countries together for direct talks without any pre-conditions. Imposition of pre-conditions is, according to her, meddling and not mediating. There is thus a stalemate and the Colombo powers are unable to do anything to break it. One can understand this inability, but one cannot understand their unwillingness, even after such an intransigent and defiant attitude of China, to utter a word of disapproval or protest. They are quietly allowing China to make a mockery of all the pains that they took and the time and resources they spent over their mediation efforts. Perhaps, it is in keeping with their initial failure to distinguish between the victim and the aggressor which so outraged the public opinion in the country.

China is now insisting on direct talks with India and is blaming her for utilising the Colombo proposals for blocking them.

not oblige by giving the commitment that was demanded. Prime Minister Nehru dealt with this note when he spoke in Parliament on December 11 and 12. China followed it up by a memorandum on December 30. It said that mere implementation of the cease-fire was not the same as its formal acceptance. Saying that the cease-fire along the border was "unstable" it accused India of "provocations". It further demanded that the meeting of officials should be held immediately. It stated: "The differences can only be solved through meetings and discussions; they would never be reduced, let alone removed, if no meeting is held". It again rejected the Indian demand for the restoration of September 8 *status quo*.

On the same day Peking opened a new diplomatic offensive against India. The *People's Daily*, the authoritative organ of the Chinese Communist Party, alleged that the Indian Embassy in Peking was being used as "an agency of the Chiang Kai-shek gang on the Chinese main land for subversive activities". The reason for the attack was the circulation by the Indian Embassy of a resolution adopted by Overseas Chinese Association of India. The commentator of the journal hinted at the closing of the Embassy and the severance of diplomatic relations.

The cease-fire came into force on the midnight of November 22. There were a few breaches; there was one serious incident of the fatal shooting of an Indian officer after he had surrendered, but by and large the Chinese troops did not indulge in firing after that hour. The Indian troops also observed the self-imposed discipline of not firing on the Chinese. The withdrawal of the Chinese troops also began as scheduled on December 1. By the end of the year it was still in progress. It is difficult to say at the moment how far they would withdraw and what civil or military check posts or others they would leave in the border area.¹⁷ While going back they returned to the Indian Red Cross a number of sick and wounded prisoners of war. They also announced their intention of returning captured war

¹⁷ According to a statement issued on March 2 by a spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of National Defence, the Chinese forces completed their withdrawal to positions twenty kilometres behind the November 7, 1959 line of actual control mentioned by Mr. Chou En-lai by the end of February 1962.

materials and stores.¹⁸ But, on the other hand, there were reports of Chinese soldiers robbing the places they vacated of all valuables and of committing many other atrocities. The following is one of the reports that appeared in the Indian press: "A large number of mutilated bodies of local tribals lying scattered in the villages between Bomdi La and Dirang Dzong in the Kameng Division of the NEFA present a grim picture of Chinese atrocities during the short space of their occupation. A group of newsmen who visited Dirang Dzong were told that these locals had to pay the supreme price for refusing to co-operate with the Chinese."¹⁹

The Indian civil administration is returning to the areas vacated by the Chinese. It returned to Bomdi La, the headquarters of the Kameng Division of NEFA on December 16, and to Walong a few days later. The people welcomed the Indian officers with open arms. The evacuees are returning and the normal administration is being restored. The position about the return of the Army is uncertain. The Government of India has not so far made any move in that direction.²⁰

Various Explanations

The world is puzzled by the sudden Chinese decision to stop the fighting and to order the withdrawal of the troops behind the McMahon Line. The decision came when the battle was going in China's favour and when India was getting the worst of it on the front. Everybody is anxious to know the

¹⁸ It was discovered later when the returned materials were examined that most of them were in a damaged condition and that the Chinese had carried away all the good materials they could lay their hands on.

¹⁹ *The Indian Express*, 20 December 1962.

²⁰ In spite of the withdrawal of the Chinese army beyond the McMahon Line—and also twenty kilometres behind the so-called line of actual control, the Indian Army did not move up and occupy the areas vacated by the Chinese. In Ladakh even civilian posts were not established. This was the position as late as the end of the first week of March 1963. Answering questions on the points, more particularly on the failure to establish civilian posts in Ladakh, the Prime Minister stated in Parliament on 25 February: "Nobody has prevented us physically. We have actually moved up in some places. It is entirely a matter for the military to decide, their convenience, the feasibility of what they should do and the timing."

reasons which prompted China to take the decision that she did. Many are the explanations that have been offered. Some say that the winter and the snow and the lengthening lines of communication and supply forced the Chinese to stop the fighting and go back. Others attribute it to pressure exerted by Russia and other Communist powers and the danger of driving India into the Anglo-American group of nations. It was evident that if the Chinese advance had continued England and America would have provided massive military aid to India and helped her stem the tide. Still others are of the opinion that China's objective was itself limited and, having achieved the objective that she had set before herself, she decided to withdraw. There is a difference of opinion even with regard to the exact nature of the limited objective. One view is that China is not at all interested in NEFA; her interest lies only in Ladakh; she began the war in NEFA only with the object of securing the area in Ladakh which she regards essential for her communications between Sinkiang and western Tibet. The other view is that at this stage China wanted only to give a convincing proof of her strength and of India's weakness and impress the Himalayan states as well as countries like Burma, Ceylon, Thailand, South Vietnam and Malaya. She achieved that object by crossing the McMahon Line and inflicting a heavy defeat on India; the fruits of this victory she would gather in course of time.

Opinion is also divided about the likely course of events. Some think that there is no danger of any fresh invasion; while others expect a repetition of the invasion as early as the spring or the summer of 1963. There is still another school of thought which is convinced that China will never give up her ultimate aim of dominating Asia, and will not stop until she destroys India as the rival pole of attraction pointing in the direction of a democratic way of life. All these explanations and theories make the problem an intricate Chinese puzzle which it is extremely difficult to entangle.

Some of the views expressed may be noted more specifically. British commentators thought that the Chinese had achieved all the objectives for which they launched the invasion. The

objectives according to them were: to show the weaker South-East Asian nations the power of China and the weakness of India, which some of them regarded as a rival pole of attraction; to convince the world of the futility of disregarding the fact of China being a world Power and of keeping her out of the United Nations; to make a mockery of Mr. Nehru's non-alignment policy and to strengthen their bargaining power in the frontier dispute which would leave them in effective control of 12,000 square miles of Indian territory in Ladakh through which runs the strategically important road linking Sinkiang with Tibet.

The *New York Times* stated: "The decision of the Chinese Communists to call a halt to their border war with India is startling, inexplicable. An astonishing feature of the decision is that it comes with military victory in the Chinese reds' hands. Until some satisfactory explanation is forthcoming, there can only be wild speculation on the reasons for Peking's decision. The military and political objectives of the campaign may have been achieved. The process of seeking to dominate south and south-east Asia will certainly continue, but perhaps it is to be attempted in stages, with the second stage (Tibet was the first) now accomplished. Perhaps the advent of winter snows, which would make the already fantastically difficult logistical problems just about impossible, brought on the truce."

The *Herald Tribune* commented that it was a "pleasant surprise" and added, "It is also something of a mystery. We can only guess at some of the underlying factors. Peking evidently had a limited objective on the Himalayan area and did not intend a fullscale invasion of India.

"The United States and Britain were prepared to supply India with all the weapons it needed to halt the Chinese aggression and Russia, after long hesitation and several unsuccessful attempts to mediate, decided to proceed with its promise to supply India with 12 MIG fighters and with a factory to produce many more of these planes.

"The implications for Peking were too vast and too dangerous to be ignored. The Chinese Communists, if they insisted on advancing into India, were faced with the prospect of running

into a wall of American and Soviet arms. We must assume that the implied threat of a Soviet-American coalition against Communist China frightened Peking much more than winter weather, over extended lines or anything else”.

An Indian correspondent from Hong Kong stated: “The prospect of having to fight a Korean type of war—for which Communist China just does not have the stamina at present—rather than any real desire to settle the Indo-Chinese border problem by peaceful means, constrained Peking to announce a unilateral cease-fire, observers of the Chinese scene said today.

“With the winter setting in and the lines of communication in Tibet already frozen, the alternatives for China were to pull back across the Himalayas or face defeat on the plains of the Brahmaputra. The pragmatic and calculating Chinese chose the former while there was still some face to save, according to these observers

Khrushchev Theory

And lastly the views expressed by Mr. Khrushchev may be noted. In the course of a speech at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet, he said: “But, comrades, there are some who try to put a different interpretation on the decision taken by the Government of China. They say: ‘Is it not a retreat?’ They also ask such a question: ‘Is it not a concession on the part of the Chinese comrades?’

“There are some who already say that China desisted from hostilities apparently because India started receiving support from American and British imperialists who are supplying her with armaments. Therefore, such people say, China realised that if the armed conflict continued to develop it might overgrow into a big war which would result in still greater casualties.

“Yes, clearly, the Chinese friends considered the situation and this also speaks of their wisdom and understanding of the fact that, when a war breaks out between friendly, neighbouring peoples, the imperialists always try to profit by that. The U. S. and Britain have an overproduction of armaments and, when war breaks out, they are happy to give them to other

countries which are prepared to forsake their national sovereignty to get hold of armaments, failing to realise that by this very act they are putting their heads into a noose and fall into dependence.

“The merchants of death reason along such lines: Why shouldn't we make something out of this conflict, when we are not losing anything, when the blood of the Indian people and the Chinese people is being shed, and even to profit on this? And, besides, this action has another profitable aspect for the militarists in that it throws back the development of democratic principles in India and creates conditions for the strengthening of the positions of reactionary forces in the country. It seems that this too was taken into consideration by the Chinese comrades when they were studying the question of ceasing fire and withdrawing troops.

“Doubtlessly, the measures of the Chinese Government will be worthily appraised by the peace-loving peoples. Indeed, why wage war? Did China ever set the task of invading India? No. We reject the contention as slanderous. That is why we sincerely welcome the steps taken by the Government of China, and in no way consider that it made some sort of retreat. No, the Government of China displayed reason, a correct understanding of the situation and exerted efforts to stop the military clash and to normalise the situation.”

It is intriguing that while, on the one hand, Chinese troops are going back from the areas in *NEFA* which they had occupied, on the other hand, there are reports of a military build-up in Tibet.²¹ *An Express News Service* correspondent, Mr. U. R. Wagle, reported from Tejpur as follows: “The Chinese are busy turning Tibet into a vast military camp, according to reliable reports available here. The Chinese are engaged in a massive military build-up in the quiet Lamaland.

“Among the major activities undertaken by the Chinese in recent days is the building up of three aerodromes round

²¹ A spate of similar reports appeared in Indian newspapers in the months of January and February 1963. The purport of the reports was that China had built up a big military force all along the Himalayan border. It was also reported that Chinese troops in thousands were being settled in the border areas of Tibet in the guise of civilians.

about Lhasa, Tibet's capital, in addition to the three already existing. These strips, equipped with radar and huge runways, are capable of receiving giant aircraft.

"The Chinese are also stated to have constructed a road parallel to the McMahon Line, with diversions at short distances of 15 to 20 miles, running into Tibet. With the use of the vast manpower at their command, the Chinese were able to construct the road within five to six weeks.

"The Chinese are also stated to have raised an army unit of Tibetan youth ranging in ages from 10 to 22. These youths will be given intensive training in both land and air warfare. Tibetans are also receiving specialized training in military strategy at Peking."²²

A report from Gangtok appearing a couple of days later stated: "The tempo of Chinese troop movement towards the borders of north-eastern Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and NEFA has of late been accelerated. They are reported to have moved recently about 70,000 troops along with huge quantities of arms and ammunition, armoured cars and T-34 Russian tanks into these areas. The heaviest concentration is reported on the borders of north-eastern Nepal and western Bhutan where the Chinese have brought in tanks."²³

Chinese Intentions

The question that is persistently asked is: has the war ended, or will the Chinese come back? Along with it another question is also asked: if the Chinese are going to come back will they come soon in the coming spring, or much later at their convenience? It is hardly possible to give any definitive answer to these questions, as everything depends upon the will of the Chinese and their intentions and both are as unscrutable as a Chinese face. However, there are a few indications and they may provide an answer, no doubt, of a rather provisional character.

China has certain demands on India. Those demands have been expressed in maps published from time to time. It is the usual practice of China to give expression to her demands

²² *Indian Express*, 28 December 1962.

²³ *Ibid.* 2 January 1963.

through maps. It is also her usual practice, when cornered and when the situation is not ripe to press her claim, to evade responsibility by saying that the maps are either old or based on old maps and that it had not been possible to revise them. That trick was played upon India for over five years and she was asked not to get perturbed by maps which were, she was told, essentially Kuo Min Tang maps. But when the time was ripe, China took her stand on the same old maps. According to those maps China's claims extend to over fifty thousand square miles of Indian territory in Ladakh, in U. P. and NEFA.

Moreover China does not recognize India's special relations with Bhutan and Sikkim. Those two states were, according to her, the feudatory states of the old Chinese Empire, and must sooner or later revert to that position. A *History of China* published recently by the Chinese Government contains a map showing "Chinese territories" seized by "imperialists" between 1840 and 1919. Such "Chinese territories" shown in the map include Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim, and such parts of India as Ladakh and NEFA. They also include independent countries like Burma, Malaya, Thailand, North and South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and big chunks of the territories of Soviet Siberia, Outer Mongolia and Soviet Republics of Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Tajikistan.²⁴ All these are the so-called lost territories of China which she is determined to get back one day or the other.

It is true that at the moment China has settled most of her border claims. The latest to be settled were those with Outer Mongolia and Pakistan. The negotiations with Burma dragged on for four years and a border agreement was signed in January 1960. A similar border treaty was signed with Nepal in October 1961. By signing these agreements with a number of countries China makes a show of being very reasonable and accommodating and holds out India as the one intransigent country which is behaving in an obstinate and unfriendly manner. But the fact of the matter is that China is deliberately adopting an unreasonable attitude in her talks with India. In the case of Burma, she readily accepted the McMahon Line

²⁴ *Times of India*, 18 November 1962.

and the principle of the highest watershed; but she refuses to accept them in the case of India. There is a deliberate design behind this inconsistency. China will not settle her border problem with India without extracting her pound of flesh which is Ladakh in the West and NEFA in the East. The conflict, the aggression and the invasion were started with the intention of extracting that pound of flesh.

India cannot readily agree to hand over those areas to China. Because, as soon as that is done, she will lose the protection of the Himalayas in the most sensitive eastern sector. Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim will also then lose their independent existence. They will have to agree to become, in essence if not in name, feudatory states of the Chinese Empire. India will not agree to such a weakening of her position and such an expansion of Chinese power unless she is forced to accept them through a military defeat. The defeat of India will leave China the only big power in Asia and then she can draw and redraw her boundaries in any manner she pleases. The border treaties negotiated and settled earlier will not be then of any value to Burma and Nepal and Pakistan and Outer Mongolia.

Apart from territorial expansion, the larger aim that the Chinese have in view is the domination of Asia. The only serious contestant that they have in that sphere is India. Japan could have been another contestant, but her actions during the thirties and the forties have so much alienated her from the Asian peoples that she cannot even think of entering the field for some years to come. India has no intention of dominating Asia; but her very existence as a powerful independent nation creates difficulties in the way of China fulfilling her ambition. Without intending it, India provides a shield to the smaller nations of Asia. As long as India remains strong and independent, China will not succeed in coercing the countries of Asia into accepting her leadership of the continent. Whether India desires it or not, she will provide an alternative pole of attraction. China must, therefore, constantly endeavour to reduce the importance, the status and the power of India. She must humble her from time to time in the eyes of other Asian countries. One of the objects of the invasion might have been

to expose India's lack of strength in the military sphere. A country which cannot defend her own borders cannot be relied upon as an ally in any contest with China. The intention may have been to drive this lesson home to the countries of Asia. Whenever necessary the same method can be tried and the same effect can be produced. As Mr. G. F. Hudson has stated in his article, *Why Have The Chinese Done It?* "there has been an urge in Peking to hit India as hard as possible, to confound and humiliate her, to upset her economy and to demonstrate to all the world, and particularly to the people of the Himalayas and of South-east Asia, China's superior military might." (*Background*, 22, Office for Asian Affairs, Congress for Cultural Freedom, New Delhi.)

Conquest of Asia

India is a rival pole of attraction from another point of view as well. India is a democracy and she is trying to bring about her economic development through democratic methods. The Indian experiment has attracted the attention of all Asian countries and all of them are weighing in the balance the results produced in India and China. If India succeeds in bringing about her economic development through democratic means, it will falsify the Communist thesis that the backward countries of Asia can secure their economic progress only through Communism. The pull of Communism will then diminish and there will be stiffer resistance to the acceptance of Communist domination. This is a challenge to China; and if she cannot meet it by securing greater economic progress through her Communist methods, she must in any case impede Indian progress so that it may not serve as an example to other Asian countries. Involvement in a military conflict will, she is sure, slow down India's rate of economic progress.

The ultimate aim is, of course, far more sinister. It is to establish in India, if not a Communist, at least a servile government. Unless such a government is established, China will not regard herself as safe. A friendly government such as that of Prime Minister Nehru is not enough for her. It must be a government which will not hamper her in her dealings with Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim and later with Burma, Pakistan, Thailand,

Malaya and other countries. She can have such a government if she succeeds in inflicting military defeats on the present government and then promises to hold back her hand if a government amenable to her is formed in its place. That will be the opportunity for the Communists, their fellow travellers and opportunist politicians who are always ready and willing to climb the band wagon of a successful party. There will be no dearth of such men in India as in any other country. A servile government can be easily transformed in course of time into a Communist government.

It is in this sense that the fight that India is putting up on her northern borders is a fight for the defence of the independence and integrity of all Asian countries. If India loses it, there will be no barrier left between them and the Chinese hordes. It is equally a fight for Democracy. China is the conquering arm of Communism. Having subdued seven hundred million people of China, Communism is now out to subdue the rest of the people of Asia. Having failed in Europe, it is now poised for the conquest of Asia and later of Africa. (M. N. Roy, "Communism in Asia" in *Radical Humanist*, issues dated 13 and 20 January 1952). It is thus also a fight between Communism and democracy. It is a confrontation between two rival outlooks on life, two rival modes of thinking and two rival ways of life. That is its significance to the world as a whole.

No doubt, quarrels have developed in the Communist camp. It is no longer the monolithic entity that it used to be. For some years the differences were debated within the international Communist movement and were not allowed to come out. But now they are being discussed in the public. There is a definite split in the movement, China is on one side and Russia on the other. The majority of the Communist Parties of the world are with Russia. But China is not afraid of being in a minority. Her leaders point out that Lenin and the Bolsheviks were also in a minority in the Second International. Moreover, she has some significant support in Asia and Africa.

It is not necessary to discuss here all aspects of the controversy. It may be noted, however, that no words are being spared in accusing each other of revisionism and opportunism

and adventurism. For example, the *People's Daily* of Peking accused the Russian leaders of following the "wrong practice of nationalism and big chauvinism" and of wanting "to unite with precisely those who should be opposed and to oppose those who should be united with." On the other hand, the Russians and others have accused China and Albania of practising "Stalinism at home and Trotskyism abroad." The quarrel flared up over Cuba, but aggression against India has also played some part in it. China is not satisfied with the limited support that she has received from Russia. She would like to get full support and the stoppage of all economic and military aid to India. The half a dozen or so MIG planes that Russia has promised to give to India are an eye-sore to her. Commenting on Mr. Khrushchev's veiled criticism of the armed action against India, the *People's Daily* stated: "China's counterblow in self-defence is a minimum legitimate measure that any sovereign state would take under similar circumstances. But the strange thing is that some people who claim to be Marxists-Leninists have forgotten Marxism-Leninism completely. They have never bothered to make an analysis from the class viewpoint of Marxism-Leninism of the Nehru Government's reactionary policy. Those who accuse China of having pushed the Nehru Government to the West are mistaking the very cause for the effect. Throughout the Sino-Indian boundary dispute, they have all along confounded right and wrong, pretending to be neutral, calling China brother, while actually regarding the Indian reactionaries as their kinsmen."²⁵

These are strong words. There will be some in India who will avidly seize them and jump to the conclusion that Russia would now work actively against China. They should remember that the quarrel is not over the end but only over the means to the end, and that, as Mr. Khrushchev stated later, it is only a family quarrel. In the years to come it may overstep that bound and develop into a fullscale competition for power and prestige. China may then bring out of the cold storage all her boundary disputes with Russia. To the Chinese the Russians are as much barbarians as other foreigners. But that is

²⁵ *Link* magazine, 23 December 1962.

a contingency which belongs to a distant future. It will not help India in her present fight against China. As long as the struggle is restricted to Asia, Russia will not feel called upon to put any limits on the activities of China. What the controversy has made clear is really the fact that in the present temper of China, Russia will not be able to exercise any restraint upon her.²⁶

²⁶ Early in the new year there were fresh attacks and counter-attacks accompanied by overtures on the Russian side to patch up the quarrel. Russia accepted after some hesitation the Chinese proposal to hold a world conference of Communist Parties to discuss and settle all outstanding differences. She expressed at the same time her willingness to hold bilateral talks. A couple of weeks later there was a meeting between Mr. Mao Tse-tung and Mr. S. V. Chervonenko, Russian Ambassador in China. There was also a meeting between Mr. Andrei Gromyko, the Russian Foreign Minister and Mr. Pan Tzu-li, the Chinese Ambassador in Russia. The meetings took place in "warm and friendly atmosphere". (*Times of India*, 25 February 1963). The polemics in the press and on the radio are, however, still continuing.

An editorial article in the *People's Daily* of 27 February revealed that the differences between Russia and China began in September 1959 and the Sino-Indian border conflict was one of the issues in dispute. The article stated: "The truth is that the international differences among fraternal (Communist) parties were first brought into the open, not in the summer of 1960 (on the eve of the Camp David talks between President Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchev) but in September, 1959—on September 19, 1959, to be exact. On that day, a socialist country (Russia), turning a deaf ear to China's repeated explanations of the true situation and China's advice, hastily issued a statement on the Sino-Indian border incident making no distinction between right and wrong. The statement expressed 'regret' over the border clash and in reality condemned China's correct stand. It even said that it was "tragic and deplorable". "Here is the first instance in history," the editorial stated, "in which a socialist country, instead of condemning armed provocations of reactionaries of a capitalist country (India) condemned another fraternal socialist country (China) when it was confronted with such an armed provocation." The editorial stipulated towards the end the four conditions which must be satisfied before talks could be held for the settlement of ideological differences: "(1) the 'public attacks' on China by other Communist parties must stop; (2) these parties must admit that they had committed a mistake in launching the attacks and must apologise to the Chinese and the Albanian parties; (3) the Albanian Communist Party must not be ousted from the international Communist fraternity; and (4) the Yugoslav 'revisionists' must be kept out of the fraternity." The edito-

Communist Expansionism

Military exploits and adventures have been all along an integral part of the history of China. During all the periods when she had a strong central government she has tried to expand the bounds of her realm by force of arms. In those days her armies marched north and south and east and west and seized many territories which, in some cases permanently and in some other cases for short periods, became parts of the Chinese Empire. The Chinese could undertake those military conquests with a clear conscience, because they regarded all those who were not Chinese as barbarians and their conquests as civilising missions. The Chinese rulers were never short of soldiers and they were employed from time to time for carrying the Chinese civilisation to the countries of the barbarians. The Chinese of the twentieth century have not forgotten that historic mission and now that they feel themselves strong they have decided to embark upon it. The nationalist urge to expand has again become powerful. It found expression in the invasion of India.

Communism which has taken hold of China has also an expansionist outlook. It can never rest satisfied with establishing its rule in any one country. It must always press forward and expand the area of its domination. World domination is

rial further charged that Russia "tore up hundreds of agreements and charters" and extended ideological differences to state relations. (*Times of India*, 28 February 1963).

These continuing polemics and the intransigent attitude of China indicate the difficulties in the way of reconciliation. At the same time a warning against wishful thinking is necessary. Mr. Dean Rusk, the American statesman, uttered it when he stated: "A warning must be directed against wishful thinking. Both the principal Communist Powers are committed to the Communist world system and to the destruction of freedom. The chief arguments between them are how best to 'bury' us. That gives us no reason to relax our guard. The Communist threats to freedom are still serious. Indeed, in some areas, they may increase in the months ahead. Our task is to continue resolutely on the path we have chosen—maintaining and strengthening our defences and building a free world while striving through negotiations to reduce the areas of conflict." According to a report published in Indian newspapers on March 12, Russia and China have now agreed to hold bilateral talks in the issues in dispute.

its ultimate aim. Until it achieves that aim it will always feel encircled by hostile powers and seek to break that so called encirclement. Aggression and subversion are the methods that it uses for securing that aim. In China it is allied with an equally aggressive nationalism; or, to put it in clearer terms, having identified itself with nationalism, Chinese Communism is utilising the nationalist aggressiveness for its own aggressive purposes. Nationalist aggressiveness may be satisfied with the recovery of the "lost territories", but Communist aggressiveness is insatiable. Its limit is the world.

Communists are now fully entrenched in China. They have liquidated all internal organized opposition to their regime. From time to time they use the weapon of the purge to nip in the bud any opposition that may develop within the party. They always talk of the plots of the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek gang to invade the mainland. They also talk of their own plans to attack Taiwan and throw out Chiang Kai-shek. But they know in their heart of hearts that as long as the American Seventh Fleet guards Taiwan neither can they attack the island nor can Chiang Kai-shek jump from the island and invade the mainland. And knowing this, they have kept in full trim and in battle order one of the largest armies in the world. According to Mr. Asoka Mehta, "they have 115 combat divisions of which two to three are armoured, one or two airborne or with amphibious capacity. Besides 2,500,000 troops, 7,00,000 men are organized as Public Security Forces. The Chinese Navy is small, mostly consisting of submarines (over 20 to 25) and motor torpedo boats. The air force counts 2,500 to 3,000 combat planes, (including 400 naval aircraft), most of them jet, MIG 15 and 17, though the force lacks heavy bombers and is weak in advanced fighter planes. The annual expenditure on armed forces is over \$2,500 million."²⁷ Besides this, China is busy building her own nuclear bomb. It is reported that she may be able to carry out her first test in the next year or two. What is the purpose of having such a huge big army and spending such a large amount of money

²⁷ *Background 22*, Office for Asian Affairs. Congress for Cultural Freedom, New Delhi.

over it when every single cent is required for relieving the distress of the people? And what is the purpose of the frantic search for nuclear weapons? The purpose cannot obviously be defence or the preservation of law and order in the country. The purpose cannot but be expansion which has its sanction both in national history as well as in Communist philosophy.

The possession of such tremendous military power—tremendous in relation to the military power of neighbours—would tempt even the most ardent of pacifists to embark upon adventures. But the rulers of China are not pacifists. They are hardened militarists, hardened through years of civil war and defence against foreign invaders. They are ardent worshippers of power and know by experience how power is based upon military strength. One of the oft-quoted sayings of Mao Tse-tung is “power grows through the barrel of a gun” and he is the supreme leader of the Communist Party of China, and the sole arbiter of the destinies of the seventy crores of the Chinese people. He is today in the same position as the Emperors of bygone ages and wields much more power than any of them ever did with the highly centralised state machine, the powerful army and the disciplined party apparatus that he has in his hands. Mao Tse-tung is also a poet. A poem that he composed in 1945 gives an inkling of his mind. He is himself very fond of that poem. It runs as follows :

These lands, these rivers, their bewitching charm
 Inspired the conquerors—emperors of Chin and Han,
 Tang and Sung in splendour striving to expand,
 Alas! All short in stature! And Genghis Khan
 Knew only how to shoot a hawk for play.
 For the towering figure watch the scene today.²⁸

Mao Tse-tung regards himself as that “towering figure” who is to outshine the glory of “the conquerors—emperors of Chin and Han”. His ambition is to make China the greatest military and industrial power in the world. He has made no secret of his readiness to use the method of war for attaining his aims.

²⁸ *Mao Tse-tung, Emperor of Blue Ants* by George Palozzi (London, 1962), p. 15.

In 1958, he said : "Some people have ridiculed us as the advocates of the 'omnipotence of war'; yes, we are. We are the advocates of the omnipotence of revolutionary war, which is not bad at all, but is good and Marxist".²⁹ Even a nuclear war has no terror for him. His line is that "a nuclear war could open the way to a beautiful future" for the Chinese version of Communism, built on the "debris of imperialism". It is this man, Chairman Mao and his colleagues, who are all his obedient followers, that control the vast and powerful armed forces of China and can throw them at any time into any war that they decide to wage. Any war that they decide to wage will be, to them, a "just war" and no disapproval of that action in Russia or any other Communist country will stop them from going ahead with it. They are a law unto themselves; they are no longer subject to the discipline of the international Communist movement nor do they care any longer for its approbation or disapprobation.

Warning Voices

Ordinarily, India should have taken note of the military build up of China and of the aggressive intentions of her leaders. The actions of the new Communist regime were also eloquent. In 1949, it suppressed the local governmental authorities in Sinkiang and made it completely a part of China. In 1950, it intervened in Korea against the forces of the United Nations and helped the stabilisation of a Communist government in North Korea. About the same time, it marched its forces in Tibet and violated the independence and the integrity of that small and inoffensive country. This was a definite blow against India, as with that conquest China destroyed Tibet's position as a buffer state between the two countries and extended her borders as far as the borders of India. In the beginning, China agreed to retain intact the internal autonomy of Tibet, but later she went back upon her promise and started introducing her Communist system. This led to the revolt of the Tibetan people in 1959 and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India. Long before this happened China had started nibbling at the borders

²⁹ *Ibid*, p. 381. Quoted from Mao's *Problems of War and Strategy*.

of India. The story of those border intrusions and of the relations between the two countries is told in earlier chapters and it need not be repeated here. During the same period, Communist rulers of China were equally busy in fomenting subversive Communist activities in neighbouring countries like Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, South Vietnam, Malaya and Indonesia. All this should have warned India and put her on her guard against China.

In the country there were a number of warning voices. The late Mr. M. N. Roy who had intimate knowledge of international and Chinese Communism wrote as follows towards the end of 1949: "Mao Tse-tung's army of liberation may not appear on the frontiers of India in the very near future; so, Nehru may carry on the long-distance flirtation with his rival for the leadership of Asia — a more formidable rival who can be expected to deliver goods...The tentacles of Communism triumphant in China are spreading out, to threaten India through Tibet, Nepal, Eastern Turkestan and Kashmir. As a matter of fact, international Communism has practically encircled India on the land. The Governments of Russia and Red China stand behind this menace to India".³⁰

Another voice that spoke plainly and categorically was that of the sage of Pondicherry, Aurobindo Ghosh. Referring to the war in Korea he wrote on June 28, 1950: "There the whole affair is as plain as pikestaff. It is the first move in the Communist Plan of campaign to dominate and take possession first of these Northern parts and then of South-East Asia as a preliminary to their manoeuvres with regard to the rest of the continent. If they succeed, there is no reason why domination of the whole world should not follow by steps". Later in an editorial article published in *Mother India* he wrote the following on the Chinese conquest of Tibet: "Yes, the basic significance of Mao's Tibetan adventure is to advance China's frontiers right down to India and stand poised there to strike at the right moment and with right strategy unless India precipitately declares herself on the side of the Russian bloc. But to go over to Mao and Stalin in order to avert their wrath is not in any

³⁰ *Radical Humanist* (Calcutta), 18 December 1949.

sense a saving gesture. It is a gesture spelling the utmost ruin to all our ideals and aspirations. Really the gesture that can save is to take a firm line with China, denounce openly her nefarious intentions, stand without reservation by the U.S.A. and make every possible arrangement consonant with our self-respect to facilitate an American intervention in our favour and what is of still greater moment, an American prevention of Mao's evil designs on India. Militarily, China is almost ten times as strong as we are, but India as the spearhead of an American defence of democracy can easily halt Mao's mechanised millions. And the hour is upon us of constituting ourselves such a spearhead and saving not only our own dear country but also South-East Asia whose bulwark we are. We must burn it into our minds that the primary motive of Mao's attack on Tibet is to threaten India as soon as possible".³¹

A number of warning voices were also raised in the nation's Parliament. Prominent amongst them were those of the late Dr. Shyamaprasad Mukerji, Mr. H. N. Kunzru, Mr. M. R. Masani and Mr. N. G. Ranga. The leaders of the socialist opposition were equally vocal. Acharya J. B. Kripalani was one of the most consistent and persistent opponents of the China policy of the Government of India. The press was also critical of the Government's policy.

Political Myopia

The criticism and the opposition did not, however, have any effect on Prime Minister Nehru and his Government. He had made up his mind that China was a friendly and peaceful nation and had no ulterior designs upon India. He dismissed as false and biased propaganda information about Chinese military preparations and plans for the recovery of their "lost territories." News about oppression and terror practised by Communist rulers in China was also disregarded by him, his colleagues in the Government and generally by members of the Congress Party as anti-Communist propaganda. Prime Minister Nehru talked always about "two thousand year-old ties between China and India untarnished by armed conflict", and refused

³¹ *Mother India*, 11 November 1950.

to believe that China would do anything to harm India. The Government of India had entered into the Panchsheel Agreement with the Government of China and was sure that the latter would loyally and faithfully abide by it. This induced, what Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan has called, a "political myopia". Ideological prejudices, he said, were responsible for it. "It was the latter that made the persons concerned shut their eyes to plain facts, and to create a world of unreality, for which there could have been no justification whatever...The real culprit was the mental and emotional alignment that went about in the garb of non-alignment. It was that that produced the myopia and double standard."³²

The Chinese invasion of October 1962 shattered that "world of unreality". The earlier intrusions which began in 1957 had given the Government of India some mild shocks. But it was disposed to regard them as "irresponsible behaviour of the Chinese local authorities". Under public pressure it began some strengthening of defence positions on the frontier, but it was hopeful that the Chinese would realise their mistake and any differences that remained would be settled through negotiations. It never thought that China would launch upon a pre-planned and premeditated invasion. It came, therefore, as a big surprise and shock. Prime Minister Nehru has given expression to that feeling of pained surprise in his letter of 27 October 1962 to Mr. Chou En-lai. He wrote: "Nothing in my long political career has hurt and grieved me more than the fact that hopes and aspirations for peaceful and friendly neighbourly relations which we entertained, and to promote which my colleagues in the Government of India and myself worked so hard, ever since the establishment of the People's Republic of China, should have been shattered by the hostile and unfriendly twist given in India-China relations during the past few years."³³ Prime Minister Nehru may regard it as a new twist, but there was nothing new in it, nor was there a twist; it was the same old Communist line of pursuing its objective some times through

³² *Background*, 20 Office for Asian Affairs, Congress for Cultural Freedom, New Delhi.

³³ *Chinese Aggression in War and Peace* by Publications Division, Government of India, p. 9.

negotiations and at other times through warfare which he had failed to notice and grasp.

India had to pay dearly for this failure of her Government to grasp the real intentions of the Chinese. She was totally unprepared for the invasion. A dispassionate observer like Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan was forced to say: "Had a deliberate effort been made to keep our defences as weak as possible, the result could not have been worse".³⁴ A full story of the battles that were fought in both the sectors of the frontier is not yet available. Nothing is yet known about the debacle at the Se La Pass. An inquiry is going to take place. It may throw some light on the mistakes that were committed and the difficulties that were faced. Whatever the mistakes, the main failure was in the political field, and unless that failure is rectified the Army will not be able to do its best.

Needs of Defence

It appears that the failure in the political field is being rectified. It is realized now that the word of China cannot be trusted and that adequate steps will have to be taken on a permanent basis for the effective defence of the northern frontier. Prime Minister Nehru has stated that the war may last for years and he has called upon the people to be prepared for that contingency.³⁵ The war may or may not flare up in the immediate

³⁴ *Background*, 20.

³⁵ A number of similar statements were made by Mr. Nehru in the following weeks. A couple of them may be noted:

Speaking in Parliament, he stated: "It is not a thing of today or tomorrow or the day after. It is a long-term thing. This conflict between China and India is a very big thing for India, for Asia and for the world. We must not think of finding a sudden solution of it by a magic wand. We want all the help. We shall try to get it and we are trying to get it. There is no argument about it. But the real strength of a nation must come from its own growth. We must keep that in mind."

In the course of his reply to the debate in the Parliament on Colombo proposals he said: "We believe and many countries agree with us, that China as constituted today is an aggressive and expansionist country, possibly with vast designs for the future. It believes in the inevitability of major wars. Essentially, it does not believe in co-existence between countries and in the five principles of panchsheel... China has be-

or near future. But the frontier has become a live frontier and needs constant and vigilant attention. The new Defence Minister, Mr. Y. B. Chavan, is fully convinced of this fact. He symbolises the new determination of the Government of India to build up an army and an air force which will be able to perform that task. Independent India had not paid much attention to the problem of defence. Being a peaceful nation, she had imagined that she would be left alone and would not have to worry about defence. China smashed that fond illusion and India has now become aware of the needs and requirements of defence.

India's relations with Pakistan assume a unique importance in the assessment of those needs and requirements. As long as

come a menace and danger to the world. It has been our misfortune that we have been the victims of this aggression. This aggression has made not only us but other countries realise the nature of the problem that faces the world."

Speaking at a meeting of the Congress Parliamentary Party in the middle of February, he said that the "conflict on the border was indicative not merely of territorial ambitions of China. Deeper issues were involved.... There was no doubt that China's overriding desire was to keep as many countries as possible under its influence and it was obsessed with the thought of increasing its strength with this end in view."

At a speech delivered at Patna in the first week of March he said: "It seems expansionist China wants to dictate terms to us. India would not submit to such dictates. She would build up her own strength as well as get all possible aid from our friends abroad." Addressing a meeting of constructive workers, he said: "War or no war, we must continue our efforts to strengthen the all-round preparedness of our country to meet the challenge posed by the Chinese aggression."

In a speech delivered a couple of days later at Rohtak, he said that India was facing a double responsibility. The future of not only India but of the whole of Asia and Africa was linked up, he asserted, with the Sino-Indian conflict. He stated: "We can no longer trust the Chinese. In fact, we know that their intentions are not honest."

Dr. Radhakrishnan, the President, said in the course of the inaugural address to the budget session of Parliament: "The issue of Chinese aggression has been, and is today, the overriding issue before us and everything else has to be considered in that context. The freedom and honour of a country must be given the first place, and, if a country cannot defend them, then other matters lose significance." He complimented the people on their "mighty response in the face of peril to the motherland."

those relations will continue to be strained, a good part of the Indian Army will remain tied on the Indo-Pakistan frontier. The same will be the case with a good part of the Pakistani Army and neither will be available for the defence of the Himalayan border. The Himalayas are the natural protection of the sub-continent consisting of India and Pakistan. It is necessary, therefore, that the two should protect it together. This will happen only if the conflicts which are keeping them apart are resolved. The conflict over Kashmir is the major conflict between the two countries. It is necessary to find an early solution to that conflict so that the energies and the resources of India and Pakistan may, instead of getting dissipated over a futile mutual quarrel, be properly utilised for the defence of the sub-continent. It is essential, therefore, that the talks that have begun should be brought to an early and successful end.³⁶

It is a fact which should be plain to all that in defending her northern frontier against Chinese aggression India is defending not only her own integrity and independence but also the integrity and independence of all Asian nations and more particularly of those of south-east Asia. It will be desirable, therefore, to build up in course of time a common defensive alliance of all those countries. In the immediate present it may not be a practicable idea as, at the moment, most of the countries concerned appear to be more inclined to adopt an indifferent or neutral attitude. But the danger of aggressive Chinese Communism may become clearer as days go by; and then there may be a change in their attitude. The process will be aided also by the coming together of India and Pakistan for the joint defence of the sub-continent.

It is equally obvious that India is also defending the cause of freedom and democracy. England, America and other Western countries readily and spontaneously rallied to her support because of their consciousness of this fact. The aid that they gave was very valuable in the crisis that was created

³⁶ Five rounds of talks were held until the end of April 1963. The sixth round is to be held in May. They have not so far brought the two countries appreciably nearer.

by the invasion. The invasion has stopped, but the crisis is continuing. It will continue as long as the danger of Chinese Communism continues. In this continuing crisis India and other countries that may get associated with her in the defence of the Himalayas will need the full and wholehearted support of all democratic countries and more particularly of England and America. There should be no hesitation on India's part to ask for that support and no delay on the latter's part in extending it. This is a longterm obligation that they will have to shoulder. It is world freedom and world democracy that will be defended on the heights and in the valleys of the Himalayas.

As the fight for the defence of the Himalayas begins in right earnest it will be realised that they cannot be successfully defended against an enemy who enjoys the advantage of the heights of the Himalayas and of the high plateau behind them. The high plateau behind the Himalayas is the land of Tibet. As long as China is in a position to mass her troops in Tibet, utilise it as her supply base and then hurl them on India across the passes at any time she pleases, it will be extremely difficult to checkmate her on this side of the Himalayas where India will be faced by insuperable logistic and other problems. In the interest of the defence of India it is necessary to deny China the use of Tibet. Thus the independence of Tibet becomes an integral part of the defence of India. India committed a grave blunder and crime when she gave away Tibet to China. It brought disaster to the people of Tibet and insecurity to the people of India. History has provided India an opportunity to right a wrong. The opportunity should be seized and the restoration of the independence of Tibet should be made an essential part of the plan for the defence of the Himalayas. The Dalai Lama should be recognised as the Head of the Tibetan Government-in-exile and it should be provided with all resources for the liberation of the people of Tibet. They and communities like those of the brave Khampas who have still continued their fight against the Chinese invaders will then render invaluable help to the Indian Army. The idea has been dismissed as "fantastic" by some, but as the fighting pro-

gresses it will be realised that this is the only way of ensuring the long-term defence of India.

People's War

The long-term defence and the likely war with China are going to impose a heavy burden on India. She may receive a good deal of help from friendly nations. All the same, the burden that she will have to shoulder will be considerably heavy. She will have to mobilise the entire resources and energies of the whole people. The war will have to be fought as a people's war. In order to give the people a sense of participation it will be necessary to effect some changes in the Government. As at present constituted, it is a government of the Congress Party. The Congress Party polled at the last general election only 45 per cent of the vote. There is in the country a large mass of voters and people who are not aligned with the Congress Party. It is essential to secure their support and draw them actively into the war efforts. That can be done best by converting the Congress Party Government into a national government consisting of the most capable men in the country irrespective of their party or other labels. Apart from ability and integrity the only commitment should be the determination to defend the frontiers of the country at any cost. Such a government will be in a much better position to organise the country for the gigantic effort that will be needed for winning the war.

Since independence, India has been engaged in the task of bringing about rapid economic development with the intention of improving the living standards of her people. To enable her to pay sole and undivided attention to that task she deliberately kept herself away from international alignments and followed a policy of peace and friendship with all. But in spite of herself she has been dragged into a war, a war involving her very existence as a sovereign independent nation. She must fight the war and win it. Hereafter, she will have to carry on simultaneously her defence efforts as well as her developmental activities. Defence efforts may, it is apprehended, impede developmental activities but it is also likely that the former may act as a spur to the latter. In any case they cannot be avoided

in view of the danger of war that is threatening the country. The war is a big challenge and opportunity to the people. It is an integrating as well as an activating force. A nation integrated and activated by war may succeed in bringing about such social and economic development as may surprise the boldest of optimists. That has happened in many countries and it may happen in India. The war may in that case bring about a social revolution which may transform the country into a modern progressive society of greater equality and greater freedom.*

* The essay was written in the last week of December, 1962 and the first week of January, 1963. It covers developments only upto January 4, 1963. The footnotes describe some of the later developments.

APPENDIX I
CHRONOLOGY OF AGGRESSION

1949

1 October. The People's Republic of China was proclaimed. Before the end of the year Sinkiang was subjugated and integrated into China.

16 December. Chinese troops reached Vietnamese border and begins supplying weapons to communist-led North Vietnamese forces.

1950

1 January. Mao Tse-tung proclaimed "liberation of three million Tibetans from imperialist aggression" as a basic task of the People's Liberation Army of China.

13 August. The Government of India represented to the Government of China that they were concerned at the possibility of unsettled conditions across their border. They, therefore, strongly urged that Sino-Tibetan relations should be adjusted through peaceful negotiations.

21 August. The Government of China declared their willingness to solve the problem of Tibet by peaceful and friendly measures and their desire to "stabilize the China-India border."

7 October. Chinese troops entered Tibet.

15 October. Thousands of "Chinese People's Volunteers", actually regular army men, began moving across the Yalu River into Korea to support Communist North Korea's invasion of the Republic of Korea.

21 October. The Government of India drew attention to the harmful effects of resorting to military action as it meant unrest and disturbances on India's borders.

25 October. The presence in Korea of Chinese People's Volunteers, composed of whole divisions and armies of regular Chinese Communist forces, was formally established.

30 October. The Government of China criticised the Government of India "as having been affected by foreign influences hostile to China in Tibet."

1951

1 February. The United Nations General Assembly, by a vote of 44-7, adopted a resolution branding China an aggressor in Korea.

23 May. Tibetan representatives in Peking signed a 17 point agreement which provided for Chinese occupation of Tibet but guaranteed the preservation of Buddhist institutions, the autonomy of the Tibetan government, and the status of the Dalai Lama.

1952

Chinese Communist assistance to the Viet Minh's guerrilla operations in Viet Nam continued to increase. Shipments of Chinese Communist military equipment to Ho Chi Minh's forces, begun in 1950, by 1952 include artillery and other heavy equipment.

1953

2 April. Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan registered protest against Chinese violation of the border in Hunza.

27 July. Korean armistice signed after more than two years of negotiations.

1954

20 April. An Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet region of China and India was signed between India and China.

In the preamble of the Agreement, the two countries reaffirmed that they would abide by the Five Principles of mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.

25 June. Mr. Chou En-lai's visit to New Delhi.

28 June. A Joint Statement was issued by the Prime Ministers of India and China, reaffirming the Five Principles.

17 July. The Government of China protested against the presence of Indian troops in Barahoti (which they called Wuje) in the Uttar Pradesh. This was the first time that the Government of China had laid claim to any part of Indian territory.

27 August. The Government of India sent a note to Government of China refuting the allegation that Indian troops had intruded into Tibet and protesting against an attempt by Chinese officials to cross into Barahoti, which was south of the Niti Pass and traditional Indian territory.

January-June. The Viet Minh continued their offensive in Viet Nam, making use of the large quantities of military equipment supplied by Peking. Viet Minh forays into Laos and Cambodia.

3 September. Chinese Communist forces began intensive shelling of Chinese Nationalist troops on the Quemoy island group. Communist military activity in the Taiwan straits was intensive until February 1955, and was sporadic in 1956 and 1957.

18 October. Mr. Nehru visited China as part of his policy to preserve and promote the friendship between the two countries. While in China, he raised with the Chinese leaders the question of some maps recently published in China which had shown an incorrect boundary alignment between the two countries and incorporated about 50,000 square miles of Indian territory within China.

Mr. Chou En-lai, in reply, sought to treat these Chinese maps as of little significance. He said that they were merely a reproduction of old Kuomintang maps and the People's Government had no time to revise them.

1955

18 April. Asian-African Conference at Bandung.

2 June. Unauthorised camping of a Chinese party at Barahoti.

15 September. A party of Chinese soldiers intruded ten miles across the border into Damzan in Uttar Pradesh.

1956

28 April. An armed Chinese party camped half a mile east of Nilang in Uttar Pradesh.

26 July. The Government of China claimed that Barahoti was Chinese territory and denied that Tunjun La was a border pass.

31 July. The Burmese Government reported clashes with Chinese communist troops who had occupied 1,000 square miles in the Kachin and Wa states after clashed with Burmese forces.

1 September. A party of Chinese soldiers crossed the Shipki Pass into India.

10 September. A Chinese party again trespassed into India across the Shipki Pass.

20 September. A Chinese patrol crossed the Shipki Pass and came up to Hupsang Khud. On encountering an Indian patrol, the Chinese party threatened to use arms.

28 November. Mr. Chou En-lai visited India.

19 December. Striking at an area of local resistance in Tibet, Chinese planes bombed the Tibetan village of Kham Ghiri Gawa.

1957

September. Chinese soldiers arrested an Indian administrative patrol party near Haji Langar in Ladakh, detained and maltreated them for almost five weeks.

27 September. Chinese survey parties crossed into the Lohit Frontier Division and later moved into Burma.

October. A Chinese party came to Walong in the Lohit Frontier Division of the North East Frontier Agency.

5 October. Peking announced completion of a highway from China's Sinkiang Province to Tibet, running 100 miles through the Ladakh area.

1958

April-May. On the initiative of the Government of India, talks were held between representatives of the two Governments on the question of Barahoti. The Government of India suggested that pending a settlement neither side should send armed or civilian personnel into the area.

The Government of China agreed not to send armed personnel, but refused to agree not to send civilian personnel.

July. India protested against the Chinese occupation of Khurnak Fort, one and a half miles inside Ladakh.

23-24 August. Another intensive artillery bombardment of Quemoy begins, following a build-up of Communist air and surface forces near the Taiwan Straits.

27 August. The Communist radio predicted imminent landings on Quemoy and called on the Nationalist forces to surrender. Intensive shelling continued through October 6.

September. Chinese soldiers arrested an Indian patrol party on normal routine duty in the northern part of Aksai Chin and detained and ill-treated it for nearly five weeks.

September. A large Chinese party entered Barahoti with building materials, clearly in order to construct permanent or semi-permanent structures.

27 September. A detachment of Chinese troops crossed into the Lohit Frontier Division and later moved into Burma.

18 October. The Government of India protested against the construction of a motor road by the Government of China across the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh.

October. Chinese personnel constructed outposts at Laphthal and Sangchamalla in Uttar Pradesh. The Chinese violated India's air space by flying over some parts of Uttar Pradesh.

14 December. Mr. Nehru wrote to Mr. Chou En-lai drawing attention to continued issue of incorrect maps.

1959

23 January. Mr. Chou En-lai, in his reply to Mr. Nehru, contended that the Sino-Indian boundary had never been formally delimited and there were certain differences between the two sides over the issue. The Government of China had not raised the issue in 1954 because conditions were not then ripe for its settlement. He added that the "McMahon Line" had never been recognised by the Government of China. As for Chinese maps, Mr. Chou En-lai claimed that the boundaries drawn on them were consistent with those on earlier maps and laid claim to about 50,000 square miles of Indian territory.

10 March. Tibetans in the capital city of Lhasa, aroused by reports that the Chinese planned to abduct the Dalai Lama, began demonstrations outside Chinese offices. Chinese officials and Tibetan collaborators were attacked. Chinese troops attempted to suppress the demonstrations.

17 March. The Dalai Lama left Lhasa. Open fighting broke out in the capital. Chinese forces bombarded monasteries and centres of resistance and attempted to intercept the Dalai Lama and his party.

28 March. Peking dissolved the local government of the Dalai Lama and replaced it with an administration nominally headed by the Pan-

chen Lama, who was made acting chairman of the "Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet." Military control committees were formed throughout Tibet by the Chinese army.

31 March. The Dalai Lama reached safely in India and was given asylum. An editorial in the *People's Daily* demanded complete suppression of the Tibetan revolt.

6 May. The *People's Daily* published the CCP's official statement about the Tibetan revolt. It is the culmination of attacks on "Indian expansionists".

20 June. The Dalai Lama told a press conference at Mussoorie, India, that the Communists were guilty of a "flagrant act of aggression" in Tibet. He said that the 1951 agreement was "thrust on the (Tibetan) people...at the point of a bayonet." He described Chinese rule in Tibet as a "reign of terror".

28 July. A Chinese armed detachment intruded into the region of the western Pangong Lake in Ladakh, arrested six Indian policemen and established a camp at Spanggur.

7 August. An armed Chinese patrol crossed into Khinzemane on the Eastern Sector and pushed back an Indian patrol.

25 August. A large Chinese detachment crossed the frontier in the Subansiri Division of the North East Frontier Agency and occupied the Indian frontier post at Longju after opening fire on the small Indian garrison and outflanking it.

20 October. Chinese military forces advanced forty miles into Indian territory in the Chang Chenmo valley of southern Ladakh. Encountering an Indian patrol near the Kongka Pass, they opened fire, killing nine Indians. Ten other members of the Indian party were taken into captivity and subjected to harsh and inhuman treatment before release.

17 December: Chinese troops advanced further west and south of the Aksai Chin area and constructed roads in that territory.

1960

19 April. Mr. Chou En-lai visited Delhi and had talks with Mr. Nehru for six days which, however, ended inconclusively. It was agreed that the officials of the two Governments should meet to examine all relevant documents.

3 June. A large Chinese party moved into Taktsang Gumpa which is about five miles within Indian territory in the Kameng Frontier Division of the North East Frontier Agency.

25 June. A Chinese survey party visited Suriah.

28 June: In an incursion into Nepal, Chinese troops killed a Nepalese officer and captured a group of Nepalese soldiers. This incident and a Chinese attempt to claim all of Mount Everest slowed negotiations on the Sino-Nepalese border treaty.

22 August. The Government of India brought to the notice of the

Government of China fifty-two instances of violations of Indian air space since March 1960 by aircraft flying from Tibet.

13 October. An armed Chinese party visited the vicinity of Hot Springs in the Western Sector.

1961

20 April. Chinese personnel crossed into Sikkim near the Jelep Pass.

May. Chinese personnel intruded into Indian territory near Chushul in the Western Sector.

July. A Chinese patrol crossed the Eastern Sector of the Indian alignment about one mile west of Chemokarpola in the Kameng Frontier Division.

August. Chinese forces established three new check-posts in Ladakh, at Point 78 12 E., 35 19 N., at Nyagzu and near Dambuguru Roads linking these posts with rear bases were constructed.

12 September. Armed Chinese personnel came into Sikkim across the Jelep Pass.

1962

14 January. A Chinese patrol advanced twelve miles further forward from the check-post at 78.12 E., 35.19 N.

January. Some Chinese civil and military officials crossed the border in the Eastern Sector near Longju and proceeded to Roi village half a mile within India.

April-May. There was consistent advance patrolling by the Chinese in the Chip Chap area of Ladakh.

30 April. The Government of China announced that they had ordered patrolling in the whole sector from the Karakoram Pass to the Kongka Pass and demanded that India withdraw two of her posts which were situated well within Indian territory.

May. A new Chinese post was established in Indian territory about 10 miles south east of Spanggur.

2 June. The Panch Sheel Agreement of 1954 lapsed.

10 July. Chinese troops encircled an Indian outpost in Galwan Valley in Ladakh.

8 September. Chinese forces were sighted taking positions near Dhola post south of McMahan line in Kameng Division of NEFA.

12 September. Chinese troops entered NEFA area near Tawang.

21 September. Chinese soldiers crept into Indian territory and threw hand grenades. Spasmodic firing continued for next few days.

10 October. Chinese attacks on Indian posts. Seventeen Indian soldiers were killed in twelve hours of heavy fighting near Dhola in NEFA.

11 October. Exchange of firing continued. Reinforced Chinese troops captured Thag La Ridge, the traditional Indo-Tibetan boundary.

20 October. About 30,000 Chinese troops began a large-scale invasion of NEFA.

21 October. Chinese crossed Namka-Chu river four miles south of the McMahon line. Dhola and Khinzemane post abandoned. Chinese occupied two Indian posts in Ladakh. A helicopter carrying casualties was shot down in NEFA.

22 October. All seven Indian posts lost in Ladakh. Indian post at Asang Dhar in NEFA abandoned under massive Chinese attack.

23 October. Peking orders its troops "not to restrain themselves to the bounds of the McMahon line."

24 October. Two pronged Chinese attack on Tawang in NEFA. Chinese captured Lampu, 10 miles south of McMahon Line. Indian posts at Brokenthong and Zaninthang lost, Kibetoo in Lohit division abandoned, Galwan valley post in Ladakh captured by the Chinese. Heavy fighting both in NEFA and Ladakh.

25 October. After bitter fighting Indian troops withdrew from Tawang. Heavy fighting in Siang division of NEFA, in Ladakh one more post captured by the Chinese. The invading Chinese forces captured Lampu about ten miles south of the McMahon line.

26 October. Chinese launch a massive attack at the Eastern side of the McMahon line to occupy Walong in the Lohit Division near the Burmese border. In the Tawang area the Chinese reached Jang village four or five miles further south on the route to Bomdi La and Tejpur. Chinese flung hundreds of troops to overwhelm the post at Siang east of Longju. In the Ladakh region sporadic fighting continued.

27 October. A slight turn in favour of India, two attacks on the outskirts of Walong were hurled back.

28 October. Troops of the Jammu and Kashmir Militia in Damchok launched a counter attack and threw the Chinese forces back when they infiltrated between Damchok and Jara La.

In the NEFA front Chinese attacked the Indian personnel of a forward post in the Siang Division.

29 October. Indian troops had to withdraw in the face of invading Chinese hordes from Damchok 90 to 100 miles south east of the strategic airfield of Chushul and from Jara La eight miles north-east of Damchok.

Indian troops recaptured Jang which they had lost to the Chinese on the 26th. In the Lohit valley Walong was bravely defended in the face of repeated Chinese attacks.

31 October. Indian troops continued shelling newly set up Chinese post in the Jang area in their bid to recapture Tawang.

2 November. Uneasy calm continued in the fighting in NEFA and Ladakh except some exchange of fire in the vicinity of Walong in the Lohit division of NEFA.

4 November. Indian forces took back three hamlets situated between Jang and Tawang. In the Chushul area in Ladakh one of Indian transport plane was fired at by the Chinese with small arms.

5 November. Chinese captured Daulat Beg Oldi near Karakorum Pass and two miles west of the Chinese 1960 claim line. With the

capture of Daulat Beg Oldi Chinese occupied all claimed areas in Ladakh.

6 November. Chinese concentrated heavy reinforcement, few miles from Chushul, thus threatening the Chushul airstrip in Ladakh.

In the Subansir division in NEFA Chinese troops and Indian patrols exchanged fire.

In Walong, eastern corner of NEFA, Chinese tried to approach an Indian post but were forced to retreat in the face of strong Indian firing.

7 November. Chinese pressure continued in Walong in the Lohit division in NEFA and near Chushul in Ladakh.

8 November. Chinese stepped up offensive with mortars and automatic weapons at Walong from the north and north-east to capture the town from surrounding hills to gain access to the strategic Lohit river valley.

9 November. Indian troops shelled Mrol in the Tawang area in NEFA. Chinese concentrated their troops in the three areas viz. Chushul in Ladakh, Tawang valley in the West of NEFA and in the vicinity of Walong in the Lohit division near Burma border.

19 November. Bomdi La fell.

21 November. Chinese Government announced cease-fire

APPENDIX II

COMMUNISM IN ASIA *

by M. N. ROY

MORE than a hundred years ago, Karl Marx imagined the spectre of Communism stalking over Europe. The bogey became a reality only after the Russian Revolution of 1917. But the revolution did not spread westwards as rapidly as prophesied by its prophets. Having suffered several defeats in Germany and other countries of minor importance, it fell back on its original base in order to prepare for stronger onslaughts on the capitalist world. Already in those early days of the history of the communist revolution, Lenin cast his prophetic vision towards the East, and cheered up his dejected followers by pointing out the possibility of Communism conquering Asia to make up for the initial defeat in Europe.

Pending spectacular developments in Asia, the communist movement in Europe reached the high-water mark when, on the downfall of Hitler, the victorious Red Army straddled across the continent on the line from Trieste to Lubeck. The rest of Europe was either frightened by the ominous shadow of the coming revolution cast ahead, or heartened by an early advent of the liberator. For known and still unknown reasons, the tide turned. The Russians committed the blunder of attaching decisive importance to political power and brute force, while the moral leadership of Europe was within their reach. They acted true to their fanatical faith, but by doing so destroyed the possibility of Communism conquering Europe peacefully.

At that juncture of European history, when old institutions were crumbling and traditional values losing significance, the progressive and democratic elements were prepared to accept the humanist and libertarian aspect of Marxism as their heritage. But the Russians were afraid that, unless Communism was buttressed on political power and brute force, it might regain its humanist soul under the influence of the rationalist and democratic culture of the West. Roman barbarians conquered Greece; but the vanquished civilised the conqueror. That memorable experience might have been repeated, in contemporary Europe.

Six years have passed since Europe was in that position pregnant with incalculable possibilities, either of good or of evil. During this period, Communism in Western Europe has been on the decline. Its perverse preference for dictatorial power and reliance on violence has alienated

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the bulk of the idealistic advocates of human freedom and social justice, who were prepared to welcome it as the messenger of liberation. The failure to attain partial political power constitutionally in France and Italy with the object of using coalition governments as the stepping stone to dictatorship on the Czechoslovak pattern and finally the miscarriage of the Berlin blockade, persuaded the Russians to turn to the East for easier victories foreseen by Lenin. And Lenin was not proved to be a false prophet, as his master had been about the proletarian revolution in Europe.

The offensive in the East, however, was not a sudden turn in the Russian strategy of world revolution. An attempt to conquer China for Communism was made as far back as 1928. It failed because of opportunist blunders made previously when the situation was more promising. During the following decade, the Russians were preoccupied with the situation created by the stormy rise of Fascism in Europe. Thereafter, they had to fight for life. On the capitulation of Japan, China as well as the countries of South-East Asia found themselves in chaos and disorder, offering Communism a promising field of operation. During the long years of civil war, and finally on the pretext of a united front against the Japanese invaders, the Communists in China had built up a considerable military force, which could serve as the spearhead of the attack on Asia. When the Russians gave the signal, the advance of Communism in China was spectacular. Within less than a year, the whole country was overrun, and armed Communism appeared on the frontiers of Indo-China and Burma, both deeply infiltrated by its advance-guards.

Lenin once said that London and New York would fall on the Yangtze under the assault of Communism. He believed that a communist triumph in Asia would secure the final victory of the proletarian revolution in the capitalist countries of Europe and America. In other words, he thought that the communist triumph in Asia, which he expected to be easily won, would assure the final victory of the proletarian world revolution. But the Marxist horoscope of history precluded that perspective; and Lenin was not a revisionist. On the contrary, he was the most dogmatic orthodox follower of the prophet of world revolution.

For Lenin, Communism conquering Europe in Asia was only a possible alternative to the orthodox belief in the inevitability of the triumph of proletarian revolution in the capitalist countries. As a fanatical Marxist, he did not believe that Asiatic Nationalism could ever turn out to be a more powerful revolutionary force than Communism. He counted upon it as a possible ally, an instrument for promoting the proletarian world revolution elsewhere. The ultimate object was to bring about the downfall of New York and London. As an orthodox Marxist and a theoretician of the revolution on his own merit, Lenin could not believe that, liberated from colonial domination, Asiatic countries would move peacefully towards Communism. He regarded the colonial nationalist

bourgeoisie as a revolutionary force, and believed that, after liberation from Imperialism, the colonial countries would necessarily go through the stage of capitalist development. He held that Nationalism was objectively revolutionary force, and warned against painting it red.

Marx proved to be a false prophet of revolution; but his most orthodox disciple made good. Having suffered setbacks in Europe, Communism turned towards Asia and won easy victories there, as predicted by Lenin. But in the meantime, Lenin's theory had been rejected in practice, and his warning forgotten. Asiatic Nationalism was painted red; the means became the end. The new tactics of revolution was to convert colonial Nationalism into a spurious brand of Communism and to establish communist dictatorships in economically backward, underdeveloped Asiatic countries. Communism in Asia, essentially, is Nationalism painted red. It succeeds not only by inciting revolt against the poverty and degradation of the masses, but also by appealing to the xenophobia and other prejudices of the educated middle class. As a matter of fact, Communism in Asia draws its strength more from the latter source than from the revolt of the masses against unbearable economic conditions. The Leninist programme was to regard Nationalism as an ally; now Communism plays the role of Nationalism, and appears as its most extreme form, having a corresponding share of all its vices—race hatred, cultural revivalism, intolerance, jingoism and resistance to the western bourgeois influence. This nationalist degeneration is a general feature of the post-second-world-war Communism. It is the most pronounced in Asia.

London and New York did not fall on the Yangtse. The Communists crossed that great water barrier, to sweep the rest of China and threaten the countries to the South and West. They anticipated that the Western Powers, particularly Britain and America, would intervene to check their triumphal march. The Russians would fight them with the Chinese masses. A long colonial war would exhaust and undermine the imperialist Powers, and consequently London and New York would fall under the communist onslaught—that is to say, proletarian revolution would triumph in the metropolitan countries.

The Western Powers did not fall into the communist trap. The Red Napoleonic strategy of conquering Europe in Asia did not succeed, but a spurious and perverted brand of Communism conquered China with a good chance of subjugating the rest of Asia. After the conquest of China, the Communists struck in Korea with the object of depriving the American forces based on Japan of a foothold on the continent. This time wisdom failed the Western Powers, and the communist strategy of pinning down a considerable part of their military power far away from the potential battle front in Europe succeeded.

At a prohibitive cost, Communism may be militarily contained in Korea. But development on the Korean pattern in other countries adjacent to China cannot be excluded. Communism has conquered Tibet without

meeting any resistance. It has deeply infiltrated not only Burma, but the Himalayan Kingdom of Nepal. The Indo-Pakistan quarrel on Kashmir provides it with the opportunity to penetrate further southwards. As a matter of fact, the eastern frontiers of India and Pakistan are infested with marauding armed communist bands.

The problem of fighting Communism in Asia will be baffling unless the causes for its spectacular success are discovered and destroyed. The lesson of the tragic experience in Korea must be learned. Communism cannot be successfully combated on the battle-field. A tremendous concentration of mechanised might has checked it in Korea. The counter-move is obvious: to strike in different directions with the object of dispersing the power of the opponent. The whole of Asia may become a battle-ground, the vast majority of the native populations rallying under the banner of anti-imperialist (anti-white) nationalist Communism. How to prevent that catastrophe?

The answer must be found in a dispassionate analysis of the situation. One must not be carried away either by appearances, such as the elemental upsurge of the colonial masses against imperialist oppression or preconceived notions about the motive and the consequence of this "revolutionary" movement. If compassion for the poor and downtrodden goes to the extent of accepting the faith of economic determinism, it only plays into the hands of the Communists. The elemental upsurge is not spontaneous; it is engineered; and the appeal to base emotions, such as hatred and greed, is a stronger moving force than economic calculations. Ignorance is also exploited to foster blind faith in leaders and saviours. The appeal to religious prejudices and mediaeval mentality is likewise made for the purpose of mass mobilisation, in India and the Islamic countries of the Middle East.

While fully exploiting these emotional and psychological factors of the situation, communist propaganda among the masses plays up their poverty and misery. But in Asia, neither Communism nor Nationalism draws its driving force from the masses. It is doubtful if anywhere they play a more important role in revolution than of the pawns in a game of chess. The educated middle class constitutes the driving force as well as the social mainstay of Communism in Asia. They play the leading part, with the masses providing the background as singing the chorus. Their main passion is anti-imperialism, which in the last analysis is racial animosity, and the hostile attitude to the real or imaginary domination by this or that Western Power implies rejection of the values of modern civilisation.

The concern for the economic betterment of the masses cannot always be honestly squared with the negative attitude towards industrial enterprises financed with foreign capital. The economic condition of the workers employed in these enterprises is by far better than that of the rest of the labouring masses. Nevertheless, at the same time, a considerable section of the educated middle class is also moved by a vague

idealism. The ideal of social justice, mainly in the sense of economic equality, has a strong appeal for them.

These two factors, a doubtful passion and a nebulous social idealism, combine in a widespread sympathy for Communism among the educated middle class throughout Asia. Admiration for Soviet Russia is the third factor which makes Communism popular. It is rather an admiration for the powerful and the successful than an intelligent understanding and appreciation of Communism. It is related with the passion of anti-imperialism. The Western Powers are capitalist, and Lenin taught that Imperialism is the highest and the most brutal stage of Capitalism. The educated middle class of Asia has imbibed the Leninist faith. As a Communist Power, Russia is the enemy of the capitalist West, and ipso facto the friend of the Asiatic peoples fighting against white Imperialism. Therefore, Communism is a good cause which deserves the sympathy, if not active support, involving risk. Russia is actually regarded as an Asiatic Power, and Communism as the cement of Asian solidarity.

The recent plot to overthrow the Government of Pakistan and establish a military dictatorship shows how the Communists exploit the emotional attitude of the educated middle class towards Russia. There was no Communist amongst the high military officers involved in the plot. But they believed that Russia would help them. They wanted to overthrow the established government because, as they alleged, it was coming under the influence of American Imperialism. They would rather become a Russian satellite. Sympathy for Communism based on a woolly idealism, if not opportunist calculation, would enable them to square their conscience. Capitalism is bad; therefore Communism is good. Russia is communist; therefore she is more trustworthy. It seems that in Pakistan the Communists influenced a number of young army officers by cleverly exploiting their vague social idealism and admiration for the power of Russia. Had the plot succeeded, there would have been another communist victory won mostly by non-communists out of sheer hatred for the Western Powers and to combat their influence.

Sympathy for Russia and Communism, motivated partly by social idealism, but mainly by the admiration for power and success, is indeed not confined to the Pakistani armed forces. A considerable section of the young Indian officers and cadets are known to share the sympathy. It is curious that the educated middle class, still lingering in the twilight of a feudal-patriarchal cultural tradition, should be attracted by the communist utopia. The phenomenon can be psychologically explained. It is not so much the ideal of social justice as the promise of dictatorial power which attracts the more ambitious members of a class which occupies the most hopeless and helpless station in the established order. As a rule, they man the leadership of the Communist Parties of Asia. Dictatorship of the proletariat, therefore, would be their dictatorship. That is an irresistible temptation for educated youths who would nor-

mally experience a life of drudgery, defeat and frustration. Their profession of social idealism may not be consciously dishonest; in a majority of cases, it is not. Nevertheless, it is a sublimation of the lust for power.

In Indo-China, all attempts of the westernised liberal nationalist politicians to set up a government with popular support have failed because the anti-imperialist passion of the educated middle class would prefer alliance with Communism to a nominal constitutional connection with the French Republic. They demand immediate withdrawal of the last French soldier. While making the demand, they cannot ignore what would happen if the demand was accepted. The communist guerilla bands would immediately occupy the entire country, which would be a Russian or perhaps a Chinese satellite. With their anti-imperialist passion, the educated middle class would rather prefer the treacherous communist alliance than build up a democratic order with the help and protection of Western Powers. The suicidal mania of those fanatical dupes of Communism is backed up not only by their kind in other Asiatic lands, but also by western Liberals. The latter accuse France of waging a colonial war and hold that American help to Bao Dai would be supporting a wrong cause. The corollary to this view is that the right thing to do in Indo-China would be to allow the Communists to have a walk-over. The Indian Prime Minister Nehru calls Bao Dai a French puppet, and on that ground refuses to recognise his government. If Bao Dai is a puppet, so also is Ho Chi-minh. The choice is between France and Russia; and extreme Asian Nationalism would prefer the latter. This predisposition of the educated middle class is fully exploited by the Communists.

In Asiatic countries, Communist Parties get some recruits, and more fellow-travellers, even from the upper bourgeoisie and the feudal aristocracy. The wife of the former Chief of the General Staff of the Pakistan Army standing trial on the charge of having conspired to organise an insurrection against the government, herself also an accused in the trial, hails from the high society of Lahore. Together with her two sisters, she has been an active fellow-traveller, if not a formal member of the Communist Party. There are quite a few of that kind, in India as well as in Pakistan.

More than two thousand Chinese intellectuals—professors, scientists, poets, artists, etc., who mostly, by tradition, belong to the aristocracy, issued a manifesto pledging their loyalty to the Red regime immediately on its foundation. They were not sudden converts. The National University of Peking, manned by modernised litterati (intellectuals socially belonging to the aristocracy), was the cradle of Chinese Communism. On the other hand, the imposing list of eleven Vice-Presidents of the Chinese People's Republic includes General Li Chi-sen, the "Butcher of Canton" (so called for his bloody suppression of the Canton Commune of 1928), and two big industrial magnates from Shanghai.

These advantages of Communism in Asia are supplemented by the absence of the two factors which oppose it in the West. Except in India and China, the capitalist bourgeoisie is practically non-existent in all other Asiatic countries. Even in China the influence of this factor was limited to the maritime provinces and the great Yangtse ports. The politics of the country even after the complete elimination of the old regime by 1919 continued to be dominated by people with pre-capitalist economic outlook and patriarchal, social and cultural traditions. The Kuomintang was only partially the party of the bourgeoisie. It was very largely controlled by feudal militarists. Continuance of the precapitalist economy kept political parochialism alive; consequently, all the efforts of the bourgeoisie and ambitious super-militarists to establish a central political authority failed. The civil war which infested the country ever since the downfall of the Manchus created chaotic conditions. In the absence of a State machinery to enforce law and order, the operation of subversive forces could not be checked.

Only in India is the bourgeoisie a dominating social factor, and as such has acquired a large measure of control on the political life of the country. Moreover, independent India inherited a centralised modern State and a fairly prosperous capitalist economic organisation. Thanks to these fortuitous advantages, India as well as Pakistan can be expected to put up the strongest resistance to Communism in Asia.

The second factor which blunted the appeal of Communism in Western Europe and stopped its further advance is the democratic tradition and the devotion to the values of a humanist culture. The factor is altogether absent in the Asiatic countries. Because they never experienced anything like the spiritual revolution which liberated the European mind from the shackles of religious orthodoxy and mediaeval authoritarian culture. The European proletariat may not have anything to lose except their chains. But others, and their number was legion, who were attracted by the social idealism of communist propaganda and added significance to the communist movement, realised before long that in the communist utopia they must forfeit individual liberty, independence of thought and expression, the right of rational and moral judgment, in short, all the values of western culture cherished since the Renaissance. It was too high a price to pay for problematical economic equality. Appreciation of these values is to be found also in the ranks of the proletariat of Western Europe. So, not only was the numerous army of declassed intellectuals, scientists, philosophers, teachers, poets, artists—who had been attracted by the apparent justice and equalitarian appeal of Communism, repelled by the realisation that intellectual and emotional regimentation and moral degradation would prevail in the communist utopia; millions of manual workers, whose passion for social justice is tempered by the advantages of a liberal education, also shared the same feeling. Love of individual liberty, intellectual independence, freedom of conscience

and sense of justice enabled them to see that under Communism they would lose much more than their economic chains, and that even these would remain intact, though thinly gilded.

In Western Europe, Communism is opposed not only by the apologists of the status quo. If that was the only opposition, Communism could not be stopped. The determination of the progressive and democratic majority to defend the values of modern civilised life—liberty, justice, morality—is the source of strength of the resistance to Communism. Therefore it has been effective. The decline of Communism in the West is mainly due to its forfeiting the support of many who were previously attracted by the libertarian and moral implications of its appeal. Now it must depend entirely on subterfuges, demagoguery and violence. In the last analysis, the military might of Russia is the only sanction of Communism.

In Asia, the decisive moral resistance to Communism is bound to be weak because there is no democratic tradition to defend. The toiling masses are deluded by the promise of economic betterment; and the educated middle class, which occupies the centre of the political stage, has a world to gain. Asiatic mentality, being still largely mediaeval, is authoritarian and naturally attracted by the idea of dictatorship. Therefore, Communists can easily infiltrate the nationalist movement. Whoever offers a strong jingoist government pledged to combat the denationalising western influence, wins popular support. Practised in a mediaeval social and cultural atmosphere, democracy is discredited. It breeds corruption and inefficiency. A strong government, meaning dictatorship, is believed to be the only alternative. The reactionary classes, except in India, are too weak to bid for it; moreover they cannot appeal to the nebulous social idealism of the educated middle class. The field is free for the Communists.

Notwithstanding all these advantages, in Asia also Communism cannot triumph except with Russian military aid. Indeed, it is particularly so in Asia, where power counts more than anything else. In China, for example, the Communists are supposed to have commanded the confidence of the toiling masses ever since the middle twenties. Nevertheless, for years they waged a losing civil war against the corrupt and inefficient Kuomintang regime. On the collapse of Japan, after the second world war, they seized a large quantity of arms. Yet, soon thereafter Chiang Kai-shek resumed the civil war and drove the Communists out of their base in Yen-an which they had held for ten years. Only two years later, the Communists began their new offensive from the new base in Manchuria, and delivered crushing defeats on Chiang Kai-shek's army.

America had spent 2000 million dollars to build an anti-communist bastion in China. It crumbled like a house of cards. How could the Communists acquire such a tremendous striking power within two years? Driven out of their original base at Yen-an, they withdrew into Manchuria.

There the vast industrial potential seized by the Russians from the Japanese was placed at the disposal of the Chinese Red Army, which was regrouped, enlarged, trained and equipped with heavy armament by Russian strategists. The army which conquered China for Communism was virtually an integral part of the Russian army. Communism has triumphed in China, and may sweep over the whole of Asia, because it is backed up by the formidable military might of Russia. Nationalist race prejudice and poverty and hopelessness of the masses have contributed to the victory of Communism in China, and may do so in other Asiatic countries also. But they are auxiliary factors. The power of Russia is the basic sanction behind Communism in Asia as well as in Europe.

The Communists failed to have a walk-over because, confident of an easy victory, the Russians did not rush heavy armament to the North-Korean army when the U.N. forces were desperately defending the Pusan beachhead. If the Russians committed their air force, the fortunes of the war in Korea could later on have changed to the favour of the Communists. For one reason or another, the Russians preferred to hold their hand, and Communism suffered a set back on the battlefields of Korea. But so long as the Russian military might remains intact, reinforced by auxiliaries like the Chinese Red Army, the Communists are sure to resume offensive in Korea, as they did in China.

Meanwhile, the strategists of the world revolution may decide to strike at more vulnerable spots. Conditions throughout South-East Asia are favourable for civil war, politically as well as psychologically. Nowhere has the chaos left behind by the Japanese invaders been ended by restoration of law and order. The authority of nationalist governments, which have replaced colonial regime, is more nominal than real. In any case, it does not extend far. Under such circumstances, banditry is a profitable profession, which can be sublimated as revolutionary violence or justified with the patriotic motive of giving the country a better government. Destitution of the masses provides an abundance of cannon fodder; and general cultural backwardness breeds callous indifference to the horrors of war. Militarism was the curse of China for half a century. It is spreading all over the overpopulated and impoverished countries of South-East Asia in a state of chronic chaos. Indo-China, Indonesia, **Malaya, Burma, are all infested with political banditry, which paints itself red.**

India is the only exception, because she alone escaped the misfortune of being liberated by the Japanese and left in a state of lawlessness. But she also is no longer quite free from the threat of communist invasion. There are pockets of red terrorism inside the country. Counting upon the widespread sympathy among the educated middle class, the Communist Party is preparing to participate in the coming general election. Granted the freedom to do so, it may capture a sufficiently large number of seats in the Federal and State parliaments to become a more disturbing factor in the political life of the country. Once internally the

Communists attain that position of vantage, the time will come for the Russians or the Chinese to intervene more actively.

This analysis of the situation and its grim perspective warrants the judgment that in Asia Communism cannot be defeated on the battlefield. The Communists are in a position to conduct a large-scale guerilla operation all over the continent. There will be little local resistance, military, political or moral. The mechanised might of the Western Powers will not be able to cope with the situation, as it has been proved by the experience in Korea and also in Indo-China. The attempt will only embitter Asian sentiments, and Communists will exploit the race hatred of Nationalism. Russia will not take part directly in the "Thirty Years War" of Asia. It will be a war between the East and the West.

Economic aid on the governmental or commercial plane is also not likely to produce the desired result. It cannot improve the economic condition of the masses in a measurable future. Industrial development on the western model will not relieve the population pressure on land; on the other hand, before long it will create the incongruous problem of industrial unemployment in the midst of a general scarcity of manufactured articles for consumption. Nor will mechanised large-scale agriculture raise national economy on a higher level. It will create mass unemployment when expansion of industry will remain restricted by a stagnant market. Politically, economic aid is more likely to defeat its purpose. Commercially, its beneficial result will not trickle down to the most needy before years, if ever. Distribution of the newly created wealth will be delayed on the pretext of giving priority to the expansion of productive capacity. Economic aid on the governmental level, as a rule, falls in wrong hands. This is the lesson to be learned from what happened in China. Generally, economic aid, either governmental or commercial, is more likely to buttress reaction than to finance reform with the object of counteracting communist propaganda.

The perspective is black, indeed. Communism may not be able to conquer Europe in Asia. That is no longer the object of its global strategy. It wants to conquer Asia; it stands a good chance to succeed. And in Asia, Communism will be an unmixed evil—revival of oriental despotism, with a thin veneer of modernism, marred by xenophobia, brutality and violence.

But neither war nor Nationalism is a preferable alternative to the ugly and frightful spectre of triumphant Communism. If war against an elusive and deceitful enemy defeats its purpose, it is a dangerous fallacy to equate Nationalism with Democracy. Nationalism is a collectivist cult, and as such tends to be totalitarian. The tendency is more pronounced in the culturally backward countries of Asia, where formal democracy easily degenerates into demagoguery. With American economic aid and diplomatic support of the other Western democratic Powers, Chiang Kai-shek set up a dictatorial regime. Nationalist politicians who collaborated with the Japanese invaders, hailing them as liberators, cannot

be trustworthy custodians of democracy. Yet, the Siamese dictator Pibul Songgram is trusted and helped as an ally of Western Democracy in the fight against Communism.

These ill-conceived and shortsighted policies should be abandoned if an effective resistance to Communism was to be organised. It would be wrong strategy to fight a numerically superior enemy all over the front stretched across a whole continent. Centres of resistance should be built up where the enemy is still weak. For more than one reason, India is the most suited for the purpose. Pakistan also offers an opportunity. The whole of the Indian subcontinent could be fairly safe against any open communist aggression from outside, provided that the internal security of both the States was not impaired by impatience. It would be a fatal blunder to stampede them to take side in the struggle between the two power Blocs. The sympathy of the educated middle class in both the countries is with Russia and the Communist Bloc. Impatience, therefore, may tip the scales to the wrong side. But at the same time, a measure of appreciation for the values of modern civilisation can be found in these countries. So, there is something to defend against communist vandalism. If India and Pakistan were allowed to find the realistic approach to their political and economic problems out of experience and independent thinking, they might be the centre to generate and radiate the will to put up a moral resistance against the siren call of Communism. Russia would most probably leave a neutral Indian subcontinent alone, so as not to drive her to the opposite camp. In India alone, there are social forces which can and want to pull her to that direction.

The power to resist Communism must generate inside the country. The will to moral resistance must be supplemented by political and economic reforms which need not conform with traditional western or American pattern. In order to keep out of the conflict of the Power Blocs, India must rely upon her own resources for economic development. That necessity will set the pattern. A corresponding pattern of political institutions will have to be conceived. The new form of social organisation created by the exigencies of the situation will most probably be nearer to the communist ideal than to the formalist democratic order of parliamentary politics and competitive economy. But it will be the most effective guarantee against totalitarian dictatorship, either communist or nationalist. Decentralisation of power through direct democracy and co-operative (as distinct from collectivist) economy will be the characteristic features of the new social order.

Democracy must regain its humanist soul and revert to the faith in the sovereignty of the individual, and economic thought and practice must be radically reorientated. Otherwise, the challenge of Communism cannot be met anywhere. Beginning from scratch the peoples of Asia could travel that path of a new life, away from a moribund past and avoiding a frightful future.

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